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1.1 The aim of this study 
Few observers of West European politics would dispute the fact that political parties, 
competing in elections for decades or even over a century, have regularly adapted 
their organisational styles, electoral strategies and ideological and policy stances. Yet, 
the precise direction and extent to which these changes have occurred have rarely 
been subjected to comprehensive empirical comparative research. This book 
represents a systematic attempt to carry out such an analysis by simultaneously 
addressing the organisational, ideological and electoral changes which have been 
wrought in political parties, party systems and party families in Western Europe since 
the end of the Second World War. 
 In order to carry out this analysis, I have taken as my focus of inquiry Otto 
Kirchheimer's well-known thesis concerning the development of the so-called catch-
all people's party, in which he asserted that class-based and denominational mass 
integration parties were transforming at the organisational, ideological as well as the 
electoral level. According to Kirchheimer's thesis, which was most clearly enunciated 
in a widely-cited article published in 1966 (Kirchheimer, 1966a), the catch-all party 
would no longer draw support from only a restricted social group by advocating a 
narrow ideological appeal, as mass integration parties had done in the past, but instead 
it would aim at more immediate electoral success by attracting a wider audience, and 
hence would modify its organisational and strategic character accordingly. 
 There are few concepts in political science that have been so frequently cited as the 
catch-all party. Ever since Kirchheimer first developed this concept in nuce (Kirch-
heimer 1954a), and argued that its emergence leads to a transformation of European 
party systems (Kirchheimer 1966a), it has become a familiar part of the conventional 
terms of reference of political scientists and political observers alike. However, despite 
the widespread currency of the catch-all concept and despite its familiarity, it has 
rarely been subject to rigorous cross-national empirical enquiry and assessment. For 
while Kirchheimer was fairly categorical in identifying the properties of this new party 
- including its ideological, organisational and electoral dimensions - there still remains 
a substantial confusion in the contemporary literature regarding precisely what a 
catch-all party is and precisely which parties can genuinely be regarded as catch-all.1 
Although such a lack of precision is not unknown to scholars involved more generally 
in the classification of party types, particularly to those working in the area of party 
organisation (Schlesinger 1984; Katz and Mair 1995), the sheer familiarity and 
common currency of the catch-all concept, on the one hand, and the relative precision 
with which it was first introduced by Kirchheimer, on the other, mark it out as a 
concept which has long required close empirical assessment. 
 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in the present debate on democracy and 
party system change many of the topics Kirchheimer emphasised, namely the 
aloofness of parties towards civil society, the state-party cartel and the functional 
                                                        
1 see, for example, Wolinetz 1979; 1991; Dittrich 1983; Mintzel 1984; Schmidt 1985; Keman 1988; 
Panebianco 1988; Mair 1989; Smith 1989; Koole 1992; Katz and Mair 1991; Müller 1991; 1992a; 1992b. 




transformation of parties, are still central themes (Katz and Mair 1994). As we shall 
see, for example, Kirchheimer already argued more than three decades ago that 
political parties and the state were becoming increasingly interdependent. According 
to Kirchheimer the state seeks to legitimise its actions through the parties in 
parliament and these political parties depend more and more on the state for their 
resources. Incorporated into the state, parties are no longer principally opposed to the 
dominant regime and do not formulate policy programs that aim to fundamentally 
change society. Kirchheimer labelled this the waning (and even vanishing) of 
opposition (Kirchheimer 1957b; 1966b). All this results in a propensity of parties to 
progressively withdraw from civil society into a state-party cartel, which weakens the 
party's internal cohesion and facilitates the rationalisation of its structures and 
procedures. One consequence of this development is that the individual citizen can 
now, in contrast to the bygone era of the mass-party, play only a very modest and 
passive role in party politics. 
 At the heart of Kirchheimer's thesis lies the assumption that the catch-all party no 
longer represents a clearly defined social group; rather it aims to articulate and 
integrate the interests of different social strata. According to Kirchheimer, this 
reduces the legitimacy of political parties. The individual, being denied a real political 
alternative and the means to change his or her environment, withdraws from the 
public sphere as a citizen into a private existence as consumer (Kirchheimer 1962b; 
1965b; 1966c; 1967). As the repressive tools of the state are becoming more subtle 
and sophisticated as well as the opportunities for repression more numerous, 
Kirchheimer had no doubts about the final victor in the struggle for political 
domination: against the party-state cartel the individual is rendered powerless. The 
political party has shed itself from its self-defined function of societal agent. The 
catch-all thesis, therefore, is useful in that an empirical test of its propositions can give 
insight into what extent there has been a weakening of party alignments, changes in 
the ideological orientation of political parties and their electoral support, the level of 
civic embeddedness of political parties and a transformation of the basic structures of 
mass politics in Western Europe in general. 
 
This book intends to identify the extent to which political parties in Western 
European polities have indeed acquired the ideological, organisational and electoral 
characteristics of catch-allism. In addition, a concluding intention of this book is to 
indicate some of the consequences these changes may entail for the functioning of 
political parties in Western democracies. The analysis itself spans the period 1945 to 
1990, and, for the first time, the concept and theory of catch-allism, in all of its 
fullness, will be tested against developments in more than eighty West European 
political parties. Moreover, these tests will always be empirically grounded, and will 
employ an extensive data set which combines all three major dimensions of party 
change. In view of this empirical analysis, the validity and reliability of the catch-all 
concept will be assessed and the study will show to what extent the catch-all concept 
can be employed to measure and assess party change in the real world. 
1.2 The structure of the book 
In part 1 of this research an empirical definition of the catch-all party will be 





heimer's original conception of catch-allism, this study will use two methods to define 
and operationalize the catch-all thesis. First, chapter 2 will explore the introduction 
and development of the catch-all thesis in Kirchheimer's original texts. Secondly, 
utilising Sartori's (1984) method of reconstruction and formation of concepts, the 
third chapter identifies the core characteristics of catch-allism in Kirchheimer’s texts 
as well as in the secondary literature in order to determine the empirical boundaries of 
the catch-all party concept. From this core definition an operational definition is 
subsequently developed to measure catch-allism empirically. To justify necessary 
choices of indicators and to avoid distortions by collective biases in the secondary 
literature, Kirchheimer's original texts and references will structure this process of 
concept formation and operationalization. Therefore, an elaborate and profound 
study of Kirchheimer's publications as well as some of his unpublished work and 
private notes precedes the (re)construction of the original meaning of the catch-all 
concept. 
  Part 2 of this study entails a rigorous empirical enquiry into the extent to which 
parties can be classified as catch-all parties. For the first time since the original 
proposition was advanced by Kirchheimer, there are now three principal sources of 
relevant cross-nationally comparable data available, each of which can be used to 
investigate the three dimensions which together constitute Kirchheimer's original 
definition. Firstly, and most crucially, in an effort to assess the extent to which there 
has been a "strengthening of top leadership groups...; [a] downgrading of the role of 
the individual party member...; [and a] securing access to a variety of interest groups" 
(Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), chapter 4 will use the data-set on party organisational 
change and adaptation, which involves a systematic gathering of cross-nationally 
comparable data on developments inside party organisations between 1960 and 1990 
(Katz and Mair 1992). Secondly, in an effort to assess the extent to which there has 
been a genuine "drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage" (Kirchheimer 
1966a, 190), chapter 5 of this study will examine the findings from the updated data-
set on party programmes (manifestos), which provide the most authoritative source of 
reliable and comparative data on party emphases and concerns (for a description of 
the data-set, see Budge et al., 1987; Volkens 1994). Thirdly, to assess to what extent 
there has been a veritable declining emphasis on "the classe gardeé, [the] specific 
social-class or denominational clientele" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), chapter 6 of this 
research takes advantage of the now substantial accumulation of survey data in order 
to assess the degree to which the electoral profiles of parties spread right across the 
social spectrum (see, for example, Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992). Through the 
integration of these different data, it is the intention of the author to properly measure 
'catch-allism', a task which has, up to now, proven most difficult. From the definition 
of the catch-all party, suitable empirical indicators of its properties are specified. 
Subsequently, on the basis of the comprehensive data-set, catch-all tendencies and 
their implications for the transformation of West European party systems, will be 
identified and charted. 
 Part 3 of this study, then, evaluates some of the consequences of the changing 
character of political parties. Chapter 7 seeks to gain insight in the interaction between 
the transformation of political parties and the functioning of democratic politics. In 
this section the variation in type and extent of party transformation and its 
consequences in the different West European countries, among the different party 
families and across time will be summarised. 




1.3 The research question and method 
Following from these considerations, the subsequent research question is formulated: 
 
How can Kirchheimer's concept of the catch-all party be operationalised and catch-allism be measured, 
and to what extent can the degree of catch-allism be charted across West European countries and over 
time? 
 
Kirchheimer formulated his catch-all thesis in a comparative perspective and 
specifically pointed to Germany, Italy, Austria, France and Great Britain to illustrate 
similarities in development. From observations in only a limited number of cases, in 
particular the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC), the German Sozialistische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD), the British Labour Party, the French Union pour la Nouvelle 
République (UNR) and the German Christlich Democratische Union (CDU), 
Kirchheimer (1966a) hypothesised that the catch-all development witnessed in these 
cases was likely to be prevalent in many countries in Western Europe and lead to a 
more or less generalised transformation of party systems. Therefore, this study will 
not be limited to the specific countries and political parties Kirchheimer enumerated, 
but instead will examine 83 parties in 12 Western European countries, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (see appendix 1). 
 
The number of countries is expanded beyond the larger democracies for three main 
reasons. First, while Kirchheimer primarily referred to the major parties within the 
larger West European countries, he also pointed to minor parties in the larger 
democracies as well as parties in the smaller European democracies when he depicted 
the catch-all development. As examples of small parties which seemed unable to 
evolve into catch-all parties, Kirchheimer singled out the Belgium Liberal Party, the 
Dutch Calvinists, the Swedish Agrarians, the Danish Justice Party and the Swiss South 
Tyrolian People's Party (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187-188). In addition, Kirchheimer 
mentioned the Swedish and Danish cases as examples of social democratic parties 
which are not transforming into catch-all parties and to the Austrian SPÖ as a party 
which, in contrast, "is becoming an eager and rather successful member of the catch-
all club" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 188). The inclusion of these and other parties allows for 
comparison between major and minor parties within one political system as well as 
across party systems and allows us to compare parties with apparently differing 
likelihood’s of developing in the catch-all direction. 
 Secondly, the inclusion of the smaller democracies provides the possibility to test 
Kirchheimer's hypothesis that parties in larger countries have a higher propensity to 
develop into catch-all parties, in comparison to parties in the smaller European 
countries. Kirchheimer advanced a multitude of hypotheses why certain countries or 
specific parties are not experiencing a transformation towards catch-allism. According 
to Kirchheimer the 'traditional framework of society', 'the pattern of social and 
professional stratification', 'the economic development and the welfare state', 'the 
party's ideology', 'regionality' and the size of the country all exercise their influence on 
the extent of catch-allism (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185-188). In order to assess whether 





phenomenon should be analysed over a wider range of political systems to increase 
the number of cases. If the adoption of a catch-all strategy is a response to decreasing 
loyalties to mass-parties in affluent societies, for example, then there are no reasons to 
limit the analysis to Britain, France, Germany and Italy as Kirchheimer did. Nor is it 
likely that the conditions of competition are different in the smaller democracies as 
Kirchheimer appears to have assumed (Wolinetz 1991). To assess to what extent 
catch-allism is variable, parties in both smaller and larger democracies are included in 
this study. 
 The third reason for including a larger number of countries is more 
methodological. In this study the most similar systems design is adopted.2 Despite 
obvious differences between Western European nations, the most similar system 
design assumes that these countries share many historical, social, economic, cultural 
and political characteristics in comparison to countries not included in the study. Next 
to geographic proximity, the countries included in this book are similar in that all are 
multi-party democracies with highly industrialised economies characterised by 
extensive welfare provisions. Nevertheless, the political systems in these countries 
differ to such an extent that meaningful variation exists to allow for a comparative 
analysis. In some countries, political parties compete under the electoral regime of 
proportional representation, while in others parties put forward candidates in single-
member constituencies (United Kingdom and France). Furthermore, some parties 
obtain executive power as single-party governments (United Kingdom) while in other 
countries coalition governments predominate (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, 
Finland, France and Italy) and in still other countries both types of government 
alternate (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden). Therefore, despite all the 
similitude of these democracies, political parties compete under distinctive circum-
stances in West European party systems. 
 Although ideally all parties in Western Europe should be incorporated into this 
analysis, lack of reliable comparative data hinders examination of the entire 
population of Western European countries and parties.3 The selection of the political 
                                                        
2 The concepts of 'most similar systems design' and 'most different system design' were advanced by 
Przeworski and Teune (1970). The 'most different' systems design compares different countries on their 
similarities, while the 'most similar' systems design compares similar countries on their differences (the 
comparable cases method). Both methods seek to isolate relationships between variables by excluding 
external variables and thus eliminate probable causal factors. In the most similar systems design, units are 
chosen which are similar on as many variables as possible, with the exception of the variables between 
which a relationship is hypothesized. Hereby the number of control variables is maximized. In the most 
different system design the units do not differ with respect to the variables to be examined, but are 
assumed to differ on a maximum of external variables (Frendreis 1983). The two methods differ in 
strategy: the most similar system design seeks to identify relevant systemic factors for the explanation of 
the phenomenon, while the most different system design can only eliminate irrelevant systemic factors. 
Both strategies also differ in the process of case selection. Case selection proceeds under two taxonomies, 
the spatial taxonomy where cases are selected on their proximity, and analytical taxonomy where cases are 
selected on the basis of their degree of similarity or difference (Smelser 1976). When cases are being 
compared which are similar on a large number of characteristics, the assumption is that only those 
variables differentiate, between which a relationship is hypothesized. The opposite method, of comparing 
completely different cases, assumes that two cases are assumed to differ in all respects, but for the 
hypothesized relation between the variables. This study, which limits itself to Western Europe can also be 
labeled an area study (Daalder 1987c; 1993). 
3 For this reason Luxembourg, Switzerland and Iceland had to be excluded. Spain and Portugal are not 
included because these countries were not multi-party democracies at the time Kirchheimer advanced his 
thesis. This does, by no means, allow for the conclusion that Spanish and Portuguese parties will not have 
catch-all characteristics (see Satrústegui 1992; Van Biezen 1998). 




parties included in this study has been conducted on two criteria. First, the 
importance of the individual party for the particular party system was taken into 
account. In order to be included, a party must have competed in at least two 
consecutive elections allowing for an inquiry of possible transformation over time. 
This criterion is a minimum requirement; many of the parties competed in all 
elections of the post-war era. Secondly, parties must have gained parliamentary 
representation, otherwise inclusion is pointless with respect to the measurement of 
several indicators. 
 In this study the results of most analysis within chapters 4, 5 and 6 are not 
reported at the level of individual political parties but aggregated to national party 
systems as well as party family groupings, while both aggregates are also subject to 
cross-time comparisons. In effect, therefore, I take the empirical evidence of change 
at the level of the individual party, which constitutes the core unit of analysis within 
Kirchheimer's theory, in order to assess the changing degree of catch-allism over time 
within national party systems and within cross-national party families. These aggregations are 
necessary because a full presentation and discussion of the 83 individual parties 
through time would simply prove far too unwieldy. Nonetheless, the original building 
blocks for these aggregations, that is, the data on the individual parties themselves, are 
fully summarised in lengthy tables at the end of each chapter, where these parties are 
ranked within the different time-periods according to their degree of catch-allism. 
Such a comparison of levels of catch-allism within the different West European party 
systems should reveal whether Kirchheimer justifiably asserted a specific geographical 
pattern of this type of party transformation (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185-188). Parties are 
analysed by party-family to determine whether, as Kirchheimer (1966a, 185-191) 
inferred, catch-allism is also a function of the party's genetic origin, suggesting that 
almost regardless of country, certain families of parties will have proved more prone 
to catch-allism than others. The classification of parties on the basis of their genetic 
origin can be found in appendix 1. 
1.4 The data 
Seven principle data sources are combined for utilisation in this analysis of party 
transformation. Best suited for longitudinal cross-national inquiry of the organisation 
of political parties and their internal decision-making processes are the data compiled 
by Katz and Mair (1992; 1994). Their data include party membership, party finance, 
the size of party professional staffs and their official procedures of decision-making 
and policy-formulation. In addition, this study employs the data Janda (1980) 
collected on the internal organisation of political parties. The ideological evolution of 
political parties is primarily examined utilising the data gathered by the Manifesto 
Research Group (see Budge et al., 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994).4 Furthermore, the 
data collected by Woldendorp et. al. (1993) on party control of government in 
parliamentary democracy provide the opportunity to evaluate the party composition 
of governments, the number of ministries each party controls, party preferences in 
portfolio's, parliamentary support of governments and their duration in office. Data 
for the analysis of electoral change, which include the composition and volatility of 
                                                        







the electorate of parties, the level of party identification as well as the social 
background of their ministers, come from a wide range of sources (see appendix 4 for 
the sources of the social composition of party electorates). The studies by Blondel 
(Blondel 1985; Blondel and Thiebault 1991) provides the information on the social 
and professional background of ministers, while Katz and Mair (1992) summarise data 
on party identification. The principal sources of data on electoral volatility are the 
electoral data handbooks by Mackie and Rose (1974; 1991) as well as the influential 
study by Bartolini and Mair (1990). 
 To investigate variation over time, the analysis presented here covers the period 
from 1945 until 1990. Although most of the data were gathered on an annual basis, 
missing values appeared too numerous to maintain an annual format. To compensate 
for the number of missing values, the post-war era is aggregated into nine periods of 
five years (see appendix 2), resulting in a number of cases sufficiently numerous to 
allow for statistical analysis.5 
 The comprehensive character of this study allows, given the data collection, for a 
rigorous investigation into the type and extent of transformation of political parties in 
Western Europe according to the 'canons' of the comparative method in political 
science. In order to define and empirically assess catch-allism, the following chapter 




                                                        
5 The number of cases under analysis leads us to the most central problem of comparative politics: the 
problem of "many variables, small N" (Lijphart 1975, 159). The "many variables, small N" problem can be 
seen as the problem of the presence of more possible explanations than cases to control for these 
explanations (Ragin 1989, 69). There are two strategies to solve this: (1) maximizing the number of cases 
or (2) eliminating variability through case selection. In this study the number of cases are simply enlarged 
by taking time periods as units of observation: the set of parties is 83 (see appendix 1) and the post-war 
era is broken into nine periods of five years, the maximum number of cases is increased to 747 (83 parties 
x 9 periods). As not all parties existed in all periods, the actual number of cases is 628, when non-existing 
cases are omitted. 





2 The catch-all thesis 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the origin and development of Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all concept 
will be discussed. The ensuing sections will show that the catch-all thesis was 
developed over a period of more than ten years, primarily between 1954 and 1966, 
and that this thesis is part of an elaborate framework of ideas which reflect 
Kirchheimer's concerns with regard to problems facing modern democracies. 
Particularly the dramatic breakdown of the Weimar Republic, which forced 
Kirchheimer to leave Germany and live in exile in France and the United States, 
shaped his political ideas and influenced his scientific work. This shocking experience 
with total system breakdown, evidence of the frailty of democracy, was never again 
eradicated from Otto Kirchheimer's mind. 
2.2 Otto Kirchheimer (1905-1965): A short intellectual biography 
Otto Kirchheimer was born on November 11, 1905 in Heilbronn, Germany. His 
middle-class Jewish parents died when he was still a young child. His remaining 
relatives arranged for him to attend a private school in Ettenheim. In 1924, at the age 
of 19, Kirchheimer graduated from 'Gymnasium' and took up the study of philosophy 
and history at the University of Münster where among his lectors were the neo-
Kantian philosophers Karl Vorlander and Max Scheler. Thereafter Kirchheimer 
studied 'Recht- und Staatswissenschaft' (Law and Statecraft) in Köln and Berlin, under 
the auspices of teachers such as Rudolf Smend, Heinrich Triepel and Herman Heller 
(Linne 1994). During his collegiate years, Kirchheimer was politically active in the 
Socialist Student Union. He finalised his dissertation in 1928 on "Die Staatslehre des 
Sozialismus und Bolschewismus" (The Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State) at 
the university of Bonn, where Carl Schmitt was his principal tutor. 
 In his dissertation6 Kirchheimer argued that in democratic states political decisions 
are reduced to legal problems. Kirchheimer acknowledged that liberalism had been a 
promoter of democratic political liberties, but only up to the point where the working 
class demands full representation. Thereafter, democracy deteriorated into a (class) 
conflict between liberals and the bourgeoisie on one side and the proletariat on the 
other. Decisions which affect power relations, Kirchheimer argued, are avoided within 
the democratic state in order to maintain an equilibrium between these conflicting 
parties. When democracy is characterised by agreement on fundamental values, then 
the majority vote is the optimal decision-making procedure. On the other hand, when 
basic agreement is absent, majority rule means repression of minorities and decision-
making deteriorates into rigid legal procedures. This process of transforming political 
decision-making into legal codification ('Verrechtlichung'), neutralises the class conflict. 
The resulting type of state ('Rechtsstaat') thus becomes a mere legal mechanism ('reiner 
                                                        
6 The complete manuscript of Kirchheimer's dissertation is lost. Part of the text was published in 
"Zeitschrift für Politik" in 1928 under the title "Zur Staatslehre des Sozialismus und Bolshewismus" (On 
Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State) (Kirchheimer 1928/1969). 




Rechtsmechanismus') (Kirchheimer 1928, 7-8). Kirchheimer considered a political system 
legitimate when no group in society is excluded from the democratic decision-making 
process, enabling the political structure to represent the social structure. This 'political 
exclusion' remained Kirchheimer's point of departure for his critique on the political 
developments in the Weimar Republic and other political systems. While, according to 
Kirchheimer, constitutions usually ratify victory or defeat of a social class, the Weimar 
constitution was a document without such resolution. He maintained that in most 
states, democratic or dictatorial, the judiciary had ceased to be an independent third 
power and had been reduced to a legal mechanism of formal democracy. This 
conclusion, that 'justice' is used for certain political ends, remained a central topic 
throughout Kirchheimer's entire work. 
 From 1930 Kirchheimer worked as a 'Doctor Juris' at the Bonn-university and 
began to lecture at trade union schools. In 1932 Kirchheimer was offered a position 
as a junior member of the Berlin bar. At the same time he was an active member of 
the SPD and often published articles in their official theoretical organ "Die Gesellsch-
aft". During this period Kirchheimer was befriended by like-minded legal pro-
fessionals, among whom Ernst Fraenkel, Franz Neumann, Otto Kahn-Freund and 
Martin Drath were the most influential (Luthard 1990). In the period spanning 1929 
to 1933 Kirchheimer became progressively  disillusioned by the events in the Weimar 
Republic in which the social and political situation further destabilised after the 
economic crisis of 1929. The radical parties on the left (KPD) and on the right 
(NSDAP) blocked the formation of stable democratic majorities. According to 
Kirchheimer, the abuse by President Von Hindenburg of article 48 (the right of the 
President to rule by decree) and article 25 (the right of the President to dissolve 
parliament) of the Weimar constitution, transformed Germany into a presidential 
dictatorship. 
 Kirchheimer's early writings show a great concern for this slow erosion of the 
Weimar democracy. On the basis of Marxist theories of the state and the constitution 
Kirchheimer critically analyses Brünings emergency decrees and the coup by Von 
Papen in July 1932. When the Brüning minority government (Centre Party), initially 
supported by the Reichspresident Von Hindenburg, could not convince parliament of 
its program, Von Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag. The following elections on July 
31, 1932 only increased polarisation in parliament. The Von Papen cabinet withdrew 
parliamentary powers and changed the electoral laws, but this new government was 
then also dismissed by Von Hindenburg. On January 30, 1933 Hindenburg appointed 
Adolf Hitler as Reichskansler. Regarding these developments Kirchheimer (1932c; 
1932d) heavily criticised Hindenburg for breaking three constitutional rules: the 
Reichskansler dissolves parliament more than once for the same reason, secondly, 
Hindenburg does not provide any justification for this dissolution of parliament and 
finally he should have called for new elections according to the constitution. 
 The action of the federal authorities of the Weimar Republic against Prussia, 
where the government headed by the SPD was overthrown on July 20, 1932, was 
additional evidence for the emergence of a presidential dictatorship (Präsidialdiktatur). 
Kirchheimer argued that conflicts between the Reich and Länder should be decided 
by trial before an independent judicial institution (Staatsgerichtshof), not by a political 
presidential decree. Hindenburg had unconstitutionally intervened in Prussia and, with 
the replacement of the Prussian cabinet, the Reichspresident had rendered it 
impossible for a large proportion of the Prussian population to freely express their 




will through elected government. The topic of political exclusion is reiterated here: no 
longer had all classes equal opportunity of representation (Kirchheimer 1932e). 
Kirchheimer argued that the re-election of Von Hindenburg as Reich President on 
April 10, 1932 was a reaction to the political crisis which Von Hindenburg himself 
had created (Kirchheimer 1932e). Furthermore, the parliamentary elections of July 31, 
1932 demonstrated that the Weimar constitution no longer enabled the representation 
of the social structure. 
 Kirchheimer's perspective at this point in time can be characterised as 'radical' and 
'leftist' (Tribe 1987). Normative point of departure for Kirchheimer was the 
assumption that state or governmental institutions and procedures, such as electoral 
laws, are not intrinsically good or bad, any more than specific constitutions. They all 
have a particular political purpose, usually that of maintaining the existing capitalist 
order. The constitutional principle of equality before the law is used by the capitalist 
interest groups as a bulwark against all changes of the economic status quo. One's 
attitude toward such institutions and procedures depends on what one wants 
politically (Kirchheimer 1930a). Although Kirchheimer's conceptualisation in this 
period resembled that of his tutor Carl Schmitt, Kirchheimer's ideas were, 
nonetheless, diametrically opposed to Schmitt's ideas (Fetscher and Münkler 1987, 
296; Luthardt 1987, 147; Kvaternik 1994, 26). Schmitt, best described as an 
authoritarian conservative, was a prominent critic of the Weimar Republic and one of 
its leading jurists (Tribe 1987). Schmitt was abhorred by the increasing state 
intervention into the private and economic sphere as for him this evidenced the 
weakness of the state, not its strength. State intervention is used to construct a 
compromise and consensus between the different interest groups within society. 
According to Schmitt, the pluralist fragmentation of parliament and the colonisation 
of the state by interest groups diminish the authority of the state. Although Schmitt 
and Kirchheimer share their concern for the fragmentation of interests and 
colonisation of the state by organised interests, their solution to these problems differ 
radically. Whereas Kirchheimer emphasises the importance of articulate 
representation of the various social classes by different political parties, Schmitt 
opposes the pluralist parliamentary party state (Schmitt 1928; 1932a: 1932b). In the 
nineteenth century parliaments, Schmitt argues, political parties were merely voluntary 
organisations, fluid, loosely structured and lacking organisational complexity. Parties 
represented currents of opinion, free from any permanent bond with specific social 
groups. Parliament was a place for the national interest and the formation of public 
opinion, not for social interests. In the modern pluralist state, however, political 
parties embody the social interests of industrial mass society. Modern parties have 
complex organisational structures with powerful bureaucracies which aim to recruit a 
maximum of their members from specific social groups and provide this clientele with 
economic and cultural services. According to Schmitt, the subsequent pluralist 
fragmentation in parliament leads to a political deadlock of conflicting interests and 
politicisation of the society and the economy. In addition, political representatives 
lose their independence by the party dominance and the public debate is subverted 
into manipulation of the masses. In this manner liberal democracy weakens and 
colonises the state, a process which can only be countered by a strong authority 
wielding sufficient power to restore national unity and order. Logically, Schmitt had 
little difficulty in supporting Hitler and he became a member of the National Socialist 
movement in 1933. That Kirchheimer and Schmitt were men of different political 




orientation was shown by the fact that the same year Kirchheimer left Germany in 
fear of Nazi persecution. 
 In 1933 it became clear that some parties in Germany were not prepared to adhere 
to democratic principles. Following the elections in March 1933 all parties, with the 
sole exception of the NSDAP, were banned and a totalitarian Nazi regime was 
established. When the Nazi's finally seized absolute power on March 24, 1933, 
Kirchheimer fled to Paris where he was employed by the exiled "Frankfurter Institut für 
Sozialforschung." During this period, Kirchheimer wrote articles on the political 
developments in France. From 1916 until 1940 the French 'Assemblée Nationale', 
Kirchheimer (1940) argued, gave the successive governments the possibility to govern 
by decree, without parliamentary control. Kirchheimer stressed that these transfers of 
parliamentary powers to the executive were not compatible with the French 
constitution. Based on his experience in the Weimar Republic, he knew that unlimited 
decree-rule weakens the political structure and inevitably leads to authoritarianism. As 
long as certain major parliamentary parties, and thus some groups in society are not 
represented in the government, parliamentary control of government actions remains 
essential for the proper expression of the popular will. Kirchheimer again showed his 
concern for political exclusion. In the French Third republic and the former Weimar 
republic, Kirchheimer saw identical processes. In both the lower strata were excluded 
from popular representation and this made the exercise of power illegitimate. Political 
decisions were rendered into law, thereby reducing the political class conflict into a 
legal battle over the democratic constitutional rules (Kirchheimer 1941a). 
 When the Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung moved to the New York Columbia 
University in 1937, Kirchheimer also emigrated to the United States. At the Institute 
Kirchheimer worked together with Franz Neumann, Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, Leo Löwental and Herbert Marcuse. In 1942, Kirchheimer left the Institute 
for Social Research and took up a position at Wellesly College, Massachusetts as a 
lecturer. Two years later, in 1944 Kirchheimer started to work for the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) in Washington and was transferred to the Division of 
Research for Europe at the Department of State in 1945. Here he was reunited with 
Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse. 
 At the end of World War II, Kirchheimer did not return to Germany. He was 
tremendously disappointed by the post-war developments in Europe and in Germany 
in particular. Kirchheimer was dumbfounded that, instead of de-nazification, an anti-
Communist attitude became dominant. His disillusion with German post-war 
developments is witnessed most emphatically in his critique on the political develop-
ments in the DDR. In his view, the German people had not learned much from the 
Nazi-period. Kirchheimer regarded East Germany as "a completely manipulated 
society" and "a totalitarian state" (Kirchheimer 1951, 131-134). He also stressed the 
lack of profound change in West Germany. Here too Kirchheimer conceived an 
absence of possibilities for political opposition and perceived severe restrictions on 
political freedoms. After a comparison of the post-war composition of the Reichstag 
with the last two free elections of the Weimar republic in 1928 and 1932, Kirchheimer 
concluded that neither the earthshaking political and social events since 1933, nor the 
changes in the electoral system during the last two decades, had substantially changed 
the traditional patterns of parliamentary representation (Kirchheimer 1950). 
 In 1950 Kirchheimer was promoted to Chief of the Central European Branch of 
the Office of Intelligence Research at the Office of Strategic Studies. During this 




period Kirchheimer also lectured at Harvard University and at the American 
University in Washington. As of 1954 Kirchheimer left the State Department, most 
probably as a result of McCarthyist attacks upon 'communist influences' in the 
government of the United States (Herz, 1989, 13), and took up a position as Professor 
of Political Science at the New School for Social Research in New York. Finally, in 
1961, Kirchheimer returned to Germany for one year where he was appointed as 
Fullbright Professor at the University of Freiburg. From 1962 Kirchheimer was 
employed as Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University in 
New York. Kirchheimer's career was tragically cut short when he died from a heart-
attack in Washington D.C. airport on November 22, 1965. 
2.3 The catch-all concept: first indications 
During the 1950s, Kirchheimer concentrated increasingly on the transformation of 
political parties. As early as 1954, in an analysis of the West German political system, 
Kirchheimer (1954a, 250) introduced the concept of the catch-all party for the first 
time. Where Duverger (1954) and Neumann (1956)7 saw a development towards 
'parties of democratic integration', Kirchheimer envisaged the development of yet 
another party, the 'catch-all' party. He argued that in most Western European 
countries political opposition is ebbing and regarded the rapid economic development 
as the most important determinant for this transformation of mass parties into catch-
all parties. 
 In West Germany, Kirchheimer argued, the inability of the political adversary (the 
SPD) to provide any real alternative for the official government policy of the CDU 
had resulted in a loyal opposition. A broader explanation for the stability and 
moderation of the post-war German political system was that, in contrast to the 
interbellum, group claims were now mediated in a collective bargaining process. The 
significant rise in prosperity allowed for the possibility that many of these claims were, 
at least in part, recognised. The social and governmental system of West Germany 
became even more coherent when the political militant left and right disappeared 
from the political scene. The majority of the working class no longer occupied the 
lower social milieus, but could rather be regarded as middle-class. In consequence, the 
individual seemed to isolate him- or herself from public and political affairs into 
private (consumerist) activities. Kirchheimer enumerated some catch-all characteris-
tics: "Undoubtedly, the face of the modern parties is shaped more and more by 
universal suffrage and the related necessity to reach as many voters as possible by 
means of the latest technological developments (...). The resulting forms of 
competition dominate the structure and the organisational principles of the parties. 
They compel them to resort to simplifications and to the identification of programs 
with typifying personalities suitable for public exposure" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 246). 
This wider appeal resulted in far-reaching uniformity of behaviour of political parties. 
Kirchheimer additionally underscored the American condition, "under which the 
parties to a certain degree even today are primarily organisms dedicated to the 
purpose of winning the next election (...)" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250). Kirchheimer 
considered it implausible that a social democratic-led government would adopt a 
                                                        
7 These first attempts at theory building on party transformation focus primarily on the classification of 
different types of parties (see especially Duverger 1954). 




significantly different policy program. Political competition in this 'one and one-half 
party system' was between a conservative catch-all party (CDU) and a democratic 
working-class party (SPD). Here, Kirchheimer (1954a, 250) asserted that the SPD 
could transform into a catch-all mass party and establish a two party system. 
 In another analysis of political transformation, or more specifically convergence of 
parties in Western Europe, Kirchheimer (1954b) differentiated three types of parties: 
the totalitarian party, the democratic mass party (which tries to appeal to a maximum 
of voters to take over the administration and carry into effect a definite program) and 
the older parliamentary party (Kirchheimer 1954b). There is no mention of the catch-
all party concept in this article, yet Kirchheimer frames the transformation of parties 
within a broader thesis of the state-party cartel. He argued that both democratic mass 
and totalitarian parties, working under democratic conditions, try to combine two 
goals; first, to organise themselves in order to attract a maximum of voters and 
second, simultaneously avoiding to jeopardise internal cohesion and political freedom 
of action. According to Kirchheimer, the political party had become a functionally 
rational instrument for the realisation of group interests. Here Kirchheimer touched 
upon the emergence of a state-party cartel; he maintains there was evidence of a shift of 
the centre of gravity from parliament to parties. In their failure to present the 
electorate with a political alternative, political parties deprived the population of the 
essence of democracy: to choose its government and replace it by a more suitable one 
if wanted. The ramifications are an ever growing discipline of the parliamentary party 
which thereby transforms its relationship with the extra-parliamentary party 
organisation. Kirchheimer alleged that the parliamentary party and the central party 
organisation became so interwoven at the personal level that political freedom had 
suffered. Subsidies by interest groups and their institutional propaganda (the praising 
of certain political goals by non-political actors without open support for a party) had 
drawn the mass parties too close to the state. Kirchheimer asserted that, although this 
interrelatedness made the democratic institutions more effective, it deprived the 
democratic mass parties of their mobility and political dynamism. To perform their 
democratic function to the fullest, Kirchheimer thought parties should combine four 
elements: put forward demands of social groups close to them, submit themselves to 
the judgement of the electorate, give maximum disclosure of party finances and 
attempt to transform the state to their own image, instead of identifying themselves 
too much with the state. 
 This development, the elimination of major political opposition through 
government by party cartel, is further elaborated in another article in which 
Kirchheimer showed his concern that a parliamentary leader "may fall easy prey to the 
comfortable belief that his political chances increase by minimising rather than by 
magnifying the policy differences between opposition and government" (Kirchheimer 
1957b, 297). In this process, every decision becomes a compromise. All parties have 
an interest in covering up inefficiency, waste and corruption of the partner, which 
results in the absence of the opposition's control function. For this reason, 
Kirchheimer considered multi-party governments to be weak. He regarded the 
transfer of votes to and from the opposition of principle to be of greater importance 
than the internal transfer of votes among the various other parliamentary groups. The 
causes of the waning of opposition can not be reversed by technical changes in the 
electoral system, as its causes lie in social developments. The most important cause is 
the emergence of a substantial new middle-class of skilled workers, the middle ranks 




of white-collar workers and civil servants. Their interests converge, becoming 
indistinguishable  from those of the old middle class. According to Kirchheimer, 
diminished social polarisation goes hand in hand with diminished political 
polarisation. To indicate the interchangeability of the doctrines of political parties 
Kirchheimer used the concept of catch-all parties once again (Kirchheimer 1957b, 
314-315) and asserted that parties were reduced "to a rationally conceived vehicle of 
interest-representation." He argued that, although catch-all parties still functioned as 
intermediary between elements of formerly united groups, the working class was now 
torn asunder in the process of social transformation. Kirchheimer suggested that the 
lower social strata still accepted the parliamentary parties, not because of their social 
vision, but because these parties promised to give priority to their material claims. 
This weakened the party's aspiration to perform the role of opposition, as this 
diminished their success in realising group claims. Kirchheimer made a distinction 
between the 'Weltanschauungs'-party, the totalitarian movement and the modern 
catch-all party. According to Kirchheimer, the catch-all party was now forced to think 
more in terms of profit and loss of electoral support and policy. The transition from 
the ideological orientated mass party to the interest-group oriented catch-all party is 
one facet in the erosion of classical opposition. 
 Kirchheimer (1958a) returned to these themes in a discussion of the consequences 
of the constitutional changes of 1958 in France. Here he argued that the new French 
constitution affirms the authority of the bureaucratic elite and personalised politics by 
strengthening the position of the president, thereby dramatically reducing the demo-
cratically elected National Assembly's legislative power. Again, legal procedures are 
used for political ends. This time a reform of the electoral laws misrepresented the 
popular strength of the Communist Party. The French election system, a single-
member district system with a second ballot, produced significant disproportions 
between the outcome in seats allocated and the votes cast. Kirchheimer thought that, 
at the elections, no real alternatives were offered and the popular vote was only used 
to justify decisions that have already been taken. In France Kirchheimer also saw a 
transformation of political mass parties aimed at representation into a conservative 
electioneering organisation. 
 At the end of the 1950s Kirchheimer continually argued that the dominant party 
type in Western Europe was still the democratic mass party. This type of party "rests 
on a nucleus of professional political personnel and on a party membership of great 
variety in size and intensity of loyalty feelings. At the same time it entertains amicable 
relations with and finds support among a variety of interest groups" (Kirchheimer 
1959a, 270). If these parties want to achieve a majority status, they need to "adapt to 
their new social, economic and intellectual environment and appeal to as many voters 
as possible by watering down their purely ideological commitments". This transforms 
democratic mass parties into the "Christian type of catch-all people's parties" 
(Kirchheimer 1959a, 270). According to Kirchheimer, the cleavage between the new 
middle class and the older independent middle class diminished and a more rational 
party structure, less bound by ideology, emerged. Especially on the Western European 
continent, where no single party can obtain a clear-cut majority, all policy changes are 
negotiated in detail and power-sharing is agreed to in advance. Here again 
Kirchheimer stressed the waning of opposition as the major political parties became 
steadily more identical in ideology and program. 
 In France as well as in West Germany, Kirchheimer (1957a) remarked that 




impressive political stability was facilitated by restrictions on the freedom of political 
choice. The West German authorities restricted political competition utilising legal 
means, for example banning of the Communist Party (KPD) in Germany. The early 
re-instalment of the other parties (CDU, SPD and FDP) by the allied occupation 
powers, gave these parties the lead in shaping public opinion, which has led to a 
multi-party system with coalition governments as opposed to the more desirable 
British two-party system. Kirchheimer examined the history, program and 
organisation of the SPD in detail and found a gradual fading of its former Marxist 
orientation. According to Kirchheimer (1957a, 437), the CDU had also transformed 
into an interdenominational catch-all of Christian politics. The fundamental 
transformation of both these former Weltanschauungsparteien gave evidence of a 
"progressive predominance of pragmatic over ideological motivations." The CDU is 
"an interest market ... barely hidden behind the screen of emphatically endorsed 
ideologies and uncontested leadership groups" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 437). On the 
social complexion of party elites, Kirchheimer depicted a substitution of nineteenth-
century intellectuals with representatives of organised interests. "Reciprocal 
permeation of parties and interest groups is one of the reasons why the influence of 
ideological factors is dwindling" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 437). As interest groups became 
their most important permanent clients, parties changed their attitude toward enrolled 
members and prospective voters. The average citizen, consequently, participated only 
indirectly through interest groups affiliation in the increasingly professionalised party 
machine. "Interest connections provide an organisational and often a financial basis 
for party operations. But they do not take the place of the parties' contest for voters. 
To this extent, all German parties are today of necessity "integration parties," i.e., 
potentially democratic mass organisations" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 440). Kirchheimer 
argued that, in the absence of any noteworthy opposition of principle, political 
competition is very orderly ('cartel-dominated') as there exists a broad spectrum of 
political consensus. This political consensus is a consequence of a "homogeneous 
middle-class society", the uncritical role of the mass media, centralisation of the 
administrative power and the establishment of the welfare state. Kirchheimer 
regarded this development not limited to the German context: "aspects of present-day 
Germany's political institutions closely resemble those of other highly industrialised 
countries in the West. The outstanding features are: increasing administrative 
centralisation to meet the social and organisational needs of mass society; a 
progressive interpenetration of interest groups and political organisations, 
accompanied by a high degree of professionalization in politics" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 
445).  
 
During the early 1960s Kirchheimer repeatedly referred to the catch-all party concept. 
In 1961 for example, he asserted that German politics (like many other advanced 
Western industrial societies) had transformed into only an administrative mechanism. 
This transformation was visible in the decreasing importance of domestic policy and a 
reduced intensity of social conflict. This was made possible through society's 
increasing ability to fulfil the expanding desires of a growing number of its members. 
As a consequence of this transformation the role of the opposition in parliament has 
been reduced "- or shall we call it an advance? - from a group having a program 
resting on intellectual analysis of situations in the light of societal development 
schemes to an American style "democratic" party pushing the image of an alternative 




Kanzler, together with a catch-all election platform ..." (Kirchheimer 1961b, 256). 
Political awareness is low, argued Kirchheimer, and democratic government is 
relegated to the few transitory periods when elections are staged. Formulation of 
social policy had become a precarious process as the socially heterogeneous CDU 
needed to attract at least a certain percentage of the working-class vote. 
Differentiations between social and religious groups were blurred as German society 
had secularised. There existed a higher level of basic consensus in Germany than at 
any previous time in history, giving impetus to the banning of extremist groups, 
namely the Communist party (KPD). 
 Kirchheimer's scepticism about German democracy, the free press and the use of 
legal means for political ends was very clear (Kirchheimer and Menges 1965a). The 
political system, he wrote, "... could be characterised as one of sluggish competition 
between well behaved parties acting primarily in response to the demands and 
pressures of well organised interest groups. As prosperity increased, the population 
took only a modicum of interest in the day-to-day activities of these parties, so that 
politics, as in many other industrial Western countries, increasingly became the affair 
of the professional politician and his interest-group colleagues.... State authority had 
been personalised in Chancellor Adenauer.... The domestic political confrontations 
that occurred at four-year intervals were increasingly devoid of substantive dispute, 
and their outcome served to confirm the existing political line with some slight 
variations" (Kirchheimer and Menges 1965a, 88). The most important feature of the 
post-war West German political system is "...the general decline of parliamentary 
conflict in the wake of the consensus on the welfare functions of the state and the 
consequent removal from the political arena of many issues that had formerly been 
bitterly contested. Moreover, especially in the case of divided Germany, the cold war 
has "internationalised" many political issues and removed them as subjects of 
domestic political debate and contention. Concurrently, the major political parties, 
which before the war primarily concerned themselves with ideology and the 
promotion of abstract goals, have become far more interested in maintaining stability 
and in fulfilling the mandates of the assorted interest groups that support them. The 
entire post-war history of Germany's SPD tells the story of ideology's decline and, 
especially since 1959, of the adoption of pragmatic programs designed to win the 
support of diverse social groups" (Kirchheimer and Menges 1965a, 90). 
 In another article on the West German political scene, Kirchheimer (1966b) 
maintained that, after the experience of the Nazi-period and the developments in the 
East, opposition of principle was extremely confined. The successes of the Ehrhard 
economic policy ruled out any opposition of principle, an opposition already 
weakened by several election defeats. According to Kirchheimer, the economic, social 
and foreign policy was no longer challenged in principle by the SPD which 
additionally adopted a catch-all party platform style (Kirchheimer 1966b, 246). The 
modern welfare state now provided solutions to the problems of numerous social 
groups, which weakened traditional controversies and modified political conflict to 
decisions on priorities. This modification freed political parties "...of the necessity of 
concentrating their electioneering efforts on specific groups while antagonising 
others" (Kirchheimer 1966b, 247). Political parties could now compete for electoral 
support of an expanded gamut of social strata and base their policies on short term 
strategic requisites as opposed to long term goals (Kirchheimer 1966b, 349). Parties 
avoid raising the more salient questions of their time, or else deal with them in a 




noncontroversial manner, which impeded national party competition. To determine 
the extent and quality of opposition Kirchheimer suggested to evaluate the correspon-
dence between the dates of elections and the pre-arranged constitutional schedule. 
The more these coincide, the more political opposition is absent. Competition 
between parties whose only goal is to participate in the next government makes only 
marginal criticism possible. According to Kirchheimer, this erosion of goal-orientated 
opposition is visible throughout most advanced industrial societies. What remains is a 
watertight political cartel between the major parties, which eliminated political 
competition by a prefabricated bargaining regime and constitutional limitations on 
extra-parliamentary opposition. 
 As a consequence of this cartelisation, individuals of industrialised nations 
experienced increasing estrangement and relied more often on the state. Kirchheimer 
(1966c) insisted that the lower classes, especially, participated only ad hoc in the actual 
political decision-making. Trade unions and religious ancillary organisations function 
merely as intermediaries between the individual citizen and the decision-making 
institutions. "Most of what can be singled out as relevant behaviour are reactions 
within the context of mass-consumer institutions. Which candidate of two competing 
catch-all mass parties the executant votes for, to which brand of gasoline he gives his 
temporary allegiance, what TV program he switches on, may have important 
consequences for the purveyor of the respective goods. But for the individual these 
decisions draw their importance only from the fact that they create the illusion of a 
margin of initiative ... it does not constitute a meaningful contribution to his problem 
of how to enlarge his control over reality" (Kirchheimer 1966c, 24). 
 Despite all these earlier references to catch-allism, however, it is not until the 
publication of "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems" 
(Kirchheimer 1966a) that Kirchheimer extensively discusses the changing nature of 
traditional parties of mass-integration into catch-all parties. In this process, Kirchhei-
mer roughly distinguished three stages in which the consequences for the social basis 
of parties, their organisation, their program and their quest for political power are 
outlined. The first stage is that of steady organisational growth which lasts until the 
beginning of the First World War. In the second period, during the 1920's and 1930's, 
class mass parties had their first experience with governmental power and 
encountered the conflict between class-interests and the need for moderation in 
government. Finally, class parties reached the more advanced stage of catch-allism, 
with some of the parties still trying to cling to their traditional (working-class) clientele 
while at the same time attempting to attract a variety of other groups. 
 Kirchheimer was inspired by the LaPalombara and Weiner load-concept8 which he 
                                                        
8 LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) asserted that European parties are often creatures of crisis situations, 
while sometimes the emergence of a party itself creates a crisis for the system. When the established 
political elite is either unwilling or unable to integrate oppositional political organizations into the political 
system a crisis occurs (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, 3-42). The most salient internal political crises 
which nations experienced during the period of party formation are crises of legitimacy, integration and 
participation. Legitimacy is the issue around which the first European parties developed. The internally 
created parties to which Duverger (1954) referred, appeared to arise when the issue of legitimacy, or 
constitutional order is much debated. With the establishment of parliaments and the diminishing power 
of the monarchy this legitimacy crisis was adequately resolved. The integration crisis relates to the 
unification-process of nations in which territorial or ethnic communities, previously divided, became 
accommodated. Crises of participation occurred when great social and economic transformations resulted 
in enormous changes in existing stratification systems and the appearance of new social groups. When 
these groups demanded their share of control of the state apparatus, the participation and legitimization 
crisis occurred simultaneously, thereby ‘overloading’ the problem solving capacity of the ruling political 




used to examine the performance of the continental political parties in the 1920's 
which successfully integrated the working classes into the political system. 
Kirchheimer also addressed the bourgeois parties' failure to develop into mass-
integration parties which would be capable to cooperate successfully with the 
working-class mass parties.9 The bourgeois parties saw no need to advance to the 
stage of integration parties themselves as they had other means of access (educational 
and class privileges) to the state apparatus. During the first three decades of this 
century, working-class mass parties were ambivalent with respect to the integration of 
their members into the existing political community, instead they integrated their 
constituency into their own organisation which was pitted against the official state 
apparatus.10  
 This problematic situation is ostensibly resolved after the Second World War when 
the class lines and denominational structures eroded and for all parties the acceptance 
of the law of the political market seemed inevitable. Consequently, the political system 
transformed, as former bourgeois parties of individual representation no longer 
determined the nature of the party system. Kirchheimer claims that: "(b)y the same 
token, the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more 
sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all 
"people's" party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral 'encadrement' of 
the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effective-
ness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The 
narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former 
all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counterproductive since they deter 
segments of a potential nation-wide clientele" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 184-185). 
2.4 The causes and consequences of catch-allism 
Kirchheimer identified several factors which determined this transformation and 
framed the catch-all development in a complex structure of hypotheses, most of 
which are implicit. It is important to note that in explaining the emergence of catch-all 
parties, Kirchheimer pointed to a wide range of socio-economic and sociological 
developments.11 Chiefly, the catch-all party is a product of increasing economic 
                                                                                                                                             
parties. 
9 One year earlier Kirchheimer had published the German version of the article under the title "Der 
Wandel des Westeuropäischen Parteisystems" in the German Politische Vierteljahresschrift (Kirchheimer 
1965d). In the subtitle of the German version Kirchheimer calls his analysis of party systems "Eine neue 
Hypothese über die Ursachen des Erfolgs und Versagens von Parteisystemen" (A new hypothesis on the 
causes of success and failure of party systems). At a conference in Frascati, Italy on January 6-9, 1964 an 
earlier English version was presented (Kirchheimer 1964c). 
10 Political integration, in Kirchheimer's view, is the capacity of a political system to make social groups 
which were previously outside the official politics, full-fledged participants in the political process. While 
the social integration of the working-class into the industrial society was well underway, the political 
integration into the existing political system did not occur until after the Second World War. 
11 In Kirchheimer's model of party transformation several independent variables can be distinguished: 
economic factors, social factors and institutional factors. As economic factors Kirchheimer mentioned (1) 
the rate of economic development and the spread of mass-consumer goods and (2) the establishment of 
the welfare state and state-intervention in the economic process. The social factors Kirchheimer 
enumerated are (1) the erosion of the traditional framework of society (the class lines and denominational 
structures) and (2) the patterns of social and professional stratification. Kirchheimer also stressed the 
importance of institutional factors like (1) the political structure (the electoral laws which condition the 




prosperity and the emergence of the welfare state. Former class- and denominational 
mass-integration, and even bourgeois parties, are most likely to adopt a catch-all 
strategy when prosperity increases and a high level of social security is guaranteed by 
the welfare state. This type and rate of economic development in Western Europe had 
reduced the patterns of social and professional stratification and had accommodated 
conflicting interests. Kirchheimer stressed that parties can only "catch" those voters 
whose interests do not explicitly conflict. Even though he saw the rate of economic 
development as the most important determinant his conclusion was, nonetheless, 
qualified: "if it were so important, France would certainly be ahead of Great Britain 
and, for that matter also of the United States, still the classical example of an all-
pervasive catch-all party system" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185). Kirchheimer further 
suggested that the (dis)continuity of the political system was also a determinant. 
However, "...if this were so important Germany and Great Britain would appear at 
opposite ends of the spectrum rather than showing a similar speed of transformation" 
(Kirchheimer 1966a, 185). Kirchheimer concluded that "we must then be satisfied to 
make some comments on the general trend and to note special limiting factors" 
(Kirchheimer 1966a, 185). 
 The first limiting factor in the development catch-all of parties is the traditional 
framework, i.e. the patterns of social and professional stratification in society. With 
the reduction of social cleavages parties are able to concentrate more on issues over 
which broad consensus existed. The second limiting factor is the number and 
complexity of determinants of economic well-being and individual security (Kirch-
heimer 1966a, 186). Voters progressively regard political alternatives less in terms of 
particular claims and more in terms of the alleged political leader's ability to cope with 
future challenges. A third limiting factor is the party's ideology. At times of de-ideolo-
gization, parties with a harsh and limited ideological claim or a limited action program 
cannot develop a catch-all strategy; neither can a party which claims to represent a 
specific group or professional category (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187). The size of the 
party is the fourth limiting factor. Only major parties can become successful catch-all 
parties. Small, strictly regional parties cannot appeal to large audiences. These smaller 
parties, with their limited clientele, express no impulse to adopt the catch-all 
strategy.12 Furthermore, Kirchheimer insisted that the size of the country is also a 
limiting factor. The catch-all strategy is not "in vogue or even sought among the 
majority of the larger parties in small democracies" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 188). In 
smaller democracies fewer factors influence the results of political decision-making, 
thus enabling parties to stabilise political competition by rigid stipulations. This does 
not to say that catch-all parties can not develop in small democracies. Kirchheimer 
remarked that "the Austrian Social-Democratic party forms a partial exception to the 
rule of less clear-cut transformation tendencies among major class-mass parties in 
smaller countries. It is becoming an eager and rather successful member of the catch-
                                                                                                                                             
accessibility of the political market and thereby the fragmentation of the party system), (2) the continuity 
of the political system and (3) the political traditions. Furthermore (4) the size of the country is important 
as well as the size of the party (see also Mintzel 1984). 
12 On the party size factor, Kirchheimer's thesis is contradictory as Kirchheimer presents the size of the 
party here as an independent variable, whereas party size is regarded a dependent variable where 
Kirchheimer argues that the electoral fortunes of parties depend on their ability to transform into catch-all 
parties. 




all club" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 188, footnote 13). The type of competition in a party 
system is also a limiting factor as the perception of the electoral chances in the next 
election of its competitors determine a parties' proclivity to maintain a dedicated, yet 
restricted, clientele. Catch-allism, therefore, is a highly competitive phenomenon. 
When parties are convinced that positive electoral results of the competitor were 
caused by circumstances that are permanent, they are liable to mimic each other's 
campaigning style. 
 Nevertheless, these six factors still do not elucidate which general elements explain 
the emergence of catch-all parties in different political systems. According to 
Kirchheimer, it is therefore necessary to evaluate the changing functions of political 
parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in relation to those of the 
post-war period. As a result of full democratisation, the expressive function has 
become ambiguous as a catch-all party has to balance this with the political-action 
(governing) function. Consequently, the expressive function is subject to a multitude 
of restrictions and tactical considerations. For electoral reasons the democratic catch-
all party has to express widely held popular concerns, in contrast to the more 
individual opinion and criticism of the representatives of the internally created parlia-
mentary parties. In order for a catch-all party to attain and keep governmental power, 
moderation and restriction is required. 
 Kirchheimer argued that parties purported to perform all these functions, but in 
reality more emphasis was placed on the nominating function. Without the ability to 
integrate people into the political community, a catch-all party can not force other 
parties to take their policy preferences seriously. Furthermore, people are only willing 
to follow a party-leader when they conceive the party's policy preferences to be in 
accordance with their own belief system. The nomination function combines all this 
together: "The nominations concretise the party's image with the public at large, on 
whose confidence the party's effective functioning depends. ... Under present 
conditions of spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting 
and less obtrusive class lines, the former class-mass parties and denominational mass 
parties are both under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties" (Kirchheimer 
1966a, 190). 
 
Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) emphasised five principal indicators of catch-allism: a 
drastic reduction of the party's ideology; a strengthening of the party's leadership; a 
reduced role for the individual party member; the recruitment of voters from the 
population at large and lastly, securing access to a variety of interest groups. Instead 
of an organisation which combined the defence of a social position with intense 
commitment to a certain ideology, catch-all parties competed with nearly identical 
programs to attain the short-range goal of winning the next election. Thus, 
Kirchheimer argued, due to the fact that the catch-all party's integration function is 
reduced to attract a maximum number of voters on election day, the catch-all party 
became analogous to an product of mass consumption.13 It had to differentiate 
                                                        
13  "When a party has or seeks an almost nationwide potential constituency, its majority composed of 
individuals whose relation is both tangential and discontinuous, the factors which may decide the eventual 
electoral outcome are almost infinite in number and often quite unrelated to the party's performance" .... 
"The party's transformation from an organization combining the defense of social position, the quality of 
spiritual shelter, and the vision of things to come into that of a vehicle for short-range and interstitial 
political choice exposes the party to the hazards of all purveyors of non-durable consumer goods: 
competition with a more attractively packaged brand of nearly identical merchandise" (Kirchheimer 




enough to be recognisable, but could not deviate too much from the other competi-
tors. Kirchheimer claimed that the decreasing membership and voter loyalty 
demanded that catch-all parties look for methods of procuring more permanent 
support through interest groups. "Only the interest group, whether ideological or 
economic in nature or a combination of the two, can provide mass reservoirs of 
readily accessible voters. It has a more constant line of communication and higher 
acceptance for its messages than the catch-all party, which is removed from direct 
contact with the public ..." (Kirchheimer 1966a, 193). However, the catch-all party can 
not afford to identify itself too closely with interest groups as this might discourage 
voters who identify themselves with other interests. In turn, interest groups establish 
connections with a multitude of parties in order to minimise the risk of losing 
influence on government policy. The interdependency and mutual adaptation of the 
catch-all party and the interest groups - the former expecting from the latter electoral 
rewards, the latter expecting rewards in government policy in return - moderates their 
behaviour. Thus, the catch-all party is reduced to a collector of interest group 
demands, resulting in the neglect of unorganised interests. According to Kirchheimer, 
catch-all parties will not advance concrete policy proposals which could be turned into 
electoral weapons by the competitors (Kirchheimer 1966a, 197). Instead, the catch-all 
party will do its utmost to establish consensus and thereby avoid party realignment. 
This moderation in policy proposals enlarged the electoral chances of the catch-all 
party, yet hampered the party's integration function.  
 On the positive side, Kirchheimer argued that the contribution of the catch-all 
party was embedded in its ability to mobilise voters on the basis of their own policy 
preferences, instead of mobilisation on the basis of a priori selected goals by party 
leaders (Kirchheimer, 1966a, 198). This expanded the area of manoeuvrability for 
leaders who were no longer restricted by specific party policy and also gave formerly 
excluded minorities the opportunity to join the political elite. Moreover, Kirchheimer 
asserted, that the "...nomination of candidates for popular legitimation as 
officeholders thus emerges as the most important function of the present-day catch-
all party. Concentration on the selection of candidates for office is in line with an 
increasing role differentiation in industrial society....Compared to his connection with 
interest organisations and voluntary associations of a non-political nature and to his 
frequent encounters with the state bureaucracy, the citizen's relations with the political 
party are becoming more intermittent and of more limited scope" (Kirchheimer 
1966a, 198-199). In contrast, the negative consequence of this looseness of the catch-
all party support excluded the possibility of radical changes in policy. Kirchheimer 
concluded that the role of the political party in Western European society became 
more limited than would appear from its position of formal pre-eminence. In its 
governmental role the catch-all party could only function as a co-ordinator and 
arbitrator between different powers. Via its electoral role the catch-all party produced 
limited popular participation and integration within political institutions. In the words 
of Kirchheimer: "The instrument, the catch-all party, cannot be more rational than its 
nominal master, the individual voter. No longer subject to the discipline of the party 
of integration ... the voters may, by their shifting moods and their apathy, transform 
the sensitive instrument of the catch-all party into something too blind to serve as a 
                                                                                                                                             
1966a, 195). 




link with the functional powerholders of society. Then we may yet come to regret the 
passing - even if it was inevitable - of the class-mass party and the denominational 
party, as we already regret the passing of other features in yesterday's stage of Western 
civilisation" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 200). 
2.5 Continuity in Kirchheimer's political thought 
Although some argue that Kirchheimer did not develop a coherent system of thought 
(see Herz 1966, 2; Herz and Hula 1969, iv; Herz 1989, 17) this chapter illustrates that 
considerable continuity in subject matter and perspective can be found in 
Kirchheimer's work. The core of criticism directed towards Kirchheimer, is that his 
writings were not based on empirical research, but on ad hoc personal observations 
(see for example Heidenheimer, undated). His writings are an amalgamation of ele-
ments from theories on social structures, empirical party-sociology and some 
principles from Downs' economic theory of politics (Sontheimer 1989, 184). 
Furthermore, Kirchheimer seemed particularly influenced by "The Lonely Crowd" by 
Riesman, Glazer and Denny (1950) and "The End of Ideology" written by Daniel Bell 
in 1960 (see Schmidt 1989, 173). Elements from all these publications were combined 
with strong normative views on democratic and social developments in Kirchheimer's 
writings. These views originated mainly from his traumatic experiences during the 
collapse of the Weimar republic and his fear that American political practices would 
also become dominant in Western Europe. Other authors were less fixated on his 
haphazard methodology and opaque lexicon, instead they stressed that the importance 
of Kirchheimer's work lies in his ability to select from numerous data that which was 
relevant, to differentiate general tendencies from specific events and to analyse them 
in an original and creative fashion. Kirchheimer was thus able to depict a new type of 
party, the catch-all party, and simultaneously describe the consequences of its 
emergence for modern democracies (Sontheimer 1989, 186-188).14 
 Whether or not Kirchheimer's scientific work can be considered systematic, there 
is substantial continuity in subject matter throughout his entire oeuvre. The most 
fundamental problem Kirchheimer grappled with is whether the essence of 
democracy is pluralism or consensus. Kirchheimer framed consensus not in terms of 
uniformity of opinion, but in the acceptance of democratic procedures by all 
participants. Kirchheimer's principle tutor, Carl Schmitt, feared 'factionalisation' in the 
political sphere as it threatened the unity of the nation. Instead, Kirchheimer feared 
the drive for unity and consensus would lead to misrepresentation of the class 
structure of society. To Kirchheimer social and political pluralism is a basic 
prerequisite for democracy. 
  Degeneration of pluralism, and thus democracy is the overarching subject matter 
of Otto Kirchheimer's oeuvre. This democratic degeneration is characterised by three 
                                                        
14 Taking an opposite position, Stöss (1989) argued that Kirchheimer did develop a systematic party-
theory. This theory incorporates party-sociological aspects as well as elementary problems of democracy 
in a bourgeois society. According to Stöss, Kirchheimer distinguished four party-types: the party of 
individual representation, the democratic mass-integration party (subdivided in democratic parties of 
integration based on class and on confessional grounds), parties of opposition of principle (or totalitarian 
parties) and catch-all parties. Kirchheimer delineated the development of the (German) party system into 
three stages in connection with the emergence or disappearance of these party types. The period of 
individual representation (1850-1875), the period of emergence of class mass-integration parties (1875-
1945 with the interlude of the totalitarian regime) and the period of the 'catch-all' party (after 1945). 




basic antagonisms, which structure Kirchheimer's work. The first is the use of legal 
means for political ends, which he coined 'political justice' and experienced at first hand in 
the Weimar republic. Abuse of legal provisions eventually leads to deterioration of the 
tripartition between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. This 'cartelization' of 
powers as well as the exclusion of political opponents consequently results in vanishing 
political choice and opposition, the second antagonism in the deterioration of democracy. 
Inevitably, vanishing political choice alienates the citizen from the state, the political 
centre. The state and its citizens no longer share common ideological goals and the 
populace is not represented. This misrepresentation of society at the political level constitutes 
the third antagonism of democratic corrosion. Declining sovereignty of the people 
and the expansion of state activities thrusts citizens from the public sphere into a 
mere private existence. 
 Kirchheimer (1964b) himself enumerated these main themes of his work in the 
introduction to "Politik und Verfassung" (Politics and Constitution). His first central 
concern, he argued, was to identify the determinants of the swift erosion and 
alteration of political systems and the synchronous transformation of democratic 
institutions (constitution, parliament, government, political parties and interest 
groups). Secondly, Kirchheimer thought it his task to uncover the basic mechanisms 
of political order and disorder; which involved the analysis of the struggle between 
different groups in society and the means by which these groups utilised legal means 
for achieving their political goals. Thirdly, the creation of humane and meaningful 
conditions for the individual, including the guarantee of individual freedom and full 
participation in the democratic process, remained a cornerstone of Kirchheimer's 
treatises. 
 
Long after he refrained from considering himself a Marxist, Kirchheimer upheld that 
Marxism remained the best method to analyse society (Herz 1989, 17; Herz and Hula 
1969, xxxvii). This explains Kirchheimer's assertion that the most decisive antithesis 
was the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and not the typical 
German conflict between liberal-democratic institutions and authoritarian powers. 
Still, the shock of the sheer brutality of Adolf Hitler's nazi-regime made Kirchheimer 
very sensitive to manifestations of authoritarianism as well as premonitions of anti-
communism and led him to analyse the origin and consequences of national-socialism 
in depth. Kirchheimer was genuinely disappointed by the post-war developments in 
Europe and his last writings "clearly show this mixture of sadness, resignation and 
indignation" (Herz 1989, 15). The article "Private Man and Society" began with a 
quote from Marx' critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state: "The real human is the 
private person in the current constitution." Kirchheimer persistently emphasised the 
limited capacity of most constitutions to represent societal structures. To typify 
Kirchheimer as a Marxist is, however, too simple. While he continued to use Marxist 
class theory and continuously stressed the influence of economic determinants on the 
political superstructure, Kirchheimer also displayed genuine anxiety about the 
increasing power of state apparatuses. His later work, in particular, emphasised the 
need for political pluralism. 
 Burin and Shell (1969, x) suggested that Kirchheimer's life and work can be 
divided into four periods. First, his German period, in which "Weimar- und was 
dann?" (Kirchheimer 1930a) was his most important essay. The second period 
comprises the years spent in exile in France and the first years in the United States, in 




which Kirchheimer worked for the "Institut für Sozialforschung". His third, and most 
'pragmatic' period was the time spent in US-government employment at the OSS, 
where Kirchheimer felt he worked for the reinstatement of democracy in Europe. In 
his fourth period Kirchheimer became a genuine 'political' scientist as his writings 
showed a broader interest, shifting from problems of the 'state' and 'sovereignty' to 
overall social and political trends, such as the changing industrial and technological 
society as well as the transformation of political institutions (political parties, 
parliaments and trade unions). His years at Columbia University demonstrated a 
decisively sociological concern with the role and conditions of individuals in modern 
society. 
 Throughout these periods, Kirchheimer's approach and subject matter has roughly 
followed the general trend in political science. Traditionally, political science is a very 
descriptive scientific discipline, oriented primarily towards political theories and 
formal political institutions. Traditional institutionalists focused chiefly on the political 
impact of the legislature, the legal system, the state and other administrative and 
economic institutions. Formal laws and structures were regarded as explanatory to 
actual political behaviour. This emphasis on legal and constitutional aspects of politics 
is clearly dominant in Kirchheimer's early work. Until 1933, Kirchheimer 
concentrated on the role of the state as a repressive machinery in the hands of the 
ruling classes. The constitution of such a state echoed the outcome of the class 
struggle. Kirchheimer indicated that when rulers risk losing their privileged positions, 
they will abuse legal provisions. Ruling by decree and dissolution of parliament, in 
order to retain their power positions, are examples of such provisional abuse. 
Although at this point Kirchheimer's writings were primarily of a more legal nature, 
his work was never purely legal in content and significance (see for example 
Kirchheimer 1930d). In his essays on the Weimar Republic a political element is 
always discernible. These writings critically examine social relations and their 
manifestation in justice, constitution and politics. Clearly, Kirchheimer was deeply 
influenced by his tutor at Bonn University, Carl Schmitt. The concepts of legality and 
legitimacy, crucial for the understanding of Kirchheimer's state theory, also played an 
important role in Schmitt's work. Further testimony of a political component in his 
work is the prominence of the concept of 'political justice' in Kirchheimer's critique of 
the Weimar Republic and post-war Europe, particularly Germany. 
 In his analysis of the Weimar democracy, characterised by great social and political 
instability and authoritarian solutions, Kirchheimer displayed a growing awareness for 
the importance of formal democratic rules, elected parliamentary bodies and political 
and civil liberties. It appears safe to assume that Kirchheimer's continuing 
preoccupation with the disturbing effects of the opposition of principle on the 
democratic process stemmed from his traumatic experience in Weimar Germany. 
Then, he was still sceptical about the exaggeration by liberals of the importance of 
constitutions and 'rule of law' (Rechtsstaat) and regarded liberal democracy a 'non-
state', an empty legal machine, thus taking a clear Marxist position. 
 With the dissolution of the Weimar democracy into presidential and subsequently 
Nazi dictatorship, Kirchheimer came to stress emphatically the importance of 
democratic rules, political rights of citizens and elected parliamentary representatives. 
His personal experience with legal procedures and 'justice' being used for political 
ends in different regimes only reinforced this conviction. Most of Kirchheimer's work 
after 1933 deals with the problematic nature of majority rule, rule by presidential 




decree, parliamentary sovereignty, the nature of political legitimacy and the role of the 
bureaucracy. In the same period, Kirchheimer also concentrated on legal-sociological 
subjects, but even this work remained politically relevant. At this point, Kirchheimer 
(1941a) additionally explores at a more theoretically level the problems of class 
conflict and its resolution, that is, political compromise by full political participation 
of all groups in society. 
 Prior to the 1950s, Kirchheimer maintained a Marxist perception of the state and 
argued that power relationships within the state are the result of conflicting social, 
political and economic positions (Kirchheimer 1944). The outcome of social, 
economic and political struggle was not, as pluralists asserted, an appeasing compro-
mise between these conflicting interests, neither can the state be seen as a 'neutral' 
power. The role of the state as arbitrator between groups was reduced by interest 
groups, dominating and controlling the class struggle. As a result, the individual as 
consumer as well as voter, had lost his 'sovereignty'. It is this position of the 
individual in the capitalist state which would become the central focus of 
Kirchheimer's later work. 
 Kirchheimer's decision to remain in the United States and not return to Germany 
after 1945 is essential in grasping the ethos of his post-war writings (Kirchheimer 
1962a). After the Second World War, Kirchheimer published several articles on the 
political developments in Germany, namely, the elections of 1949, the composition of 
the Bundestag and on the government in Eastern Germany. The most important 
feature in his work during this period was the introduction of the concept 'political 
justice' (Kirchheimer 1955; 1961). According to Söllner (1988), throughout the 1950s 
two trends were visible in Kirchheimer's writing. First, his Marxist perspective was 
steadily replaced as Kirchheimer became influenced by pluralist theorists, most 
notably by Laski (1938). The second trend was the introduction of historical and 
sociological aspects in his analysis. This was again in line with a general trend in social 
science. The static approach to politics of the institutionalists and the need for more 
comparative concepts provoked the behaviourist revolution in political science. This 
behaviourist revolution was characterised by a shift of scientific attention to values, 
individual characteristics, attitudes and behaviour as explanatory variables for political 
phenomena. In his analysis of modern capitalist societies, Kirchheimer now seemed 
to combine the Marxist perspective of the state with more liberal notions of concepts 
such as equality and liberty, although he never abandoned his conviction that the 
political structure must genuinely represent the social-economic structure of a society 
for a regime to be legitimate. Attempts by authorities of all regimes, whether 
democratic or authoritarian, to misrepresent certain groups by institutional and 
electoral engineering were fiercely criticised by Kirchheimer. At the same time, 
Kirchheimer seemed to criticise the penetration of the private sphere by state 
institutions, a very liberal criticism. According to Kirchheimer, there was no justifica-
tion for an incisive distinction between totalitarian and constitutional democratic 
political regimes. Both penetrate deeply into the lives of their citizens, not to integrate 
them into the body politic, but to appease them into the role of an uncritical 
consumer. This leaves citizens without means to configure the state and society into 
their own image. 
 In post-war Europe, Kirchheimer detected a waning of the tripartition of functi-
ons between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. He claimed that the 
representatives of these powers, political parties, governments and the courts, were 




increasingly forming a unified cartel. This power block leaves the individual virtually 
powerless in the scarce attempts to influence his or her environment. After the 
Second World War, Kirchheimer concentrated profoundly more on the role of 
political institutions, in particular, the function of political parties within the nation-
state. Kirchheimer posited that the interdependency of political parties and the state 
had increased. According to Kirchheimer, parties were drawing nearer to the state, 
into a state-party cartel which had resulted in the waning of political opposition. 
 Kirchheimer's most significant writings concern the analysis of political systems 
and regimes. Following 1954, Kirchheimer developed a truly comparative approach 
on the transformation of political structures and institutions in Western Europe. He 
made good use of all the information collected during his years in government service; 
data he was not allowed to use in publications during his years in government 
employment (Herz 1989, 13). Freed from the state censorship, Kirchheimer now 
produced his most famous articles on political parties and introduced the catch-all 
concept in 1954. Another prominent topic which gained increasing prominence in his 
work was the role of interest groups in society and the state. Instead of a 
fragmentation of Western party systems, as some authors would typify the develop-
ments of the sixties, Kirchheimer saw a vanishing of opposition into a party-state 
cartel. He regarded the British party system as the classical pattern of government and 
opposition, in which agreement on fundamental features and presentation of 
meaningful policy alternatives enabled a smooth transformation of the machinery of 
government from one party to another. He distinguished two different types of 
deviation from this classical government-opposition model in Europe. Firstly, the 
vanishing of opposition of principle, which had predominated in Europe until World 
War II and secondly, the emergence of the catch-all party in the period after 1945. 
 According to Kirchheimer, the catch-all party did not integrate its followers into 
its own ranks against the official state, but rather performed its integrative function by 
amalgamating the mass-population into the existing political community. The 
weakened antagonisms between the classes in modern industrial societies lead to a 
new type of opposition which was based on pragmatic rather than on ideological 
motives. These oppositional forces no longer strove to fundamentally change society, 
since all parties advanced identical demands. Disagreement was thereby confined to 
the question of priority, methods and accents in solving practical political problems. 
Political opposition was reduced to a non-ideological competitive element as parties 
try to win a maximum of votes among all social strata of the population. Citizens only 
had a meagre and passive role as the mediation of conflicting interests will be effected 
through interests-groups rather than through political parties. In countries where the 
opposition of principle is left mainly to the communist parties, this ultimately poses a 
threat to the parliamentary system. Kirchheimer (1959a) regarded a democratic 
regime, confronted with a large opposition of principle, as the least stable type of 
democratic government. He pointed out that "Weltanschauungsparteien" (parties of 
socialist and religious denomination) did not integrate their members into the political 
community as a whole, but rather tended to integrate them into a particular party 
organisation. This had a negative as well as a positive side. Negatively, it isolated the 
members' social activities from the political community and thus rendered consensus 
impossible, but conversely it protected its members against the consequences of 
atomisation of the modern industrial society by promising a betterment of life in a 
more just political and social order. Kirchheimer regretted the disappearance of party 




systems similar to the Weimar Republic; those with an opposition of principle against 
the prevailing economic and social structure. According to Kirchheimer, modern 
parties no longer constructed a blue-print of the community as a whole. The 
difference between the Weimar period and the post-war period, Kirchheimer asserted, 
was that the Weimar Republic suffered from a crisis of political elites, while the post-
war catch-all period is characterised by a crisis of mass politics. Where the weakness 
of the parties in the Weimar Republic could be found in their integration-deficiency, 
the weakness of the catch-all parties lay in its representation-deficit. This was caused 
by the emergence of the welfare state, which solved the most urgent problems 
without deteriorating the position of competing social groups. Subsequently, there 
was no longer serious deprivation of certain social groups. 
 In his later writings this general process of rationalisation of the modern world and 
its consequences became Kirchheimer's most important concern. Depoliticisation, 
privatisation and the incorporation of the working class into the mass-consumption 
society of the post-war period had not replaced the earlier working class-alienation 
(Entfremdung). The working class (now called 'executants' to underline their passive 
role) had come to accept the role of middle-class consumers. They had little interest 
in politics and casted their vote only to legitimise the political system. Furthermore, 
political candidates of catch-all parties beguiled only a real initiative or choice. 
According to Kirchheimer, no party or other intermediary institution provided 
legitimisation, in that catch-all parties no longer reflected the social structure of 
society. The effect of this party system change upon the participation of citizens was 
perhaps Kirchheimer's deepest concern in his later work. 
 
What makes Kirchheimer’s oeuvre remarkable and valuable is that while some 
author’s argued that politicians were conducting ancient feuds long forgotten by 
everyone else, Kirchheimer's concern was the opposite. He conceived the catch-all 
party to be an instrument which betrayed the interests of the masses. According to 
Kirchheimer, post-war politics differed from the interbellum in that the catch-all 
people's party acted as an agent of the personal political ambition of elites, rather than 
a mass organisation oriented towards the mobilisation of the people. The diminished 
activity of the ordinary citizen in politics, within as well as outside party organisations, 
indicated this depoliticisation. The incapacity of social democratic parties in particular 
to increase intra-party activity and democracy, thus failing to create a working class 
identity and solidarity, was fiercely targeted by Kirchheimer. Social democratic parties 
no longer challenged the capitalist state and related mode of production, which 
resulted in the disappearance of principled opposition against these structures. 
Kirchheimer stressed that the domination of the catch-all party in contemporary party 
systems entailed severe implications for the quality of parliamentary democracy. This 
process severely limited the choice of the electorate, the effectiveness of opposition 
and the pluriformity of political representation. Subsequently, the functioning and 
development of individual parties as well as West European party systems as a whole 
transformed significantly. It is precisely this sophisticated and multifarious cluster of 
social and political aspects which, according to Kirchheimer, indicated a profound 
transformation of democratic politics, that now justifies a closer examination of 
Kirchheimer's catch-all theory. Although Kirchheimer's complex and broad ideas are 
not easy to operationalise, it is this which I will attempt in the following chapter. 
 




Summary of the main ideas underpinning Otto Kirchheimer’s work: 
• political justice: constitutions and legal provisions are used for political ends by 
powerholders. 
• political inclusion: for a regime to be legitimate the political structure should represent 
the social structure. There is substantial penetration of political parties by interest 
groups, while unorganised interests remain unrepresented. 
• political opposition: opposition of ‘principle’ is vanishing and the electorate is deprived of 
political alternatives by a state-party cartel. 
 
 





3 A definition of Kirchheimer's catch-all party 
3.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the Lipset and Rokkan 'freeze-hypothesis' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), 
Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis points to a fundamental restructuring of West 
European political systems. Kirchheimer feared that the American type of party 
system would become dominant in Western Europe (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185; 1954a, 
250; 1961b, 256). He stressed the competitive element of catch-allism and argued that 
when one party adopts the catch-all strategy, other parties in the party system are 
forced to follow its example. Inconsistently, Kirchheimer excluded certain parties 
from the catch-all development when he suggested that the class and denominational 
mass parties, in particular, were transforming into catch-all parties.15 Moreover, he 
provided inadequate evidence as to why other mass parties, as well as cadre parties 
and parties of individual representation, would not succumb to the pressures to 
transform into catch-all parties. Assuming that catch-allism was indeed a contagious 
phenomenon, logically catch-allism would either be ubiquitous within a party system 
or hardly discernible at all. Presuming there is convergence of political parties in 
Western Europe towards catch-allism, parties obviously begin this process of 
transformation from different (ideological, organisational and electoral) starting points 
and will not necessarily follow the same course and speed of transformation. 
Moreover, this transformation into catch-all parties will not happen overnight, but 
more likely constitute a gradual process. Therefore, the concepts of 'mass parties' and 
'catch-all parties' should not be regarded as a dichotomy. Rather, these concepts refer 
to two different party types with distinctive characteristics, which constitute two 
extremes on a continuum of 'catch-allism' on which all parties can be placed and few 
parties will be pure 'mass' or pure catch-all parties.16 
 Furthermore, Kirchheimer's conceptualisation of the catch-all party is ambiguous 
and not sufficiently lucid, complicated by the fact that the concept was developed 
over a period which at least spans the years from 1954 until 1966, during which 
Kirchheimer provided very incoherent indications to what precisely constitutes a 
catch-all party. The reader becomes confused at times, because the catch-all party is 
sometimes referred to as the "catch-all people's party" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), 
other times as the "catch-all mass party" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250; 1966a, 191), the 
"conservative catch-all party" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250), the "Christian type of catch-
all people's parties" (Kirchheimer 1959a, 270) and still another version is the 
"personal loyalty variant of the catch-all party" (Kirchheimer, 1966a, 187, footnote 
                                                        
15 "former class-mass parties and denominational mass parties are both under pressure to become catch-
all peoples' parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190). Kirchheimer first excludes communist mass-parties, but is 
not consistent: "However, even in France - not to speak of Italy - Communist policies are under pressure 
to accommodate the new style" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 191). 
 
16 Botella (1989, 9) draws the same conclusion arguing that we should be "thinking of "catch-all" and 
"mass" parties not as two different groups of empirically visible realities but in terms of a "continuum" 
along which we can place actual political parties. The extremes of the "continuum" would be the "pure" 
definitions (in a Weberian, ideal-type sense) of catch-all and mass parties respectively." 




12). Only if one tries to construct an operational definition does it become clear how 
vague and unkempt the catch-all concept actually is. Moreover, the formulation of the 
five developments which Kirchheimer (1996a, 190) regarded to be the principal 
indicators of the transformation from mass- or individual representation parties into 
catch-all parties are indistinct and difficult to operationalise intelligibly. 
 Finally, Kirchheimer himself did not empirically and systematically test the catch-
all development. Lacking the necessary data and methods for such an empirical cross-
national analysis as well as possibly the inclination to carry out such a study, 
Kirchheimer's 'evidence' for the catch-all development is at best illustrative and 
inconclusive. Overstating this point somewhat, Mayer (1989, 160) argues that "(i)n 
relying on such illustrations, Kirchheimer chooses to ignore numerous parties that 
clearly are not catch-all. He never suggests criteria for disconfirming the claim that a 
trend does, in fact, exist in the catch-all direction". Obviously, what is needed is a 
valid and accurate definition and research strategy to evaluate the catch-all thesis. 
 In order to develop this valid and unambiguous definition of Kirchheimer's catch-
all concept, Sartori's method of concept reconstruction and formation will be used 
(Sartori 1970; 1984; 1991). Sartori's methodology implies that, first, the meaning 
(connotation) of the catch-all concept must be reconstructed by enumerating all 
characteristics mentioned in the literature in order to establish what exactly 
characterises a catch-all party. The aim of this exercise is to find a common core of 
characteristics and organise these constituent abstract elements in a meaningful and valid 
manner (Sartori 1984, 50). Sartori (1984, 55) argues that the "crux of (re)-
conceptualisation consists of separating the defining (core) properties (or necessary 
characteristics) from the accompanying properties (or contingent and accidental 
characteristics)." The defining properties delineate the extension of the concept, that 
is all objects to which the concept applies (Sartori 1984, 24). In this study, a twofold 
strategy is used to find the defining or core properties of the catch-all concept. To 
ensure validity of this operationalisation, this inquiry first examines Kirchheimer's 
original development of the catch-all concept, and second it evaluates the debate on 
'catch-allism' which followed its introduction. In order to avoid misconstruing catch-
allism, this study attempts to move away from all the different interpretations and to 
remain as close as possible to the original meaning of the catch-all concept. Therefore, 
Kirchheimer's original texts, references and personal notes function as a point of 
departure for the selection of the empirical indicators of catch-allism. 
3.2 The original catch-all concept 
Kirchheimer (1954a) introduced the catch-all party concept with particular reference 
to the West-German party system and also explicitly referred to the United States as 
the classical example of a catch-all party system (see Kirchheimer 1966a, 185; 1961b, 
256), without providing a clear definition. Twelve years after its first introduction, 
Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) had still only formulated a very cursory definition of the 
transformation into a catch-all party which is now conceived of as involving five 
related elements: a) drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage. (...) b) Further 
strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged 
from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system 
rather than identification with the goals of their particular organisation. c) 
Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered a historical 




relic which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all party image. d) De-emphasis of 
the class-gardée, specific social-class or denominational clientele, in favour of 
recruiting voters among the population at large. e) Securing access to a variety of 
interest groups for financial and electoral reasons. These five elements, in turn, can be 
categorised into an ideological dimension (point a), an organisational dimension 
(points b, c and e) and an electoral dimension (points d and e). These three 
dimensions will structure the format of the ensuing analysis. 
 An earlier version of Kirchheimer's renowned article, "The Transformation of the 
European Party Systems" (Kirchheimer 1964c), showed that considerable revisions 
had been made to the original manuscript17. The most substantive alterations were 
made to the section which describes the post-war catch-all party. This suggests that 
Kirchheimer, between the initial version and the final published version, rethought 
and re-formulated his views considerably. The most significant revisions to the 
original manuscript are made to the section in which Kirchheimer elaborates on the 
factors which influence the catch-all development in different European countries 
(page 185 to 188 have almost been completely re-written). Also, the section in which 
the expressive function is discussed (page 189 in the later version) and the part on the 
aggregative function (on page 194-195 of the 1965-text) have been significantly 
modified. Finally, Kirchheimer added a substantial portion of text to the conclusion 
on the attitude of the party's leadership towards the functional powerholders. Most 
important in the context of this study, however, are the changes that were made to the 
five characteristics which Kirchheimer listed as the properties of the catch-all 
development. In the earlier version Kirchheimer stated that the change towards catch-
allism involves: "Further development of a party bureaucratic apparatus committed to 
organisational success without regard to ideological consistency" (Kirchheimer 1964, 
16). The element "further strengthening of the top leadership groups" (Kirchheimer 
1965, 190) has later been added to the definition. 
 More clarity on the original meaning of the catch-all concept can also be achieved 
by scrutinising Kirchheimer's personal notes which he used for his lectures at 
Columbia University and unpublished papers he wrote.18 In one undated paper19 
Kirchheimer specified in which domains the major changes in the character and role 
the parties have to be analysed (Kirchheimer undated I, 5-7). Firstly, Kirchheimer 
suggests examining the electorate of the party, focusing on the correlation between 
social class and political activism. Secondly, he asserted that attention must be paid to 
the party membership and party leadership. Kirchheimer argued that the role of party 
members had undergone changes and the increased gap between members and 
leaders of the party should be investigated. Furthermore, to evaluate changes in action 
                                                        
17 Otto Kirchheimer died suddenly before submitting the final text of the chapter. Joseph LaPalombara 
included the text "with only minor revisions" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 177). However, the differences 
between the first draft (Kirchheimer 1964) and the published version are substantial. 
18 Part of Kirchheimer's personal papers can be found in the German Intellectual Emigre Collection, 
Department of Special Collections and Archives, State University of Albany, New York. During the 
summer of 1994 I analyzed the material from this archive of which the results are presented here. 
19 This paper (referred to as Kirchheimer undated I) is entitled: "The realities of Political responsibility: 
Parliament and Party in Western Europe. Outline for a Research Project." It must have been written after 
1962 as Kirchheimer refers to his position at Columbia University. 




preferences of parties, Kirchheimer stated that the representatives in political office 
needed to be analysed, as well as the cohesiveness of party organisation and the 
mechanisms of enforcing party decisions. Another unpublished paper (Kirchheimer 
1964d), which dealt with core political problems in advanced industrial societies, 
provides additional information on the essence of catch-allism, most important of 
which is de-ideologization of parties. The function of the catch-all party was restricted 
to the "effective selection of political personnel ... Change to catch-all party allocates 
to the party mainly electioneering or referenda engineering functions and de-
emphasises anything more than symbolic participation of the mass of the people in 
the political process" (Kirchheimer 1964d, 8). Echoing his earlier concerns, 
Kirchheimer stressed the invisibility of ordinary citizens in the decisive power 
structures and especially emphasised the powerlessness of the lower strata. 
 
Although no previous study has ever focused on the direct references and intimations 
Kirchheimer gave in order to specify the meaning of these various elements, an 
analysis of such sources can facilitate a more precise understanding of what was 
involved. For example, in referring to "further strengthening of top leadership 
groups" and "downgrading of the role of the individual party member", it is 
imperative to note that Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) points specifically to earlier work by 
Lohmar (1963) and Pizzorno (1964) to indicate developments at the organisational 
level: 
 
"Ample material to points b) and c) may be found in the interesting study by a practising German 
politician: Ulrich Lohmar, Innerparteiliche Demokratie, Stuttgart, 1963, esp. pp. 35-47 and 117-124. See also, 
A. Pizzorno, "The Individualistic Mobilization of Europe", in Daedalus (Winter 1964), pp.199, 217." 
 
This reference to Lohmar (1963) suggests that Kirchheimer interpreted the downgra-
ding of the role of the individual party member as a multifaceted process. This 
process first includes a stagnation in the size of membership of parties20 and secondly, 
the idea that the social composition of the membership of parties will shift towards a 
more balanced representation of different social groups.21 Thirdly, the relevance and 
status of membership declines for the party's financial revenues in favour of state 
financing.22 The diminishing function of party-members as mediators between party-
leaders and the populace is the fourth element here.23 Finally, the process of 
                                                        
20 "Die Mitgliederschaft ist bei der SPD über Jahrzehnte relativ konstant geblieben .... Das deutet ... auf 
eine relatieve Stabilität, aber auch auf die Stagnation der Mitgliederbewegung hin" (Lohmar 1963, 35).  
21 "Die berufliche Schichtung der Mitgliederschaft in beiden Parteien erklärt sich u.a. daraus, daß die 
jeweiligen sozialen Gruppen ihre spezifischen Interessen bei jeweils einer der großen Parteien am besten 
aufgehoben wähnen" (Lohmar 1963, 36). 
22 "Die Bedeutung der Finanzierung der Arbeit politischer Parteien durch die Beiträge der Mitglieder wird 
jedoch vermutlich in nächster Zeit zurücktreten, da die Parteien im Bundestag und in den Landtagen dazu 
übergegangen sind, sich erhebliche Zuwendungen aus öffentlichen Mitteln zu beschaffen. Ob die teilweise 
Verlagerung der Finanzierung der Parteien auf den Staat zu einer Stärkung des Status der Mitglieder 
führen kann, darf mann bezweifeln" (Lohmar 1963, 37). 
23 "Die Mitgliedshaft der Parteien ist nur in unzureichenden Grade als Mittler zwischen Führung und 
Bevölkerung anzusprechen. Sie hat weder in der innenparteilichen Willensbildung noch in der 
Meinungsbildung nach außen Bedeutung erlangen können" (Lohmar 1963, 43). 




transformation towards a catch-all party organisation involves an increasingly 
negligible role of members in the selection of candidates.24 The further strengthening 
of upper echelons of the party organisation must be understood as an unavoidable 
consequence of representation which leads to indirect (co-opted) (s)election of leaders 
(Lohmar 1963, 117-124).25 As a consequence of mass consumption and protection by 
the welfare state, Kirchheimer feared that the masses would increasingly be excluded 
from political affairs. The catch-all party abandons the recruitment and encapsulation 
of members as a principal and permanent activity. "The very catch-all character of the 
party makes membership loyalty far more difficult to expect and at best never 
sufficient to swing results" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 193). Kirchheimer clearly distin-
guished the mass party from the catch-all party at the organisational level: "To the 
older party of integration the citizen, if he so desired, could be closer. Then it was a 
less differentiated organisation, part channel of protest, part source of protection, part 
surveyor of visions of the future. Now, in its linear descendant in a transfigured 
world, the catch-all party, the citizen finds a relatively remote, at times quasi-official 
and alien structure. (...) the individual and society may indeed find the catch-all party - 
non-utopian, non-oppressive, and ever so flexible - an ingenious and useful political 
instrument" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 199). 
 Kirchheimer frequently used Duverger's conceptualisations of mass and cadre 
parties (Kirchheimer 1966a, 178 and Kirchheimer 1954, 246, 259) and commented 
that the "internal-external creation dichotomy has to be viewed in the light of 
presence or absence of a supporting framework for religious or class-motivated 
parallel organisations. The local committee of the internally created bourgeois party 
and its financial backers can never serve as such a fool-proof prop of electoral success 
as can the network of parallel organisations typical of external parties" (Kirchheimer 
1966a, 178 footnote 1). The function of these affiliated organisations are obvious to 
Kirchheimer; "Socialist parties around the turn of the century exercised an important 
socialising function in regard to their members. They subjected a considerable 
number of people hitherto living only as isolated individuals to voluntarily accepted 
discipline operating in close connections with expectations of a future total 
transformation of society" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 182). According to Kirchheimer, the 
catch-all party is organisationally more differentiated and offers less opportunity to 
the individual citizen to participate in the internal decision-making processes and 
therefore, ancillary organisations will gradually be rendered superfluous. Kirchheimer 
also emphasised that financial resources had become increasingly important in order 
to communicate with the electorate. As catch-all parties no longer possessed the 
                                                        
24 Lohmar 1963, 43: "Sowohl bei der innerparteilichen führungsauswahl als auch bei der Nominierung 
van Kandidaten für die Parlemente erweist sich, daß die große Mehrheit der Mitglieder auf das 
Geschehen keinen oder nuhr sehr geringen Einfluß hat." 
25 Pizzorno (1964) in turn, emphasised the modifications of power structures in European societies. 
Political parties no longer espoused a change to the structural elements of society and tended to abandon 
the pursuit of ideological goals. Selection of (party)leaders therefore ceases to be determined uniquely by 
class origin or ideological orientation, but instead by their technical and managerial qualities: "The circle 
where political personnel are recruited has grown numerically, spread socially (...), and risen qualitatively. 
(...) The chances for attaining political power have improved for individuals belonging to the middle and 
lower middle classes, and not only for those belonging to the classes which are the traditional reservoir of 
the ruling groups. (...) ...technical-economic values now constitute effective standards of selection." 
(Pizzorno 1964, 212-217). 




means of communication of a mass-integration party (party-press and ancillary 
organisations), they needed to communicate through other channels and with other 
means. When volunteers are unavailable, the organisation then, becomes less labour 
and more capital intensive. This professionalisation of political parties leads to 
proportionally larger amounts of money spent on salaries of experts as well as 
increasing campaign expenditures. 
 For electoral as well as financial reasons catch-all parties will secure access to a 
variety of interest groups: "The financial reasons are obvious, but they are not the 
most important where official financing is available, as in Germany, or where access 
to the most important media of communication is fairly open, as in England and 
Germany" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190-191). Kirchheimer suggested two financial 
sources which gained eminence for catch-all parties, namely financial backing by the 
state and by interest-groups, whereas the prominence of membership revenues 
abated. Kirchheimer is incisive about the electoral reason for this approachment to 
interest organisations: "(t)he chief reason is to secure electoral support via interest-
group intercession" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190). 
 
Kirchheimer regarded the electoral dimension of crucial importance, which is clear 
from the fact that this dimension gives the catch-all party its name. The catch-all 
"people's" party attempts to transgress the (already declining) socio-economic and 
cultural cleavages among the electorate in order to attract a broader ‘audience’ (Kirch-
heimer 1965, 184). 
 Commenting on inter-party elite co-operation and consensus Kirchheimer (1966a, 
188) referred to Torgersen (1962) to illustrate how Scandinavian parties stabilised 
their political relations.26 Kirchheimer argued that the Swedish and Norwegian social 
democrats had no incentive to change their form of recruitment and electoral appeal. 
The parties reduced political conflict to a minimum by decreasing the differences in 
their political programs. Political conflict was only exhibited when necessary to 
emphasise the distinctiveness of the parties to the electorate. Parties adopted a 
position in the political centre by moving away from extreme policy stances. 
Moreover, parties de-emphasised 'old' political issues and traditional lines of conflict 
which were considered antiquated and inappropriate. All political leaders co-operated 
closely, thus leaving little room for political opposition. This indicated a development 
from 'ideological politics' to 'pluralistic politics.' Furthermore, political competition 
was minimised and political participation of citizens declined as a result of this. 
According to Kirchheimer, such a development can be assessed by examining changes 
in electoral turnout, reduced involvement in organised party activity and citizens' 
participation in electoral meetings and rallies. 
 With reference to the work of Rokkan and Valen (1963), Kirchheimer finds 
additional evidence for a reduction in political competition. He specifically referred to 
                                                        
26 In this article Torgersen made a distinction between four problems. First, the decreasing differences 
between the platforms and programs of parties, which concerns the major political alternatives within a 
political system. Second, the low quality of the intellectual and academic discussion. Third, the problem of 
declining mass activity, reducing parties to "pretty empty organizational shells, since what they offer is just 
the difference between "tweedledee" and "tweedledum" in a society where other and more exiting ways of 
spending one's leisure time have emerged." The fourth problem relates to the channels of political 
influence in cases such as Austria, where parties "have established elaborate agreements between 
themselves in order to share power" (Torgersen 1962, 159-160). 




page 29 of the article, in which Rokkan and Valen sketch a trend toward de-
ideologisation and de-politicisation: "Urbanisation, industrialisation and the growth of 
the national economy have created new lines of conflict and have also gradually 
affected the alignments of leaders and followers in the local communities. Conditions 
in the peripheral areas have created important barriers, socio-economic as well as 
geographical, against the spread of partisan politics and have made for persistently 
low levels of politicisation." 
 Kirchheimer (1966a, 191) cited a similar argument by Lipset (1964) in support of 
the assertion that there is a general decline in ideological conflict as well as in political 
participation. Increasing affluence and consequent upward social mobility within 
Western industrial democracies resulted in the emergence of new middle strata. 
According to Lipset, professionalisation of politics minimised the class conflict and 
generated substantial political consensus and moderation as well as a pragmatic 
orientation among all major parties after 1945. Parties make a trans-class appeal, with 
a programme spearheaded by collective bargaining and moderate political and socio-
economic changes. Lipset (1964, 268-272) argued that in Western social systems the 
class conflict between representatives of the left and the right were resolved amicably 
with social-democratic ideology. Parties of the right have accepted the welfare state 
and economic planning and the leftist parties had become more moderate in their 
revision of capitalism. Catholic and socialist mass parties were transforming their 
electoral appeal, losing their membership and attendance at party meetings as well as 
the readership of their newspapers.27 Non-partisan interest groups, on the other hand, 
gained in membership and power. Voters were far less loyal to the traditional socialist 
parties as a result of the emergence of a new middle class. Even if citizens remained 
loyal to a party at elections, their commitment to the party declined. At that point in 
time, Lipset (1964, 282-290) perceived only moderate parties, with a middle class 
appeal, competing in the political arena. 
 In his lecture notes, Kirchheimer clarified what he meant with the wider electoral 
'catchment' of parties28. In the mid-1960s, according to Kirchheimer, parties in the 
main countries of Continental Europe and in Britain change significantly and become 
American style catch-all parties. These parties ceased the recruitment of their voters 
among a specific clientele and although parties can never appeal to one hundred 
percent of the voters, " the general appeal is to all social classes. Only those with 
definite points of view contra are excluded." (Kirchheimer undated II, 27). According 
to Kirchheimer, a Catholic party, for example, can appeal to all voters with the 
exception of convinced anti-clericals. To Kirchheimer, this mass appeal is facilitated 
by the fading of class distinctions and increasing social mobility. Votes are attracted, 
not on the basis of a consistent pre-set party program, but through the personality of 
the party leader. The catch-all party thus reduced politics to individual political 
personalities. Kirchheimer thought that if the 'Weltanschauung' of the party was lost, 
the electorate would shift its loyalty when the personal image changed. 
                                                        
27 "The transformation in class attitudes as reflected in political and interest group behavior is most 
noticeable in northern non-Latin Europe and among the socialist and Roman Catholic political parties." 
(Lipset 1964, 272). "In Germany and in Italy, the Christian Democratic type parties, with their efforts to 
retain the support of a large segment of the unionized working classes, have made a trans-class appeal in 
favor of moderate changes." (Lipset 1964, 276). 
28 Kirchheimer's lecture notes are also available at the German Emigre Archive at Albany. The term 
'catchment' was coined by Houska (1985). 





In addition to authors mentioned above, Kirchheimer also referred to Anthony 
Downs (1957) for catch-all characteristics on the ideological dimension: "In 
Anthony Downs's well-known model, action preference simply results from the 
party's interest in the proximate goal, the winning of the next election. In consequence 
the party will arrange its policies in such a way that the benefits accruing to the 
individual members of the community are greater than the losses resulting from its 
policy" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 195). This Downsian concept of the 'multi-policy party' 
is in its essence equivalent to Kirchheimer's catch-all concept.29 Both authors pointed 
to the fact that parties sacrificed their former ideological position, in order to 
maximise their electoral appeal. Catch-all parties are competitive; they aim at vote-
maximisation and are no longer mere representatives for certain social strata. The 
catch-all party is described as a mass-consumer good for it mobilises voters on policy-
preferences rather than on ideology. Their multi-interpretable ideologies are products 
for the electoral market, being limited only by the fact that voters will not vote if all 
parties stress totally identical programs. Parties therefore, compete by means of 
personalities (candidates), traditional loyalties and other 'irrational' means.30 
 Regarding ideology Kirchheimer refers to Lipset (1964, 290-299) again, who argues 
that the communist parties seemed reluctant to accept the new social realities, 
although some (like the PCI) modified their ideology in a social-democratic direction. 
In deference to Duverger, Kirchheimer specifically excluded the (communist) anti-
system parties from the catch-all development, although he argued that the French 
and Italian communist parties were more inclined to adopt the catch-all style 
(Kirchheimer 1966a, 191). In the text referred to by Kirchheimer, Duverger (1964) 
argued that the need for parties to coalesce with others makes them more moderate in 
their political stance. Whenever parties in coalition cabinets are faced with concrete 
problems they refrain from fundamentally changing the existing political order. In the 
words of Duverger (1964, 245): "The reciprocal isolation of governing politicians and 
ideologues is harmful to both. Denied contact with ideas and ideologies and losing 
sight of distant goals by concentrating on immediate affairs, governing politicians 
condemn themselves to immobility and turn to financial deals (...)." Political 
compromise and centrist positions are now more likely to develop as all parties 
consist of factions or wings which spread widely across the ideological spectrum. 
These different factions counterbalance and check one another against any extremist 
tendency of the party. Due to this ideological convergence, alternation in cabinet 
composition does no longer lead to different policies. 
 On the ideology and policy of modern political parties, Kirchheimer remarked in 
                                                        
29 Mintzel 1984, 66: "Kirchheimer beruft sich in seinem klassischen Artikel über "Den Wandel des 
westeuropäischen Parteiensystems" lediglich in einer fußnote ausdrücklich auf die "Ökonomische Theorie 
der Demokratie" von Downs. Bei näheren Hinsehen wird aber deutlich, daß die hintergründigen 
"Anleihen" Kirchheimers so weitgehend ist, daß in bezug auf das Volksparteikonzept von einer geistigen 
Vaterschafts Downs gesprochen werden muß. Kirchheimers artikel hinterläßt an vielen Stellen geradezu 
den Eindruck, als habe sein Autor wichtige Teilstücke des Zweiparteien-Konkurrenzmodells van Anthony 
Downs nur mit historischen Datenmaterial und Beispielen angereichert." 
30 The difference between the analyses of Kirchheimer and Downs is, that Downs explains this behavior 
with a rational choice model and Kirchheimer ascribed catch-all behavior to the "present conditions of 
spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive class lines" 
which puts "parties under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190). 




his lectures: "While parties are mass parties, a party large enough to get a majority has 
to be so catch-all that it cannot have a unique ideological program" (Kirchheimer 
1962c, 1). This shows that Kirchheimer assumed modern parties adopt similar policy 
positions and emphasised similar issues, though it is still not clear which position is 
taken or which issues catch-all parties embrace. From another section it emerged that 
Kirchheimer believed catch-all parties adopt a position in the centre of the political 
spectrum: "Under proportional representation, one party can ignore the others in 
establishing its program, and can emphasise the points in which it is unique. However, 
the CDU and SPD aim for the middle. (In) English and American systems, parties 
fight for marginal voters. There are certain people who always vote for one party, but 
in order to get the floating vote one party minimises its differences from the next" 
(Kirchheimer 1962c, 3). Catch-allism, according to Kirchheimer, is indicated by 
convergence of political parties to the centre of the political spectrum. 
 
This close examination of the evolution of Kirchheimer's conceptualisation of catch-
allism and of the references he made to support his assertions, provides adequate 
clues to what Kirchheimer considered to indicate catch-allism. In accordance with 
Sartori’s method of concept (re)construction, these findings will be checked against 
the main arguments in the continuing debate in political science literature over the 
interpretation and measurement of catch-allism. 
3.3 The debate on catch-allism 
Ever since Kirchheimer coined and developed the term catch-all party it has been 
cited in numerous texts which deal with European party systems. The indiscriminate 
acceptance and use of the term is mainly pre-empted by the obvious, but very sketchy, 
evidence Kirchheimer provided for in his thesis. Furthermore, the term fell in line 
with the fashionable end-of-ideology literature.31 Superficial confirmation of 
Kirchheimer's analysis was evidenced in November 1959 by the ratification of the Bad 
Godesberg programme in which the German SPD distanced itself from its former 
Marxist position and adopted the principle of private ownership. Additionally, the 
formation of the grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD in 1966 
highlighted, for many political observers, the 'waning of opposition' in an extreme 
form. Why the term catch-allism remained to be in vogue in political science 
literature, even in the face of evident re-ideologization and increasing polarisation 
during the 1970s, is not easily explained. Neither is the renewed attention the catch-all 
concept received during the 1980s. 
 
As it is difficult to evaluate all the references to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, the 
selection of body of literature for this study is based on the comprehensiveness in 
which a particular text deals with defining the catch-all party concept and whether the 
concept is framed in a comparative empirical context. The summary of the debate is 
structured on the basis of the three dimensions which were differentiated earlier: the 
ideological, organisational and electoral dimension. 
 Although authors put different emphases on, and have their own interpretation of 
                                                        
31 see Marshall 1949, 67 ff.; Aron, 1955, 219 ff.; Bell 1960, 369-375; Shils 1955, 52-58; Lipset 1960, 403-
417, 1970, 267-304; Kirchheimer 1957, 127-156. 




the reduction of ideology, the characteristics mentioned by the various authors of this 
ideological dimension of catch-allism can be summarised in five categories: catch-
all parties adopt an electoral strategy aimed at vote maximisation, they have increasing 
similarities in issue emphasis, catch-all parties downgrade their traditional ideology, 
they mediate the different interests and fifth, a catch-all party adopts a centrist 
position in the party systems. There is, however, some overlap in the interpretation of 
these ideological elements. The electoral strategy aimed at vote maximisation seems to 
be the overarching element. Increasing issue similarity is indicated by the search for 
"themes that can appeal to the electorate as a whole rather than to specific groups or 
classes" (Wolinetz 1979, 302); emphasis on general and valence issues, as well as on 
issues that are designed not to deter potential voters (Dittrich 1983) or "emphasis on 
popular, consensus issues" (Norris 1993, 1). Still, other authors define this element as 
increasing policy agreement (Schmidt 1989; Katz and Mair 1992). The element of 
downgrading traditional ideology is emphasised by many authors32, stating, for 
example, that it results in "diminishing ideological distance between parties" (Schmidt 
1989, 174). Many authors stress that catch-all parties adopt a centre position in the 
political spectrum.33 The mediation of interests is highlighted by Tarrow (1969) who 
argued that catch-all parties adopt moderate electoral strategies which lead to 
depolarisation (see also Herz 1989, 19 and Norris 1993, 1) and increasing coalition 
potential (Dittrich 1983; Keman 1988; 1994; Schmidt 1989). 
 Several authors have argued that the crucial dimension of catch-allism is the 
organisational dimension (see Panebianco 1988). Mair (1989), for example, asserts 
that, apart from the first characteristic Kirchheimer enumerates (the decline in 
ideological baggage), all other characteristics have organisational implications, while in 
addition Dittrich (1983, 266) insists that in order to scrutinise the catch-all thesis "we 
need to get inside the parties." The organisational features of catch-allism are related 
to the means of communication between the party and the electorate, the financial 
structure of the party, the function of the party in a democratic polity, to the size and 
role of its membership, the professionalisation of the party organisation and to the 
relative power position of the party leadership. 
 The decline in membership is an essential indicator of catch-allism (Tarrow 1969, 
170; Mintzel 1984). Indeed, Naßmacher (1993) defined the catch-all party solely on 
the basis of its member-to-voter ratio. Others argued that not only the number of 
members decreases, but also their internal participation and influence on decision-
making up to the point where they are effectively marginalised.34 The main 
beneficiaries of this power shift are those who lead the party. As party leaders can no 
longer rely on the mass-party organisation, they must procure their staff and financial 
means elsewhere. Professionalisation and differentiation are thus inevitable reper-
cussions.35 Politics increasingly becomes a profession of experts, while at the same 
                                                        
32 see Mintzel 1984; Buchaas 1981; Wolinetz 1979, 302; Schmidt 1985; 1989; Mayer 1980a; Dittrich 1983; 
Smith 1989; Farneti 1985; Müller 1991; 1992b; 1992c; Manning 1992. 
33  Wolinetz 1979, 302-305; Norris 1993, 1; Keman 1988, 174-178; Schmidt 1985, 392; Schmidt 1989, 174. 
34 Mintzel 1984; Mintzel 1990; Panebianco 1988; Dittrich 1983; Müller 1991; 1992; Mair 1989; Katz and 
Mair 1992; 1994. 
35 Tarrow 1969; Mintzel 1984; Smith 1989; Norris 1991. Panebianco (1988, 221 and 232-235) argues: "If 
Kirchheimer's theory about the transformation of mass parties into catch-all parties is correct, the 




time the capital intensity of the party organisation and its electoral campaigns 
increases (Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1991). Most notably, generous state party 
finance makes parties less dependent on membership fees (Müller 1991; 1992c). 
Parties additionally rely progressively more on external interest groups, rather than on 
members in order to finance the party organisation (Panebianco 1988). In this 
process, party organisations have become more uniform and their scope of activities 
(or functions) has narrowed (Sundberg 1985, 315). Additionally, catch-all parties are 
primarily involved in the recruitment of popular leaders (Wolinetz 1991). The primary 
function of the catch-all party is the nomination of candidates for public office.36 
Furthermore, most parties no longer directly control the national media (most 
importantly television) and have come to depend on non-party channels of 
communication.37 
 Kirchheimer considered the electoral dimension of catch-allism pivotal enough 
to use this dimension for its label: catch-all party. In describing parties which 
endeavour to appeal to a multitude of different voter groups, Kirchheimer focused 
"on the ways in which class or denominational parties adapt to weakened loyalties. 
Minimally, any test of the catch-all thesis should be couched in terms of changes in 
bases of support" (Wolinetz 1979, 6). Electorally, three electoral factors surfaced from 
this debate: the size and composition of the party's electorate, the party's connection 
with the electorate and its relation with interest-groups. 
 Most authors which use the catch-all concept refer to the broad-based appeal of 
modern parties and their wider electoral catchment.38 Catch-all parties attract a sub-
stantial number of voters from all the social strata (Schmidt 1985, 382-384; Schmidt 
1989). This leads to a certain degree of resemblance between the party's electorate and 
the entire electorate or minimally less distinctive electoral profiles (Dittrich 1983; 
Sundberg 1985). Some authors argued that a catch-all party can not appeal 
undifferentiatedly to the total electorate. The party must rely on the passive support 
of its traditional social groups and wield modern techniques of campaigning in order 
to attract the floating voters.39 Thus, while there remains a certain social structural 
                                                                                                                                             
evolution of modern political parties would be essentially... from ...weakly institutionalized, "cadre" parties 
to ...highly institutionalized, mass parties to ...weakly institutionalized, "catch-all" parties." 
36 Mintzel 1984; Farneti 1985; Schmidt 1985; Müller 1991; 1992. 
37 Katz and Mair 1991; Müller 1991; 1992c; Wolinetz 1991. 
38 McHale and Shaber 1976, 295-296; Mayer 1980a; Mintzel 1984; 1990; Feist et. al. 1978; Houska 1985. 
The ultimate catch-all character of the parties is achieved when a party is capable of approaching a cross-
cutting of the entire population. Müller (1992a, 155) states that we should not apply the most stringent 
conception of catch-allism, that is that the parties' social structure should mirror the entire population: 
"Indeed there would be hardly any catch-all party at all since there are few parties with such a balanced 
social structure." Müller reminds of the fact that Kirchheimer argued that parties cannot attract all 
electoral groups. For a party to develop towards catch-allism it suffices to extend their electoral appeal 
outside their traditional group(s) at a faster rate than the transformation of the social structure suggests. 
Rose and Urwin (1969, 16) related the level of social cohesiveness to Kirhheimer's catch-all thesis: "Kirch-
heimer (1966, 192) has argued that rising standards of living have so reduced social differences that major 
European Socialist parties are all becoming catch-all or heterogeneous in their appeals for votes." 
Heterogeneous parties are parties whose supporters share no major social characteristics. Rose and Urwin 
found 19 parties which belonged to this 'catch-all'-category: of which the Austrian FPÖ, The British 
Labour Party, Radical Venstre in Denmark, the CDU in Germany, all major parties in Ireland (Fine Gael, 
Fianna Fail and Labour), the PSDI in Italy and Venstre in Norway are part of this study. 
39 Smith 1989; Müller 1991; Müller 1992; Panebianco 1988, 262-274; Zuckerman and Lichbach 1977; 




emphasis (Buchaas 1985), the catch-all party's connection with the electorate is 
considerably weakened and more discontinuous. Contact with the electorate is 
established only indirectly through intermediary interest organisations (Panebianco 
1988; Wolinetz 1979; Müller 1991; 1992). 
 From this evaluation one conclusion is inescapable: there is no consensus on how 
to define the catch-all concept. Authors apparently take numerous aspects at random 
from Kirchheimer's text, put different emphases on them and, in addition, give their 
own interpretation. Moreover, some writers concentrate heavily on the electoral 
dimension, thereby neglecting the multi-dimensionality of Kirchheimer's catch-all 
development. This is not surprising when one considers that when these scholars 
were writing the only cross-national and comparable data that were available, were 
electoral data. The study of McHale and Shaber (1976) as well as McHale and 
McLaughlin (1974) are good examples of this electoral bias. In turn, Panebianco 
(1988) primarily emphasised the organisational elements of modern parties (see also 
Katz and Mair 1991). Other authors, such as Schmidt (1985; 1989) regarded only the 
ideological and the electoral dimension important and neglected the fact that 
Kirchheimer also outlined organisational developments. Wolinetz (1991) argued that 
Kirchheimer's thesis not only contained an organisational dimension, but also an 
ideological component, thereby overlooking the electoral dimension. In contrast, 
Müller (1991; 1992b; 1992c) broke down the catch-all development into five instead 
of three dimensions: ideology, intra-party distribution of power, composition of the 
electorate, links with interest groups and the function of the party in the political 
system. Tarrow (1969) as well as Feist et. al (1978) are examples of the few studies 
which have taken all three dimensions of the catch-all development into consideration 
(see also Mair 1989). 
 In addition to these discrepancies in defining catch-allism, there also exists sparse 
consensus among scholars regarding its measurement. 
3.4 Defining catch-allism 
Most authors writing on catch-allism do not clarify which indicators should be utilised 
to measure the catch-all development. Due to the overemphasis on the electoral 
dimension, several authors suggest to take electoral volatility as the principal indicator 
of catch-allism.40 Keman (1988), for example, related the degree of electoral volatility 
to the extent to which party distances have diminished. Still, others look at develop-
ments in the party system format, or changes in the fragmentation of party systems as 
indicators of catch-allism. Mayer (1980a), for instance, argued that Kirchheimer's 
thesis presupposes a lowering of the fractionalisation-index in West European party 
systems over time.41 Dittrich (1983), on the contrary, argued that parliamentary 
fragmentation is not an adequate measure. If all parties developed a catch-all 
character, then a renewed equilibrium is the outcome, resulting in probably minor 
                                                                                                                                             
Norris 1993, 1. 
40 Maguire 1983; McHale and McLaughlin 1974; Zuckerman and Lichbach 1977; Shamir 1984; Wolinetz 
1979. 
41  Wolinetz 1979; Shamir 1984; Mayer 1980a and Schmidt 1989 all measure the catch-all development 
with Rae's index of fractionalisation (Rae 1968, 413-418). 




changes in vote percentages and numbers of parties. Instead, Dittrich (1983) 
proposed examining trends in votes for individual parties, as well as patterns of 
aggregate electoral volatility, in order to test the catch-all thesis. If the connection 
between voters and the party is loosened, this will necessarily result in a larger 
proportion of floating voters. Most of these indicators are, however, features of the 
party system as a whole, not of individual parties to which Kirchheimer clearly 
referred. 
 On the ideological level, Dittrich (1983) suggested to assess the degree of 
depoliticisation through content analysis of party-programs and policy-outputs. In 
addition, Schmidt (1985; 1989) argued that catch-all parties no longer distinguish 
themselves ideologically from their competition; instead he suggested measuring 
disassociation with the political-distance scale developed by Thomas (1975; 1980). 
Tarrow (1969) selected the voting of party members at congresses as an indicator of 
polarisation. Müller (1991; 1992b; 1992c) went further, suggesting three methods of 
measuring de-ideologisation: the development of an ideological consensus, the decline 
in the practical influence of ideology and a greater separation between the ideological 
pronouncements and practical policy. In order to measure the development towards a 
decline of mass-party membership and organisation, Tarrow (1969) employed as 
indicators of catch-allism the voter-member ratio, membership per section as well as 
organisational density of sections. Müller (1991; 1992) measured the power shift from 
the mass membership to the party top by counting the frequency of party 
conferences. 
 Regarding the electoral dimension, Zuckerman and Lichbach (1977) tested 
Kirchheimer's thesis by assessing the increasing number of voters with little or no 
party loyalty. In turn, Schmidt (1985) suggested measuring a party's ability to catch 
voters from all the social strata by estimating the weakness or even absence of social 
cleavages, visible in the social stratification of party support. When the proportions of 
the different social groups of voters for each political party resemble the percentages 
of the entire population, it then justifies the designation of catch-allism (Schmidt 
1985; 1989, 179-180). 
 
For all the variety, most if not all of the empirical assessments of catch-allism have 
been at best myopic and at worst uni-dimensional. This study strives to go beyond 
this uni-dimensional bias of most of these earlier attempts. Instead, it intends to chart 
the catch-all development and integrate the three dimensions. Sufficient data are now 
available for a multi-dimensional verification of catch-allism in Western Europe. 
Admittedly, the data are not complete and they are not standardised, but they are 
available over a sufficiently long period, to scrutinise Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis. 
 The main postulate in this study, is that the catch-all concept should not be 
disassociated from the theoretical framework in which it was developed. Therefore, 
this study utilises an important part of Kirchheimer’s oeuvre, in which the original 
configuration of the catch-all concept can be found, as the fundament for the 
definition of the core (or minimal) elements, which demarcate the catch-all concept. 
In order to elucidate the empirical indicators of catch-allism, this study also 
encompasses the debate on catch-allism which followed its inception, in addition to 
Kirchheimer's references in the article "The Transformation of Western European 
Party Systems", as well as his private notes and unpublished writings. This leads to the 
following core definition of the catch-all party: 





A catch-all party is characterised by an indistinct ideological profile, a wide electoral appeal aimed at 
vote maximisation, a loose connection with the electorate, by a power balance in favour of the party 
top vis-à-vis the party members and by a professional and capital-intensive organisation. 
 
Employing the findings of the analysis presented above, this core definition can now 
be operationalised in terms of empirically observable and measurable indicators which 
do justice to Kirchheimer's authentic multi-dimensional conception of catch-allism. 
The method used here, including both primary and secondary literature, maximises 
the validity of the operationalisation of catch-allism outlined below. 
 Let us first look at the organisational characteristics of catch-allism as explicitly 
indicated by Kirchheimer (1966a, 190, footnote 16). Indicating a declining importance of 
party membership, catch-all parties cease to encapsulate large numbers of voters into the 
party organisation as members, resulting in a stagnation in the size of the member-
ship. Aside from numerical marginalisation, members also cease performing an 
important role in the internal decision-making procedures of the party. In the 
development towards a catch-all party there is a power shift from the members in favour of 
the party leadership. The party leadership disavows members of their influence on the 
decision-making process, particularly in the selection of candidates. Nominating 
electorally attractive candidates then becomes the paramount function of a catch-all 
party, whereby ideology is superseded by the charisma of political leaders. Modern 
methods of campaigning are introduced and more professional staff is employed 
within the party organisation, leading to increasing professionalisation of the party 
organisation. As a result, the party progressively differentiates between the different 
functions. This professionalisation also changes the financial structure of parties, since 
the higher costs can no longer be obtained from membership fees. Thus, catch-all 
parties are increasingly dependent on state finance and private contributions coming 
from a wider variety of sources. These various characteristics, as well as their 
empirical indicators and modes of operationalisation, are summarised in table 3.1. 




Table 3.1 The operationalisation of the organisational dimension of catch-allism. 
characteristic indicator  unit of measurement 
declining importance of party 
membership 
stagnation or decline in 
membership size 
the number of members in 
proportion to the total elector-
ate  
(MERATIO) 
 declining importance of the 
membership for the party's 
financial revenues 
proportional level of members-
hip revenues relative to total 
income 
(MEMFIN) 
 increasing financial 
dependence of state finance 
proportional level of state 
funding relative to total income 
(STATFIN) 
increasing professionalisation 
of the party organisation 
increasing capital intensive 
election campaigns 
expenditures for election cam-
paigns relative to annual 
income 
(CAMPAIGN) 
 increasing capital intensive 
party structure 
number of professionals in the 
central party organisation and 
the parliamentary party 
(STAFMEM and STAFSEAT) 
change in the intra-party power 
balance in favour of the 
leadership 
declining role of party 
members in selection of 
candidates and 
representatives 
official procedure in party 
statutes on candidate and 
leadership selection and actual 
practice of candidate and 
leadership selection 
(CANDSEL and LEADSEL) 
 declining role of members in 
policy formation and decisions 
on government participation 
frequency of possibilities of 
policy influence (congresses) 
and the openness of method of 
influence (rules of putting 
motions to the congress) 
(NOCONGR and MOTIONS) 
   
NB: (CAPITALS) are variables used to define the SPSS data-set, for their operationalisation see appendix 
2. 
 
As can be seen from table 3.1, the first organisational catch-all characteristic, the 
declining importance of party membership, is evidenced by three indicators. Firstly, 
by a stagnation or decline in the number of party members. To ensure this measure is 
comparative across countries, membership size is related to the total electorate. 
Secondly, the importance of the membership for the party is measured in financial 
terms. Catch-allism, as argued above, is also indicated by a decreasing proportion of 
the total party income derived from membership fees, as well as by the increase in the 
proportion of party income from state finance, the latter being the third indicator of 
the declining importance of membership. 
 The second organisational characteristic of catch-allism, professionalisation of the 




party organisation, is measured by two indicators: the capital intensity of both election 
campaigning and organisational structure. The capital-intensity of electoral campaigns 
is measured as the percentage of the total party income spent on election campaigns, 
whereas capital intensity of the organisation is indicated by the number of 
professionals employed at the party central office and within its parliamentary 
bureaucracy. To allow cross-national comparisons, this number of professionals in the 
central party office is related to the membership level and the number of staff 
employed at the parliamentary party organisation is related to the number of 
parliamentary seats of the party. 
  The third organisational characteristic of a catch-all party is a power-shift from the 
members to the leadership of the party, which is measured by two indicators: the 
declining role of party members in internal decision-making processes and, secondly, 
the procedure by which the party chairman and parliamentary candidates are selected. 
With regard to the role of members in intra-party decision-making, the frequency by 
which congresses are held, quantitatively determines the opportunities which 
members have on the policies of the party and on the decisions to enter a 
government. Furthermore, the openness of the procedure of putting motions to 
national conferences, measures the qualitative level of influence members can exert on 
important decisions made by the party. This openness is manifested in the specific 
procedure by which motions can be put to the party congress. The second relevant 
indicator of the power balance between party members and the party leadership to be 
used here is the level of influence members have in the selection of the national party 
chairman and the parliamentary candidates for the party. For these indicators this 
study will analyse the official rules as they are laid down in the party statutes. 
 Here, as elsewhere when discussing these three broad characteristics, I will begin 
the analysis by assuming uni-dimensionality. That is, I will assume that each of the 
indicators within each broad characteristic, tends in the same direction. Only at the 
end of each discussion and on the basis of the findings to that point, will I put this 
uni-dimensionality to the test. 
 
Drastic reduction of the party's historical ideological profile and the resulting waning 
of opposition are central elements of Kirchheimer's thesis. The first ideological 
characteristic of a catch-all party's maturation is de-ideologisation: a decline in emphasis on 
traditional issues in the official communications of the party. Some authors who defined catch-
allism framed this development in terms such as de-emphasising or downgrading 
ideology, vague party programs or disposal of ideological heritage. Ideological catch-
allism is also characterised by a decrease in traditional policy preferences. Catch-all parties 
phrase their policy preferences in accordance with the general opinion, emphasising 
valence issues and seeking compromise and consensus. This de-polarisation is 
indicated by an increasing propensity of catch-all parties to accept government 
responsibility even when they are unable to control 'traditional' preferred policy areas 
through ministerial portfolios. In addition, catch-all parties recognise the political 
status quo and legitimise the current political order. This waning of opposition leads 
to greater uniformity in ideological and policy positions of the different parties within 
one party system. Kirchheimer asserted that catch-all parties converge towards a centre 
position in the political spectrum. Convergence on the left-right dimension decreases the 
space of party competition. Next to the inclination of government participation 
regardless of policy and ministerial control, the homogeneity in issue-emphasis as well 




as centripetal movement, catch-allism is also indicated by increasing coalition potential of 
parties. The extent as well as the continuity of executive control, is respectively 
demonstrated in the proportion of ministerial portfolios parties obtain and the 
accumulated duration of time in office. These characteristics and their 
operationalisation are summarised in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 The operationalisation of the ideological dimension of catch-allism 
characteristic indicator  unit of measurement 
adopting a centrist position 
within the party system 
convergence of parties on a 
left-right scale towards the 
centre of the scale as well as 
overall convergence between 
parties within one party system 
the distance from the centre 
space by determining the 
frequency of left and right 
issues emphasised in party-
manifestos (saliency 
approach) 
(DISTCNTR and LRMANIF) 
a decline in emphasis on      
traditional issues 
a reduction of references to 
traditional issues in the party 
platform 
the proportion of emphasis on 
traditional issues in the party 
platform  
(TRADEMPH) 
a decrease in traditional policy 
preferences 
a decline in control of tradi-
tional ministerial portfolio's 
proportional control of 
traditional ministerial portfolios 
(TRADCONT) and non-
traditional or opportunist 
portfolio control (OPTCONT) 
an increase in coalition 
potential 
an increase in quantitative 
ministerial control (government 
participation) as well as 
accumulated time in office 
the percentage of ministries 
held by parties in government 
(GOVTCONT) and the 
proportion of time parties hold 
governmental responsibility 
(TIMEGOVT) 
NB: (CAPITALS) are variables used to define the SPSS data-set, for their operationalisation see appendix 
2. 
 
As can be seen from table 3.2, the first catch-all characteristic on the ideological 
dimension is indicated by the position of parties on the left-right policy dimension, a 
position determined by the saliency of issues in the party's manifesto. This left-right 
score for each party is determined by a combination of the Castles and Mair expert-
scale and party manifesto data (see Pennings and Keman 1994). On the basis of these 
party positions, the systemic centre space in all countries is established as well as the 
distance of all individual parties from this centre. Consequently, the level of 
centripetal and centrifugal movement as well as the extent of polarisation or 
convergence within each party system can be assessed over time. Finally, the 
programmatic trends of parties on the left-right scale will be evaluated as well as their 
flexibility in policy position. A centripetal movement and increasing policy flexibility 
indicate catch-allism. 
 Second, a decline in emphasis on traditional issues is analysed by assessing the 
consideration parties give in each party manifesto to the five issues which were most 
emphasised by all parties of the party family in the period 1945-1960. These five 




issues are considered to be the 'traditional issues' for all parties of the respective party 
family. For each party the relative emphasis on these traditional issues is measured 
across time. 
  To ascertain party loyalty to their traditional policy preferences, the third indicator 
of ideological catch-allism will analyse whether or not parties have become 
increasingly driven by office-seeking motives, and shifted their preferences for 
ministerial control. For all party families the 'traditional' ministerial portfolios are 
established (see Budge and Keman 1990) and for parties the score in each period is 
based upon the level of control of these ministries. This level of traditional portfolio 
control is consequently related to the total proportion of ministerial control in order 
to establish the level of opportunistic office-seeking behaviour of political parties. 
 As the fourth ideological catch-all characteristic, the level of coalition potential 
(Sartori 1976) of a party is determined on the basis of government participation and 
the proportion of time parties are in office. Since there are no data available on 
participation in coalition negotiations or the perception of coalition potential by the 
party elites, this study measures coalition potential a-posteriori by assuming that 
parties have coalition potential once they have been incorporated into governments 
(see Lijphart 1984a, 58-59; 1984b; 1984c). Firstly, the level of ministerial control is 
measured by the average percentage of all ministerial posts held by the party in each 
of the nine periods. Secondly, the proportion of time the party has controlled 
governmental office is calculated over time. 
 
With regard to the electoral dimension, the most important element of catch-allism is 
the wider electoral appeal of the catch-all party. Kirchheimer and other authors indicated 
this decline in clear stratification of the party's electorate with references to ‘attracting 
voters from all strata’, ‘orientation to a nation-wide electorate’, ‘broader electoral 
base’, ‘mirroring the general population’ and ‘appealing to new groups of voters’, all 
designating the ability of a catch-all party to increase its potential number of voters. 
At the same time, catch-all parties loose their direct and durable connection with their voters, 
a development parties attempt to curb by establishing connections with the electorate 
through the different interest groups and through non-partisan means of communica-
tion. The indirect relationship between catch-all parties and voters reduces the 
number of voters who strongly identify with the party, resulting in higher levels of 
floating voters. The third electoral characteristic of catch-allism, related to the 
ideological level, is the increasing influence of interest groups. This representation of 
different social groups becomes evident in the recruitment of representatives outside 
the traditional pools. Candidates from outside the party are recruited on the basis of 
their technical and managerial skills, rather than on their political affiliation and 
adherence to party ideology or program. 




Table 3.3 The operationalisation of the electoral dimension of catch-allism. 
characteristic indicator  unit of measurement 
a broadening of the electoral 
appeal of the party 
a less class-distinctive 
composition of the party’s 
electorate 
level of social stratification of 
party support, a decline in 
class-voting 
(CLASSDIS) 
a disjointed connection with 
the electorate 
a decline in the level of party 
identification 
percentage of voters which 
strongly identify with the 
party 
(IDENTIFY) 
 higher levels of electoral turn-
over 
level of electoral volatility  
(VOLATIL) 
increasing influence of 
interest groups 
less emphasis on the political 
qualities of the 
(parliamentary) leadership 
and increasing emphasis on 
the technical and managerial 
qualities 
number of ministers recruited 
from interest groups and 
from outside the party 
organisation 
(EXTRECRUT) 
NB: (CAPITALS) are variables used to define the SPSS data-set; for their operationalisation see appendix 
2. 
 
As can be seen from table 3.3, the wider appeal of the party will be analysed by 
ascertaining whether parties are catching voters beyond their traditional bases of 
support. This study, therefore, will examine changes in the social composition of the 
electorate between support of the working class, and middle plus upper classes, 
constituting a measure of class-distinctiveness of party support similar to the Alford-
index of class-voting (Alford 1962). Catch-allism is indicated by  a declining class-
distinctiveness of the party's electorate. 
  The second indicator of electoral catch-allism, a disjointed connection with the 
electorate, will be investigated by observing changes in the proportion of voters which 
claim to have a strong party identification. In addition, electoral volatility is employed 
as an indicator for the de-alignment of the electorate and increasing electoral 
turnover. 
 Finally, the last characteristic of a catch-all party, an increasing influence of interest 
groups, will be evaluated by examining the number of ministers recruited from these 
special interest groups and from outside the parliamentary party. 
3.5 Measuring catch-allism 
In order to test the catch-all thesis empirically, I first measure the transformation 
towards the catch-all model in separate univariate analyses of all individual variables. 
For each individual indicator of catch-allism, the cross-national variance, cross-time 
variations, and the different levels of catch-allism within the party families are 
summarised in chapters 4 to 6. On each of the indicators this development over time 
is summarised by way of regression analysis. My analysis will clarify the direction and 
extent to which parties in Western Europe are transforming towards the catch-all 
model, as well as provide evidence to whether this transformation constitutes a linear 





 Finally, at the end of each of these chapters, the different variables which together 
constitute one dimension of either organisational, ideological or electoral catch-allism 
are analysed in relation to one another by utilising multivariate reliability and factor 
analyses. A reliability test is performed in each chapter to establish whether all 
indicators tap one single dimension of catch-allism. In theory all items are different 
indicators of the same phenomenon, namely catch-allism, so it is obvious that they 
should correlate reasonably strongly with one another if we are to assume one single 
underlying dimension. This question is also addressed in the final chapter, where I will 
assess the validity or otherwise of treating catch-all development tout court as one 
single phenomenon. 
 The following chapter begins the empirical test of the catch-all thesis by examining 
the extent of organisational catch-allness of political parties. As with each of these 
empirical chapters, the bulk of the analysis is focused on political parties within their 
national contexts, on the one hand, and within their family groupings, on the other. In 
other words, rather than presenting and discussing the findings at the level of the 
individual party, the data are aggregated up to the level of national party systems and 
cross-national party families, with both being also subject to an over-time analysis. 
These aggregations are necessary because a full presentation and discussion of the 
eighty or more individual parties through time would simply prove far too unwieldy. 
Although these individual party data are fully summarised in lengthy tables at the end 
of each chapter, the analysis within the chapters themselves therefore remains at quite 
an aggregate level. In effect, therefore, I take the empirical evidence of change at the 
level of the individual party, which constitutes the core unit of analysis within 
Kirchheimer's theory, in order to assess the changing degree of catch-allism over time 
within national party systems and within cross-national party families. Nonetheless, as 
indicated above, the original building blocks for these aggregations, that is, the data on 
the individual parties themselves, are presented in the summary tables at the end of 
the chapters, where these parties are ranked within the different time-periods 
according to their degree of catch-allism. 
 
Summary: 
• A catch-all party is a party that is characterised by an indistinct ideological profile, a 
wide electoral appeal aimed at vote maximisation, a loose connection with the 
electorate, by a power balance in favour of the party top vis-à-vis the party members 
and by a professional and capital-intensive organisation. 
• Catch-allism is a three dimensional phenomenon, consisting of organisational, 
ideological and electoral components. 
• Catch-allism is characterised by 10 characteristics, which can be measured by 15 
indicators. 
• In this study catch-allism will be measured over the post-war era (divided in nine 
periods of five years), across 12 West European countries by observing 83 parties 
which are categorised in party families. 
 
 




4 The organisational dimension of catch-allism 
4.1 Political participation and party organisations 
Any viable democracy needs a minimum of political participation by its citizens in 
order to be responsive and legitimate (Dahl 1971; 1989). Political participation may 
assume diverse forms and take place outside traditional political institutions, yet 
organisational membership of political parties is crucial for large-scale popular mobili-
sation (Verba and Nie 1978; Inglehart 1990). Political parties function as important 
agents in the political articulation and institutional translation of societal demands 
(Rueschemeyer et. al, 1992). Moreover, it is through political party organisations that 
the leadership in representative democracies gains executive power. Therefore, the 
type of political parties in the party system, either mass-integration parties, cadre 
parties or elite-clientelistic parties, determine to a large extent when and how citizens 
participate in the articulation of their interests. As intermediary agents, the 
organisational structure of political parties effects the opportunities for citizens to 
participate in the political decision-making process. Conversely, citizens perform a 
multitude of tasks for political parties when they decide to become active party 
members (see Scarrow 1994). Kirchheimer recurrently expressed his deep concern 
with the limited capacity of modern catch-all parties to perform this integrative 
function in the political system (see chapter 2). 
 Since the 1950s, an interesting discrepancy has emerged in Western Europe. While 
the level of cognitive mobilisation (the political skills) and political interest of citizens 
has increased substantially, partisan loyalty and membership have declined 
dramatically in most European countries (Ester et. al 1993, 258; Inglehart 1990, 354-
358). In addition, the propensity to participate in unconventional political activities 
has increased substantially over time (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Kriesi et al. 1995). 
Still, not all change can be ascribed to individual attitudes of citizens. This chapter will 
show that the elites of political parties in Western Europe have professionalized their 
organisations extensively, in particular the parliamentary bureaucracy. Additionally, 
political parties in most countries have gained access to substantial financial resources 
since the 1960s, especially through state funding, making them less dependent on 
membership fees and voluntary activism by party members. This marginalization of 
membership in numerical and financial terms coincides with the continuation of 
negligible influence of members on leadership selection and policy formation. 




In order to determine whether country-specific aspects as well as the genetic origin of 
parties influence the transformation of parties in Western Europe, the next three 
chapters explore the development of political parties cross-nationally, over time and 
by party family. As explained in chapter 3, the format of the discussion is similar 
throughout the book; each of the indicators of catch-allism is first univariately 
examined across time, by country and by party family. Secondly, at the end of each 
chapter multivariate statistical techniques will be used to substantiate possible 
relations between the different indicators of catch-allism. This particular chapter 
begins with an analysis of the organisational characteristics of catch-allism: the 
development in party membership, the changes in the financial structure of parties, 
the level of professionalisation of the party organisation and the intra-party power 
balance. 




4.2 Size of party membership42 
At the organisational level, catch-allism is indicated firstly by a declining relevance of 
party membership. In theory, members become less important for the financial 
revenues of catch-all parties; members are given only a marginal role in the 
increasingly professional election campaigns and they do not perform an important 
function in the internal decision-making process. Therefore, catch-all parties will no 
longer attempt to incorporate a large proportion of their supporters as party members 
and will require very limited membership participation and involvement in inner-party 
activities. 
 For the purpose of this analysis, and particularly for cross-national and cross-time 
comparison, measuring party membership in absolute terms is clearly inadequate (see 
also Katz and Mair 1992). A more suitable measure for comparison over time is the 
ratio of party members to party voters (M/ V), which is often used as an indicator of 
social penetration or encapsulation. Still, as in an equation both numerator and 
denominator can vary, this measure fails to indicate whether a party managed to 
encapsulate a higher or lower proportion of its voters, or whether variation is due to 
electoral gains or losses. Therefore, a measure which relates the size of the total 
national electorate with the raw number of members (M/ E) is best suited for cross-
national comparisons. Moreover, the sum of M/E for all parties within a party system 
denotes the total proportion of party-members in a given electorate. Therefore, this 
section summarises national trends in party membership in relation to the total 
electorate.43 The total member-electorate ratios of West European countries are 
summarised for each of the nine periods in the table below. Note that the entries are 
not averages, but the total proportion of the electorate holding a membership  card 
for any of the parties in the national party system. 
                                                        
42 In the West European context, party membership refers to the act of joining a political party, usually by 
meeting the requirement of registration and the periodic payment of dues. Frequently parties ask their 
members to 'remain loyal to the party platform and policies' and prohibit them to 'join any other political 
party'; a certain age and nationality is also often required. All other obligations have slowly become 
obsolete in Western Europe (see Janda 1980, 126; Duverger 1954, 61; Riggs and Janda (1968), pp. 45-104 
and 159-216). Indirect party membership has become almost extinct in Western Europe; the majority of 
the parties have only direct membership. The social democratic party in Sweden abolished indirect 
membership in 1990 and lost a substantial part of its membership because of it. Now, only the British 
Labour Party, the Austrian ÖVP, the Norwegian DNA and the Finnish communist People's Democratic 
League still have a considerable number of indirect members and the Finnish and Norwegian conserva-
tives (KOK and Hoyre), the Finnish Agrarians (KESK), the French Radical party and the Irish Labour 
Party continue this type of link with the electorate, albeit on a modest scale (see Janda 1980 and Katz and 
Mair 1992). 
 
43 However, with regard to the catch-all thesis it is also important to analyze the level of encapsulation of 
the different party families, since Kirchheimer distinguished parties on the basis of their effort to integrate 
the populace into the body politic. Hence, in the final section of this chapter the member-voter ratio will 
be included in the multivariate analysis. 























X S CV 
Aut 23.8 21.2 27.6 29.8 29.7 29.3 28.5 27.3 24.5 26.9 6.3 .234 
Bel  - - -  7.6  7.8  8.4  8.8  8.8  8.9  8.4 1.3 .154 
Den 18.3 20.3 21.5 18.3 16.4 11.8  8.4  7.4  6.8 14.4 2.9 .201 
Fin  - -  - 18.9 17.9 16.5 14.9 14.0 12.9 15.9 2.7 .169 
Fra  8.3  4.0  2.1  1.7  1.3  1.7  4.6  3.1  1.0  3.1 0.8 .258 
Ger  4.3  2.6  2.7  3.0  3.2  3.8  4.6  4.4  4.2  3.6 0.8 .222 
Ire - - -  2.6  8.3  8.8  9.4 10.7 12.8 11.0 3.7 .336 
Ita 11.9 13.6 12.2 12.2 20.6 12.5 10.0  9.4  9.7 12.5 2.1 .168 
Net 14.2  10.1  11.6 16.3  9.7  6.2  5.3  3.8  2.9  8.9 1.3 .146 
Nor 14.0  8.5 16.8 30.4  8.8 12.9  8.8 13.7 12.2 12.3 3.0 .243 
Swe 20.2 16.2 22.7 22.3 19.9 20.3 22.7 23.4 21.2 21.0 6.2 .295 
UK  2.1  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.5  5.8  1.6  0.8  1.0  2.3 1.1 .478 
X 13.0 11.0 13.2 13.8 12.2 11.5 10.7 10.7  9.6 11.7 2.7 .233 
S  3.7  4.4  4.1  4.1  3.6  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.1  3.7 - - 
CV .284 .400 .311 .297 .295 .296 .327 .327 .323 .316 - - 
 
Entries are percentages of the total electorate which hold a membership of one of the national parties. 
Sources of the data are Katz and Mair 1992, Beyme 1985 and several other studies (see appendix 2). The 
first column in the table contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix 2. Columns 
and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period and country means. The column 'S' lists 
the standard deviations of the countries, while the row 'S' at the bottom of the table provides the standard 
deviation for each period. Standard deviations are used to assess cross-national and cross-time variation. 
Rows and columns labelled 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X) for countries and periods, as 
this measure is more suitable for comparison of several clusters of data with respect to their relative 
homogeneity in instances where the groups have very different means (see appendix 3 for methodological 
considerations). Entries given in italics are based on one score only and considered unrepresentative. A 
minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. 
 
This table shows that there are substantial differences in the average level of party 
membership across Western Europe and, importantly, in only a few countries 
significant proportions of the electorate join a political party. In general, Austrian 
parties have the largest membership party organisations in Western Europe in relative 
terms, followed shortly by the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark) and Italy. Substantially lower proportions of the electorate joined political 
parties in north-western Europe (Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany), while the lowest membership ratios are found in France. In Austria over 
one quarter of the population eligible to vote held membership cards of political 
parties and in Sweden over twenty per cent of those qualified to vote signed up with a 
party. In the rest of Scandinavia (Finland, Denmark and Norway) approximately one 
sixth of the population is a party member, an average level which is also found in 
Italy. As stated above, in the other European countries the average proportion 




of the electorate which actually joins a political party is significantly lower. In the case 
of Ireland, around ten percent of the population took the effort of registering as a 
party member, while in Belgium and the Netherlands around eight per cent of the 
population qualified to vote were enlisted as party members. In the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany only a very low share of the electorate enrolled as member of a 
political party. 
 In these terms at least, very few political parties can claim the label 'mass-party' 
and membership can hardly be considered "the very substance of the party" as 
Duverger (1954, 63) once claimed. With some leniency the 1950s and 1960s could be 
labelled the decades of 'mass membership', when the average level of partisan 
affiliation reached its post-war peak at thirteen per cent of the European electorate. 
As Kirchheimer asserted, aggregate levels of membership have declined in most 
European party systems, particularly since the late 1960s. In the late 1980s party 
membership relative to the total electorate has dropped below the ten per cent level. 
This decline has been most striking in Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Party membership in Denmark dropped from 
around twenty per cent in the 1960s to approximately six per cent of the electorate in 
the 1980s. In France, where levels of party membership have traditionally been very 
low to begin with and only the PSF and PCF have extensive party organisations, the 
membership-electorate ratio has nevertheless declined further during the late 1980s. 
Similarly, parties in Norway, Austria, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands lost 
party membership in proportion to the total electorate.44 In Austria a clear decline in 
average membership levels set in during the 1970s, yet this country still has the 
highest membership level of all countries in this study. Swedish parties have also been 
able to maintain noticeably high levels of party membership throughout the last five 
decades. 
 The consistent trend of membership decline does not affect all European 
countries. Belgian, German, Irish and to a lesser extent some Norwegian parties have 
been able to incorporate an increasing proportion of the electorate into their party 
organisations. In these countries, at least until the 1990s, a generalised catch-all 
transformation at the membership level did not materialise. In addition, in recent 
years absolute membership has increased for some of the major parties in Finland, 
Italy, Norway and Sweden. The highest levels of fluctuation in membership are found 
in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, as compared to more homogeneous 
(trends in) membership levels in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy. 
Germany, France, Norway and Austria are in the middle of the distribution regarding 
intra-country variation. In line with Kirchheimer's assumption of convergence, the 
differences in membership level between parties have declined over time as is shown 
by a lower levels of variance in later periods. 
 For every country the extent of membership decline over time is summarised by 
computing the regression coefficient of membership-electorate ratios, taking the year 
                                                        
44 Selle and Svåsand (1991) differentiate between countries in which the major parties have declined (the 
Netherlands, Britain and Denmark), countries in which membership in general has been increasing 
(Belgium, Austria, Ireland, West-Germany and Finland) and those in which some parties have increased in 
membership while others have declined (Sweden and Norway). The data presented here do not confirm 
this analysis when the post-war period as a whole is taken into account. As the authors do not specify 
which parties they included, it was not possible to clarify these differences. 
 




in which the observation was made as the independent variable.45 A decline in 
membership relative to the electorate would be indicated by a negative trend 
parameter. Table 4.2 shows that in most European countries membership did decline 
over time (the overall β = -.16*). Only Belgium seems to be excluded from this 
general trend. 
 
Table 4.2 Trends in membership-electorate rates over time in Western Europe 1945-
1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
beta (β) -.07 .15 -.58* -.03 -.26 -.15 -.32 -.42* -.34* -.24 -.09 -.65* 
 
The column indicated 'beta' (β) provides the regression coefficient between the membership-electorate 
ratios and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five 
percent level (t = < .05). 
 
The steepest decline over time in party membership is found in the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and France, while the downward trend in 
Finland, Austria and Sweden is more moderate. Belgium has the only party system in 
which parties have attracted more members over time. 
 Since Kirchheimer insisted that, in particular, the social democratic and Christian 
democratic parties are prone to adopt a catch-all style, the differences between party 
families are important. With regard to this genetic origin, the conventional wisdom 
that parties of the traditional left (socialist, social democratic and communist parties) 
are better organised and socially embedded than their right-wing non-socialist 
competitors is only partly corroborated by the data presented in table 4.3, which 
provides the average membership-electorate ratios of the European party families. 
                                                        
45 The variable year in this study is defined as the last year of each period (see appendix 2). The linear 
regression parameter represents the straight line which mathematically is the 'best fit' to all points in a 
scattergram of all scores. It constitutes only a summary measure of an overall negative of positive trend, 
without regard to fluctuations in this trend over time. 
























X S CV 
cd  3.3  3.5  3.2  4.3  3.2  2.7  2.4  3.0  2.8  3.1  3.8 1.232 
com  1.5  1.9  1.9  1.3  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.4  1.1  1.3  1.7 1.341 
con  2.5  1.0  2.7  2.4  3.1  2.7  2.0  2.2  2.2  2.3  1.4  .614 
sd  6.2  6.2  6.1  4.6  5.4  4.7  4.8  4.3  3.8  4.6  5.2 1.134 
soc - -  0.1 -  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  .502 
lib  2.6  2.2  1.6  1.4  1.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  1.3  1.6 1.241 
env - - - - - -  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 1.006 
eth - - -  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.5  .501 
agr  2.7 -  2.6  8.9  4.9  4.2  4.1  3.8  3.4  4.3  3.6  .834 
prt - - - - -  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2 1.045 
X  3.1  3.0  2.6  3.1  2.5  1.8  1.5  1.6  1.4  1.7  1.8 1.143 
 
Entries are average member-electorate ratios. Sources of the data are Katz and Mair 1992, Beyme 1985 
and several other studies (see appendix 2). The abbreviations in the first column refer to the party 
families, which are explained in appendix II. The last columns, 'S' and 'CV ' list the standard deviation and 
the coefficient of variance (S/ X) of the party families. Column and row indicated with an X lists the 
average of the period and party family mean. Entries given in italics are based on one score only and are 
not included in the calculations. Data before 1955 are too scarce to report. The - indicates that data were 
not available. 
 
Although it is important to note that the initially significant differences between 
parties of different origin are declining, it can be seen that the highest membership 
levels are still found among social democratic parties. Particularly during the 1950s 
West European social democratic parties affiliated the largest proportions of the 
electorate as party members, while in the 1960s a period of membership decline sets 
in for the social democratic party family. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of 
the Austrian and Swedish social democrats, few ('mass') parties of social democratic 
origin encapsulated high proportions of the electorate. Parties of communist origin 
can neither be counted as political mass membership organisations, for these parties 
have relatively low ratios of membership. Moreover, most European communist 
parties have now either vanished as political membership organisations or merged 
with other leftist groups to form new and broader political movements. Socialist 
parties even had significantly lower levels of membership than their social democratic 
and communist brethren. In contrast, agrarian parties encapsulated more supporters 
and reached a relatively high level of membership organisation compared to other 
party families, although agrarian membership levels are also dwindling since the 
1970s. This process of membership decline has, on average, less impact on 
conservative parties in Western Europe, which were able to maintain a relatively stable 
fraction of the electorate as party members. Still, conservative parties have also been 
losing some of their appeal as membership organisations since the mid-1970s. Despite 
the fact that Christian democratic parties were also able to sustain a relatively stable 
level of organisational encapsulation throughout the last five decades, these parties do 
demonstrate decreasing membership levels during the late 1980s. More pronounced 
and consistent are the losses in membership discernible within almost all European 




liberal parties. Only some well-organised Scandinavian liberal parties have been able 
to prevent this overall membership decline in relation to the total electorate. The 
nascent environmental party organisations have not (yet) been able to encapsulate a 
large proportion of their voters. 
 As far as the various party families are concerned, the highest variance in 
membership, relative to the total electorates are found within the communist, social 
democratic, Christian democratic and liberal party families, while the lower 
coefficients of variance of the conservative, ethnic and agrarian parties are indicative 
of relatively more homogeneity in membership levels among members of this party 
family. 
 To summarise the trends in membership over time, table 4.4 provides the 
regression coefficients of the membership-electorate ratios of party families with the 
year of observation as independent variable. 
 
Table 4.4 Trends in membership over time of West European party families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib env eth agr prt 
beta   
(β) 
-.09 -.13 -.08 -.14 .19 -.34* .32 -.08 -.07 .65 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the membership-electorate ratios and the year of observation. 
An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Cross-time analysis of membership-electorate ratios demonstrates that all the major 
traditional party families lost membership in relation to the total electorate, in 
particular the liberal, social democratic and communist parties. It materialises, for 
example that, despite their sometimes unrealistic membership claims, communist 
parties of 'total integration' experienced a steep decline in membership since the 1970s 
from very low levels of membership to begin with. Only more contemporary parties 
of socialist origin, as well as the new protest and environmental parties are excluded 
from the general decline in membership. Overall, an era of distinct decline in 
membership seems to have set in during the late 1960s and 1970s and parties have not 
been able (or willing) to reverse this process. 
 In conclusion, one finds that with the exception of some Belgian, German and 
Irish parties, as well as most of the 'green' parties, relatively few political parties in 
Western Europe escape a decline in membership. From this finding it seems that 
sizeable membership can hardly be regarded as a necessary condition for the survival 
of political parties. Even the oldest European parties, the British Conservatives, the 
Danish and Italian liberals and the German SPD, never encapsulated high proportions 
of the electorate as members in their organisation and only in very few cases can 
membership levels of West European parties justify the label of 'mass parties'. These 
findings therefore appear to sustain Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis at least at the 
national level and as far as many of the individual party families are concerned. 




4.3 Party political finance 
Party finance is perhaps the least transparent aspect of the study of political parties.46 
Recently, the Augusta and Dassault-affairs in Belgium, the acceptance of 'cash-for 
questions' by British MP’s and illegal donations of Asil Nadir to the British 
Conservative Party, as well as the mani pulite-inquiry into illicit party funding in Italy, 
suggest that parties have access to enormous, sometimes illegal, financial resources 
(Fisher 1994). Nonetheless, central authorities attempt to control party political 
finance by formal regulation. In most countries parties are legally compelled to 
disclose their financial reports and submit these accounts to an official audit. 
Furthermore, ceilings on expenditures and contribution limits have been introduced 
and in some countries it is prohibited to receive contributions from certain sources. 
On the other hand, most central authorities subsidise political parties from public 
funds. 
 Under most national legislation there are no limits set on the income of parties, so 
parties can raise the amount of money they regard necessary to perform their 
activities. Encompassing not only membership fees and state funding, political money 
can also derive from a wide variety of other sources (Ware 1996, 298-302). As a result, 
almost all party organisations in Western Europe have become more capital 
intensive.47 
4.3.1 Membership fees 
According to the catch-all thesis, the declining importance of members for political 
parties should be visible in several organisational aspects. In the operationalisation of 
organisational catch-allism above, the second indicator that was specified is the 
declining importance of members for the party's financial revenues. This aspect is 
measured here in proportions of membership fees relative to the total party income. 
A cross-national and cross-time comparison of the extent to which European parties 
relied on financial resources from membership dues is summarised in table 4.5. The 
entries refer to the proportion to which membership fees (MF) account for the total 
income (TI) of parties (the MF/TI-ratio).48 
                                                        
46 See for classifications of party finance Weber 1925, 169; Von Beyme 1985, 196-197; Heidenheimer 
1970; Paltiel 1981. Nassmacher (1993) defined political finance as 'money spent by candidates and parties 
for campaign as well as non-campaign purposes.'  
 
47 The largest increases in income of party central offices are found in Germany, Austria and Ireland. 
Parties in Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland and Norway have also witnessed a 
substantial growth rate of their annual income. Only parties in Sweden and Italy are showing a decline in 
the "official" income figures. The annual growth rates are less impressive when the annual inflation rates 
are taken into account. Only in Austria and Norway does the average growth rate in party income exceed 
the average inflation growth rate. Inflation figures are taken from table 4.7. "Inflation: average growth 
rates 1960-1985" in Lane and McKay 1991, 54. 
 
48 Janda (1980, 91) regards the sources of funds as a main indicator of organizational autonomy: "The 
most autonomous party would be one that relied entirely on its internal operations for financing, which it 
might do through a combination of party dues and party enterprises, such as income from businesses, 
investments or sales of publications. The least dependent would be one which depended on contributions 
from some specific institutional sector of society, for example labour unions, business, military, church, 
and education/scientific. Between these two extremes would be parties which were guaranteed 
government funds through legislation to finance party activities." 
 






















X S CV 
Aut 84.8 87.2 87.1 86.7 58.7 30.4 31.8 20.6 63.3 31.5 .492 
Den - 60.5 65.3 52.4 46.2 47.9 52.7 36.0 51.6 30.1 .583 
Fin -  2.3  2.2  1.7  2.7  2.7  3.1  3.0  2.6  1.3 .504 
Ger - 63.4 21.7 26.7 33.1 32.7 35.9 31.1 34.9 15.5 .441 
Ire - 44.6 18.3 42.8 47.3 41.7 45.4 32.6 39.0 28.7 .730 
Ita 42.0 43.3 47.4 13.2 12.6 14.4 16.9 16.8 28.5 15.3 .541 
Net - 84.2 81.4 74.3 68.9 77.2 71.8 75.0 76.1 12.4 .164 
Nor - 54.7 61.5 46.5 29.4 25.8 29.3 33.8 40.1 19.5 .492 
Swe - 25.4 19.3 10.0  7.1  6.0  8.8  7.2 11.9 10.7 .901 
UK - 13.4 14.2 16.1 12.3 30.3 37.7 35.5 22.8 19.6 .864 
X 63.4 47.9 41.8 37.0 31.8 30.1 33.3 29.2 37.2 18.5 .502 
S 30.3 32.4 33.4 30.9 27.5 27.3 25.5 24.7 27.5 - - 
CV .478 .676 .799 .835 .864 .906 .765 .845 .739 - - 
 
Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992, Tables E1). The row marked by an X lists the average of the 
period and the column X provides the country mean score. The column and row S provide the standard 
deviations, while the column and row labelled CV  provide the coefficients of variance (S/ X). The - 
indicates that data were not available. No data for Belgium and France are available, while data for the 
first period are too scarce to report. For Germany there are no separate data on members/branches and 
party taxes. 
 
Across Western Europe a distinctive and secular decline in the proportion of income 
from membership fees is discernible (see also table 4.6 and 4.10). From an average of 
approximately fifty per cent of the total party income in the 1960s, European parties' 
resources originating from membership dues constituted less than thirty per cent in 
the 1980s. Nevertheless, significant differences between countries can be observed. In 
the Netherlands, for example, parties are still largely financially dependent on 
membership contributions, while the proportion of membership fees for the total 
party income in Finland is almost negligible. On average, Austrian parties depend for 
more than sixty per cent of their income on contributions from members and Danish 
parties derive over fifty per cent of their income from their members. Norwegian 
parties utilise their membership fees to finance forty per cent of their activities, while 
in Germany and Ireland around one-third of the total income of parties derives from 
membership fees. For Italian, British and particularly Swedish parties, members are 
least important in terms of total financial revenues. 
 With the exception of the United Kingdom and Finland, all over Western Europe 
the importance of membership in financial terms declined. Primarily the introduction 
of state finance (see next section) contributed to this development.49 After the 
introduction of state finance in 1975 in Austria, for example, the average percentage 
of membership fees dropped thirty per cent points and declined even further in the 
                                                        
49 The correlation coefficient between the membership level and revenues from membership fees is rather 
low (r² .14), while the correlation between membership and state finance is a much stronger r² -.65* 
(significant at the .001 level). 




last decade. An equally drastic decline can be found in Germany after the introduction 
of state finance in 1959. To a lesser extent this development also occurred in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Italy when provisions were introduced for 
state finance of political parties in these countries. The inevitable conclusion is that in 
financial terms, members became less important for parties as the losses in 
membership revenues were progressively substituted by other sources of income. 
Additionally, the declining standard deviation marks a convergence of parties over 
time with respect to the proportion of income obtained from membership fees. Table 
4.6 recapitulates the magnitude of membership fees for the total income of the 
different party families included in this study. 
 
















X S CV β 
cd 84.5 67.4 49.8 45.8 42.6 36.8 34.8 51.7 28.1  .542 -.44* 
com 31.5 32.6 23.6 14.9 15.5 24.0 11.8 27.3 16.6  .613 -.58* 
con  7.4  7.2 14.7 15.6 17.6 21.8 21.8 15.2 14.8  .972  .34* 
sd 58.6 55.0 55.4 40.8 38.4 41.0 37.6 53.7 31.1  .581 -.28* 
soc 27.2 69.1 61.8 43.0 56.4 40.4 35.9 47.5 28.7  .604 -.17 
lib 39.5 29.0 23.7 22.3 29.3 36.6 30.7 30.2 24.7  .822  .05 
env - - - -  4.5 28.6 22.3 25.5 23.3  .911  .21 
agr 47.4 41.7  9.2  3.1  7.8  9.7  8.8  7.7 15.8 2.112 -.54* 
prt - - - -  6.7  8.5  5.8  7.1  2.4  .344 -.26 
X 47.9 41.8 37.0 31.8 30.1 33.3 29.2 37.2 18.5 .502 -.21* 
 
Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992, Tables E1). Column and row indicated with an X lists the 
average of the period and party family mean. The column 'S' provides the standard deviation of the party 
family scores in each period and the column 'CV ' gives the coefficient of variance (S/ X). The - indicates 
that data were not available. The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the proportion of 
membership fees of the total party income and the year of measurement. Coefficients marked by an 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Note that the 
data for Belgium and France are not included. The communist score is based on only two parties (PCI 
and VpK). 
 
On average, both social democratic, socialist as well as Christian democratic parties 
procure more than fifty per cent of their income from membership contributions, 
setting these parties apart from the other West European party families. Until the 
1960s these three party families banked on membership fees for the larger part of 
their financial resources, yet the proportion of their income accumulated from 
membership fees declined to less than forty per cent in the 1980s. While 'green' as 
well as communist parties derived approximately one quarter of their financial 
resources from membership fees, members were much less important to agrarian and 
protest parties in financial terms. 
 Over time, the steepest decline in income from membership fees have occurred in 
the agrarian, communist and Christian democratic party families, concurrent with 
significant transformation of the income structure of socialist and social democratic 
parties. Evidently, liberal, agrarian and conservative parties have access to other 




substantial sources of income as they obtained only a relatively moderate proportion 
of their total income from membership fees throughout the post-war period. Liberal 
parties boosted their income from membership fees during the seventies and early 
eighties, making it the only traditional party family in which the decline in income 
from membership is not manifest. The largest variance can be found among agrarian 
and conservative parties, while the most homogeneous party families are the social 
democratic, Christian democratic, socialist and liberal parties. 
 In sum, the development over the last forty-five years shows that West European 
parties have restructured their party income significantly.50 Clearly membership fees 
became less important to political parties than was the case before the introduction 
and extension of state finance. This finding corroborates Kirchheimer's catch-all 
thesis. Additional evidence of a catch-all development at the level of party finance can 
be found in that the vast differences in financial structure between the party families 
which existed forty years ago are disappearing. Whether this convergence is solely 
attributable to increasing similarity in dependence of state finance will be assessed in 
the next section, where the third indicator of organisational catch-allism, an 
increasing dependence of parties on state finance, is discussed. 
4.3.2 State finance 
Two opposite normative positions emerge in the debate on the consequences of state 
funding to political parties.51 The first view emphasises that state subventions52, 
especially those based on seats in parliament, increase the significance of elections in 
financial terms. Parties procure a clear incentive to win votes rather than members 
and will therefore direct their efforts less towards the mass membership organisation 
and more towards election campaigns. Furthermore, state funding leads to 
                                                        
50 Of the different party families, the conservative parties increased their income at the rate of +7.8 per 
cent annually. The recent emergence of environmental parties may account for their higher annual growth 
of +11.5 per cent. The Christian democratic and communist parties are close to the average annual 
growth-rate (+6.6 per cent and +6.7 per cent respectively). The social democratic (+5.6 per cent) and 
socialist parties (+8.3 per cent) are also becoming more capital intensive. The liberal parties have the 
lowest annual increase in income (+3.5%) which may be the result of their high capital intensity from the 
outset. 
 
51 The justifications for the introduction of state finance have been the rising costs of party activities, 
especially campaigning, and the decline in traditional sources of income. The political debate over the 
benefits and drawbacks of public finance all started from the viewpoint that parties perform important 
functions in the democratic system. According to the supporters of public finance, the quality of the 
political process depends largely on the quality of political parties. To create equal opportunities and 
fairness in political competition and to avoid corruption, financial facilitation by the state has been 
introduced in most political systems. The opposition towards state finance of political parties argued that 
public funding will decrease the possibilities of public assessment of the parties and their accountability to 
the sovereign people. Finally, parties become more dependent on the state and as parties themselves 
control the state, they are able to secure their own future and hamper the entrance of new parties. 
 
52 State subsidies consist of direct public party funding where the recipient is the party central 
organization or the parliamentary group of the party. These direct financial subventions can consist of 
inter-election maintenance grants as well as campaign subsidies. Direct subsidies also include funds given 
to the youth and women organizations or party educational and research foundations, such as exist in the 
Netherlands and Ireland. State subventions can also be facilitative and indirect: free broadcasting, mailing, 
telecommunications and billposting, free press access and the use of meeting halls. Additionally, indirect 
party funding is any form of indirect assistance (financial or otherwise) that benefits the parties. This 
includes tax credits and tax reduction facilities. The data in this section are primarily from Von Beyme 
(1982, 241-261); Paltiel (1970; 1981); Nassmacher (1987); Katz and Mair (1992; 1994); Müller (1992); 
Deschouwer (1992); Bille (1992, 267-271). 




centralisation of the party hierarchy and reduces the influence of the rank-and-file 
activists as it opens possibilities for the party leadership to campaign with more 
professional mass communication and public relations experts. Finally, state finance 
by and large discriminates against new parties which can results in a 'cosy cartel' of the 
traditionally dominant parties in the system (Kirchheimer 1966b; Paltiel 1981). A 
contradictory position is adopted by Mendilow (1992, 93) who argues that public 
party finance can "actually enhance the appearance and survival of new parties, and 
moreover, enable ideological factions within established parties to threaten their 
parties with secession. These factors may create an effective barrier against the full 
formation of catch-all parties...." 
 Clearly, state funding is a party system function rather than a voluntaristic choice 
of a specific party and according to Gunlicks (1993), diversity between countries in 
party political finance is therefore best explained by the centralisation of the national 
state, the electoral and political system. In general, Gunlicks argues, a centralised state 
leads to stronger national party organisations, also in financial terms. A more 
decentralised, federal system will strengthen parties at the federal level at which they 
compete for public office. The electoral system also affects the financial structure of 
parties as majoritarian plurality systems allows candidates to be financially more 
independent, while proportional representation generates candidates which are 
financially dependent on the national party organisation. Stronger national party 
organisations in a parliamentary democracy make the national party office financially 
more dominant, while presidentialism and weak partism, like in France, will lead to 
more financial independence of the individual candidates (from the central party that 
is, not from other contributors). 
 In Western Europe numerous provisions for financial assistance from the state are 
made available to political parties (see table 4.7). Direct public finance of political 
parties was first introduced in 1959 in Germany, soon followed by similar provisions 
in Finland (1967) and Sweden (1966). In Austria subventions for the parliamentary 
party were introduced in 1963 and in Britain in 1975, be it only for the opposition 
party. In the late 1960s a wide scale introduction of direct funding of parliamentary 
fractions as well as of central party organisations was discernible in most countries. In 
the late 1970s, when parties were confronted with financial difficulties, another wave 
of state subventions could be observed. In France, Denmark and Belgium direct 
public finance to the parties' central office was adopted in the late 1980s. This left the 
Netherlands and Ireland as the only West European countries which do not subsidise 
central party offices directly.53 The subsidies to the central offices are usually based on 
the number of parliamentary seats parties obtained at the general elections or, as is the 
case in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Norway, on the basis of the number 
of voters at the last election. Additionally, funds are made available to ancillary 
organisations for youth activities, the emancipation of women, for specific educational 
or research activities as well as for organisational costs of travelling and mailing. In 
some countries, Norway, Sweden and Austria for example, the state also provides 
funds for newspapers which are controlled by political parties. More indirectly, parties 
are assisted by the allotment of free (or inexpensive) access to national broadcasting 
facilities or other means of communication such as billboards (Smith 1981, 173 ff.). 
Finally, parties usually have access to local, regional and national bureaucracies, 
                                                        
53 Irish parties do, however, receive substantial funds through the 'Oireachtas Grant' (Farrell 1994, 235). 




providing them with the use of public halls, telephones and other institutional 
facilities. In some countries, most notably Austria and Belgium, patronage positions 
within local and national bureaucracies as well as in nationalised industries are used by 
parties to staff with their own personnel. Since parties in government have 
proportionately more access to these facilities, British and Irish rules of state finance 
make a distinction between opposition parties and governmental parties, allowing 
direct subsidies only for opposition parties. The evidence shows that in most 
countries political parties are facilitated in a substantial manner through direct 
financial as well as indirect material contributions at the local and national level of 
government. In this analysis I will only use the direct state subsidies to central party 
offices. 
 In order to summarise and distinguish all the different provisions in European 
countries table 4.7 provides information on the first year of introduction of direct and 
indirect public party finance for each country as well as the recipient, the interval with 
which the subsidy is provided, the basis on which the subsidy is calculated, the type of 
indirect subsidies and finally the specific grants and services that parties benefit from.  
 





Table 4.7 Public finance of political parties in Western democracies. 
country introduction direct 
funding 






annual per vote and per 
seat 
billposting, broadcasting, press access, youth, research 




















annual per seat billposting, broadcasting, press access, women and 
youth organisations 
- 
France 1988 party (presidential and parliamentary) annual        
election 
per seat, per 
vote and per 
candidate 





annual        
election 
per vote and per 
seat 







annual per seat travel costs, postage, broadcasting and youth 
organisations 
- 
Italy 1974-1993 parliamentary group annual        
election 
per vote broadcasting, press access, women and youth 
organisations 
- 
Netherlands 1964 parliamentary group annual per seat billposting, broadcasting, women and youth, educational 






annual per vote and per 
seat 





annual per seat broadcasting, press access, women and youth 
organisations 
- 
United Kingdom 1975 opposition parliamentary group annual per seat broadcasting, mailing and use of public halls 1975 
 
Source of data: Von Beyme (1982; 1985); Gunlicks (1993); Katz and Mair (1992; 1994); Mendilow (1992); Nassmacher (1987) and Paltiel (1970; 1981). See Appendix 2 for additional sources. 
 




Given the fact that the earliest (direct) state subvention emanated in Germany in 
1959, it follows that it is only after this pivotal point that political parties progressively 
turned to the resources of the state for financial support. To assess the extent of this 
development, table 4.8 summarises the level of state funding as a percentage of the 
total income of political parties in Western European countries since 1960. 
 
Table 4.8 Direct state funding as a percentage of the total income of political parties 













X S CV 
Aut - - 26.3 37.0 36.5 42.8 35.7 13.5 .378 
Den - - - - - 33.9 33.9 22.9 .676 
Fin - 86.9 55.2 44.9 47.8 46.1 56.2 20.0 .356 
Fra - - - - - 59.2 59.2 13.9 .235 
Ger 47.5 32.9 21.7 15.8 19.7 19.1 26.1 14.2 .544 
Ire 35.4 29.4 20.4 19.1 18.9 15.4 23.1 10.8 .468 
Ita - 91.6 67.8 67.2 66.0 53.7 69.3 24.9 .359 
Net  1.9  1.3  1.7  1.2  0.8  1.8  1.5  1.4 .933 
Nor  3.2 57.0 63.4 54.1 58.1 55.6 48.6 20.0 .411 
Swe 49.0 51.6 63.5 68.8 60.4 54.6 58.0 15.3 .264 
UK - - 13.8 10.8  9.4 10.5 11.1  5.6 .505 
X 27.4 50.1 37.1 34.4 35.3 35.7 38.4 14.8 .385 
S 25.0 34.2 28.9 28.9 26.9 24.2 28.0 - - 
CV .912 .682 .778 .840 .762 .677 .729 - - 
 
Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992), with the exception of the data for France (see appendix 2). 
The first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix II. Before 1960 no 
state subventions existed, whereas for Belgium there are no data at all. Other missing data are indicated by 
a minus sign (-). The row marked by an X lists the average of the period and the column 'X' provides the 
country mean score. The column and row 'S' provide the standard deviations, while the column and row 
labelled CV  provide the coefficients of variance (S/ X). 
 
Despite the vast differences between countries, most West European parties depend 
heavily on direct public funding. Italian parties, in particular, derived a large 
proportion of their officially declared income from state finance; yet, the Italian 
average fell to a level of about half of the parties' total income as a result of income 
from other private and corporate donations and simply because of high inflation (see 
Bardi and Morlino 1994, 258-259). With the introduction of public party finance, 
Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish parties also became largely dependent on state 
subsidies. In Norway, for example, parties in the early 1960s derived only three per 
cent of their total income from public resources, whereas, after the introduction of 
state finance in 1970, this level rose to over sixty per cent (Svåsand 1994, 324). 
Denmark has only recently begun state financing of political parties and exhibited the 
steepest rise in public funding. According to Bille (1994, 146), Danish parties 
increased their income from public resources significantly over the last few years. 
Austrian parties banked on circa thirty-five per cent of their income on financial 
support from the state, though the bulk of public funds is provided at the level of the 




Länder (Müller 1994, 55). In Germany the dependency of parties on public finance 
has decreased since the late 1960s, although Poguntke (1994, 193) calculated that "(b)y 
the end of the 1980s ... the proportion of state subventions had reached between 60 
and 80 per cent of total central office income." Here too the provisions at the sub-
national level constitute a substantial part of the total income of parties. In Britain, 
where only the opposition parties are entitled to direct financial support from the 
state, the proportion of state funding to the total party income hovered around ten 
per cent. Surprisingly, parties in Ireland are dependent on state funding for almost a 
quarter of their total income despite the relatively limited financial provisions for 
political parties. The absence of direct state funding to parties makes for the lowest 
proportions of state dependence in the Netherlands, though indirect subsidies 
through several party foundations are substantial (see Koole 1992a; 1996). Large 
variation among parties within the same party system are found in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, while there is high homogeneity among Swedish and French parties. 
 Nonetheless, particularly with relevance to what might be anticipated by Kirch-
heimer's catch-all thesis, it is important to underline that there has been no general 
and substantial increase in the proportion of state subsidies since the 1970s. In 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands financial 
support from the state even declined in relative importance for the total income of 
parties. In contrast, Austrian, Norwegian and Swedish parties relied increasingly on 
state funding. In addition, over time the differences between parties have declined and 
across Europe parties are showing more homogeneity in financial structure, indicating 
convergence on this indicator. Although national legislation determines the level of 
state funding, the main differences in dependency on state finance between party 
families are summarised in table 4.9. 
 














X S CV β 
cd  5.9 14.3 31.6 26.8 31.6 28.8 23.2 20.9 .900  .32* 
com 31.9 80.1 51.3 48.9 49.7 48.7 51.8 31.4 .606 -.11 
con 31.6 62.6 37.8 33.9 42.7 43.5 42.0 23.3 .554 -.07 
sd 39.9 40.2 36.1 33.9 33.8 31.3 35.9 24.8 .691 -.11 
soc - - 62.1 51.4 65.2 41.9 55.2 21.1 .382 -.36 
lib 36.8 49.0 41.9 43.1 40.3 35.6 41.1 31.2 .759 -.09 
env - - - 47.1 42.8 38.8 42.9 33.7 .786 -.10 
agr 60.8 76.5 71.4 53.2 50.2 48.2 58.9 19.4 .329 -.46* 
prt - - - - 81.5 73.2 73.2  9.3 .127 -.50 
X 27.4 50.1 37.1 34.4 35.3 35.7 38.4 14.8 .385  .01 
 
Data are from Katz and Mair (1992). The first column contains the abbreviation for the party families as 
explained in appendix II. Column and row indicated with an X lists the average of the period and party 
family mean. The column 'S' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each period and 
the column 'CV ' gives the coefficient of variance (S/ X). The column 'β' provides the regression 
coefficient between the proportion of state funding and year of measurement. Coefficients marked by an 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). The - 
indicates that data were not available. The data for Belgium and France are not available. 





Due to the fact that all agrarian parties (Centre parties) in this study are Scandinavian, 
where state finance is at a relatively high level, the average proportion of public funds 
of their total income is almost sixty per cent. Social democratic parties as well as 
parties of Christian democratic denomination are, on average, less dependent on state 
funding and relied for more than half of their income on membership fees. The 
opposite is found for the socialist and communist parties, which, despite their 
doctrine of mass mobilisation, relied heavily on state funding. Probably as a result of 
their ability to generate funds from corporate interests besides membership fees, 
conservative and liberal parties depended on state funding for only approximately 
forty per cent of their total income. Environmental parties, with their low 
organisational capacity, derived a similar percentage of their income from state 
subventions. For all party families the 1960s and early 1970s were the heydays of state 
support. Thereafter, in contradiction to what Kirchheimer anticipated, the mean 
proportion of state funding of the total party income declined. The highest 
fluctuations in reliance on state finance are found within the Christian democratic, 
social democratic, communist and liberal party families, whereas the socialist and 
agrarian parties have a much more stable and homogeneous income pattern. Similar 
to income derived from membership, the initial distinctions between parties of 
different origin are disappearing over time, primarily due to the introduction of direct 
state finance for parties in most countries. 
 To draw some overall conclusions, it is useful to summarise the findings on the 
transformation of the financial income structure of political parties in the different 
countries. Table 4.10 provides the regression coefficients of the proportion of 
membership fees and state finance relative to total party income with the year of 
observation as independent variable. 
 
Table 4.10 Trends in income over time of political parties in Western Europe 1960-
1990 
beta (β) Aut Den Fin Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
membership fees -.75* -.22  .25 -.06  .15 -.39* -.25 -.42* -.49*  .48* 
state finance .43 - -.58* -.49* -.55* -.30 -.10  .14  .17 -.20 
 
The table provides the regression coefficients (β) between the proportion of membership fees for the 
total party income and the proportion of state finance with the year of observation as independent 
variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
Data for France and Belgium are not available. 
 
This pattern of regression coefficients generates four types of transformation which 
can be distinguished on the basis of the two sources of party income; from 
membership and from state subventions. In table 4.11 countries are assigned to the 
four cells on the basis of transformation of their income pattern. 
 
 




Table 4.11 Types of financial transformation 1960-1990 
 increasing proportion of state 
funding 



























Note that the data for Belgium and France are very scarce so their categorisation should be treated with 
caution. 
 
The United Kingdom, Ireland and Finland differ from all the other countries in that 
the financial importance of the membership actually increased in these countries, 
thereby refuting Kirchheimer’s catch-all thesis at this point. The other rift between 
countries is constituted by the importance of direct state subvention. Regarding the 
development of state finance, the German and Italian cases also contradict the catch-
all thesis as financial support from the state actually decreased proportionally in these 
countries, whereas in the Netherlands direct state finance is practically non-existent. 
This makes the Netherlands an outlier in terms of the financial structure of political 
parties in the West European context since party activities here are largely financed by 
membership fees (Koole 1996, 179). Parties in Sweden and Denmark, on the other 
hand, hardly generate any income from their members and are primarily dependent on 
state funding. Parties in the United Kingdom also deviate from the general picture in 
that the relevance of membership fees increased considerably. The cell which 
represents a transformation according to the catch-all thesis is found on the bottom 
left, indicating decreasing importance of membership and increasing importance of 
state finance. In this cell Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are situated. Thus, 
only four out of the twelve countries in this sample evidence a generalised 
development over time towards catch-allism on this indicator. Following the recent 
introduction in Belgium and France of state subventions to political parties, these two 
countries can be added to the left bottom cell, still constituting only half the cases in 
this study that show a development along the lines of Kirchheimer’s assertions. 
Danish, Austrian, Swedish and Norwegian parties have experienced a financial 
transformation which most resembles the catch-all model. However, although there is 
no constantly increasing level of catch-allism on this indicator, the introduction of 
state finance itself in most countries since the 1960s makes West European political 
parties certainly more catch-all in the 1980s than in the 1950s. Kirchheimer was 
correct in his assertion that state finance would gain in importance, yet he erroneously 
assumed that this process would continue. 
 One further significant conclusion extracted from this study is, that while 
membership fees are becoming less important for most parties, this loss of income 
has not been progressively compensated with state finance in all countries. Obviously, 
many parties in Western Europe have tapped other financial means for organisational 
continuity and expansion. Evidence suggests that these resources originate primarily 
from corporate and individual donations (Fischer 1994; Mendilow 1992; Paltiel 1981). 




In most countries these donations are not subject to legal restrictions and in some 
countries these private contributions are even tax-deductible, making them indirect 
state finance. Furthermore, the disclosure of party income is usually only at the 
aggregate level, so that individual contributors remain anonymous. Frequently, 
financial donations are also made to organisations which are not directly related to a 
political party, yet which channel these donations into the party organisation. These 
various sources of income for political parties have resulted in numerous political 
scandals over illegal funding and created an atmosphere of political corruption. In 
combination with weak party-attachments of the electorate, this 'sleaze factor' has 
already cost some parties in Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom dearly at election 
time. 
4.3.3 Campaign expenditures 
After examining the income structures of West European parties, this section surveys 
the other side of the coin, namely party expenditures.54 Here the focus is only on 
campaign expenditures; in that an increasing capital intensive effort and style of political 
campaigning is considered the fourth indicator of organisational catch-allism55. This 
indicator is measured by the proportion of the total annual party income spent on 
election campaigns, which is taken here to be an approximation of the level of profes-
sionalization of West European parties. 
 Political parties (or individual candidates) have two main resources that can be 
used in election campaigns: money and labour (Ware 1996, 296). Additionally, as was 
shown in the last section, parties have access to considerable facilitative resources, 
encompassing free access to the media, patronage positions and the use of state 
bureaucracies, all of which are utilised during electoral campaigns, yet will not appear 
in official campaign budgets. Since it is impossible to include these indirect means in 
the analysis, this section will only discuss the financial resources parties deplete to 
attract voters. Section 4.4 of this chapter examines the development in the size of the 
human resources, that is the size of the professional staff, of political parties in 
Western Europe. 
 In absolute terms campaign expenditures have sky-rocketed almost all over 
Western Europe during the post-war period (see Katz and Mair 1992, tables E.6). 
Several factors contribute to the increasing capital intensity of democratic political 
campaigning. The traditional lines of communication through a variety of intermedi-
ary organisations are abandoned by many parties and more direct means of political 
communication with the electorate are adopted. Many political parties in Western 
Europe disposed of their party newspapers and other forms of monopolised media 
and now progressively rely on the commercialised press. This encumbers their effort 
to get their message across as parties have to compete not only with the other parties 
in the national party system, but with other news-items as well. Many parties have 
tried to tackle this problem by hiring professionals from marketing or commercial 
agencies to advice them on the form and substance of their political information. As a 
                                                        
54 Two types of party spending can be distinguished: the routine, inter-election expenses necessary for the 
maintenance of the party organization and the campaign expenditures during the election campaign, of 
which only the latter is analyzed here. 
 
55 Pedersen, for example, suggests that parties increasingly campaign in a "catch-all style, i.e. to use more 
broadly based appeals, marketing techniques, etc." (Pedersen 1983, 58). 




result, the content of the slogans at election time have also changed. Under the 
influence of image-consultants, less emphasis is put on the ideological content of the 
party platform while increasing emphasis is laid on the positive characteristics of 
personalities. Party leaders and parliamentarians now often receive media training by 
professionals, especially concerning their appearances on television. Contrary to 
Kirchheimer's assertion, political opponents attack each other more directly, usually 
with the help of commercial advertising companies. One of the most famous 
examples was perhaps the Saatchi & Saatchi campaign for the British Conservative 
Party with their slogan "Labour Doesn't Work." This text was displayed underneath a 
long line of people queuing in front of an employment office. 
 All these factors make Kirchheimer's assumption of increasing campaign 
expenditures a logical hypothesis. Furthermore, in several countries such as Norway 
and Sweden, expenditures on elections campaigns are not confined by a legal 
maximum, neither are parties restricted in their expenses by legislation in Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium (in the latter a maximum expenditure was set 
for both parties and candidates in 1989). This also suggests that parties can employ 
whatever financial resources they deem necessary to win the next election. 
Nevertheless, in some West European countries legal regulations on campaign 
expenditures do exist. In Austria, for example, parties set their own maximum 
expenditures limits, which are reported and inspected by an all-party committee after 
the election. Since 1974 Italian parties are also compelled by law to supply a detailed 
account of elections expenses, although no maximum limit is set. In Ireland 
regulations concerning campaign expenditures existed since 1923, but were removed 
in 1963. Strict party regulations on finance exist in Germany, though they are hardly 
ever enforced. Legislation in the United Kingdom sets a maximum expenditure on 
campaigns, although these restrictions are applicable only to individual candidates in 
local constituencies, not to parties at the national level (Fisher 1994, 62). Moreover, 
the maximum expenditure has been raised five times since 1960. One could say that 
there are very limited barriers for parties to increase the amount of money spent on 
campaigning. 
 In this section the (sometimes estimated) campaign expenditures of parties in 
national elections are examined.56 To make the data comparable across the different 
countries in this study, the amounts spend on political campaigning are given as the 
percentage of the total annual income of the party Head Office. Table 4.12 below 
summarises these data for each of the countries in this study. 
 
                                                        
56 For Germany there are no longitudinal data available for national election. Therefore, the Land election 
in Baden-Württemberg was compared for two consecutive elections, as well as one local election in Nord 
Rhine-Westphalia and the European elections of 1984 and 1989. 




Table 4.12 Campaign expenditures as proportion of the total annual party income in 













X S CV beta   
(β) 
Aut 201.3 173.9 151.9  56.9  75.4  82.0 108.0  71.8 .665 -.56* 
Bel - - - 471.3 272.6 257.8 333.9 138.2 .413 -.62* 
Den  98.4  33.2  26.4  31.7  25.1  45.2  46.3  30.4 .656 -.21 
Fin 100.0  13.5  16.0   8.7   8.8   9.4  26.1  20.7 .793 -.53* 
Ger - - - 165.5  30.7  35.4  77.2  11.9 .154  .22 
Ire  19.1 - - 124.1 135.9  81.6  90.2  57.7 .639  .37 
Ita - -  25.8  28.9  25.1  29.4  27.3  17.6 .645  .03 
Net  24.2  29.1  37.0  30.0  25.4  23.8  29.1  15.6 .536 -.15 
Nor  99.7  28.7  38.4  21.2  38.0  24.3  41.6  53.5 1.28 -.59* 
Swe  48.9  39.1  35.4  53.6  86.5  53.0  52.8  54.1 1.02  .19 
UK  88.1  42.7  47.8  90.4  45.1  71.3  64.2  29.1 .453 -.03 
X  83.8  51.5  47.3  61.1  49.6  45.5  56.3  36.3 .645 -.00 
S  55.5  47.6  52.0 139.9  87.9  73.5  78.9 - - - 
CV .662 .924 1.09 2.29 1.77 1.16 1.40 - - - 
 
Entries are average percentages of an annual income spent on election campaigns. Data on campaign 
expenditures are taken from Katz and Mair (1992, Tables E.6). Data before 1960 are not available for 
most countries and for France too scarce to be included. For Belgium the campaign expenditures in 
proportion to the total amount of state subventions are used, as total party income data are unavailable. A 
minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. The first column contains the abbreviation for the 
countries as explained in appendix II. Column and row indicated with an X lists the average of the period 
and party family mean. The column 'S' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each 
period and the column 'CV ' gives the coefficient of variance (S/ X). For every country a linear regression 
was computed with the campaign expenditures as the dependent variable and the period of observation as 
the independent variable. The column 'β' provides these regression coefficients. A decline in campaign 
expenditures as a proportion of the total party income would be indicated by a negative trend parameter. 
Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level 
(t = < .05). 
 
Legal restrictions on campaign expenditures have indeed not checked a considerable 
growth in election campaign expenditures. In absolute terms, almost every single West 
European party increased its campaign expenses between 1960 and 1990. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen from table 4.12, these increases were relatively moderate 
compared to the total party income growth; resulting in lower proportions of 
campaign expenditures over time in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Norway, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The effect of income growth is exemplary in 
the Finnish case: before the introduction of state finance, Finnish parties spent almost 
one total annual income on their election campaigns. This proportion dropped to 
one-tenth of one annual income after the introduction of state subventions in 1967. 
Parties in Sweden, Germany, Ireland and Italy spent an increasing proportion of their 
annual income on elections. Relative to their total income, Austrian, Irish and 
German parties have spent most on election campaigns. The lowest proportions of 
the annual income spent on election campaigns are found in the Netherlands, Italy 
and Finland. Overall, less than half of the parties' national income is spent on election 
campaigns and over time, contrary to Kirchheimer's assertion, this proportion has 




even decreased in most countries. The differences between parties within and across 
countries in expenditure levels on electoral campaigning remain substantial, witnessed 
by high coefficients of variance. To reiterate, the absolute amount of money parties 
spent on election campaigns grew significantly, yet this increase has been more than 
compensated by an even steeper rise in the total annual income of political parties. 
 An interesting pattern also emerges when the data are broken down for the 
different party families, as is summarised in table 4.13. 
 














X S CV beta   
(β) 
cd  23.9  42.0  71.2 153.4  71.9  74.4  72.8 125.3 1.722  .05 
com - -  31.9  31.5  15.8  13.4  23.2  13.9  .599 -.60 
con  76.8  24.8  29.6  69.9  58.2  54.2  52.3  49.2  .941  .08 
sd  97.7  64.5  52.9  62.5  53.5  54.0  79.1  66.5  .840 -.31* 
soc -   2.1  15.7  27.3  21.7  27.1  25.4  13.3  .524 -.16 
lib  46.6  44.0  28.6  97.4  81.5  80.7  63.1 105.4 1.673  .15 
env - - -  21.3 145.8  74.4 110.1 104.0  .945 -.04 
eth - -  27.6 204.7 162.9 265.2 167.9 174.1 1.044  .34 
agr  30.0  21.6  23.4  30.3  22.8  37.5  27.1  24.4  .900  .08 
X 83.8  51.5  47.3  61.1  49.6  45.5  56.3  36.3  .645 -.00 
 
Entries are percentages of an annual income spent on election campaigns. Data are taken from Katz and 
Mair (1992). The first column contains the abbreviation for the party families as explained in appendix II. 
Column and row indicated with an X lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column 
'S' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each period and the column 'CV ' gives the 
coefficient of variance (S/ X). The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the proportion 
of campaign expenditures relative to the total party income and the period of observation. Coefficients 
marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
The minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available and data for France are too scarce to be included. 
 
In interpreting this table, the reader should bear in mind that the proportions are 
determined by both changes in the level of expenditures as well as by changes in the 
income of parties, which in turn are subject to specific national provisions and 
regulations. Keeping this in mind, the data show that on average, the social 
democratic and the Christian democratic parties spent more than seventy per cent of 
their income on election campaigns, whereas the liberal parties in Western Europe 
also depleted a fair proportion of their annual income on electoral purposes, namely, 
over sixty per cent on average. The party families which spent the lowest proportions 
of their income on attracting the popular vote, are the agrarian, socialist and 
communist parties (excluding the fascist, environmental, ethnic and protest party 
families from the comparison). The differences between party families are too small 
to ascribe them to different ideologies concerning the level of mass organisation of 
the parties. Two conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, the general trend of 
decreasing proportions in expenditure on election campaigns is only found among 
parties traditionally positioned on the left of the political spectrum, namely 
communist, socialist, social democratic and environmental parties. This downward 




trend in campaign expenditure is not found among the Christian democratic, agrarian 
and liberal parties. Communist, socialist and social democratic parties also have the 
lowest variation in campaign expenditures. Some of this variability, however, is also 
caused by the inclusion of a different number of parties from the various countries 
with their typical national legislation on electoral campaigns and the availability and 
type of public finance. A second important conclusion from all this is that 
Kirchheimer’s assumption that parties in Western Europe would primarily 
concentrate their (financial) efforts on winning the next election is not corroborated 
by these data. 
 In summary, Kirchheimer was correct in assuming that larger amounts of money 
would be spent on election campaign by political parties. However, despite an increase 
in the absolute amount spent on election campaigns, most parties increased their 
income at a proportionately higher rate, resulting in lower expenditures relative to 
their total income. Apparently, parties spent their burgeoning riches on other 
activities, one of which is discussed in the next section: the professionalization of the 
party organisation. 
4.4 Professionalization: the size and structure of the party staff 
With the decline of mass membership, the importance of voluntary labour has also 
declined for most political parties (Bartolini 1983; Heidar 1994). A possible shift from 
labour-intensive to capital intensive political activity can also be assessed by examining 
the level of bureaucratic professionalization of party organisations. To measure the 
level of professionalization, the fifth indicator of organisational catch-allism, I will 
look at the number of professional salaried experts and bureaucrats employed at the 
party organisation.57 Firstly, the focus is on the professionalization of the party central 
office and secondly, in section 4.4.2, on the professionalization of the parliamentary 
party.  
4.4.1 Staff in central office 
For reasons of comparison, the number of professionals in the central party 
organisation is related to the number of party members.58 The entries in the table 
below refer to the number of professionals employed at the party central office for 
each 10.000 members. For most parties the absolute size of professional staff at party 
headquarters in Western Europe increased substantially during the post-war period.59 
Only nine parties are exempted from this general pattern of professionalization (Katz 
and Mair 1992, tables C.1). The variation in professionalization between the different 
countries is summarised in table 4.14 below. 
 
                                                        
57 The total size of the party bureaucracy can be much larger as some people outside central party offices 
can also devote themselves to full-time party work (Panebianco 1988, 223-231; Katz and Mair 1993b, 16). 
 
58 The level of professionalization is the ratio between bureaucrats dedicated to and responsible for the 
maintenance of the national central party organization and the total membership (M). 
 
59 Katz and Mair 1992, tables C.1; Müller 1994, 73-74; Deschouwer 1994, 104; Sundberg 1994, 173-175; 
Farrell 1994, 223; Von Beyme 1985, 238; Koole 1994, 290-291; Krouwel 1996, 183-184; Pierre and 
Widfeldt 1992, 789-791; Webb 1994, 124-125. 




















X S CV beta  
(β) 
Aut  1.93  1.31  2.03  2.52  2.55  2.75  2.85  2.28  0.01 .001  .36  
Den  2.96  1.95  2.53  2.22  5.82  6.17  6.00  3.95  0.04 .001  .36* 
Fin  3.58  3.36  3.86  4.30  4.69  5.35  5.56  4.39  0.03 .001  .31* 
Ger  -  7.08  3.74  6.22  2.23  3.63  4.45  4.56  0.02 .001 -.37 
Ire  1.01  0.87  0.36  0.30  3.51 18.42  8.34  4.69  0.11 .002  .36 
Ita  1.59  1.95  1.77  2.99  7.18 18.95 17.87  7.47  0.18 .002  .35* 
Net  2.45  3.68  5.92 10.20  3.60  4.57  4.89  5.04  0.06 .001  .05 
Nor  -  1.62  1.54  6.25  3.78  3.55  3.99  3.41  0.04 .001  .12 
Swe  1.07  2.50  3.32  3.85  4.71  6.89  6.32  4.09  0.04 .001  .45* 
UK  0.49  0.68  0.67  0.67  0.67  2.13  2.75  1.15  0.01 .001  .79* 
X  1.89  2.50  2.57  3.95  3.87  7.24  6.30  4.05  0.05 .001  .24* 
S  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.12  0.11  0.06 - - - 
CV .001 .001 .001 .002 .001 .002 .002 .001 - - - 
 
Entries denote the number of professionals per 10.000 members. Data on staff of party central offices 
and membership are taken from Katz and Mair (1992). Data for France and Belgium are unavailable. The 
first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix II. The column indicated 
by CV  lists the standard deviation of the country scores. The row 'X' lists the average of the period and 
the row labelled CV  provides the coefficient of variance (CV/ X). The column indicated 'beta (β)' 
provides the regression coefficient between the number of professionals employed at the party central 
office for each 10.000 members with the year of observation as independent variable. Coefficients marked 
by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Data 
prior to 1955 are not available. 
 
Table 4.14 clearly vindicates the catch-all assertion that West European parties 
professionalized their central party organisation. Relative to membership, the number 
of professionals has more than tripled in the last three decades. Parties in Italy 
employed the highest proportion of professional staff in relation to membership size. 
Also, parties in the Netherlands have a relatively high proportion of professional staff 
working in their central office, despite the fact that Dutch parties employ relatively 
few professionals at their central offices in absolute terms. Obviously, the low level of 
membership in the Netherlands accounts for this relatively high ratio. Parties in 
Austria and in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have much lower proportions 
of professional staff relative to their membership despite the fact that they employ 
two or three times the number of professionals found at Dutch party central offices. 
Still, in all countries, with the sole exception of Germany, the level of professionalism 
of parties increased as regression analysis shows. The steepest increases in 
professionalisation are found in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Ireland, while 
Norwegian and Dutch parties professionalized more slowly. The relative decline in 
professional staff in Germany is more than anything the result of very early 
professionalization. German parties employ by far the largest number of professionals 
in absolute terms. Albeit, most of these proportional increases are also the result of 
declining membership figures; in response to this development parties have not opted 
to decrease their staff accordingly. On the contrary, parties seem to assign many of 




the tasks previously given to the rank-and-file voluntary activists to professionally 
trained personnel. This indicates that modern political parties can do without large 
memberships, but are reluctant to do away with the expertise of the professionals. 
Over time, nevertheless, the heterogeneity between parties has increased somewhat as 
becomes evident from the two measures of dispersion (the standard deviation and 
coefficient of variance). 
 The trend towards professionalization is also visible when the data are broken 
down into party families as is done in table 4.15 below. Again, the entries in the table 
below refer to the number of professionals employed at the party central office for 
each 10.000 members. 
 Table 4.15 makes clear that, over time, with the exception of environmental and 
protest parties, all party families enlarged their professional staff at their Head Office 
relative to their membership-size. The lowest proportions of professionals are found 
among the agrarian, social democratic and Christian democratic parties. These three 
party families also have the largest pools of membership, which may go a long way in 
explaining these low scores on the number of professionals per ten thousand 
members. The largest variation between parties of the same germane origin are found 
among the socialist and environmental parties, while Christian democratic, social 
democratic, agrarian and conservative parties show more cross-national homogeneity. 
Agrarian, socialist, communist and social democratic parties have professionalized 
their central extra-parliamentary organisation most rapidly, while Christian 
democratic, liberal and particularly conservative parties have transformed more 
slowly.  




















X S CV β 
cd 1.67 3.10 2.29  3.09  3.03  3.16  4.30  2.95 0.02 .001  .23 
com 6.25 4.81 7.23 11.13  9.01  8.99 11.60  8.42 0.05 .001  .39 
con 1.34 4.70 6.89  4.14  5.09  4.90  4.22  4.47 0.03 .001  .09 
sd 1.63 1.94 2.10  2.44  2.97  3.17  3.37  2.52 0.02 .001  .35* 
soc 9.00 4.62 5.83  5.20  8.75 23.33 26.27 19.45 0.17 .001  .45 
lib 2.12 2.17 3.54  6.67  4.95  4.87  6.26  4.37 0.05 .001  .27* 
env - - - - - 30.29 22.76 26.53 0.25 .001 -.16 
agr 0.87 0.86 1.06  1.26  1.53  1.37  1.73  1.24 0.01 .001  .55* 
prt    19.61 20.04  9.56  4.79  7.18 0.08 .001 -.81* 
X  1.89 2.50 2.57  3.95  3.87  7.24  6.30  4.05 0.05 .001  .24* 
 
Entries are the average number of professionals per 10.000 members. Data on staff of party central 
offices and membership are taken from Katz and Mair (1992). Data for Belgium and France are not 
included. The minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. Column and row indicated with an X 
lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column 'CV ' lists the standard deviation of the 
country scores. The column indicated 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the number of 
professionals employed at the party central office for each 10.000 members with the year of observation 
as independent variable. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is 
below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
In sum, throughout Western Europe a significant increase in professionalization of 
central party offices is evident. Kirchheimer correctly asserted that political parties 
have diverted their resources towards building more professional organisations 
instead of investing in voluntary membership organisations. Despite the lack of cross-
national data on membership activity, the evidence available from country studies 
strongly suggests that the role of members for the daily functioning of political parties 
has declined substantially throughout Western Europe (Von Beyme 1985, 186-188; 
Heidar 1994, 82; Seyd and Whitely 1992, 89; Zielonka-Goei 1992, 102). 
4.4.2 Staff of the parliamentary party 
Subsequent to professionalization of parties' central offices, catch-all parties will also 
professionalise their parliamentary party organisations according to the catch-all 
theory outlined in chapters 2 and 3. To measure the level of expertise at the 
parliamentary parties, the ratio between the number of parliamentary staff and the 
number of parliamentary representatives (seats in parliament) is utilised. A score of 
100 means that the number of experts employed at the parliamentary party is equal in 
number to the seats in parliament. The results of these calculations for the different 
countries in this study are given in table 4.16. 


















X S CV β 
Aut  28.5  57.1  55.5  54.1  51.3  55.6  38.2  39.8 1.04 .33 
Den  26.1  16.3  28.0  62.0  68.2  90.3  46.1  41.2 .893 .57* 
Fin   3.5   5.0   7.5  11.0  15.9  15.4   8.6   5.4 .628 .89* 
Ger 423.1 103.3 126.9 130.2 208.7 358.4 206.1 176.9 .858 .25 
Ire  -  -   7.6  19.9  80.0  95.5  50.8  41.7 .820 .89* 
Ita  -  15.1  15.5  57.0  40.2  54.3  36.4  23.7 .651 .47 
Net   7.7  28.5 109.3 171.6 174.5 172.2 110.6  70.8 .640 .70* 
Nor  16.3  19.6  39.8  70.4  67.0  53.2  44.4  43.8 .986 .38* 
Swe   4.8  14.0  20.3  24.7  32.5  36.6  20.8  12.5 .601 .78* 
UK  22.2  20.0  28.6  -  35.7  40.6  33.4  28.7 .859 .28 
X  66.5  31.0  43.9  66.8  77.4  97.2  59.5  48.5 .815 .19* 
S  92.5  31.1  43.8  68.0  67.8 105.7  73.6 - - - 
CV 1.39 1.00 .997 1.02 .876 1.09 1.24 - - - 
 
Entries are ratios between the number of parliamentary staff and number of parliamentary 
representatives. Data on staff of parliamentary party are taken from Katz and Mair (1992) and number of 
seats are taken from Mackie and Rose 1989 (updates from European Journal of Political Research). A 
minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. Column, 'S' lists the standard deviation of the country 
scores. Row 'X' lists the average of the period and the row labelled 'CV ' provides the coefficient of 
variance (S/ X). The column indicated 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the number of 
professionals employed at the parliamentary party in relation to the number of seats with the year of 
observation as independent variable. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance 
level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
As can be seen from table 4.16, in all West European countries parties 
professionalized their parliamentary organisation. Although this secular trend towards 
professionalization of the parliamentary parties in Western Europe is unmistakable, 
the ratio between the number of professionals employed by the parliamentary parties 
and the number of parliamentary seats reveals large dissimilarities between countries. 
Despite the fact that these cross-national differences in the level of parliamentary 
professionalization declined since the late-1950s, substantial disparities remain. The 
German Bundestag and the Dutch Tweede Kamer have professionalized most 
thoroughly over the last three decades. In Germany parliamentarians have, on 
average, more than two assistants and Dutch MP's have more than one professional 
at their disposal. While in Germany the rapid growth of parliamentary party staff 
became evident even before the early introduction of state funding, professionali-
zation in the Netherlands occurred mainly after the introduction of state subsidies in 
1968 for the assistance of individual MPs and parliamentary parties. The most 
'understaffed' parliamentary representatives are found in Sweden and particularly 
Finland, yet parties in these countries are professionalising rapidly in the last decade 
of this study. A similar high beta-coefficient was found for Ireland; Irish parliamen-
tarians did not have any staff at their disposal until 1975, when state finance provided 
secretarial assistance. Initially, one secretarial assistant was made available for each 10 
MP's (TDs), while in 1982 this proportion increased to almost one assistant for every 




MP. In Denmark the increasing professionalization resulted from the introduction in 
1986 of a state subsidy enabling each MP to hire professional assistance. Austria, Italy 
and the United Kingdom are in the middle of the distribution concerning the ratio of 
professional staff and MP's as well as the speed of professionalization. 
 Despite the fact that provisions for parliamentary staff are largely the function of 
national regulations and financial provisions, there is some variance between the 
different party families concerning the speed of transformation. Table 4.17 gives the 
regression coefficients of the parliamentary staff in relation to parliamentary seats of 
party families with the year of observation as independent variable. 
 
Table 4.17 Trends in professionalization of the parliamentary party of West European 
party families 1960-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib env eth agr prt 
beta (β) .48* .18 .53* -.18 .26 .41* .34 .97 .73* .80* 
 
The column indicated 'beta' (β) provides the regression coefficient between the parliamentary staff in 
relation to parliamentary seats and the year of observation. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates 
that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
With the exception of the social democratic parties, all party families show a 
propensity towards more professionalization over time. This finding clearly 
contradicts Kirchheimer’s assertion that social democratic parties would be most 
eager to adopt catch-all practices. More in line with the general trend, however, social 
democratic parties did professionalise their parliamentary organisation most rapidly 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Liberal, conservative and Christian democratic parties 
also employed higher numbers of staff over the last decades, while communist an 
socialist parties were a little more reluctant to take on larger numbers of professional 
parliamentary staff. It emerges that, of the larger party families, agrarian and 
conservative parties have professionalized most rapidly over time. Kirchheimer 
correctly asserted that parties in Western Europe are rapidly professionalising their 
parliamentary organisation. Only the social democratic parties seem to hold on to 
somewhat more traditional organisational practices.  
 To summarise, political parties is Western Europe have thoroughly 
professionalized both their central office organisation as well as their parliamentary 
party. In most countries the increase in parliamentary party staff has steadily exceeded 
the speed of professionalization of the central offices. The only exceptions to this 
pattern are Italy and the United Kingdom, where party central offices were 
professionalized more rapidly than the parliamentary party. The increasing 
predominance of the parliamentary party over the central office has been most 
insistent in Ireland and Denmark; exhibiting an increase in staff was ten times higher 
for the parliamentary party than for the central office. In Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Norway and Sweden, the professionalization of the parliamentary party has surpassed 
that of the party's central office by three to four times (see Katz and Mair 1994). The 
tendency in Western Europe to bestow state finance to the parliamentary party has 
transcended the proclivity to grant financial support to the parties' central offices, 
which in turn resulted in a power shift from the extra-parliamentary party organisation 
to the parliamentary party. Further evidence of this alteration in intra-party power 
structure is elaborated in the next section where the internal democracy of West 




European parties is assessed. 
4.5 Internal democracy and power distribution 
This section concentrates on the distribution of power within political parties between 
the leadership and the rank-and-file membership.60 As was shown in chapter 2, one of 
Kirchheimer's central concerns was the limited opportunity for political participation 
by citizens in modern party systems dominated by catch-all parties. Catch-all parties 
discourage members from having any control in the selection of the national party 
chairman and parliamentary candidates, so enhancing the party leadership's increasing 
influence over these internal decision-making processes. Furthermore, it is expected 
that the institutions for the internal process of will-formation shall also become less 
democratic in the development towards catch-allism. 
 In chapter 3 it was argued that both the nominating process or selection of party 
leaders and parliamentary candidates are the most crucial functions of political parties 
and therefore, good indicators for the distribution of power within the party 
organisation (see also Schattschneider 1942, 64). Moreover, the selection of the 
leadership and the formulation of policy are interrelated since candidates, who are 
elected into public office or in the party central office are, for example, in a position 
to influence the political agenda and prepare the documents used in the debate. One 
could also reverse this argument: decisions about persons are often preliminary policy 
decisions and thus, choices on candidates are structured by policy preferences (see 
Niedermayer 1989; Ranney 1981, 103). Therefore, the manner in which the leadership 
of political parties is selected is related to intra-party conflict and party cohesion 
(Gallagher 1988). As some of the earliest studies of political parties also emphasised, 
an 'open' or democratic selection of leadership is also crucial for the legitimacy of 
political leaders (Michels 1911, 120-128; Duverger 1954, 135). Indeed, the recruitment 
and nomination of candidates for public office is such a vital function that it is widely 
regarded as the discriminating criterion of the definition of a political party (Sartori 
1976; Eldersveld 1982). 
 In this study I use the number and status of people who participate in the 
leadership and candidate selection and policy formation process to determine the 
'openness' of the procedures. In general terms, the higher the number of people that 
have the opportunity to participate in these procedures, the more 'open' the 
procedure. If the rank-and-file membership is excluded from the candidate selection 
and policy formation, the procedure is considered centralised. Usually candidate 
selection is an intra-party affair, where only a limited number of party members are 
eligible to vote and thereby, become part of the 'selectorate'.61 Two opposing 
                                                        
60 See also Beer 1956, 9-57;Von Beyme 1985, 232-240; Katz and Mair 1993b; Niedermayer 1989. 
61 Ranney (1981, 83 ff) distinguishes three dimensions of candidate selection: centralization, inclusiveness 
and direct or indirect participation. Centralization refers to the pattern of power distribution in the 
candidate selection process over the different levels of the party organization (national, regional and local). 
Inclusiveness refers to the restrictiveness of the qualifications for participation in the selection process. 
The inclusiveness is determined by the extent to which the party elite allows the lower party echelons to 
participate in the election process. A direct intra-party selection procedure would thus entail an open 
primary, poll or referendum among all party members. An indirect method is the selection by committees 
or conventions where delegates decide on who is to be the candidate for public office. Another important 
aspect is the extent of competitiveness of the inter-party competition: the number of candidates which 
run for the same office. Parties will try to limit too open a competition between candidates for the party 
leadership, as a display of disunity will damage the party's electoral credibility and attractiveness. As 
politicians become more professional, and more ambitious for office and less policy oriented, they will 




selection procedures, democratic direct membership polls or indirect nomination by 
the incumbent national leader(s) can be seen as two poles on the scale of 
centralisation in the selection of candidates. As it is necessary (and sometimes 
compulsory by law) for parties in a democratic polity to retain a democratic structure, 
parties will rarely opt for an official procedure of total co-optation. However, as will 
be shown below, even when direct membership polls are held, candidate selection 
within parties is largely outside democratic popular control and the larger majority of 
citizens are not involved in inner party politics (see von Beyme 1985, 239). Many 
inner-party elections are indirect, namely, through committees or bureau's, 
nomination by the leadership itself, selection by the elected representatives, party 
congresses or conferences, all allowing for extensive manipulation of the outcome by 
the party leadership. The relevance of the selection of the party chairperson, as 
opposed to policy decisions, lies in the fact that the latter are usually very temporal 
and vague, whereas the appointment of party leaders have more durable consequences 
(Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991, 40). The importance of these decisions on individuals 
transcend party affairs themselves, since top officials of political parties are often 
consulted in decisions made by governments and ministers. Conversely, ministers 
depend on the party leadership for re-election and political support. Moreover, 
negotiators in coalition formations often consult party leaders (if these leaders do not 
conduct the negotiations themselves) to ensure that the party will lend support the 
newly formed government. 
 On the basis of research on candidate selection by Janda (1980, 110-111) and 
Gallagher (1988a), a scale of centralisation of candidate and leadership selection is 
constructed. Unlike practices in the United States such as ‘primaries’, the selection 
procedure in Western Europe is purely an intra-party process. Voters in Europe can 
only participate in leadership and candidate selection when they join a political party 
organisation. Party voters are therefore not included in this scale. 
                                                                                                                                             
sooner put the party's unity at risk. This will have consequences for the style of (democratic) leadership, 
the internal cohesion of the party and its electoral fortune (Marsh 1993; see also Dahl 1971, 7). 




Figure 4.1 Openness (inclusiveness) of the leadership and candidate selection 
procedures: locus of major influence 
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This scale is used to quantify centralisation in both the selection of party leaders and 
parliamentary candidates of European parties. The determining factor for each score 
is the major locus of influence in the selection process. The right end of the scale, box 
7, indicates the most open and democratic selection procedure, in which all members 
formally have the right and opportunity to participate in the selection procedure. This 
would mean open primaries, referenda or polls among party members. Box 6 
indicates a procedure in which party active members have to attend (local) meetings 
or congresses to be admitted in the selection procedure. Usually, this procedure 
entails the appointment of special election committees. A procedure in which the 
official congress representatives or local party leaders participate in the selection 
procedure and members can only ratify the candidate selection afterwards is indicated 
by box 5. A party is placed in box 4 when the parliamentary party mainly influences 
the selection of the party leader. This procedure may include ratification by party 
members after the selection. When the locus of most influence rests outside the 
official party organs with affiliated interest groups (such as trade unions), yet the 
selection requires ratification by the party central body, score 3 is assigned. Box 2 is 
indicative of a procedure which gives the party central office or executive body vital 
influence in the selection procedure. When there is complete co-option by the 
incumbent party leader, the most centralised score of 1 is given to the respective 
party. If a party moves toward the centralistic end of the scale, because the party top 
increases its influence over the selection of the party leader, the party is transforming 
toward catch-allism. By using the same scale for both processes, chairman and 
candidate selection, a comparison between the two processes across parties and 
countries over time is rendered possible. 
 One important distinction which has to be made, is between the official rules for 
the selection procedure as they are laid down in the party rules and the 'real world' 
selection process. This 'actual' selection process denotes a very complex mechanism 
of interaction involving multiple actors (some of which may even be outside the 
formal party organisation), in which all actors have a variegated degree of influence. 
Seldom will one single actor exert complete control over the selection process. The 
measurement of centralisation in this study concentrates on the formal, official 
written party rules of leadership and candidate selection. 
 Changes in the intra-party balance of power between the party members and the 
party leadership is assessed by two measures. First, the selection of the national party 
chairperson (or party president), which is the highest official in the party central 
office, is analysed. An increasingly centralised (exclusive) selection procedure of the 
party chairperson indicates organisational catch-allism. In section 4.5.2 the selection 
of parliamentary candidates is analysed. Both measures together constitute the sixth 
indicator of organisational catch-allism. 




4.5.1 Selection of the party chairperson 
In Western Europe, the eminence and role of the party 'leader' differs from party to 
party. He or she may have the sole task of managing the party organisation or, 
conversely, play an important role in the policy formulation and decision-making. In 
some parties the party chairperson or president is the most important position, while 
in other parties the parliamentary leader (or governmental leader) is more influential.62 
In some cases, the parliamentary leader automatically becomes the party leader or is 
able to appoint confidants to the party chair. Furthermore, it is important whether the 
function of party leader is given to a single person or is a shared responsibility by 
several individuals. In Austria, Belgium and Italy the national party executive 
commonly select their leader from their midst. This extra-parliamentary leader yields 
significant power in the appointment of ministers, governmental policy making and 
coalition formation. In Ireland, France, Finland and Denmark the party chairperson 
and the parliamentary leader is usually the same person, who combines both 
functions. In contrast, in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, the parliamentary leadership tends to dominate the extra-parliamentary 
organisation. The next table summarises the most dominating bodies in the selection 
of the party chairperson in each country. 
 
Table 4.18 Major locus of party leader selection in West European countries 1945-
1990 
country Most important party body in selection Other important actors 
Austria national executive parliamentary party 
Belgium national executive national convention 
Denmark parliamentary party national executive 
Finland national congress local conventions 
France national executive  
Germany national executive national congress 
Ireland parliamentary party national congress 
Italy national executive  
Netherlands national executive national congress 
Norway parliamentary party national executive and congress 
Sweden parliamentary party  
United Kingdom parliamentary party  
 
Adapted from Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 254. Data from Katz and Mair 1992. 
 
This table clearly shows that leadership selection within West European parties is 
often an oligarchic intra-elite selection procedure, in which members are, at most, 
allowed to 'rubber-stamp' decisions at the national party congress after they have been 
taken by the party national leadership. In most West European countries national 
party executives and parliamentary representatives maintain firm control over the 
                                                        
62 Dewachter 1987, 320-322; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 252-253; Müller 1994; Deschouwer 1994; 
De Winter 1993, 245; Mair 1994; Bille 1994; Sundberg and Gylling 1992, 277; Thiebault 1993, 283-290; 
Raymond 1990; Poguntke with Boll, 1992: 352; Marsh 1993, 299; Krouwel 1996; Koole 1994; Svåsand 
1994, 306; Strom 1993, 332; Webb 1994, 121-122. 




leadership selection procedure. Despite the presence of factionalism in almost all 
political parties, candidates which stand for the national party leadership will seldom 
be openly contested (von Beyme 1985, 226-232; Massari 1989; Cole 1989). Overt 
challenges to incumbent leaders are rare, allowing for the conclusion that party 
leadership elections in Western Europe are seldom open or competitive. Table 4.18 
only gives a very static picture of the general pattern in each of the countries, thereby 
neglecting the variation between parties within countries and transformation of 
individual parties over time. In the next table a more dynamic approach is adopted; 
the entries given are the average 'scores of inclusiveness' in the selection of the party 
chairperson, based on the 7-point scale explained above (see figure 4.1). 
 


















X S CV beta 
(β) 
Aut 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.1 3.7 1.1 .297  .23 
Bel 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.9 3.3 1.4 .424  .19 
Den 4.3 4.4 4.4 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 0.9 .225 -.28* 
Fin 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 1.1 .244  .26* 
Fra 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 0.9 .333  .15 
Ger 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.5 1.0 .286  .52* 
Ire 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.9 4.4 0.6 .136  .16 
Ita 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.3 2.5 1.0 .400  .46* 
Net 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.8 4.1 3.8 4.5 4.5 3.8 1.7 .447  .26* 
Nor 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.8 0.3 .063 -.10 
Swe 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.6 0.8 .174  .24 
UK 3.3 3.3 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9 1.0 .256  .62* 
X 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.2 3.8 1.0 .263  .20* 
S 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 - - - 
CV .400 .400 .361 .316 .307 .307 .293 .285 .342 - - - 
 
Note that the scores of the period 1945-1955 are aggregated in one column for reasons of space (scores 
did not differ). Entries are average ‘openness-scores’. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection 
procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on the selection procedure are 
taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.2. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average 
score by period and country means. The column and row marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation 
for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance 
(S/ X). The row 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the inclusiveness of the selection 
procedure and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the 
five percent level (t = < .05). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be 
calculated. 
 
Overall, the openness of leadership selection in Western Europe is low, with few 
parties allowing party members to voice who they want to be party leader. Still, a 
moderate trend towards more inclusive and open procedures of party leadership 
selection is discernible, particularly since the 1960s (β = .20). An increasing number 
of parties have been willing to grant party members some influence over the selection 
of party leaders, although usually only in the ratification of choices made earlier by the 




party elite. In all countries, with the exception of Denmark and Norway, this 
moderate trend towards democratisation of internal decision-making is noticeable. 
The most democratic party organisations can be found in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland, in contrast to the French and Italian parties which remained relatively 
undemocratic and centralised with regard to their leadership selection procedure. 
French parties did adopt more open procedures during the 1960s and 1970s, yet 
regressed to more centralised procedures again in the 1980s. The coefficients of 
variance show the moderate trend towards convergence among West European 
parties. While, for example, the initially very undemocratic German, Italian and British 
parties democratised their leadership selection procedures, the originally very 
democratic Danish parties have moved towards more centralised procedures. 
Notwithstanding a moderate general trend towards more openness, prior to 1990 only 
a very small minority of political parties in Western Europe granted members any 
substantial influence beyond casting their vote in leadership elections at the national 
conference, and then only after these leaders had been pre-selected by the party elite. 
This is also evidenced in the next table, where the average level of openness in 
leadership selection is given for the different party families. 
 


















X S CV beta 
(β) 
cd 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.3 1.0 .303  .39* 
com 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 1.4 .452  .30* 
con 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 1.0 .244  .20 
sd 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.4 3.9 1.2 .308  .12 
soc 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.7 0.7 .149 -.41* 
lib 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 1.3 .333  .07 
env - - - 5.0 5.0 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.4 0.8 .148  .29 
eth 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 2.0 .588 -.06 
agr 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 1.1 .255  .19 
X 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.2 3.8 1.0 .263  .20* 
 
Note that the first two periods are taken together. Entries are average ‘openness-scores’. A score of 1 
indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. 
Data on the selection procedure are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.2. Columns and rows 
indicated by an X provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by 'S' 
provides the standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by 'CV ' provide the 
coefficient of variance (S/ X). The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the 
inclusiveness of the selection procedure and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the 
significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
As can be seen from table 4.20, since the 1960s individual parties within most party 
families have adopted more open and democratic leadership selection procedures. 
Christian democratic, social democratic, communist, conservative, liberal and agrarian 
parties have all contributed to the general trend towards a more open procedure of 
designating the party leadership. The most democratic procedures in selecting the 
party chairperson are found within the environmental party organisations. Other party 




families which, on average, allow fairly open elections are the socialist and agrarian 
parties, although the former have closed their procedure to some extent. Ethnic 
parties have centralised their leadership selection procedure only moderately. 
 One obvious conclusion is that few parties were willing to change their formal 
rules on leadership election into a more centralised direction; the French UDF and 
the Italian MSI being notable exceptions. Moreover, the firm grip of party executives 
over the nomination of the official leadership has been a characteristic feature of West 
European politics ever since the earliest phase in the process of democratisation. 
Thus, Kirchheimer incorrectly assumed a trend towards the exclusion of the 
membership-party from the leadership selection process. Contrary to Kirchheimer's 
assumption, some Western European parties cherish their democratic image and even 
increased the formal level of membership influence in the selection of the party 
leader. Despite this trend, in the large majority of cases members are not allowed to 
partake directly in the election of the party chairman. Although some parties 
experimented with membership primaries over the years, only 9 parties (the Belgian 
PRL and PSC, the German Grünen, the Irish Labour Party and Greens, the Dutch 
D66, and the Swedish MP, Liberals and SDP) allowed members a direct vote in the 
selection of the party leader at the end of the 1980s. In most parties members only 
confirm the candidate that has been selected by a preliminary internal party procedure 
where a select number of individuals exert influence. In still other parties members 
have no say at all in the matter. This justifies the conclusion Müller and Meth-Cohn 
(1991, 56) draw: "... party leadership selection is about 'horizontal power games' rather 
than 'vertical power games'. The party conference, formally the highest party organ, 
does little more than rubber-stamp." 
4.5.2 Selection of parliamentary candidates 
No analysis of politics can afford to neglect the manner in which individuals gain 
political power at the national level (Valen 1966; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). The 
method through which parliamentary candidates are selected has important 
consequences for the quality of the democratic political process. The calibre and 
actions of selected candidates, their educational and professional background, their 
age and gender all influence the quality and representativeness of parliament. These 
qualities of parliamentary representatives subsequently determine the quality of 
government as an increasing number of ministers start their national political career in 
parliament (see section 6.3 below). Also, the parliamentary voting behaviour of 
deputies and the manner in which they are selected are interrelated as politicians will 
show most loyalty to the locus that has greatest influence on their (re-)election. If the 
procedure is centralised and deputies depend for their re-election on the central party 
organisation, they will avoid deviant roll-call behaviour. When the selection is more 
decentralised, deviant roll call behaviour can occur if this benefits the regional 
selectorate which decides on the re-election of the deputy. The cohesion of the 
(parliamentary) party is thus closely related with the locus of selection (Gallagher 
1988, 12-16). This is important as party cohesion is generally seen as the most vital 
prerequisite for programmatically effective and democratically responsive parties 
(Ranney 1968). 
 In some countries the selection process63 is regulated by legal provisions, whereas 
                                                        
63 In this study 'candidate nomination' and 'candidate selection' are considered two distinct processes. 




in all countries the process is influenced by historical tradition, the political culture, by 
the size of the constituencies as well as the electoral system. Legal provisions which 
regulate the inner-party process of candidate selection exist only in Finland, Germany 
and Norway.64 In all the other countries candidate selection is not formally governed 
by law. In these countries electoral laws, such as the size of the constituencies, the 
number of candidates per district and the ballot system, primarily determine the 
internal party rules and democratic participation. Duverger (1954, 356-359), for 
example, pointed out that a smaller constituency as well as proportional 
representation increases the influence of parties over the candidates, in that the rank-
and-file membership can exercise more influence on the choice of the candidate. In 
addition, other authors have put forward a similar argument by stating that the larger 
the constituency, the more difficult it is for members to influence the selection, unless 
primaries or polls are held (Epstein 1967, 203). Furthermore, the degree of financial 
facilitation from the state and the accessibility to the media and other means of 
communication exert their influence on internal decision-making within political 
parties. In addition to these factors the governmental structure of a country (federal 
or unitary state), the political culture (people's attitudes towards political phenomena) 
and the nature or type of the party influence the method of candidate selection 
(Gallagher 1988, 8-11; Eldersveld 1964, 80). Although no European constitution 
outlaws candidates to run for public office outside the 'official' parties, the main route 
to public office is through the established political parties. Thus, in practice, 
nomination for public office is not equally accessible to all individuals. Legal 
stipulations, such as a number of required signatures or the deposit of a certain 
amount of money, all result in the domination of 'official' parties in the nomination of 
candidates for public office. 
 As stated above, a progressively centralised (exclusive) selection procedure of 
parliamentary candidates also measures the sixth indicator of organisational catch-
allism, namely the declining role of party members in the selection of the 
(parliamentary) party leadership. Table 4.21 below is based on the official party 
statutes which regulate parliamentary candidate selection (Katz and Mair 1992, Tables 
                                                                                                                                             
Nomination "is the predominantly legal process by which election authorities certify a person as a qualified 
candidate for an elective public office and print his or her name on the election ballot for that office. 
Candidate selection, on the other hand, is the predominantly extralegal process by which a political party 
decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the 
ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or lists of 
candidates" (Ranney 1981, 75; see also Eldersveld 1982, 196-197; Epstein 1967, 202; Duverger 1954, 354; 
Obler 1973; Rush 1969; Scarrow 1964; Valen 1966). 
 
64 Finland has strict legal provisions stipulated in the 1978 Party Law, under which party primaries are 
compulsory. In Germany Article 21 of the Basic Law (which stipulates that the internal organization of 
the parties must be democratic) and Article 2 of the Party Law (stipulating selection of parliamentary 
candidates as the defining function of political parties) and Article 17 of the Party Law (candidates must 
be selected by secret ballot) all regulate the candidate selection in German parties (Poguntke 1987, 611). 
Norway has the oldest legal regulation on candidate selection: the 1921 Norwegian Act of Nominations 
forbids the national party leadership to intervene directly in the nomination procedure and stipulates that 
voters are allowed to cross out the names of unwanted candidates. In Denmark and Sweden voters are 
given large influence in the final nomination of candidates. In Denmark a principle of candidate 
nomination was introduced in the electoral law in 1970 which made preferential voting more effective 
(Pedersen 1987, 32), while in Sweden voters have the opportunity to strike the names of unwanted 
candidates and thereby change the order of the candidates, yet the internal party selection is not legally 
regulated in both countries. 
 




D.5) as well as secondary literature65 and summarises the most dominant bodies in the 
selection of the parliamentary candidates in Western European countries. 
 
Table 4.21 Major locus of parliamentary candidate selection in West European 
countries  1945-1990 
country Most important party body in selection Other important actors 
Austria local conventions national executive 
Belgium local conventions national executive 
Denmark local conventions  
Finland local members  
France national executives local conventions 
Germany local conventions  
Ireland local conventions national executives 
Italy national executives local conventions 
Netherlands local conventions national executives 
Norway local conventions  
Sweden local conventions  
United Kingdom local conventions  
 
Adapted from Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 254, additional information from Gallagher and Marsh 
1988. 
 
As can be seen from table 4.21, parliamentary candidate selection in Western Europe 
is mainly a prerogative of active local party members and the national executives of 
the parties. Most parties shy away from giving members, let alone voters, a direct and 
substantive voice in the selection of parliamentary candidates. With the exception of 
some of the Belgian parties during the 1960s, Labour in Britain, D66 in the 
Netherlands and the environmental parties, practically none of the parties in this study 
allowed the electorate to influence the selection procedures through open primaries. 
Admittedly, voters are given some influence over the rank-order of candidates in 
Denmark and Finland through the use of preference votes, by way of the alternative 
vote in Ireland. Finland is the only country where party members (not all voters) have 
been granted the legal right of direct influence in the selection of parliamentary 
candidates through primaries. 
 The most common procedure adopted in Western Europe is the selection of 
parliamentary candidates by a local (regional or national) committee, followed by the 
subsequent ratification by the local convention of active members; the final approval 
or veto concerning (the rank-order of) candidates usually remains with the national 
executive (see also Gallagher et. al. 1995, 255). Central control therefore, is substantial 
and only a select group of local party activists are involved in the process (see 
Gallagher 1988, 245). The decision to determine which candidate's name will appear 
on the party's ballot paper is usually left to the party elite at the constituent level. 
                                                        
65 Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 253-259; Katz and Mair 1994; Müller 1992, 
116; 1992a, 100-104; Gerlich 1987, 83; De Winter, 1988, 36; Deschouwer 1994; Pedersen 1987, 34; 
Sundberg and Gylling 1992, 277; Thiébault 1988, 78-80; Gallagher 1985; 1988, 131; Mair 1987; Wertman 
1988, 153; Koole 1994; Valen 1988, 228; Epstein, 1967, 220-228; Pierre 1992, 38; Denver 1988, 59-60. 




Although a very small number of parties do hold a referendum among their members, 
in most West European parties members have to attend local meetings to participate 
in the selection. From the 'official story' it is unfortunately difficult to determine to 
what extent these selections are actually controlled by the higher echelons of the 
parties. From the analysis above it seems that national party bodies do try, and often 
succeed, in controlling the candidate selection to a large extent and usually have some 
kind of veto power as well. Still, in none of the parties in this sample are 
parliamentary candidates selected solely by the incumbent party leader. In some, such 
as the French right-wing parties, party leaders do wield substantial influence. There 
are, nevertheless, considerable deviations from the general pattern between countries 
and across time. This is summarised in the following table, for which the 
centralisation scale developed above (see figure 4.1) was used again. 




Table 4.22 The openness of the selection of parliamentary candidates of Western 



















X S CV 
Aut 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.5 0.9 .26 
Bel 5.8 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.2 3.3 2.0 2.7 2.7 4.0 2.0 .50 
Den 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.2 0.9 .17 
Fin 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.0 1.1 .22 
Fra 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 2.5 1.8 4.1 1.6 .39 
Ger 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.1 0.4 .08 
Ire 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.3 4.8 1.4 .29 
Ita 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.0 1.4 .47 
Net 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.5 4.7 3.7 3.9 1.9 .49 
Nor 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.4 5.8 0.6 .10 
Swe 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 0.5 .08 
UK 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.3 0.5 .12 
X 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.6 1.1 .24 
S 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 - - 
CV .313 .313 .313 .292 .340 .326 .428 .409 .439 .348 - - 
 
Entries are average ‘openness-scores’. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while 
a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on candidate selection procedures are taken from 
Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.5. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period 
and country means. The column and row marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the periods 
and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). 
 
The most open and democratic candidate selection procedures are practised in the 
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland), while the most 
centralised and exclusive procedures can be found in Italy, France, Austria and the 
Netherlands. In contrast to leadership selection, the dominant trend in the selection 
of parliamentary candidates in Western Europe is one of increasing exclusion of the 
rank and file membership from the selection procedure (β = -.12*). Table 4.23 
provides the results of a linear regression analysis of openness of candidate selection 
with the year of observation as the independent variable. 
 
Table 4.23 Trends in the openness of candidate selection over time in Western 
Europe 1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
(β) -.44* -.60* .22 .26* -.68* .31* .24 -.44* -.01 -.31* -.07 .12 
Entries are regression coefficient between the inclusiveness score and the year of observation. An asterisk 
(*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
In Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden the selection 
procedure is progressively centralised. Most notably, this exclusion of members 
occurred in France and Belgium. The major parties of Belgium gave their members 
substantial influence in the selection of representatives until the 1960s. At the end of 
the sixties, however, in most parties (except for the PS) the member polls were 




replaced by more oligarchic selection procedures (De Winter 1988, 42-43). Contrary 
to Kirchheimer's assertion, however, ordinary party members within some parties in 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom were given a greater 
voice in candidate selection since the 1960s. In some instances, such as the German 
and Irish case, the higher score results from the emergence of new parties with more 
open and inclusive selection procedures. This underlines the fact that in contrast to 
the convergence hypothesis, the differences between parties have increased over time. 
The pattern for the different party families is summarised in table 4.24. 
 
Table 4.24 The openness of elections of parliamentary candidates of West European 



















X S CV 
cd 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.6 4.2 4.2 4.2 1.4 .33 
com 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.3 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.0 .57 
con 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 1.3 .25 
sd 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.4 3.9 4.1 3.6 4.5 1.4 .31 
soc 2.0 2.0 3.3 4.2 4.3 5.0 4.3 4.3 3.8 3.7 1.6 .43 
lib 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.6 4.6 4.7 5.0 1.6 .32 
env - - - - 4.0 4.0 4.3 5.1 4.9 4.5 1.8 .40 
eth 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 5.3 1.9 .36 
agr 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.8 .13 
prt - - - - - 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 .00 
X 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.6 1.1 .24 
 
Entries are average ‘openness-scores’. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while 
a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on candidate selection procedures are taken from 
Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.5. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period 
and party family means. The column marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation the party families, 
while the column indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). 
 
On average, the most open and decentralised procedures for the selection of 
parliamentary candidates are found within the agrarian, conservative, liberal and 
protest parties, while the most exclusive procedures are more common within the 
communist and socialist party families. Christian democratic and social democratic 
parties opted for procedures which place them in between these two groups. As a 
summary measure of overall trends the next table provides the results of a linear 
regression analysis of the inclusiveness of candidate selection of the different party 
families with the year of observation as the independent variable. 




Table 4.25 Trends in the openness of candidate selection over time of West European 
party families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib env eth agr 
beta (β) -.15 -.02 -.03 -.37* .24 -.13 .20 -.47* .00 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the inclusiveness score and the year of observation. An 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Most party families, with the exception of socialist and environmental parties, 
centralised their candidate selection procedures, particularly during the 1970s and 
1980s. This process of exclusion of the party membership is most distinct within 
social democratic parties in Western Europe, precisely as Kirchheimer predicted. 
Although some socialist parties democratised their selection procedures for 
parliamentary candidates during the 1960s and 1970s, this process was reversed again 
in the 1980s. Similarly, some Christian democratic parties decentralised their candidate 
selection in the late 1970s. In particular, special interest groups outside the party 
gained influence over the selection of candidates in the CVP, ÖVP and DC, yet 
overall the procedures of Christian democratic party organisations were progressively 
centralised up until the 1980s. 
 In summary, parliamentary candidate selection in Western Europe can hardly be 
regarded open and democratic. The hesitant experiments with primaries and member-
polls during the sixties and seventies were soon reversed as parties went back to their 
former practice of central control over candidate selection. Regional or local elites 
usually nominate the candidates while party members are at best asked for their 
approval of these pre-selected candidates. Moreover, the proportion of members 
which actively participate in the selection of parliamentary candidates is very low to 
begin with (Gallagher 1988c, 246). Additionally, if candidate selection takes place at 
the local level, national executives of most parties maintain substantial supervision 
and control over this selection of parliamentary candidates. If members are given a 
voice in the selection procedure, veto power usually remains with the national 
executive as a final safeguard. In other cases, such as in most of the major Dutch, 
Italian and French parties, the national leadership does not take any risk and preselect 
all the candidates themselves and members are consequently only asked to ratify this 
selection. Still, this high level of centralised control is more a stable characteristic of 
European parliamentary democracy, rather than a bearing which parties embarked 
upon at the time Kirchheimer advanced his catch-all thesis. 
4.5.3 Power distribution in the formulation of policy 
Kirchheimer’s assertion that within catch-all parties members have very limited 
opportunities to participate in the internal decision-making procedures is subjected to 
another empirical assessment here. Earlier, the interconnectedness between personnel 
recruitment and policy formation was pointed out, when I stated that the selection of 
party leaders and parliamentary candidates are, in fact, indirect policy choices. The 
leadership of a catch-all party will, therefore, also restrict extensive participation of the 
membership in policy decisions as this would seriously limit their room to manoeuvre 
and their flexibility in policy stances (see also Niedermayer 1989). Moreover, open 
conflict over policy and the party program causes a party to look divided and weak, 




which can have serious electoral and governmental repercussions. One method to 
curb the influence of the membership on the formulation of party policy can be 
found in Austria, where the term of office for the party leadership was lengthened and 
the duration of the party congresses has been slimmed down. In general, the nature of 
national party conventions has also changed significantly. Modern party conventions 
are predominately used to generate free publicity. Conventions have transformed into 
carefully prepared media events where dissension from the lower echelons of the 
party is downplayed in order to plug an image of a united governable party (Müller 
1994, 69). In other countries party conferences also mainly serve ideological and 
electoral purposes (Deschouwer 1994, 87). Moreover, the leadership controls the 
agenda of the discussions ensuring that congresses remain "little more than a forum 
for the expression of approval" (Von Beyme 1985, 235). 
 The extent to which the level of participation and the role of party members 
declined in the policy formulation, is firstly, measured by the frequency of party congresses 
(the number of times members have the formal opportunity to influence policy 
formation) and secondly, by the rules to put motions to the national congress. These 
indicators both measure the seventh indicator of organisational catch-allism. 
Frequency of party congresses, indicating the level of centralisation of a party, can be 
used to analyse the relative power balance between the party leadership and the active 
members (Rohrschneider 1994, 225; Kitschelt 1994, 223-224)66. The 'openness' of 
rules to put motions to the national congress also indicate this relative power balance, 
as these rules determine the extent to which (active) members have the opportunity to 
influence party policy. Again, the official regulations as stipulated in the party rules are 
used here to measure both indicators. First, the general pattern and the variations in 
the number of congresses scheduled by parties in the different countries are reviewed 
in table 4.26. 
                                                        
66 “Conferences can be one important arena in which to contrain the strategic choices open to party elites. 
For this reason, autonomous elites will want (1) to schedule conferences infrequently, (2) to time them, if 
unavoidable, close to elections because this may cut down on the delegates’ willingness to criticize the 
leadership, and (3) to control the agenda and the motions by a powerful conference committee framing 
the delegates’ choices in detail.” (Kitschelt 1994, 223-224). 




Table 4.26 The average number of congresses scheduled by political parties in West 



















X S CV 
Aut 4.2 3.6 3.4 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.7 1.3 .481 
Bel 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.1 4.5 1.1 .243 
Den 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.7 1.6 .434 
Fin 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.7 1.1 .409 
Fra 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.8 1.1 .394 
Ger 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.3 2.9 1.3 .451 
Ire 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.6 5.0 0.4 .084 
Ita 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.7 1.0 .372 
Net 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.1 .601 
Nor 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.3 1.1 .333 
Swe 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.7 1.4 .521 
UK 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.3 5.1 0.9 .184 
X 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.5 1.2 .342 
S 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5 - - 
CV 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 - - 
 
Entries are the average number of congresses scheduled by parties. Data on frequency of congresses are 
taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.4b and Janda 1980. Columns and rows indicated by an X 
provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row marked by 'S' provides the 
standard deviation for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by 'CV ' provide the 
coefficient of variance (S/ X). 
 
Only thirteen of the 83 parties in this study reduced the frequency of their 
congresses67 and limited the opportunity to influence the policy of the party as 
Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis predicts. From 1945 until 1970 there is little change in 
the number of party congresses scheduled in West European countries, while during 
the 1970s there is a limited increase in the number of national congresses. Since the 
mid-1980s, however, the frequency of party congresses declined again, culminating in 
the lowest average number of congresses in the late 1980s. In all, there is a modest 
trend towards a higher frequency in national party conferences (b = .06). That this 
finding of more frequently scheduled conferences must be qualified in some countries 
is witnessed in the Dutch case where according to the statutes the Catholic People’s 
Party was presumed to hold bi-annual national conferences. However, from 1966 
until 1980 not one conference was held. 
 To provide a summary measure of national trends the results of a linear regression 
analysis of number of congresses with the year of observation as the independent 
variable are summarised in the next table. 
                                                        
67 The  Austrian FPÖ, ÖVP and SPÖ, the Belgian PCB and VU, the German CDU, the Irish ILP, the 
Italian DP, PSI, PRI and PCI and the Swedish Fp and MSP. 




Table 4.27 Trends in number of congresses in Western Europe 1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
beta (β) -.43* -.08 .26* .04 .36* .09 -.23 -.17 .12 .18 .13 .27 
 
Entries are regression coefficient between the number of congresses and the year of observation. An 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Over time, Danish, Finnish, French, German, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and British 
parties gave members more frequent opportunities to meet with the party executive 
over policy issues. The highest number of party congresses were held in Britain and 
Ireland, where annual conferences are firmly embedded in the political culture, even if 
membership influence on the decision-making processes is very low (Kelly 1989; 
Webb 1992b). In these two countries the variation across parties and across time is 
very low. Belgian parties usually hold an annual conference as well, while in other 
countries party executives are traditionally less keen to consult the party membership 
annually on policy decisions. Nevertheless, in only four out of the twelve countries in 
this analysis have party elites decreased the number of congresses. Most drastically the 
frequency of national party conventions is reduced in Austria. There are considerable 
intra-country differences in some party systems where a number of parties have 
decreased the frequency of congresses, while other parties in the same system have 
increased the number of congresses. Such large variation among parties within one 
party system can be found in the Netherlands, as well as among parties in Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany and Austria. Overall variation between parties has remained 
stable over time, suggesting that change on this indicator is more of a qualitative 
nature than a quantitative development. Earlier I concluded that national congresses 
have transformed from very closed intra-party events, where outsiders were not 
welcome, into open media-oriented manifestations. Similar observations of relative 
little change can be made when the data are sorted by party families as summarised in 
table 4.28. 
























X S CV 
cd 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1.4 .433 
com 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 0.4 .211 
con 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 1.2 .324 
sd 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.9 1.3 .452 
soc 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.3 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.7 1.3 .354 
lib 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.2 1.6 .381 
env - - - - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 .000 
eth 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.9 0.5 .101 
agr 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 1.2 .362 
prt - - - - - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 .000 
X 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.5 1.2 .342 
 
Entries are the average number of congresses scheduled by parties. Data on frequency of congresses are 
taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.4b and Janda 1980. Columns and rows indicated by an X 
provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by 'S' provides the 
standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by 'CV ' provides the coefficient of 
variance (S/ X). 
 
As can be seen from table 4.28, annual conferences are a consistent trait of 
environmental and ethnic party organisations. Of the major party families, liberal and 
conservative parties organise the highest number of congresses on average. In 
contrast, parties of the traditional left, in particular communist and social democratic 
parties, created much fewer opportunities for their members to participate in the 
policy formulation. Between the social democratic and Christian democratic parties in 
different countries there is substantial variation, indicating the high propensity of 
these parties to adapt to the parameters of the national political culture. As a summary 
measure of overall trends within the different party families the results of a linear 
regression analysis of the number of congresses with the year of observation as the 
independent variable are given. 
 
Table 4.29 Trends in number of congresses held by West European party families    
1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib env eth agr 
beta (β) -.01 .00 .06 -.06 -.13 .07 .00 -.38 .00 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the number of congresses and the year of observation. An 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Over time the frequency of national conventions does not vary significantly; the 
number of congresses remains relatively stable within the agrarian, environmental and 
communist party families. Contrary to the general trend, ethnic, social democratic, 
socialist and Christian democratic parties reduced the frequency of national party 
conferences. Instead, liberal and conservative parties, with a relatively large number of 




congresses to begin with, increased the frequency of their congresses. 
 On this indicator Kirchheimer's assertions are not corroborated; most parties have 
not opted to organise party conferences less often and some parties have even 
increased the frequency by which national conferences are scheduled. Rather than the 
frequency, political parties have changed the character of these national conferences 
which have become primarily media-oriented manifestations of unity and 
governability instead of intra-party meetings at which crucial policy decisions are 
taken. 
 
Next to the frequency of occasions at which the lower echelons of the party can exert 
their influence on policy-formation, the quality of these opportunities is important. 
This qualitative aspect reveals the extent to which delegates can influence policy 
decisions of the party when congresses are held. Therefore, the second measure of 
influence which (active) party members can exert on policy formation is the 
'openness' of the procedure by which motions can be put to the party's national 
congress. Figure 4.2 represents a scale of procedures by which motions can be put to 
the party congress. 
 
Figure 4.2 Procedure by which motions can be put to the national party congress. 
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The left end of the scale, box 1 indicates a procedure which gives the party leader the 
most influential position deciding which motions are to be discussed at the national 
congress. A party is assigned a score of 2 when the procedure by which motions are 
put to the congress is largely dominated by elites formally outside the official party 
organs. Box 3 means that the parliamentary leader or group is allowed to determine 
the motions to be discussed at the congress. Indicated in box 4 is a procedure in 
which a national committee or board is the gatekeeper and agenda-setter for the 
congress. The following category, box 5, indicates a procedure in which party 
members have to attend (local) meetings or congresses to have their motion accepted 
by this lower party body before the motion is send to the national congress. This 
category also includes a procedure by which only a local board or policy committee is 
permitted to send motions to the national congress. Finally, box 6 indicates the most 
open and democratic procedure to put motions to the national congress. In this 
procedure all members, formally, have the right and opportunity to participate in the 
policy formation. They can suggest or vote on policy proposals. When a party moves 
toward the left end of the scale, the party top increases its influence in the motion-
procedure; which means that the party is transforming towards the more exclusive 
catch-allist type of organisation. Parties which had no official rules concerning the 
proposal of motions but have later introduced them are also considered to have 




become more exclusive over time. The procedure additionally becomes more closed 
when fewer party bodies have the right to propose motions or the rules to introduce 
motions become more complicated. Finally, stipulations about the maximum number 
of motions which can be put before the national conference also reduce the 
possibilities to influence policy. The results of this quantification are recapitulated by 
country in table 4.30. 
 




















X S CV 
Aut 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.3 0.8 .186 
Bel 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 1.4 .388 
Den 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.8 5.0 0.6 .120 
Fin 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.5 0.3 .066 
Fra 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 .000 
Ger 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 0.3 .063 
Ire 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.7 4.9 4.5 0.5 .111 
Ita 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 0.5 .111 
Net 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.3 0.4 .093 
Nor 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.4 0.2 .045 
Swe 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 0.2 .040 
UK 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.8 4.0 0.7 .175 
X 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 0.5 .111 
S 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 - - 
CV 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 - - 
 
Entries denote the average ‘openness’ of decision-making measured by the locus of decision-making. A 
score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open 
procedure. Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992; 1994), Janda (1980) and Jacobs 1989. Columns and 
rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row 
marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns 
indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). 
 
Table 4.30 shows there is little variation between countries in the average openness of 
decision-making procedures as parties all over Western Europe have been unwilling to 
open up their national congress to more membership-influence. On the other hand, 
only seven parties adopted regulations with a higher exclusiveness of their procedure: 
the Austrian SPÖ, the Danish KrF and Venstre, the German CDU, the Irish WP and 
FG and the Italian PLI. The most common procedure within the larger majority of 
parties is the one of providing local party members with the opportunity to propose 
policies (motions) at local conventions. These proposals are only discussed at the 
national congress after a committee has functioned as a 'gate-keeper', which ensures 
that the leadership does not lose control over internal policy-making. Thus, within 
most European parties the national executive exercises firm control over the agenda 
of the national conventions. As a result, open dissent and conflict are not often seen 
at national conferences. Belgian, French and British parties are more exclusive than 




their European counterparts, while within Danish, Swedish and German parties the 
procedure to put motions before the national conference is more open and 
democratic. Within Belgium there are substantial differences between parties and 
across time. Table 4.30 clearly shows that Kirchheimer’s assertion that party members 
would be progressively excluded from internal decision-making procedures is not 
corroborated. Over time the overall trend is one of solid central control over policy in 
most countries (β = .06). If any change over the post-war period can be observed it is 
in the opposite direction as Kirchheimer suggested, namely towards more open 
procedures. 
 Table 4.31 provides the results of linear regression analyses of openness of the 
procedure to put motions to the national conference with the year of observation as 
the independent variable. 
 
Table 4.31 Trends in openness of procedure to put motions to national conferences 
in Western Europe 1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
beta (β) .07 .05 -.16 .05 .00 .29 .18 -.11 .47* .20 .03 -.03 
 
Entries are regression coefficient between the openness of motion procedure and the year of observation. 
An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
As can be seen from table 4.31, parties in most countries have not substantially 
modified their procedures regarding policy discussions at national party conferences. 
In the majority of countries there is a moderate trend towards more openness. In the 
Netherlands some of the major parties opened up their procedures to allow for 
member-influence which was traditionally at a very low level, accounting for the most 
significant trend towards more internal democracy. The positive parameters in other 
countries are primarily the result of the emergence of new parties with more 
democratic, open procedures for debates at national conferences, such as the ‘new 
left’ parties in the 1970s and the ‘green’ parties in the 1980s. Only in Denmark, Italy 
and the United Kingdom have procedures to put motions before the national 
conference become more restricted over time. 
 To evaluate the variation among parties of different genetic origin, table 4.32 
summarises the openness of procedures to put motions before national conferences 
grouped by different party families. 




Table 4.32 The locus of decision-making at congresses of West European parties by 

















X S CV beta    
(β) 
cd 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2 0.5 .119  .02 
com 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.7 1.4 .378  .10 
con 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 0.5 .116  .00 
sd 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 0.5 .111  .10 
soc 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.8 4.9 4.4 4.6 0.5 .108  .10 
lib 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.8 0.6 .125 -.02 
env - - - - 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.8 5.4 0.9 .166  .75* 
eth 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 0.4 .085  .27 
agr 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 0.2 .043 -.40* 
prt - - - - 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 0.3 .069 -.24 
X 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 0.5 .111  .06 
 
Entries denote the average ‘openness’ of decision-making measured by the locus of decision-making. A 
score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open 
procedure. Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992; 1994), Janda (1980); Jacobs (1989). The first two 
periods are taken together as data did not vary. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average 
score by period and party family means. The column marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation the 
party families, while the column indicated by 'CV ' provides the coefficient of variance (S/ X). The column 
'β' gives the regression coefficients between the openness of the procedure to put motions before the 
national congress and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is 
below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
This cross-time and cross-national analysis shows that there are only minor 
differences between the party families and little variance over time in the openness of 
the decision-making procedures at national party conferences. Environmental and 
liberal parties practice the most inclusive procedures for policy formulation. On the 
other end of the scale are the communist parties; their theory and practice of 
democratic centralism makes for relatively exclusive procedures in policy decisions. 
The reader should bear in mind that these data on policy-making at the national 
congresses of parties only tell the 'official' story, the stipulated rules on the 
possibilities of exercising influence, they do not tap the materialisation of membership 
influence on intra-party decisions. Nevertheless, a corroboration of these findings are 
found in an expert study conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 84) assessing the intra-
party distribution of influence on policy formation based on expert judgements. They 
also showed that, in 56 out of the 83 parties included in this study, the party 
leadership exercises the largest influence on policy (see also May 1973). Again, what 
was found is that, contrary to the catch-all thesis, West European political parties have 
not progressively excluded party members from the internal decision-making 
processes. Nevertheless, although this study found a moderate trend towards more 
membership influence in intra-party decision-making, this trend was primarily the 
result of the entry of new, more ‘participatory’ parties with more democratic 
structures. In most parties the influence of members on policy decisions was very 
moderate to begin with and this central control by the party leadership over policy has 
remained a stable feature of West European party politics. 




4.6 Conclusion: organisational catch-allism of West European parties 
Some of the findings in this chapter are consistent with Kirchheimer's catch-all 
theory, while other aspects of the catch-all thesis were not corroborated by this 
empirical analysis. 
 Conforming to Kirchheimer's thesis, party members in Western Europe were 
marginalised in both numerical sense as well as in financial terms, while at the same 
time party leaders highly professionalized central party offices and particularly their 
parliamentary party organisation. Across Western Europe a progressively larger 
majority of citizens shun party membership. Relative to the total electorate, party 
membership declined in an almost secular trend, with the partial exception of some 
German, Belgium and Irish parties as well the environmentalist party organisations. 
Mass parties, if they ever existed, are clearly not a dominant feature of modern West 
European party systems. Directing their organisational activities away from civil 
society, parties increasingly sought financial facilitation from the state or other 
sources, rather than enlarging their membership revenues. 
 Despite their flourishing wealth, parties have not used these growing financial 
means to build extensive membership organisations. Instead, Western European 
parties primarily expanded their professional staff and spent a considerable, but 
declining, proportion of their annual income on election campaigns. Still, it has not 
been the central extra-parliamentary party organisation which has professionalized 
most speedily and extensively; in most countries the parliamentary parties employed 
larger numbers of professionals and experts than party central offices. Parties in 
Western Europe have undergone a process of extensive professionalization and 
capital accumulation, particularly at the level of the parliamentary party. This 
accumulation of human and financial resources by the parliamentary party has 
resulted in the dominance of the parliamentary party over the total party organisation. 
Those who decide on the level of and conditions for public funding of political 
parties thought it wise to allocate most of the resources to the section of the party 
which they themselves could control best, namely their own parliamentary 
organisation.  
 Kirchheimer correctly asserted that party organisations are increasingly 
instrumental to the electoral ambitions of elites. Indeed, political parties in Western 
Europe are no (longer) grass-roots movements where information and authority is 
generated bottom-up from members and voters. Even though few parties have been 
willing to totally shed their democratic image, the rank-and-file membership only 
plays a very moderate role in the selection of the party leadership, the parliamentary 
candidates and in the formation of policy. Contrary to Kirchheimer's assumptions, 
however, this analysis found that members are not progressively excluded from the 
selection of the party leadership and no secular trend towards centralisation of power 
was found either. Indeed, a moderate tendency towards the opposite, namely 
democratic inclusion, is discernible. The consequences of this development should 
not be exaggerated. Concurrent with the selection of the party leader becoming more 
democratic came an ebbing of influence by members over the selection of parliamen-
tary representatives. It was found that while members gained marginal influence on 
the selection of the party leaders, the selection of parliamentary candidates and the 
formation of policy remained firmly under central control throughout the post-war 
period. Decisions on power positions within the party organisation as well as in public 




office are largely controlled by or under veto of the national executive. When internal 
selection and decision-making procedures are opened up, parties have given more 
influence to ordinary party members rather than to party activists, being as that the 
former are more likely to rubber-stamp decisions taken by the national executive. The 
conclusion can only be that the higher echelons of the party hierarchy have allowed 
members more influence over the extra-parliamentary party which itself has rapidly 
declined in importance. Rather than empowering the better informed and more 
ideologically motivated party activists, party leaders have allowed individual members 
more influence only over the domain of the party organisation which is least 
influential in the decision-making process. 
 In contrast to Kirchheimer's assertions the number of opportunities for members 
to influence policies of political parties has not been reduced. Nevertheless, the 
agenda at national conventions is still firmly controlled by the national executives. 
Open dissent and conflict is rarely seen as this would seriously damage the public 
image and electoral appeal of political parties. 
 
To examine Kirchheimer's assertion that primarily the major traditional parties are 
susceptible to the catch-all inception, table 4.33 reports the correlations between the 
various indices of organisational catch-allism and indicators of ancientry (the age of 
party), of electoral strength and organisational continuity of political parties. 
 
Table 4.33 Correlation matrix of organisational indicators with party age, electoral 
size and organisational discontinuity 
 PARTY AGE ELECTORAL SIZE ORGANIZATIONAL 
DISCONTINUITY 
MERATIO  .17-*  .61** -.00 
MEMFIM -.00  .19* -.02 
STATFIN -.07 -.24** -.06 
CAMPAIGN  .18**  .15  .01 
STAFMEM -.33** -.29** -.06 
STAFSEAT -.02 -.15 -.08 
LEADSEL -.01 -.05 -.11* 
CANDSEL -.04 -.05 -.07 
NOCONGR  .07 -.07 -.01 
MOTIONS -.00 -.08  .04 
 
The table reports Pearson's correlations. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 level (*) or at 
the 0.001 level (**). The definition and measurement of the variables are explained in Appendix 2. 
 
Insofar as the evidence is concerned, there are only weak relationships between 
electoral strength and the indicators of organisational catch-allism; correlation 
coefficients are, generally, low. One case of interaction which should be pointed out is 
the substantial correlation between party membership relative to the electorate and 
popular support at election time, indicating that parties with relatively large 
membership levels are also dominant in electoral terms. Another notable finding is 
that professionalization relative to membership and financial support from the state 
are both negatively correlated with electoral strength, suggesting that parties with a 
substantial popular appeal rely less on state finance and professionals in the 'party on 




the ground' than their electorally less successful competitors. The life span of the 
party has little or no effect on the organisational indices, although there is a weak 
negative relationship between professionalization of the membership party and party 
age. This latter finding suggests that the older parties have been relatively more 
dependent on voluntary party work for their daily activities and have been relatively 
less predisposed to hire professionals. Organisational discontinuity, that is the number 
of splits and mergers, is practically unrelated to any organisational characteristic. 
 
To analyse the overall trend of catch-allism at the organisational level over time, all 
scores have been standardised by means of z-scores68. Subsequently, the variables are 
recalculated so that for each variable a high standard score means more catch-allism 
and a low score means that parties have transgressed less towards the catch-all 
organisational model. The scores are summarised in table 4.34. 
 
Table 4.34 Cross-time developments of organisational catch-allism (in z-scores) in 




















meratio -.22 -.33 -.17 -.20 -.07  .08  .15  .13  .21 441 
memfin -.96 -.99 -.47 -.33 -.11  .13  .12  .07  .21 284 
statfin - - - -.43  .18  .08 -.04  .07 -.47 228 
campaign - -  .59  .11 -.24 -.24  .20  .03 -.35 218 
stafmem - - -.37 -.32 -.25 -.06 -.06  .36  .27 274 
stafseat -.08  .83  .01 -.30 -.45 -.27  .07  .13  .39 222 
candsel -.17 -.14 -.13 -.11 -.03 -.04  .23  .10  .17 564 
leadsel  .26  .26  .22  .12 -.02 -.06 -.09 -.22 -.31 577 
nocongr  .00  .08  .10 .13  .04 -.08 -.05 -.05 -.12 586 
motions  .07  .07  .08  .06  .00 -.03 -.04 -.06 -.09 505 
 
The variable names are explained in Appendix 2. Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation 
from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high (positive) score means have a 
relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in 
comparison to the other parties. 
 
Table 4.34 shows that some indicators do not confirm a trend towards increasing 
organisational catch-allism. Moreover, the selection of the party leader, the procedure 
to put motions to the national congress and the number of congresses, even show a 
development in the opposite direction. Two opposite trends are visible; more catch-
allism over time in terms of professionalization of the party organisation, yet less 
catch-allism in terms of the formal possibilities of membership participation in the 
internal decision-making processes. The development towards the catch-all model is 
most advanced and consistent with regard to the membership size and the level of 
professionalisation of the party central offices and the parliamentary party 
bureaucracy. During the 1960s and 1970s there was a slow yet constant increase in the 
                                                        
68 A z-score is calculated by finding the deviation of the individual score from the arithmetic mean of the 
distribution and dividing this result by the standard deviation of the distribution. Thus, all scores have a 
mean of .00 and a standard deviation of 1.0 (see Blalock 1979, 96-100; Spence et al. 1983, 72). 




level of organisational catch-allism in terms of membership and the financial 
structure. Expenditures on political campaigning, however, do not show a linear 
development in the direction Kirchheimer suggested. In the internal power structure 
catch-allism is only discernible in the increasing centralisation of parliamentary 
candidate selection. Contrary to the catch-all thesis, political parties have not 
decreased the influence of members in the leadership selection or in the policy 
discussions at the national party conventions. However, as was shown earlier, 
members had little influence over policy to begin with and party elites in Western 
Europe maintain firm control over the agenda of the national party convention. 
 To qualify Kirchheimer's theory, in this empirical research a linear trend towards 
organisational catch-allism is not validated. The main conclusion from all this is that 
only few parties ventured towards the organisational catch-all model on all indicators 
and even when parties did it was not to the same extent. Admittedly, there is little 
variation between countries or over time in the formal rules on internal decision-
making. Thus, at the formal level, organisational stasis dominates. Nonetheless, other 
indicators of catch-allism at the organisational level show substantial cross-national 
and cross-time variation. This signifies that Kirchheimer’s assumption of a linear and 
uni-dimensional transformation towards organisational catch-allism is inaccurate. 
  
To test Kirchheimer’s assumption of uni-dimensionality of organisational catch-
allism, a reliability analysis of the organisational variables was performed (see 
appendix 3). The main conclusion from this test can only be that the indicators 
Kirchheimer regarded to indicate catch-allism do not tap one single underlying 
organisational dimension. This finding of multi-dimensionality is corroborated by 
factor analysis performed on this set of organisational indicators which suggests that 
three factors underpin organisational transformation of West European parties (see 
appendix 3). To test Kirchheimer’s assumptions on the geographical distribution of 
catch-allism as well as his assertions of divergence between parties of different origin, 
these three factors will be used in the remainder of this chapter to evaluate the relative 
level of catch-allism of West European political parties.  
 
In combining the factor analysis with the standard scores, it is possible to assess the 
relative extent to which parties have transformed towards or moved away from the 
catch-all model on these three organisational factors.69 By way of simple summation 
of variables with high factor loadings, the z-scores of the items on the three extracted 
factors are averaged into one score (Kim and Mueller 1978b, 70). 
 The openness of the leadership and parliamentary candidate selection (CANDSEL 
and LEADSEL) as well as the number of congresses held by the party (NOCONGR) 
are all positively correlated with a factor which will be coined 'centralisation of 
internal decision-making.' Scores on this factor consists of the standard scores of 
these three variables. 
 Staff at the central office relative to members (STAFMEM) is negatively correlated 
with the second factor, while the number of members relative to the electorate 
(MERATIO) is positively correlated with this factor. Therefore this factor denotes 
the relative level of 'non-professional mass partism.' Standard scores of the 
                                                        
69 This study does not use the factor scores to determine the level of catch-allism of political parties, 
instead the relative level of catch-allism is determined on the basis of the Z-scores of the raw variables. 




membership-electorate ratio and staff relative to members are  added into one after all 
scores have been recoded into the expected catch-all direction. Now a higher score 
means that parties have moved away from the non professional mass-party model, 
this factor designates the professionalization of the membership party  at the central 
office. 
 The level of professional staff in relation to the number of parliamentary seats 
(STAFSEAT) is positively associated with the third extracted factor. More difficult to 
interpret is that income derived from membership fees (MEMFIN) is also positively 
correlated, while state finance (STATFIN) is negatively correlated to this factor. The 
structure of party income from membership fees and state subsidies is related to the 
level of professionalization in a different fashion than the catch-all thesis foretold. 
This does not need to detain us here since all z-scores on these items are re-coded so 
that they all point in the expected 'catch-all direction'. Therefore this third factor is 
interpreted as the 'professionalization of the leadership party'. 
 Since all the standard scores are re-coded in the ‘catch-all direction’, higher scores 
in the table below denote a relative high level of 'catch-allism', while a lower or 
negative scores indicate lower levels of 'catch-allism' on the respective factors. For 
example, a high score on the centralisation-factor means a high level of internal 
centralisation. Higher scores on the factor of professionalization of the central office 
of the membership party indicates that the party has moved towards the catch-all 
party model as all scores are recalculated into the direction hypothesised in the catch-
all thesis. Nevertheless, these average standard scores should be interpreted with 
caution as the data-base has a considerable number of missing values on some 
indicators which influences the relative position of the cases. Bearing this in mind, the 
relative levels of organisational catch-allism expressed in average standard scores (z-
scores) of the party families in three periods, are summarised in table 4.35. For each 
period the party families are rank-ordered by the level of catch-allism. 
 
Table 4.35 Relative organisational catch-allism (in z-scores) of West European party 
families 1945-1990 
CENTRALISATION OF INTERNAL 
DECISION-MAKING 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE 
MEMBERSHIP PARTY 




















com  .91 com  .83 com  .80 com  .23 com  .41 env  1.41 con   .44 lib  .12 com  .41 
cd  .38 cd  .21 cd  .20 lib  .05 lib  .20 com  .44 sd  -.27 com  .10 agr  .31 
sd  -.03 sd  .10 sd  .19 con  -.06 con  -.06 lib  .32 com  -.29 con  .05 lib  .23 
con  -.21 lib  -.36 con  -.34 agr  -.18 cd  -.21 con  .06 lib  -.35 agr  -.02 env  .19 
lib  -.30 con  -.36 lib  -.36 cd  -.23 sd  -.47 cd  -.07 agr  -.48 sd  -.36 con   .09 
agr  -.33 agr  -.41 agr  -.46 sd  -.87 agr  -.72 sd  -.31 cd  -1.46 cd  -.66 cd  -.15 
  env  -.94   agr  -.39   sd  -.21 
 
Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the 
standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of 'catch-allism', while a low or negative score 
indicates a low level of 'catch-allism' in comparison to the other parties. The first column provides the 
relative level of centralisation of the internal decision-making processes, the second column gives the 
relative level of professionalization of the extra-parliamentary party central office and the third column 




provides the relative standing of party families with respect to the professionalization of the parliamentary 
party. 
 
Table 4.35 shows that, concerning 'the centralisation of the internal democracy', the 
relative highest level of catch-allism is found among communist parties, whose 
tradition of democratic centralism makes for very little influence on the internal 
decisions by their membership. Kirchheimer was correct in assuming that parties of 
social democratic and Christian democratic origin are very susceptible to the catch-all 
development concerning the centralisation of power. Of the major party families, the 
Christian democratic and social democratic parties are consistently closer to the catch-
all model than their conservative, liberal and agrarian counterparts with respect to this 
internal decision-making. At the lower end of the distribution of relative catch-allism 
are the very democratic and open environmental party organisations. This rank-
ordering of party families on the level of internal democracy is very stable over time, 
confirming the earlier conclusion that centralisation of power is a constant and static 
feature of West European party systems. 
 Regarding the 'professionalization of the membership party' and the ‘organisation 
in support of the party leadership', a different pattern emerges. Over time some party 
families moved towards more professionalized (catch-all) practices and away from the 
mass-party model. Particularly liberal and conservative parties have changed their 
organisation towards the professional catch-all model. The traditionally extensive 
membership organisations of social democratic and Christian democratic parties 
resulted in relatively low levels of professionalization for these parties and preserved 
more compliance with the mass-party model. Analogous to this, the former mass 
parties of agrarian descent also lagged behind in their professionalization of the 
membership party, yet professionalized the party organisation according to the catch-
all model at the leadership level. In the last period, spanning 1976 to 1990, the 
Christian democratic and social democratic parties clearly differ from all other party 
families with respect to their relatively low level of professionalization both at the 
parliamentary party as well as in their central offices. 
 A development towards catch-allism on all three factors is not found in equal 
proportion within each party family. In the next table, the cross-country differences 
are summarised. Again I use the three extracted factors (see appendix 3). The entries 
in the table are the average standard scores of all items which load significant on the 
three extracted factors. Countries are rank-ordered in ascending order based on their 
relative level of catch-allism. 
 
Table 4.36 Relative organisational catch-allism (in z-scores) in West European 
countries 1945-1990 
CENTRALISATION OF INTERNAL 
DECISION-MAKING 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE 
MEMBERSHIP PARTY 




















Ita   .76 Ita  .83 Ita  .87 Bel  .54 Fra  .52 Ita  .71 Ger  .94 Ita  .64 Fra  .68 
Fra  .56 Aut  .62 Aut  .63 Fra  .43 Ger  .46 Ire  .58 UK  .72 UK  .39 Ita  .54 
Ger  .43 Ger .  24 Fra  .45 Ger  .38 Bel  .28 Fra  .53 Fin  .49 Swe  .39 Swe  .47 
Net   .29 Fra  .08 Bel  .27 Net   .06 Net  .21 Ger  .36 Swe  .07 Ger  .18 Nor  .24 
Aut  .23 Net  .07 Net  -.03 Fin  -.08 Den  -.10 Den  .29 Ire  -.38 Fin  .05 Fin  .16 
Fin  .06 Bel  .04 Ger  -.07 UK  -.17 Nor  -.12 Net  .27 Ita  -.39 Nor  -.24 Ger  .05 




Den  -.10 Fin  -.11 Den  -.24 Nor   -.19 Ita  -.15 Bel  .19 Den  -.65 Aut  -.41 Aut  .04 
UK  -.18 Den  -.12 Fin  -.27 Ita  -.23 Fin  -.16 UK  .08 Nor  -.74 Den  -.58 Den  -.09 
Bel  -.22 UK  -.29 Nor  -.49 Ire  -.53 UK  -.23 Fin  -.03 Aut  -.92 Ire  -.51 UK  -.37 
Swe  -.39 Swe  -.46 Swe  -.56 Den  -.62 Swe  -.34 Nor  -.03 Net  -1.78 Ne t -1.18 Net  -.38 
Ire  -.48 Nor  -.48 Ire  -.65 Swe  -.68 Ire  -.84 Swe  -.13   Ire  -.43 
Nor  -.48 Ire  -.49 UK  -.67 Aut  -1.84 Aut  -.86 Aut  -.85    
 
Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the 
standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score 
indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. The first column provides the 
relative level of centralisation of the internal decision-making processes, the second column gives the 
relative level of professionalization of the party central office and the third column shows the relative 
level of  professionalization of the parliamentary party. 
 
As can be seen from table 4.36 there are substantial differences between countries on 
aal three extracted dimensions. The dominant message of the table is that highest 
levels of catch-allism on the three organisational factors are found within the larger 
Western European democracies, namely France, Germany and Italy. Parties in these 
countries of continental Western Europe have transformed most rapidly and 
extensively towards the catch-all model and adopted, or rather maintained, relatively 
undemocratic internal structures. Also, parties in France, Germany and Italy score 
relatively high on the professionalization of the parliamentary organisation and move 
away from the mass-party model on this factor. Belgian and Dutch parties also have 
relatively high catch-all scores on the internal democracy factor and ended up with a 
relatively high level of professionalization of the membership party, yet the Low 
Countries are lagging behind in this transformation on the professionalization of the 
leadership organisation. In both countries this results from the absence of substantial 
direct state funding to extra-parliamentary party organisations. On the internal 
democracy factor, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
clearly differ from the continental mainland. Norwegian, Swedish, Irish and British 
parties allow members to have more influence on the proceedings of the party than in 
the rest of Europe. This pattern is only partly duplicated at the other two extracted 
factors. Austrian parties, for example, have a very high catch-all score on the 
centralisation of the internal democracy factor, yet remained very close to the mass-
party organisation with respect to the level of professionalization. This picture may be 
distorted by the significant level of 'patronage' (Müller 1994, 73). However, Danish, 
Norwegian and Finnish parties are most often found in the middle of the distribution 
with regard to professionalization. Swedish parties have relatively low standardised 
catch-all scores on the centralisation of decision-making factor and on 
professionalization of the membership party, meaning that they have build and 
maintained relatively democratic parties with a large membership in comparative 
perspective. At the same time, however, Swedish parties have also professionalized 
their leadership organisation to a relatively high extent. Parties in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom proved comparatively immune to the catch-all virus at the 
organisational level. 
 To specify these findings, the three tables below provide similar standardised 
scores on the three extracted factors of all individual parties in three aggregated 
periods (1945-1960, 1961-1975 and 1976-1990). Again, parties are rank-ordered in 
descending order, meaning that parties with the highest catch all scores are at the top 




of the league table. The first column indicates the relative position concerning the 
centralisation of internal democratic procedures. A high (catch-all) standard score on 
the 'centralisation' factor indicates a low level of internal democracy and membership 
influence on policy-making, while a low (negative) score indicates a very democratic 
party organisation. The second and third column give the rank-ordering of parties 
with regard to the relative level of professionalization of the central party organisation 
and the parliamentary party organisation. 
 Overall, three main conclusions can be drawn after examining cross-national 
differences as well as variety among party families in the type of party organisation in 
Western Europe over time. First, there is insufficient evidence to assert that there is 
an unvarying and consistent trend towards catch-allism at the organisational level. 
Parties are clearly experiencing the influence of their genetic origin, the impact of the 
national political institutions and culture, as well as the constraints of national party 
competition. A second important inference materialising from the data presented here 
is the sizeable cross-national variation and substantial differences in party organisation 
between party families. Evidently, when the genetic origin of a party can be equated 
with the Duvergerian extra-parliamentary mass-party model, as is the case with most 
social democratic, Christian democratic and agrarian parties, the organisational 
development towards catch-allism is thwarted by this historic genetic inheritance. 
Similarly, the ideological and consequent organisational legacy of democratic 
centralism explains why communist parties are over-represented at the undemocratic 
end of the scale regarding centralisation in decision-making procedures. A third 
feature of organisational transformation of West European parties found in this 
analysis is a distinct geographical distribution in terms of catch-allism. Geographically 
a picture emerges, where parties from the larger European democracies, particularly 
Italy, Germany and France, rank among the those parties which have adopted 
relatively many catch-all characteristics. In contrast, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and 
Irish are primarily found at bottom of the table in each of the periods due to their 
relatively democratic internal organisation. Although Kirchheimer had incorrectly 
assumed that the trend towards catch-allism would be universal, he did correctly 
assert that the larger parties (in particular of social democratic and Christian 
democratic origin) in Western Europe as well as parties in the larger West European 
party systems in general would be more prone to adopt a catch-all style. 





Summary of the main findings: 
• Party membership has declined substantially in most West European countries and is 
now below 10 per cent of the total electorate. 
• Membership fees have become less relevant and now accounts for less than one-third 
of the financial revenues of political parties. 
• Revenues from state finance increased in importance and political parties now depend 
on financial support from the state for one -third of their income. 
• Campaign expenditures increased substantially in absolute terms over the post-war 
period, but the income of parties has been steeper resulting in a much lower proportion 
of annual incomes spend on election campaigns (less than fifty percent of one annual 
income). 
• Parties have professionalized their organisations thoroughly and employed larger 
numbers of experts at the Head Office and in the parliamentary party organisation. 
• Parties have professionalized their parliamentary party organisation more extensively 
than their extra-parliamentary party. 
• Party members have gained some influence on the selection of the party leadership, but 
their influence on the selection of parliamentary candidates has declined. 
• Party members have not been progressively excluded from all internal decision-making, 
yet there is no clear trend towards democratisation of political parties either. 
• Central control over internal decision-making is solid and durable. 
• In Western Europe three types of party organisation can be distinguished on the basis 
of the internal decision-making procedures, the professionalization of the extra-
parliamentary as well as the parliamentary party, namely traditional mass parties, 
democratic cadre parties and traditional cadre parties. 
• Christian democratic and social democratic parties have moved relatively little into the 
catch-all direction at the organisational level. Liberal and conservative parties have 
moved closer to the organisational catch-all model. 
• As a geographical pattern the highest levels of organisational catch-allism are found in 
the larger European democracies (France, Italy and Germany), while the lowest levels of 
catch-allism are found in most of the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. 
 




Centralisation and professionalisation 1945-
1990 
Table 4.37 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of centralization and 
professionalization 1945-1960 
Country Family Party Centra 
lise 
Country Family Party Profco Country Family Party Proflead 
Fin com SKDL 1.37  Ger sd SPD 1.43  Ger cd CSU 0.68  
Ita com PCI 1.37  Fin con KOK 1.16  Fra rad RAD 0.66  
Bel com KPB 1.19  Fin eth SFP 1.06  Nor com NKP 0.61  
Ita fas MSI 1.19  UK sd LAB 0.93  Fra cd MRP 0.61  
Ita lib PLI 1.19  UK con CON 0.69  Den soc SF 0.58  
Ger com DKP 1.12  UK lib LIB 0.53  Ita lib PLI 0.56  
Den com DKP 1.12  Swe com VPK 0.50  Den com DKP 0.56  
Aut com KPO 1.12  Den soc SF 0.23  Aut com KPO 0.55  
Net cd ARP 1.06  Swe lib FP 0.17  Bel com KPB 0.54  
Fra cd MRP 0.88  Swe sd SAP 0.08  Ger com DKP 0.52  
Ita cd DC 0.83  Den lib RV -0.18  Net com CPN 0.51  
Net cd KVP 0.78  Aut lib FPO -0.19  Fra sd PSF 0.51  
Fra sd PSF 0.76  Ire sd ILP -0.38  Swe com VPK 0.51  
Ger cd CDU 0.69  Ita com PCI -0.40  Ger cd CDU 0.46  
Net cd CHU 0.64  Swe agr C -0.48  Net lib VVD 0.46  
Ita sd PSI 0.60  Ger cd CSU -0.52  Ita lib PRI 0.41  
Fin agr KESK 0.58  Ger cd CDU -0.52  Nor lib V 0.38  
Ger cd CSU 0.57  Den con KF -0.52  Nor cd KRFP 0.36  
Fra com PCF 0.55  Nor sd DNA -0.59  Fin com SKDL 0.32  
Swe com VPK 0.55  Fin com SKDL -0.74  Fra con GAUL 0.32  
Fra con GAUL 0.41  Nor lib V -0.88  Ger sd SPD 0.17  
Ita sd PSDI 0.37  Aut sd SPO -1.17  Net sd PVDA 0.14  
Fra lib UDF 0.37  Net lib VVD -1.54  Den lib RV 0.14  
Aut cd OVP 0.30  Net cd KVP -1.56  Fra com PCF 0.12  
Den sd SD 0.27  Net cd ARP -1.76  Aut lib FPO 0.10  
Fra rad RAD 0.26  Net sd PVDA -1.99  Fin sd SSP 0.09  
UK con CON 0.23  Net cd CHU -2.04  Net cd CHU 0.04  
Aut sd SPO 0.23  Den sd SD -2.11  Nor agr SP 0.01  
Ger sd SPD 0.19      Swe con MSP 0.01  
Fin sd SSP 0.08      Ita sd PSI 0.00  
Net lib VVD 0.05      UK sd LAB -0.02  
Den con KF 0.02      Net cd ARP -0.04  
Bel eth VU -0.05      Nor con HOYR -0.11  
Den soc SF -0.10      Swe lib FP -0.11  




Swe sd SAP -0.13      Swe agr C -0.18  
Ire soc WP -0.14      Ita cd DC -0.31  
Net com CPN -0.18      Fin eth SFP -0.31  
Ita lib PRI -0.18      Den con KF -0.34  
Fin lib LKP -0.20      Fin con KOK -0.36  
Fin con KOK -0.20      Net cd KVP -0.43  
Fin cd SKL -0.20      Ire sd ILP -0.53  
Nor cd KRFP -0.27      Fin agr KESK -0.57  
Ire sd ILP -0.29      UK con CON -0.61  
UK sd LAB -0.29      Net cd CDA -0.62  
Ger lib FDP -0.36      Ita com PCI -1.06  
Bel cd CVP -0.38      Den lib VEN -1.16  
Nor sd DNA -0.40      Nor sd DNA -1.53  
Nor agr SP -0.40      Den sd SD -1.88  
UK lib LIB -0.49      Aut cd OVP -2.27  
Nor con HOYR -0.51      Aut sd SPO -2.85  
Aut lib FPO -0.55      Swe sd SAP -2.86  
Swe lib FP -0.61          
Net sd PVDA -0.61          
Swe con MSP -0.61          
Ire cd FG -0.70          
Bel lib PVV -0.70          
Nor lib V -0.83          
Ire con FF -0.83          
Den lib RV -0.95          
Den lib VEN -0.96          
Bel sd BSP -1.16          
Swe agr C -1.16          
Fin eth SFP -1.19          




Table 4.38 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of centralization and 
professionalization 1961-1975 
Country Family Party Centra 
lize 
Country Family Party Profco Country Family Party Proflead 
Ita com PCI 1.37  Ita lib PLI 1.39  Net lib D66 1.43  
Ita fas MSI 1.19  Ita fas MSI 1.26  Nor prt FRP 1.25  
Ita lib PLI 1.19  Ita sd PSDI 0.99  Net com CPN 0.91  
Bel com KPB 1.19  UK sd LAB 0.92  Den lib CD 0.70  
Net cd ARP 1.16  Ita lib PRI 0.86  Ger com DKP 0.69  
Ger com DKP 1.12  Den lib CD 0.76  Nor com NKP 0.68  
Den com DKP 1.12  Ita cd DC 0.64  Ger lib FDP 0.66  
Aut com KPO 1.12  Swe sd SAP 0.55  Den com DKP 0.66  
Ita sd PSI 1.06  Ita sd PSI 0.53  Ger cd CSU 0.65  
Ita cd DC 0.83  Swe lib FP 0.43  Bel com KPB 0.65  
Net cd KVP 0.78  Nor soc SV 0.43  Fra con GAUL 0.64  
Aut sd SPO 0.72  Swe agr C 0.40  Fra sd PSF 0.63  
Ita sd PSDI 0.65  Ger lib FDP 0.38  Bel eth VU 0.59  
Net cd CHU 0.64  Fin con KOK 0.34  Fin lib LKP 0.58  
Aut cd OVP 0.62  Aut lib FPO 0.33  Aut com KPO 0.52  
Fra sd PSF 0.58  Swe com VPK 0.32  Fra com PCF 0.39  
Fra com PCF 0.55  Ger sd SPD 0.28  Ger cd CDU 0.37  
Fin com SKDL 0.54  UK con CON 0.27  Bel lib PVV 0.36  
Den sd SD 0.53  Swe con MSP 0.27  Ita sd PSDI 0.35  
Ita lib PRI 0.46  Fin eth SFP 0.26  Swe con MSP 0.33  
Net com CPN 0.42  Net com CPN 0.25  Nor lib V 0.32  
Fra lib UDF 0.37  Fin com SKDL 0.24  Den soc SF 0.21  
Bel eth VU 0.36  Ger cd CSU 0.20  Swe com VPK 0.19  
Fin agr KESK 0.32  Fin agr KESK 0.12  Net lib VVD 0.18  
Ger cd CDU 0.25  Den lib RV 0.06  Aut lib FPO 0.12  
Ger sd SPD 0.19  Nor con HOYR 0.01  Fin com SKDL 0.10  
Fin sd SSP 0.08  Nor lib V -0.03  Net sd PVDA 0.09  
Swe com VPK 0.03  UK lib LIB -0.03  Ita lib PLI 0.09  
Fra con GAUL 0.03  Ire sd ILP -0.07  Ita fas MSI 0.08  
Aut lib FPO 0.01  Ire cd FG -0.11  Den cd KRF 0.07  
Ger cd CSU -0.01  Nor prt FRP -0.12  Ita lib PRI 0.05  
Fra cd MRP -0.02  Den prt FRP -0.18  Net cd CHU 0.05  
Bel cd CVP -0.04  Ger cd CDU -0.28  Den lib RV 0.05  
UK con CON -0.12  Ita com PCI -0.29  Fin sd SSP 0.04  
Den soc SF -0.13  Nor cd KRFP -0.37  Net cd ARP 0.04  
Net lib VVD -0.16  Den con KF -0.37  Fin eth SFP 0.04  
Swe sd SAP -0.16  Aut cd OVP -0.43  Bel cd CVP 0.02  
Swe cd KDS -0.18  Nor sd DNA -0.48  Swe lib FP -0.00  




Fin cd SKL -0.20  Den lib VEN -0.53  Ger sd SPD -0.00  
Fin con KOK -0.20  Nor agr SP -0.59  Fin con KOK -0.06  
Fin lib LKP -0.20  Fin sd SSP -0.70  Net cd KVP -0.15  
Nor sd DNA -0.27  Den soc SF -0.72  Swe agr C -0.18  
Nor cd KRFP -0.27  Net lib D66 -0.73  UK lib LIB -0.19  
Ire soc WP -0.27  Net lib VVD -0.74  UK sd LAB -0.20  
UK sd LAB -0.29  Ire con FF -0.75  Ita sd PSI -0.21  
Ire sd ILP -0.29  Aut sd SPO -1.14  Nor con HOYR -0.23  
Ger lib FDP -0.36  Den cd KRF -1.23  Bel sd BSP -0.24  
Den cd KRF -0.36  Net cd CHU -1.40  Nor cd KRFP -0.30  
Bel lib PVV -0.36  Net cd KVP -1.48  Den con KF -0.40  
Nor agr SP -0.40  Net cd ARP -1.49  UK con CON -0.43  
Nor soc SV -0.40  Ire soc WP -1.63  Net cd CDA -0.46  
Den con KF -0.44  Den sd SD -1.67  Ita com PCI -0.49  
UK lib LIB -0.49  Net sd PVDA -1.69  Nor sd DNA -0.55  
Nor con HOYR -0.53      Den lib VEN -0.59  
Net sd PVDA -0.54      Ita cd DC -0.61  
Ita env PR -0.55      Den sd SD -0.65  
Swe con MSP -0.55      Nor agr SP -0.80  
Den prt FRP -0.57      Ire sd ILP -0.84  
Fra lib RAD -0.62      Fin agr KESK -1.19  
Den lib CD -0.65      Aut cd OVP -1.85  
Den lib RV -0.67      Swe sd SAP -2.04  
Ire cd FG -0.70      Aut sd SPO -2.24  
Ire con FF -0.70          
Swe lib FP -0.72          
Den lib VEN -0.73          
Nor lib V -0.83          
Nor prt FRP -0.96          
Bel sd BSP -0.96          
Fra lib MRG -1.07          
Fin eth SFP -1.14          
Swe agr C -1.16          
Net lib D66 -2.78          
 




Table 4.39 Parties rank-ordered according to the level of centralization and 
professionalization  1976-1990 
Country Family Party Centra 
lize 
Country Family Party Profco Country Family Party Froflead 
Ita com PCI 1.40  Net com CPN 2.79  Ire soc WP 3.74  
Fra com PCF 1.37  Fra com PCF 1.40  Ita env PR 2.92  
Bel com KPB 1.32  Ger lib FDP 1.33  Ita soc DP 2.33  
Fra lib UDF 1.19  Ita fas MSI 1.27  Ire env GRE 2.31  
Ita fas MSI 1.19  Nor prt FRP 1.01  Den prt FRP 0.90  
Ita lib PLI 1.19  Ita sd PSDI 0.95  Swe env MP 0.81  
Fra cd MRP 1.15  Ita soc DP 0.80  Ita lib PLI 0.73  
Den com DKP 1.12  Ita lib PRI 0.74  Bel env ECO 0.70  
Aut com KPO 1.12  Ita lib PLI 0.72  Aut env GA 0.70  
Ger com DKP 1.12  Ita env PR 0.71  Fra lib UDF 0.68  
Ita sd PSI 1.11  Swe agr C 0.66  Ger com DKP 0.68  
Aut cd OVP 1.00  Swe com VPK 0.65  Net com CPN 0.68  
Ita lib PRI 0.96  Aut env GA 0.63  Ger lib FDP 0.66  
Net cd ARP 0.95  Fra con GAUL 0.60  Fra lib RAD 0.66  
Bel eth VU 0.92  Aut lib FPO 0.59  Swe com VPK 0.65  
Ita soc DP 0.88  Swe lib FP 0.53  Fra lib MRG 0.64  
Aut sd SPO 0.86  Den prt FRP 0.50  Den com DKP 0.63  
Ita sd PSDI 0.80  Fra sd PSF 0.50  Ire lib PD 0.61  
Net cd KVP 0.78  Nor soc SV 0.45  Ger cd CSU 0.60  
Fra sd PSF 0.78  Swe env MP 0.42  Den soc SF 0.58  
Fra con GAUL 0.74  Den lib CD 0.35  Fra sd PSF 0.56  
Net cd CDA 0.69  Swe con MSP 0.34  Nor soc SV 0.51  
Den sd SD 0.66  Nor sd DNA 0.33  Bel eth VU 0.51  
Net cd CHU 0.64  Nor cd KRFP 0.32  UK sd SDP 0.48  
Net com CPN 0.42  UK con CON 0.32  Net lib D66 0.47  
Ita cd DC 0.42  Ita cd DC 0.31  Fra con GAUL 0.47  
Ger sd SPD 0.19  Fin agr KESK 0.30  Den lib CD 0.45  
Ger cd CDU 0.19  Ire lib PD 0.29  Ger env GRU 0.44  
Fin agr KESK 0.19  Ger env GRU 0.28  Den lib RV 0.38  
Bel lib PVV 0.16  Fin eth SFP 0.25  Fin com SKDL 0.34  
Net lib VVD 0.11  Fra cd MRP 0.24  Ire cd FG 0.34  
Fin sd SSP 0.08  Fin con KOK 0.24  Swe con MSP 0.33  
Bel cd CVP 0.06  Swe sd SAP 0.18  Fin con KOK 0.31  
Aut lib FPO 0.01  Fin sd SSP 0.13  Den cd KRF 0.27  
Nor sd DNA 0.01  Nor lib V 0.03  Bel lib PVV 0.25  








Net sd PVDA -0.13  Den cd KRF 0.03  Swe lib FP 0.24  
Ita env PR -0.14  Ire cd FG 0.01  Net sd PVDA 0.23  
Bel sd BSP -0.14  Den con KF 0.00  Ita sd PSDI 0.23  
Swe cd KDS -0.18  Den lib RV 0.00  Net cd KVP 0.22  
Fin cd SKL -0.20  Nor agr S -0.04  Fra com PCF 0.19  
Fin con KOK -0.20  Ger cd CSU -0.05  Fin eth SFP 0.18  
Fin lib LKP -0.20  Ita sd PSI -0.08  Aut lib FPO 0.17  
Swe sd SAP -0.23  Ire sd ILP -0.12  Net cd ARP 0.16  
Swe com VPK -0.23  Fin com SKDL -0.12  UK sd LAB 0.14  
Nor soc SV -0.27  Aut cd OVP -0.13  Ita lib PRI 0.14  
Nor cd KRFP -0.27  Nor con HOYR -0.15  Ita fas MSI 0.14  
UK con CON -0.29  UK sd LAB -0.31  Ita com PCI 0.12  
UK sd LAB -0.34  Net sd PVDA -0.39  Net cd CHU 0.06  
Den cd KRF -0.36  Net cd CDA -0.39  Net lib VVD 0.05  
Den soc SF -0.36  Ita com PCI -0.40  Den con KF 0.04  
Ger lib FDP -0.36  Ire con FF -0.41  Ita sd PSI 0.04  
Nor agr S -0.40  Ger cd CDU -0.45  Net cd CDA 0.02  
Swe con MSP -0.43  Net lib VVD -0.50  Ger cd CDU 0.00  
Fin com SKDL -0.48  Net lib D66 -0.51  Ger sd SPD -0.01  
Ire sd ILP -0.51  Aut sd SPO -0.53  Bel cd CVP -0.01  
Ire soc WP -0.55  Den soc SF -0.56  Fin sd SSP -0.03  
Den prt FRP -0.57  UK lib LIB -0.60  Nor prt FRP -0.07  
Den lib CD -0.65  Ger sd SPD -0.85  Nor agr S -0.09  
Den lib VEN -0.67  UK sd SDP -0.87  UK lib LIB -0.10  
Den lib RV -0.67  Ire soc WP -0.98  Nor cd KRFP -0.11  
Den con KF -0.67  Den sd SD -1.14  Swe agr C -0.14  
Ire cd FG -0.70  Ire env GRE -1.16  Den sd SD -0.18  
Ire lib PD -0.70  Net cd KVP -1.58  Nor sd DNA -0.18  
Ire con FF -0.70  Net cd CHU -1.60  Ita cd DC -0.22  
Aut env GA -0.75      Den lib VEN -0.23  
Nor lib V -0.83      Ire con FF -0.28  
Nor con HOYR -0.83      Bel sd BSP -0.33  
Swe lib FP -0.87      UK con CON -0.51  
Nor prt FRP -0.87      Nor con HOYR -0.55  
UK sd SDP -0.88      Fin agr KESK -0.95  
Swe env MP -0.96      Ire sd ILP -1.10  











Ire env GRE -1.06      Aut cd OVP -1.70  
Fra lib RAD -1.07      Swe sd SAP -2.39  
Fra lib MRG -1.07          
Swe agr C -1.16          
Bel env ECO -1.21          
UK lib LIB -1.25          
Ger env GRU -1.57          
Net lib D66 -2.05          
 









5 The ideological dimension of catch-allism 
5.1 Policy and party competition 
In representative democracies political parties compete with their political opponents 
for popular support. The previous chapter showed that political parties attempt to 
increase their financial and human resources in order to boost their competitiveness. 
Still, these resources are not the only prerequisite for political competition. In 
principle, democratic party competition takes place on the basis of policy proposals. 
In more functional terminology, political parties select, aggregate and articulate 
societal demands and subsequently communicate these policies to the electorate 
through election programs, political speeches, via modern mass-media and voting 
behaviour in parliament (Almond and Powell 1966; 1995). Ideally, voters are offered a 
choice between the proposed alternatives at regularly held elections. In short, 
democratic theory assumes ideological and policy differences between the different 
competitors (Klingemann et al. 1994, 7-8). 
 As chapter 2 has demonstrated, one of Kirchheimer's main concerns was that in 
political systems dominated by catch-all parties, the electorate is no longer offered 
these clear policy alternatives. According to Kirchheimer (1966b), political opposition 
was 'vanishing' from West European politics as catch-all parties dispose themselves of 
their ideological heritage. The catch-all theory outlined above holds that ideological 
catch-allism is indicated by a drastic reduction of ideological baggage since catch-all 
parties exchange policy-seeking for office-seeking behaviour. This chapter 
concentrates on the transfiguration of the space for interaction between political 
parties in West European party systems. To evaluate whether a development towards 
catch-allism has evolved on the ideological level, the next section will first analyse the 
direction of party competition. Kirchheimer asserted that, in the catch-all era, parties 
adopt a 'centrist position' in their party system, which leads to a more confined space 
of party competition and thus a decline in the degree of polarisation. Furthermore, 
catch-all parties no longer compete in traditional terms on ideology, instead they de-
emphasise their 'traditional' issues. Next to an assessment of the centripetal 
movement of parties and the emphasis on traditional issues, this chapter also analyses 
the conversion into catch-all behaviour by party elites in terms of pay-offs in office 
control. According to Kirchheimer, elites of catch-all parties are more co-operative in 
their behaviour and show an increasing propensity to accept governmental 
responsibility even they are unable to control 'traditionally preferred' ministerial 
portfolios. 
5.1.1 The centre in West European party systems 
In order to establish how many and which parties move towards the 'centre-space' of 
their party system, this 'centre-space' has to be defined.70 Traditionally, different policy 
                                                        
70 For discussions and conceptualizations of the 'centre' in party systems see Downs 1957, 115-116; 
Duverger 1963, 215; Sjoblom 1968, 177; Sartori 1976, 134 and 202; Farneti 1983; Daalder 1984, 79 
and 100-105; Ieraci 1992; Hazan 1997, 23-28. Other authors have also developed measures for the 
centre position; see for example Castles and Mair 1987; Rozendaal 1990, 331; Van Deemen 1990, 
187-190; Keman 1994, 2. 




positions of political parties are represented in one-dimensional left-right spaces of 
party competition. The assumption of these left-right or 'spatial models' of party 
competition (Downs 1957; Stokes 1963) is that political parties adopt positions on the 
same set of issues. Although many citizens evaluate political parties in terms of left 
and right and voters have little difficulty in defining themselves in these terms (see 
Inglehart 1990), this study utilises a modified form of this approach, usually referred 
to as the 'saliency theory of party competition' (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 
1977; 1983; Klingemann et al. 1994). In the saliency model the position of parties is 
based on the saliency they put on different issues. The assumption is that parties do 
not directly compete with each other by taking opposite positions on the same issues, 
instead they selectively emphasise different issues. To an extent, parties even 'own' 
certain issue-domains.71 Since this study evaluates the left-right positions of political 
parties over time, the saliency model has a distinct advantage over more static left-
right scales, and I will apply this model by drawing from the policy emphases as 
revealed in party election manifestos72, for which the most comprehensive source is 
the content analysis of party programs conducted by the ECPR Manifesto Research 
Group, which include data on most of the election manifestos of the major political 
parties in this study.73 
 To move from this relative salience of the different issues to a spatial 
representation of party positions on a dynamic left-right scale, this study follows a 
procedure developed by Pennings and Keman (1994).74 Pennings and Keman do not 
                                                                                                                                             
 
71 Butler and Stokes 1974; Sjöblom 1968; Budge and Farlie 1977; 1983a; Sani and Sartori 1983; 
Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Budge 1992; Laver 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1994. An 
alternative approach is the directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989; 
MacDonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991) which, in most simple terms, assumes that parties are 
only evaluated by voters when they adopt extreme positions (in intensity) on issues that are at the 
core of their platform. 
72 Laver and Schofield (1990, 245) argue that four methods can be distinguished to locate parties 
on a left-right scale: the scaling can be done on the basis of expert-judgements (Taylor and Laver 
1973; de Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992), on the basis of 
the analysis of parliamentary roll-call behaviour of party representatives, on the basis of the analysis 
of mass survey-data (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976) and on the basis of policy-documents of 
parties (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Laver and Budge 1992). This study utilizes the last 
method. Expert and mass surveys are too static, and in this study the left-right movement of 
parties over time is needed. Manifesto analysis allows for this dynamic modelling of party positions 
on policy dimensions over time. 
73 The Manifesto Research Group developed a common coding scheme for the analysis of issue 
dimensions of postwar election manifestos. The coding procedure consists of assigning each 
sentence in party manifestos into one unique category. Fifty-four different categories are 
distinguished in party platforms within seven broad issue domains. The proportion of sentences of 
the total manifesto devoted to each of these categories provides an interval measure of the saliency 
of the different issues for parties over time. For a description of this data-set and its format see 
Volkens 1992. 
74 The Pennings and Keman-scale is constructed by first, determining which parties are considered 
to belong to the left, centre or right of their party system on the basis of the Castles and Mair 
(1987) expert-scale. The authors thus obtain a categorization of parties independent from their 
party programmes. Secondly, the average scores of all parties on 54 variables in the party 
Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; see also Klingemann et al. 
1994), are correlated with the scores on the Castles and Mair left-right scale. Issues with 
correlations higher than 0.40 are considered 'typically left' or 'typically right.' The final step is the 
calculation of the position of parties by subtracting the sum of emphasis of the 'left-wing-issues' 
from the sum of the emphasis on the 'right-wing' issues. The poles of the scale are +100 (when the 




assume a fixed centre, instead they project the political centre as relative to the 
position of all parties within a particular party system. This method facilitates a 
dynamic analysis of the total range of party competition and makes movement of the 
relative centre possible. The total range of party competition is the 'distance' between 
the party on the most extreme left and the party on the extreme right position, which 
Sartori (1976) has referred to as the "space elasticity" of the party system. To calculate 
the centre-space Pennings and Keman divide this total range of party competition 
into three equal parts; the left space is the maximum left position minus the range 
divided by three, the right space is the maximum right position plus the range divided 
by three (as the right positions are negative values) and the centre space is confined by 
the inner boundaries of the left and right space. The centre-range is thus dependent 
on the distance between the positions of the two most extreme parties (see also 
Keman 1997; Pennings 1997). The exact mid-point between the two most extreme 
party positions can be regarded as the exact centre of the party system. 
 The implications of a variable centre space are substantial. First, this definition of 
the centre space means that the centre space expands when parties proliferate their 
positions and the centre range shrinks when parties converge, which implies that 
growing catch-allism will be associated with a reduced width of the centre. In 
addition, the entrance of new parties, the dissolution, mergers or splits of existing 
parties can all alter the range of party competition and thereby, change the size and 
directional movement of the centre. This, in turn, can modify the number of parties 
that populate the centre space. As a consequence, the composition of the centre-space 
can vary between different party systems as well as within one national party system 
over time. The range and boundaries of the centre space in West European party 
systems, measured as outlined above, are presented in table 5.1. 
                                                                                                                                             
entire manifesto consists of emphasis on left-wing issues) and -100 (when the entire manifesto 
consists of emphasis on right-wing issues only). 




Table 5.1 Width of centre range and boundaries of the centre in West European party 
systems 1945-1990 













beta         
(β) 
Aut        16.5 21.6 15.9 18.0 31.3 -12.5 to 3.9 - 2.7 to 18.8 - 8.2 to 7.7 -.62* 
Bel 22.7 16.5 17.6 18.9 32.4 -17.0 to 5.6 - 1.0 to 15.4 -15.2 to 2.4 -.27 
Den 27.7 30.2 32.4 30.1 40.0 -11.3 to16.3 -19.4 to 10.7 -23.7 to 8.7 -.69* 
Fin  -  - 20.7 20.7 20.7  -  -   1.9 to 18.8 - 
Fra 21.0 29.4 19.3 23.2 32.3   2.4 to18.6   8.2 to 21.2 -11.1 to 8.1  .42* 
Ger 18.2  7.6 18.5 14.8 25.3 - 6.9 to11.4 - 6.4 to 1.1   0.1 to18.4  .45* 
Ire 21.2 13.6 16.2 17.0 29.4 -19.8 to 1.3 -10.5 to 3.2 - 6.5 to 9.6  .25 
Ita 22.3 17.3 22.8 20.8 33.9 -17.7 to 4.6 - 9.6 to 7.8 -26.1 to -3.3 -.73* 
Net 11.8 22.9 20.4 18.4 28.0 -11.2 to 0.5 -11.6 to 11.4 -16.6 to 3.7 -.15 
Nor 16.4 32.5 21.2 23.3 51.5 - 4.6 to 11.7 -39.8 to -7.3 -19.4 to 1.7 -.67* 
Swe 35.1 29.1 27.7 30.6 35.1 -31.7 to 3.4 -31.3 to-2.3 -24.4 to 3.2  .20 
UK 11.0 13.1 16.8 13.5 26.0 - 5.4 to 5.7 - 2.8 to 10.3 -15.7 to 0.6 -.75* 
X 19.8 19.7 20.3 19.9 21.9 -12.3 to 7.5 -11.5 to 8.2 -13.7 to 6.6 -.23* 
 
Data are kindly provided by the Manifesto Research Group. Theoretically, party scores can range from 
+100 (extreme left position) and -100 (extreme right-wing position), allowing the total range of 
competition a maximum width of 200. This theoretical situation allows for a maximum width of the 
centre space of 66.7. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average centre range by period and 
country means. 'Range' refers to the width of the centre space, which is the total space of party 
competition divided by three. Columns under 'boundaries' provide the two perimeters of the centre space 
within each 15 year period. The column indicated 'MAX' presents the maximum distance between the 
two most extreme boundaries of the centre space of party competition over all post-war periods. A minus 
sign (-) means that data are not available. The column beta (β) provides regression coefficients between 
the exact centre point in the party system and the year of observation, summarising the direction of party 
competition. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < 
.05). 
 
Table 5.1 shows considerable cross-national variation in expansion and compression 
of the centre space of party competition in Western Europe. The centre range is 
widest in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) and Italy, while 
it is most cramped in the United Kingdom and Germany. Particularly during the 
1960s the German centre space became very narrow which may well have sparked 
Kirchheimer's assertion that this was a European-wide phenomenon. Nevertheless, in 
Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark the centre range 
of competition has actually expanded; a development contrary to Kirchheimer's 
waning of opposition thesis. The growth of inter-party distances was most extensive 
in the Netherlands, where the centre range practically doubled after 1960. Closer 
examination shows that the expansion of the centre range of competition in the 1960s 
and 1970s in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands was primarily caused by the 
emergence of new parties at a time when traditional parties actually adopted more 
moderate stances. It should be noted that many of the parties with the most extreme 
position included in this study are very small in electoral terms and negligible to 
government formation and national policy formulation. In some other countries such 
'extremist' parties are not included in the study, which may explain some of the 




variation. In Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and Italy new political competitors 
entered the political scene in the 1960s and 1970s during which time the range of 
competition actually narrowed. Sweden, the country with the widest centre space, is 
the only case with a linear development towards compression of the space of party 
competition. Conversely, the inter-party distances expanded in Austria and France 
during the 1960s and 1970s, yet the centre space of competition dwindled in the last 
two decades. As noted earlier, the most cramped centre space of party competition is 
found in Germany since the late 1950s until the mid-1970s. This decline in inter-party 
distances started to unfold at in the country Kirchheimer observed most closely, 
triggering him to fully develop the catch-all thesis. 
 Overall, there is no consistent trend towards a declining centre space of party 
competition. In the majority of countries the centre space actually expanded during 
the last decades, indicating more extreme positions of some parties in their party 
system and a larger 'room to manoeuvre' for political parties. Only in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Ireland and Sweden did the width of the centre space of party 
competition decline over time. In sum, no firm evidence of an overall reduction in 
inter-party distances was found in West European party systems and hence we cannot 
confirm Kirchheimer’s hypothesis that a process of ideological convergence and 
'waning of opposition' characterised West European party systems after the Second 
World War. 
 Also, the shift in direction of the centre space shows several different trends across 
Western Europe. Over time the nucleus of party competition shift to the left in 
France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden, whereas in the other countries the mid-point 
of the space of party competition shifts to the right (see column 'beta β' in table 5.1). 
More precisely, in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands the centre 
shifts to the left in the 1960s and early 1970s, yet moves back to the right again in the 
period 1976-1990. In Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden the movement of the 
centre is in the opposite direction during the 1960s, namely to the right. In Denmark 
and Norway the centre space of party competition moves almost continuously to the 
right during the post-war period, yet shifts to the left again in the last period. 
 Thus, within and across West European party systems the centre space of party 
competition shows considerable variation over time both in width and direction, 
making Kirchheimer's assertion of the waning or even vanishing of political 
opposition seem untenable. There is no linear and uniform trend of movement 
towards the centre; rather, parties seem to take advantage of the considerable room to 
manoeuvre inside as well as outside the centre of their party system in order to 
strategically position themselves for electoral and governmental competition. That 
said, it must also be emphasised that the range and direction of the centre space tells 
us nothing about the parties which actually occupy the centre in West European 





In Western Europe a considerable proportion of political parties, including over one 
third of the total number in this study, is located in the centre range of party 
competition. The numbers of parties occupying the centre augmented particularly 
during the late 1950s and again in the 1970s. Yet, there is no secular trend of an 




increasing number of centre parties in West European party systems. In fact, the 
proportion of parties in the centre has actually declined since the late 1970s (see also 
Keman 1997, 96). Occupancy of the centre space also demonstrates substantial cross-
national variation and over time the dissimilarities between West European party 
systems have even increased. Partly due to its fragmented party system, Italy for 
example, has the most crowded centre space in Western Europe over the total post-
war period. Party competition within the centre range of the party system is also very 
common in Austria, the United Kingdom and Denmark. In contrast, the French 
political and constitutional changes that brought about the Fifth Republic resulted in 
few parties positioning themselves in the political centre space. Perhaps it was this 
development that led Duverger (1963, 215) to assert that the French centre space is 
always empty. Clearly, an empty centre is exceptional in Europe, as next to France, 
this situation only occured in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany for limited 
periods of time. Parties in France also exhibit the highest volatility in centre 
occupation, while the most stable proportion of centre parties can be found in the 
Netherlands; although even this coefficient of variance still shows substantial centre-
migration. 
 
Occupancy of the centre space of competition is, however, dependent on the relative 
position of other parties and is therefore inadequate in itself to provide substantiation 
or rejection of the catch-all thesis. Two modes of interaction between party positions 
and the centre-range are feasible. First, parties may have (relatively) stationary 
positions while the centre-range changes to such an extent that parties move in and 
out of the centre. A second possibility is that the centre is relatively stable and parties 
change their policy position. To test whether West European parties demonstrate a 
centripetal or centrifugal movement it is therefore necessary to calculate the distance 
of all parties from the exact centre position (which itself is variable) in each period. As 
this study concentrates only on the absolute distance of parties from the centre, the 
positive and negative signs of the scores are ignored. For each of the nine periods, 
table 5.2 provides the average distance of all parties in West European countries from 
the exact centre position of their party system. 
























X S CV 
Aut  6.7  8.8 12.9 16.4  7.2 10.4  1.1 14.7  7.2  9.5  6.1 .642 
Bel 14.0 22.4  7.0 12.2  9.3  8.1  6.2 10.4  6.5 10.3  7.2 .699 
Den 11.3 10.8 26.8 15.5 17.7 21.1 20.3 26.2 23.5 20.2 12.7 .629 
Fin - - - - - - - 14.8  6.2 10.5  8.1 .771 
Fra 13.5 18.3 10.2 13.3  8.7 13.4 14.3 2.9 18.9 12.3  6.2 .504 
Ger  5.5  6.9 17.6  1.9  4.8  6.7  4.8 15.8 12.2  8.9  7.9 .888 
Ire 13.7 16.8  8.2  9.3 12.4  6.0  2.6 11.3 16.1 11.1  7.3 .658 
Ita 12.7  6.6 10.5  5.9 11.5  8.3  6.2 11.6 16.1 10.1  7.6 .752 
Net  6.9 12.2  7.2  9.5 14.6 12.0 14.7 13.7  7.3 10.9  6.6 .606 
Nor  7.7 13.5 11.8  8.9  8.3 36.4 15.0 20.4 18.3 16.1 11.9 .739 
Swe 16.3 22.8 19.8 29.3 14.7 12.2 10.9 17.6 14.6 17.5 12.7 .726 
UK  8.3  6.8  5.5  9.7  7.3  9.2 23.4 16.7 16.3 11.5  7.0 .609 
X 10.8 13.2 13.1 12.2 11.3 15.1 11.8 15.7 14.6 13.2  9.9 .750 
S  7.4  9.4 10.3  9.6  7.9 11.7  9.9 11.5 10.0 - - - 
CV .685 .712 .786 .787 .699 .775 .839 .732 .684 - - - 
 
Entries are average distances of all parliamentary parties from the exact centre (mid-point between the 
most extreme left-wing and most extreme right-wing party). For Finland no data were available until 
1980. Belgian and Dutch parties which split or merge are counted as one over the entire period. See 
appendix 2 for sources of the data. Above the first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as 
explained in appendix II. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period and 
country means. The column 'S' lists the standard deviations of the countries, while the row 'S' at the 
bottom of the table provides the standard deviation for each period. Standard deviations are used to 
assess cross-national and cross-time variation. Rows and columns labelled 'CV ' provide the coefficient of 
variance (S/ X) for countries and periods, as this measure is more suitable for comparison of several 
clusters of data with respect to their relative homogeneity in instances where the groups have very 
different means. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. 
 
These figures clearly show that across West European party systems no uniform trend 
towards the centre is discernible, but rather a pattern of substantial variation in 
centripetal and centrifugal party movements can be seen. Nevertheless, as far as the 
1960s are concerned, these data do corroborate Kirchheimer's belief that parties were 
then moving towards the centre space. Overall, the average distance from the centre 
declines during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, most West 
European party systems manifest a centrifugal tendency indicating programmatic 
polarisation. Polarisation between political parties is most profound in the 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), while parties in Germany 
and Austria position themselves relatively much closer to the centre position. In order 
to summarise the overall centrifugal and centripetal trends within countries, table 5.3 
provides the results of a linear regression analysis of the distance from the centre of 
political parties with the year of observation as the independent variable. 
Table 5.3 Trends in party distances from the centre over time in Western Europe     
1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 






-.07 -.41* .28* -.55 -.16 .22 -.04 .13 .17 .37* -.20 .61* 
 
Entries are regression coefficient between the distance from the centre and the year of observation. An 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Clearly, there is no secular centripetal trend among parties in West European political 
systems. The positive parameters show that, over time, the distance of political parties 
from the centre space actually increased in Denmark, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. Only in half the countries included in 
this study, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and Sweden, are parties 
demonstrating a moderate centripetal movement over time. Following this evaluation 
of cross-national variation, table 5.4 reviews differences in distance from the centre of 
the parties belonging to each party family. 
 




















X S CV 
cd 9.1 8.7 8.0 8.1 7.6 10.8 4.1 11.6 7.7 8.5 6.5 .765 
com 20.8 22.4 22.1 22.0 22.2 12.7 16.8 23.7 21.7 20.7 10.7 .516 
con 14.3 17.3 17.8 19.2 17.2 17.2 16.6 19.6 15.9 17.3 11.5 .665 
sd 11.9 10.2 12.8 9.8 9.5 14.3 9.4 14.3 13.4 11.8 7.6 .644 
soc - - 39.7 21.1 21.1 33.1 23.6 26.5 25.5 26.1 11.6 .444 
lib 7.9 13.8 10.2 12.6 9.6 13.8 11.9 10.9 14.5 11.7 8.4 .718 
env - - - - - - - 27.3 10.7 16.2 9.9 .611 
eth - - - 8.1 7.9 0.3 2.0 14.4 4.7 7.1 6.5 .915 
agr 3.0 14.9 8.9 2.3 8.0 19.9 6.6 8.2 5.0 8.4 7.5 .893 
prt - - - - - 41.6 27.3 31.0 31.1 32.7 6.7 .205 
 
The abbreviations in the first column refer to the party families, summarised in appendix 2. Entries are 
percentages of all parties included in this study. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available or 
parties did not exist at that particular point in time. The column 'X' provides the average score of the 
party family. The column 'S' gives the standard deviations by party family, while the column 'CV ' provides 
the coefficient of variance (S/ X). 
 
With regard to genetic origin, agrarian, liberal, Christian democratic and social 
democratic parties are most often found in, or close to the centre of West European 
party systems (see also Keman 1997, 107). In particular, the data in table 5.4 confirm 
the centrist tendency of Christian democratic and agrarian parties. For the Christian 
democratic parties this centrist position is relatively stable over time. Apparently, 
agrarian parties have not labelled themselves 'centre-parties' without reason; since 
these parties have the lowest average distance from the centre position and can often 
be found in the centre of the political spectrum. In contrast, conservative, communist 
and socialist parties are consistently most distant from the exact centre in their party 
system. Liberal and social democratic parties usually do not move far away from the 
centre point in their party systems. As Kirchheimer suggested, in several countries the 
social-democratic parties adopted a more centrist position during the 1960s, yet a 
centrifugal movement of social democratic parties is visible in the 1980s. As a 




summary measure of overall trends in 'centrism', the next table presents the results of 
a linear regression analysis of the distance of parties of the different party families 
from the centre with the year of observation as the independent variable. 
 
Table 5.5 Trends in movement towards the centre over time of West European party 
families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib env eth agr 
beta (β) -.01 -.04  .03  .09 -.06  .12 -.96  .09 -.23 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the distance from the centre and the year of observation. An 
asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level    (t = < .05). 
 
The stable centrist position of the Christian democratic parties is evidenced by a very 
low negative trend over time in their distance from the centre. While Christian 
democratic, agrarian, communist and socialist parties show a moderate centripetal 
tendency, conservative, social democratic and liberal parties reveal a modest 
centrifugal trend over time. Overall, this analysis also shows that party families in 
general basically maintain a similar distance from the centre over time, evidenced by 
very low coefficients, with the exception of the polarizing environmentalist family. As 
the exact centre point varies considerably across countries and within party systems 
there can be no other conclusion than that parties strategically re-position themselves 
at relatively comparable distances from the centre. 
 A more specific analysis indicates that two major patterns of centre occupation 
dominate West European party systems. First, there is the dominant centrism of 
Christian democratic parties, a situation found in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Italy (see also Keman 1994). Christian democratic parties in these countries 
generally maintained their centrist position, while conservative parties in other 
countries were moving away from the centre space. Only in Ireland, Norway and 
France have Christian democratic parties left the centre space and become embedded 
at the right-wing of the political spectrum. A second dominant pattern in Western 
Europe is centre space occupation by social democratic parties in their respective 
party systems. The Danish, German, Irish and Swedish social democratic parties 
already resided in the political centre immediately after World War II, as opposed to 
the Austrian, Belgian, Italian, British and Dutch social democratic parties which came 
to inhabit the centre space at a later stage. In other countries the picture is less 
transparent. In Norway, for example, the population of the centre is in continuous 
flux. New parties which emerged in the mid-1970s in Norway pulled the centre to the 
right, making it possible for the conservatives to monopolise the centre space. 
Another deviant case is the Swedish party system, where the conservative party 
appears to be the stable factor in the political centre. In both of these Scandinavian 
countries the former agrarian, now self-labelled Senterpartiet, situates itself in the 
centre space as well. Even more abundant fluctuation in centre space occupancy is 
found in the United Kingdom, where first, the Conservative Party resides in the 
centre, only to be driven out by Labour's move to the right in the 1960s and finally by 
the entry of the Liberal Party and its successor (SDP) as residents of the centre space 
in the 1980s. 
 Over time no linear trend towards increasing centre space occupation nor an 




overall centripetal movement of political parties is discernible in Western Europe. The 
evidence actually indicates the opposite trend to what Kirchheimer claimed, as for 
example, the number of conservative and liberal parties which inhibit the centre space 
declined since the late 1970s. Moreover, although Christian democratic and social 
democratic parties show relatively stable levels of centre space occupation, the 
propensity of parties to move in and out of the centre range actually increased 
between the 1950s and the 1980s. Still, it is too early to dismiss Kirchheimer's thesis 
altogether. Kirchheimer argued that modern catch-all parties are disposing themselves 
of their ideological inheritance, which would then be visible in more flexible policy 
stances and in the adoption of strategically more advantageous positions in the 
Downsian sense. With this in mind, I will now turn in section 5.1.2 to look at the 
extent to which political parties have converged towards each other or, instead, have 
proliferated in their policy positions. 
5.1.2 Convergence and polarisation of political parties 
Convergence of political parties indicates increasing consensus between party elites 
within party systems and behaviour oriented towards co-operation. This 'waning' or 
even 'vanishing of opposition' is a prominent aspect of Kirchheimer's political 
thinking, and I will measure it here by taking the standard deviation of all party 
positions within one party system.75 These calculations are summarised in table 5.6 in 
which the entries are the average standard deviations of all party positions, indicating 
the average distance parties have adopted. The higher the mean standard deviation, 
the more parties proliferate on average; the lower the standard deviation-score, the 
more parties converge towards each other by adopting similar policy positions. 
 





















Aut 8.2 10.5 16.7 23.1 8.4 14.2 1.6 17.7 8.6 14.2 
Bel 18.3 30.1 10.3 13.5 10.9 10.5 8.5 13.9 8.9 14.0 
Den 14.6 13.4 33.1 17.6 22.0 24.0 23.9 32.2 27.7 23.8 
Fin - - - - - - - 17.0 7.4 13.2 
Fra 11.9 21.4 12.3 14.1 11.3 15.1 16.7 2.9 22.0 14.1 
Ger 7.2 8.8 25.1 2.3 6.5 9.4 6.5 22.6 14.2 13.1 
Ire 19.1 23.9 10.2 11.8 15.3 6.9 1.0 14.8 18.5 15.1 
Ita 13.1 9.8 12.0 7.0 17.4 11.8 6.1 11.7 19.8 14.3 
                                                        
75 "A general interest is in the general convergence or divergence of parties over the postwar 
period, particularly in view of theses of the "end of ideology" (Bell 1962) or of the emergence of 
the totally pragmatic "catch-all" party (Kirchheimer 1966). In part, of course, judgements of 
convergence and divergence rest on arbitrary decisions about which years to compare. Inspection 
of individual graphs of party movement on the main dimension shows that in most countries there 
is no steady movement to convergence or divergence; parties come together and move apart 
presumably in response to imperatives of party competition, not to secular trends towards de-
ideologisation" (Budge 1992, 24; see also Thomas 1975; 1979; 1980; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 
1987; Laver and Hunt 1992, 65-67; Katz and Mair 1993a). 




Net 8.6 15.0 10.0 11.8 16.5 13.1 20.3 15.7 10.4 13.2 
Nor 11.1 17.3 14.6 12.7 12.8 31.7 18.7 21.1 19.1 18.0 
Swe 20.5 27.9 26.5 33.3 18.3 13.2 16.5 26.9 18.2 22.0 
UK 10.2 8.0 7.6 11.8 10.7 11.8 27.4 23.3 19.0 14.3 
X 13.4 17.4 18.3 16.3 15.2 17.6 16.1 20.9 18.2 - 
 
Entries are standard deviations of party positions between all parties within one party system in each 
period. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average standard score by period and country 
means. A minus sign means that data were not available or statistic could not be calculated. 
 
Countries show significant variance in timing and extent of political polarisation and 
convergence of political parties. As noted earlier, Denmark and Sweden emerge as the 
most polarised party systems in Western Europe. Particularly during the 1950s and 
early 1960s, as well as in the 1980s, Swedish and Danish political parties differ 
substantially in policy position. Overall, considerable polarisation between parties is 
also found in the United Kingdom, France and Norway. Relatively low levels of 
polarisation characterise political competition in Germany, Austria and Italy. In 
Germany two short periods, the late 1950s and the early 1980s, stand out as times of 
considerable polarisation between the different political competitors. On the whole, 
however, party distances in the German political system rank among the lowest in 
Western Europe, a fact which was noted by Kirchheimer as well. Several interesting 
findings emerge from this analysis, such as the evidence that the Italian party system is 
far less polarised as could be expected from its relatively fragmented format. 
Apparently the numerous Italian parties cluster to a significant extent around similar 
policy positions. Only the late 1960s and 1980s are times of increasing ideological 
polarisation in the Italian polity. Although parties converged towards one another in 
Belgium, Austria, Denmark and Sweden over time, there is no evidence here either of 
a secular trend of convergence as suggested by Kirchheimer. In sum, this analysis 
does not corroborate Kirchheimer’s assertion of vanishing opposition in Western 
Europe. There is no linear development towards convergence of political parties, 
instead polarisation and convergence alternate over time in all European party 
systems. 
 Utilising the same data on policy positions of parties on the dynamic left-right 
scale, which runs from an extreme left-wing position (+100) to an extreme right-wing 
position (-100), we can also chart the programmatic movement of West European 
political party families over time and the results of this analysis are summarised in 
table 5.7 
 




















X S direction 
 
cd - 2.4 - 6.6 - 8.7 - 4.1 - 3.9 - 1.6 - 3.7 - 6.0 - 6.6 - 4.8 8.9 -  4.2 
com 18.4 28.2 23.6 20.5 28.4 15.9 20.3 27.4 14.9 14.8 10.3 -  3.5 
con -14.7 -12.7 -14.0 -19.7 -14.3 - 8.9 -17.9 -20.0 -22.4 -12.1 16.9 -  7.7 
sd 12.2 13.8 13.4 7.4 11.6 14.5 6.9 6.2 5.9 10.2 9.4 -  6.3 
soc - - 44.0 20.2 25.4 22.1 22.7 20.8 19.0 24.9 9.0 - 25.0 




lib - 4.4 - 6.7 - 6.5 1.5 - 0.7 - 2.1 - 2.4 - 9.6 -13.4 - 4.9 14.1 -  9.0 
env - - - - - - - 36.6 9.7 23.2 19.1   n.a 
eth - - - - 0.8 5.3 9.1 - 0.9 -13.7 - 1.3 - 0.4 8.7 -  0.5 
agr - 8.6 -11.7 -15.5 - 9.5 - 2.1 6.4 1.1 - 1.1 - 3.5 - 4.9 8.4 +  5.1 
prt - - - - - -52.6 -29.2 -43.4 -41.2 -41.6 14.5 + 11.4 
X 0.3 1.6 3.4 1.8 5.5 - 0.3 - 0.7 - 1.2 - 7.1 - 0.1 17.3  -  6.8 
 
Entries are average positions of the left-right scale of all parties of the same genetic origin (see section 
4.1.1 and Appendix 1). A score of +100 signifies an extreme left-wing position, while a score of -100 
indicates an extreme right-wing position. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score 
by period and party family means. The column marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation the party 
families. The last column indicated by 'direction' provides the difference between the first available average 
position-score and the score in the period 1986-1990. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not 
available or parties did not exist at that particular point in time. 
 
In general, and as can be seen from table 5.7, West European parties show substantial 
movement along the left-right scale and have, over time, shifted their policy 
preferences to the right end of the political spectrum. With the exception of the 
agrarian and protest parties which already had distinctive right-wing policy profiles, all 
party families adopted increasingly right-wing policy positions, particularly during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s as well as in the 1980s. This rightward drift can be detected 
within most party families and appears to counter Kirchheimer's predictions regarding 
the emergence of centripetal competition in West European party systems. Moreover, 
the 1970s proved to be a period of left-wing radicalisation for the social democrats, 
while the 1980s mark a shift to the right once more. Similar trends of ‘moderation’ 
and ‘radicalisation’ over time are found with socialist and communist parties and, to a 
lesser extent, environmentalist parties. Liberal parties, having positioned themselves 
on the right in the 1950s, shifted towards the left in the 1960s. During the 1970s and 
1980s, however, liberal parties follow the general shift to the right. Parties of 
conservative origin have, on average, a solid right-wing policy stance, although this 
stance radicalised during the late 1970s and early 1980s. What this erratic pattern 
might suggests is that parties shift their policy stance and converge or pull together 
when they consider this beneficial to their chance of government participation or 
electoral gains. That said however, and with the exception of the period spanning 
from 1960 to 1975, there is an unmistakable programmatic movement of West 
European parties to the right of the political spectrum, which suggests that centrist 
positions are not automatically seen as electorally beneficial by many parties. Indeed, a 
movement to the right can also have a considerable pay-off in electoral terms as is 
shown by the electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, the enduring 
electoral success of Helmut Kohl in Germany and the advent of right-wing 
governments in Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark during the 1980s (Gunn 
1989). In the end, however, few of these movements, including the programmatic and 
ideological radicalisation to the left in the 1970s and to the right in the 1980s, appear 
to substantiate Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis. 
 Kirchheimer also suggested that catch-all parties would adopt progressively 
flexible policy positions and increasing willingness to exchange ideological rigidity for 
strategic office-seeking behaviour, and this flexibility is also something which we can 
assess with these policy data. Accordingly, table 5.8 reports the standard deviations of 
left-right scores of the different party families over time. 





Table 5.8 The flexibility in policy position (standard deviations) of Western European 




















cd 11.3 10.9 10.7 6.9 6.9 9.0 6.2 10.5 7.7 8.9 1.8 
com 5.0 6.7 6.5 9.5 3.0 13.0 15.1 10.1 15.1 10.3 0.5 
con 15.9 12.8 24.9 22.3 11.3 15.5 10.8 26.9 7.7 16.9 1.0 
sd 4.4 5.3 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.9 11.2 10.4 12.6 10.2 0.9 
lib 8.8 17.1 10.7 16.5 14.4 12.1 13.8 15.3 14.6 14.1 0.3 
agr 9.5 2.4 11.3 13.1 6.1 0.7 0.6 7.5 2.7 8.7 1.8 
X 9.2 9.2 12.1 12.8 8.4 9.9 9.6 13.5 10.1 11.5 1.1 
 
Entries are average standard deviations in policy position. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide 
the average standard deviation over all post-war policy positions of the particular party family and of the 
nine periods respectively. The row marked by 'CV’ provides the coefficient of variance of  the party 
families over the post-war period. 
 
The differences in this case are striking, particularly insofar as they associate 
differential degrees of flexibility with parties of different lineage. When this genetic 
origin is taken into account, for example, it is found that liberal and particularly 
conservative parties are far more flexible in their policy stance than Christian 
democratic, agrarian and social democratic parties. The finding, that parties generally 
found on the right hand of the political spectrum adopt more flexible positions while 
parties predominately situated in the centre and on the left are more rigid in their 
commitment to principle, was also noted by Klingemann et al. (1994, 247-248). 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, there appears to have been a more 
generalised ideological flexibility which corroborates Kirchheimer's own emphasis on 
the downgrading of traditional ideology. In contrast, however, the late 1960s and 
1970s marked a period of more rigidity in policy positions, a process which was 
reversed again in the 1980s. In other words, there is no evidence of a linear trend 
towards more flexibility in left-right programmatic movement; rather parties appear to 
use the 'room for manoeuvre' when this is possible, and seem to regress to more 
ideological rigidity when they deem this necessary for electoral reasons or as a 
coalitional strategy. 
 In sum, we can detect neither a general trend towards ideological moderation, nor 
evidence of a continual centripetal trend or programmatic convergence. Rather than a 
centripetal movement of parties, the centre of gravity of party competition in Western 
Europe has shifted to the right, and in contrast to Kirchheimer's theory, the 
proportion of parties which occupy the centre space has even declined since the late 
1970s. What can be witnessed across Europe is a cyclical movement of parties in and 
out of the centre for strategic purposes and a pattern of flexibility in policy position 
which both suggests that parties adapt their policy stance to the prerequisites and 
parameters of national party competition and electoral calculations. 
5.2 Emphasis on traditional issues 
Political issues (politically salient problems) are central to democratic party 
competition. Political elites frame existing dimensions of conflict, as well as new 




problems and challenges which modern democracies face, in terms of political issues. 
In addition, the power to do the opposite, and to keep issues from surfacing on the 
political agenda has also important consequences for the agenda-setting in modern 
democracies (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). However, this rise and fall of issue saliency 
is not totally unstructured, and shifts in salient issues as well as changes in the relative 
dominance of issue dimensions may indicate fundamental changes in the social 
structure (Inglehart 1990). Equally important, the origin of parties can be traced to 
specific social cleavages and conflicts and as long as these political conflicts persist or 
maintain relevant to certain groups, the political parties will keep the related issues on 
the political agenda. Communist and socialist parties, for example, continue to 
emphasise class-based issues and state ownership of means of production, while social 
democratic parties will more likely emphasise redistributive and state interventionist 
issues. In turn, agrarian parties, along with Christian democratic parties usually 
emphasise traditional morality-issues in conjunction with religious issues. 
Traditionally, liberal parties primarily emphasise the importance of law and order as 
well as individual and economic freedoms, whereas conservative parties are usually 
oriented towards nationalist and military issues, as well as the preservation of 
traditional morals. Indeed, some go as far as to claim that certain issues 'belong' to 
certain party families and that political parties can basically be regarded as single-issue 
movements. Budge and Farlie (1983a), for example, argued that social democratic 
parties have always been single-issue parties and that they do not expand their 
concerns; instead they simply reduce emphasis on unpopular issues.76 
 If Kirchheimer was correct in asserting that parties, in their transformation 
towards catch-allism, abandon their specific clientele and aim for wider electoral 
support, they no longer need to hold on so tightly to their specific emphasis.77 
                                                        
76 Budge and Farlie (1983a, 304-305) argue that, "the assertion made originally by Kirchheimer that 
parties - especially socialist parties - are expanding their appeal so as to encompass all issues that 
might attract votes, and thus are becoming indistinguishable 'catch-all' parties. In point of historical 
fact, Kirchheimer's criticism was sparked off by the repudiation of certain traditional but 
unpopular elements in the socialist platform (e.g., state ownership, control) rather than by its 
expansion. (...) Our analysis of competition reveals an asymmetry in the competitive position of 
socialist and bourgeois parties, which put the latter in a 'catch-all' position from the earliest 
emergence of the former as a popular force. Socialist parties 'own' only the issue of socio-
economic redistribution: since this would always produce immediate benefits for the majority of 
the population, it is a frequently occurring issue with a considerable impact on floating voters (to 
say nothing of its permanent effects on the socialist basic vote). Socialist parties are to a large 
extent single-issue parties: the logic of effective competition indicates that, far from becoming 
'catch-all' parties, they should get rid of vote-losing elements in their policy (such as 
nationalization) to bring their winning issue into effective focus. During the 1960's this was in 
effect what was done by the German and Austrian social democrats. How can bourgeois parties 
compete with the redistributive appeal? Historical evidence indicates that, as heirs to all the older 
party appeals, they became catch-all parties from the beginning of the socialist threat, searching 
their wide range of proprietary issues for the one(s) most likely in the current election to direct 
attention away from redistribution. These contrasting emphases, together with direct 
confrontations of records and candidates and sometimes foreign policies, constitute the familiar 
pattern for an election under left-right competition." 
77 Budge and Farlie (1983a, 280) argue that parties compete by "adding other appeals to the 
traditional partisan emphasis in close elections, all parties act as 'catch-all' parties under given 
circumstances. At other times when they feel bound to win or loose regardless, parties will stress 
their ideological purity. This broadening and contracting of appeals is not therefore a once-and-for-
all process as argued, for example by Kirchheimer (...), but one closely related to the ebb and flow 
of election fortunes. ... Where party competition is conceived of as emphasizing different issues, 
'convergence' towards a 'centre' simply means that they start talking about the same issues, not that 
they necessarily agree on them." 




Instead, catch-all parties strategically use political issues for electoral purposes. 
However, only at the risk of very high electoral costs can parties totally do away with 
their ideological heritage. As Klingemann et al. (1994, 24) point out; "parties sustain 
an identity that is anchored in the cleavages and issues that gave rise to their birth... 
Parties are historical beings." This does not mean, nevertheless, that parties can not 
selectively emphasise or de-emphasise issues at times when this seems electorally 
advantageous to them. Furthermore, new issues which can not be neglected are 
bound to crop up in every party system and parties will include them in their policy 
statements. 
 Accordingly, the second feature of ideological catch-allism is likely to be indicated 
by a declining emphasis on issues which are traditionally highlighted by parties in their 
party program. Again, the data from the party manifestos of the ECPR Manifesto 
Research Group can be employed in order to determine which issues are typical and 
traditionally emphasised by different party families. All party manifestos of one party 
family in the period from 1945 until 1960 are aggregated and the average proportion 
of emphasis on the different issues is calculated. The five issues most emphasised by 
each party family are then considered to be the 'traditional' issues for all parties 
belonging to that particular party family. This relatively ‘rough-and-ready’ index may 
be regarded as indicative of the relative saliency of issues which are considered to be 
traditional for that party family. An important difference between this measure and 
the left-right scale used in section 5.1 is that the traditional issues differ for each party 
family and these are reported in appendix 2. Table 5.9 below summarises the average 
percentages of the party manifestos devoted to these traditional issues by the different 
party families over time. 
 
Table 5.9 The mean proportion of emphasis on traditional issues by Western 



















X S CV 
cd 31.5 27.7 27.6 24.0 18.3 20.4 23.7 19.0 21.0 23.9 9.5 .397 
com 28.1 29.8 31.7 19.9 21.6 19.0 22.8 28.0 21.5 24.7 8.9 .360 
con 33.2 21.2 35.4 34.7 21.4 27.4 22.4 23.4 29.2 27.6 14.3 .518 
sd 28.8 23.7 27.3 26.2 20.5 23.7 26.3 23.2 24.4 24.9 8.3 .333 
soc - - 40.0 23.6 24.3 25.3 27.0 30.7 25.4 27.4 7.8 .284 
lib 20.2 22.3 20.3 17.2 17.4 17.2 18.3 18.7 17.5 18.8 8.2 .436 
env - - - - - - 6.0 32.3 41.8 30.5 17.0 .557 
eth - - - 2.1 5.3 8.7 9.5 7.1 17.5 9.6 7.1 .739 
agr 28.3 25.3 26.8 17.1 12.4 10.5 11.6 13.4 8.8 17.1 9.5 .555 
prt - - - - - 40.8 29.6 33.8 37.2 35.4 15.5 .438 
X 26.8 24.2 26.7 22.6 18.5 21.2 21.6 22.2 23.6 22.3 10.6 .475 
S 10.5 10.3 13.0 10.2 7.8 12.0 10.0 9.2 10.2 10.6 - - 
CV .391 .426 .487 .451 .422 .566 .462 .414 .432 .475 - - 
 
Entries are average percentages of the party manifesto devoted to traditional issues (see appendix 1). A 
minus sign (- ) means that data were not available. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the 
average score by period and party family means. The column marked by 'S' provides the standard 
deviation the party families, while the column indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). 





Although traditional issues still constitute an important segment of the party 
platforms in Western Europe, the data in table 5.9 clearly indicate that the late 1960s 
and the 1970s mark a period where non-traditional political issues began to gain 
prominence. Kirchheimer correctly noted this development, yet he appears to have 
overestimated the extent to which this process would continue. What can be seen is 
that this trend of de-emphasis on traditional issues was reversed in the early 1970s as 
parties awarded more saliency to their traditional concerns in their public declarations 
of principles; a process which persisted during the 1980s. These findings clearly 
contradict Kirchheimer’s catch-all thesis. 
 Among the party families there is substantial variation in timing and extent in the 
downgrading of traditional salient issues. Christian democratic and agrarian parties 
emphasised policy preferences which are typical to their ideology more during the late 
1970s and early 1980s; thereafter, a smaller section of their party platform was 
reserved for their traditional concerns. A similar cyclical pattern is discerneable within 
the conservative party family: a progressively larger part of their manifesto was 
devoted to policies and issues outside their conventional concern during the late 
1950s and early 1960s as well as during the late 1970s and 1980s. While some social 
democratic parties retain their historic emphases, particularly in Germany, Ireland and 
Norway, over time the saliency of traditional issues declines for this party family. 
Liberal parties too have downgraded their traditional issues in the 1960s, while from 
that point on the level has remained relatively stable. Most parties within the 
communist party family have shed their original emphasis considerably, while the 
environmentalist parties increasingly emphasise their 'traditional' policy preferences. 
In the 1980s a moderate return to traditionally salient issues can be found within the 
social democratic, Christian democratic and conservative party families. Finally, by 
examining the measures of dispersion (standard deviations and coefficients of 
variance), it can be assessed that the highest flexibility in traditional issue emphasis is 
found among conservative, Christian democratic, environmental and protest parties. 
The most stable emphasis on traditionally salient issues can be detected within the 
party families of the traditional left (communist, socialist and social democrats), a 
pattern which was pointed out earlier. The direction and extent of these trends can be 
summarised by a regression analysis of emphasis on traditional issues with the year of 
observation as the independent variable as reported in table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10 Trends in traditional issue emphasis over time of West European party 
families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib env agr 
beta (β) -.38* -.25 -.11 -.13 -.04 -.13 .96* -.70* 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the proportional emphasis on traditional issues and the year of 
observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < 
.05). 
 
It is evident that none of the traditional party families escaped the need to address 
new issues in their party manifesto and thus devote less space to their traditional 
concerns. Particularly agrarian and Christian democratic parties have felt the need to 
include non-traditional issues in their party manifestos at the expense of their 
conventionally addressed subject matter. Communist parties have also modernised 




their party platforms substantially over time. Only the novel environmentalist parties 
have increased their emphasis on their ‘traditional’ core issues. 
 This variation in traditional issue-emphasis across party families also helps to 
account for variation between countries, as can be seen from the summary figures in 
table 5.11. In this case the contrasts are quite marked. Parties in Ireland, for example, 
attribute far more attention to traditional issues than do parties in Italy and the United 
Kingdom. In the so-called consociational democracies in this sample (Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands), all major parties have de-emphasised their traditional 
issues. In contrast, most parties in Denmark and France by and large remained loyal 
to their traditional policy pledges. All these cases may offer support for the 
'contagion-hypothesis' of catch-allism, by which Kirchheimer suggested that when 
one party adopts the catch-all strategy other parties in the system will follow. 
However, there are countries which do not corroborate this assertion. Italy, for 
example, shows a very mixed picture with the DC, PSDI and PCI playing down their 
traditional stance, while the liberal parties, the PSI and MSI remain loyal to their long-
established emphases. Further analysis of dispersion and homogeneity in issue 
emphasis within countries shows that particularly Irish, Swedish and Danish parties 
vary substantially in their emphasis on traditional issues. Party competition on the 
basis of constant emphasis on traditional issues is more characteristic for the French 
and German party systems. 
 
Table 5.11 The mean proportion of emphasis on traditional issues in Western 



















X S CV 
Aut 32.0 22.6 23.6 20.9 12.2 25.8 23.4 19.9 24.9 22.9 7.9 .345 
Bel 30.6 27.8 32.3 17.2 12.8 20.8 18.7 14.5 16.7 20.5 10.6 .517 
Den 17.3 15.8 27.7 21.1 16.4 18.2 25.3 26.6 39.4 22.2 11.9 .536 
Fin - - - - - - - 19.1 27.7 26.0 11.1 .426 
Fra 19.8 15.2 18.5 19.6 19.2 16.7 22.2 24.6 26.1 29.7 6.9 .232 
Ger 28.0 26.4 21.6 18.5 19.1 19.6 21.8 21.1 29.7 23.2 6.9 .297 
Ire 40.2 34.0 58.7 31.8 25.1 61.9 20.3 32.9 30.4 35.9 14.1 .393 
Ita 20.3 15.1 15.4 18.9 12.9 18.2 14.9 16.6 17.6 16.7 9.5 .568 
Net 27.9 30.1 26.2 26.5 21.5 19.2 24.9 19.5 14.4 23.5 6.3 .268 
Nor 27.7 26.4 31.3 26.4 23.7 28.6 23.1 23.0 23.4 25.8 9.1 .353 
Swe 39.7 36.7 36.4 28.3 23.6 19.8 25.0 27.4 23.4 28.9 12.1 .419 
UK 20.5 15.5 14.1 20.0 15.1 16.6 18.3 17.3 21.1 17.6 4.5 .256 
X 27.6 24.1 26.5 22.6 18.3 24.1 20.1 21.9 24.6 23.3 9.2 .395 
 
Entries are average percentages of the party manifesto devoted to traditional issues (see appendix 1). 
Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period and country means. The 
column marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the nine periods. The column indicated by 'CV ' 
provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could 
not be calculated. 
 
Across West European countries, a substantial number of political parties de-
emphasised traditional issues during the 1960s. This is in line with Kirchheimer's 




interpretation of this period. Over time, however, the data do not indicate a secular 
trend towards de-emphasis on traditional issues and at the national level the 1970s 
and 1980s even mark a return to more traditional issue-emphasis. Parties in Denmark, 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom emphasise more traditional issues in the 
late 1980s than they did in the 1950s. In contrast, within the Dutch, Italian and 
Belgian party system a propensity of constant depreciation of traditional issues can be 
detected. French parties manifested a relatively low level of saliency for traditional 
issues until the 1970s, and thereafter the proportion of the manifesto devoted to 
conventional issues increased again. This substantial variation across and within 
countries show that there is little evidence of a universal and constant de-emphasis on 
traditional issues. 
 To summarise the overall trends in traditional issue emphasis within European 
countries, table 5.12 gives the results of a linear regression analysis of traditional issue 
emphasis with the year of observation as the independent variable (the overall β is -
.12*). 
 
Table 5.12 Trends in traditional issue emphasis over time in Western Europe 1945-
1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
beta    
(β) 
-.15 -.45* .26* .35 .26 -.04 -.31 -.04 -.65* -.20 -.45* .12 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the proportion traditional issue emphasis and the year of 
observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < 
.05). 
 
This table shows that particularly Dutch, Belgian and Swedish parties have adapted 
their party manifestos to modern times and discarded traditional issues from their 
platforms. Parties in Germany and Italy have largely perpetuated traditional issue 
emphasis at a similar level. As noted above, parties in Denmark, France, Finland and 
the United Kingdom have even increased emphasis on traditional policy preferences 
in their manifestos over time, thereby appearing to refute Kirchheimer's catch-all 
thesis. 
 
In the end, however, the most striking conclusion to be drawn from these data is that 
the period set apart by Kirchheimer in his thesis appears to be exceptional. Only 
during the 1960s a general decline in traditional emphasis can be found. During the 
1970s and 1980s parties showed renewed interest in traditional issues. Over time there 
is no singular direction of change in issue emphasis apparent throughout West 
European party systems. Indeed, since the 1970s trends in issue-emphases have 
diverged even further. 
 This finding is substantiated by the study of Blinn and Carkoglu (1994, 10-11) who 
found a clear decline in issue volatility (changes in policy positions) along the 
traditional cleavages over the last decades. Notwithstanding the continuing salience of 
the traditional issues in political competition, their analysis shows that the ideological 
positions of parties on the left-right cleavage stabilises, with the partial exception of 
parties in Norway, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. In contrast, parties 
show increasing ideological volatility in issue salience on the 'new politics' dimension, 
except for Belgian and Norwegian parties. This suggests that parties maintain a firm 




commitment to traditional issues, yet are willing to include new issues in their party 
platform when this is beneficial in electoral terms. However, parties delete these new 
issues with more ease then they discard the traditional issues from their manifestos. 
 Budge (1992, 27) has suggested that, rather than a decline in ideological conflict, 
this increasing saliency of new ‘post-material’ and environmental issues may well lead 
to new ideological conflict and a restructuring of politically important dimensions. 
Questions, for example, connected with traditional morality (family, abortion and 
divorce) are much less emphasised in party manifestos than in earlier days, indicating 
deconfessionalization and individualism. Proportions of manifestos devoted to 
military issues and international issues are declining, primarily as a consequence of 
decreasing international political tensions. Additionally, emphasis on economic issues 
declined during the 1980s and particularly the 1990s. Issues that have replaced 
disappearing issues are those to do with 'technology' and new political issues, such as 
democracy, decentralisation, social justice and environment (see also Laver 1996, 9). 
Empirical analysis suggests that this (dis)appearance of political issues is a function of 
economic, social and international political change - general tendencies that are largely 
outside the control of individual politicians or parties. Issues become independently 
salient in elections and politicians have only a limited ability to (de)emphasise certain 
issues and can therefore only partially influence the political agenda by their 
campaigning strategies (Budge 1992). Hence, developments in Western Europe in the 
1960s and 1970s caused parties to downgrade the relative salience of traditional issues 
and stress similar issues. Still, as we have seen here this process was reversed in the 
1980s and to some extent traditional issues were resuscitated by political parties, 
which clearly contradicts the catch-all hypothesis and shows that political parties are 
unwilling to completely abandon their historic identity as Kirchheimer seemed to 
suggest. 
5.3 Government participation and ministerial control 
The third indicator of ideological catch-allism, which quantifies the extent to which 
political opposition in Western Europe dwindles and parties seek compromise and 
consensus, is analysed through government participation. The assumption is that the 
inclusion of a growing number of parties in government78 indicates declining political 
opposition.79 This study measures governmental inclusiveness by determining the 
                                                        
78 In this study parties are considered to be in government only when they provide cabinet 
ministers (Lijphart 1984, 53; Pridham 1986, 16-17). For a broader definition, see Sartori 1976, 123: 
"...parties that have in fact entered, at some point in time, coalition governments and/or have given 
the governments the support they needed for taking office or staying in office." 
79 Katz and Mair (1993a; see also Mair 1995) labelled this the "dimension of incorporation" and 
distinguish three elements of the process of incorporation. First, a tendency towards the inclusion 
of an increasing number of parties in national governments. Second, a decline in the share of the 
electorate unrepresented in government over time, caused by the electoral losses of non-included 
parties and the incorporation of parties into government. Third, the cyclical nature of the process 
of incorporation. This cyclical nature refers to the process that the non-incorporated parties gain 
an increasing percentage of the popular vote, whereafter they are either included in a government 
or experience a decline in popular support. Katz and Mair explain this cyclical nature with the 
argument that, if a party gains a substantial portion of the popular vote and is enduring, the party is 
eventually likely to gain office. The inclusion of parties, in its turn, "may allow for an opening of 
the electoral market to new parties which seek to challenge the prevailing consensus or to break the 
mould created by the established (in this sense, incorporated) parties, or to those few parties which 
remain permanently excluded, with the result that a decline in the vote of non-incorporated parties 




proportion of ministries controlled by parties in regard to the total number of 
ministerial portfolios available. Secondly, the continuity of executive power is analysed 
by measuring the time over which political parties maintain government control. 
Finally, this section will assess the extent to which parties are indifferent towards 
specific ministerial portfolios they can control when accepting government 
responsibility. The next section analyses these three quantitative and qualitative 
elements of ministerial control. 
5.3.1 Ministerial control 
Traditional governmental parties in Western Europe have been reluctant in admitting 
new participants into the inner sanctum of executive power. Over the post-war period 
the average number of parties in West European governments has increased only 
marginally as few new parties have been admitted to participate in government, 
although a number of non-traditional coalition parties did gain executive office during 
the 1960s and 1970s.80 
 To determine the variation in government control of the different party families, 
the proportion of the total number of ministerial portfolios controlled by parties is 
used (see appendix 2). Table 5.13 gives the average percentages of all ministerial 
portfolios held by the representatives of the party families. 
 




















X S CV 
cd 33.9 39.6 38.5 31.2 34.7 15.8 10.9 20.7 23.1 26.8 29.2 1.089 
com 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.4 1.4 1.6 0.0 1.1 3.5 3.181 
con 0.0 26.2 22.6 36.7 29.2 19.4 28.5 28.5 43.4 26.1 34.8 1.333 
sd 43.5 31.6 28.9 25.8 28.4 45.8 37.0 35.2 26.4 33.6 33.6 1.000 
lib 10.0 11.7 7.7 6.7 5.5 8.0 10.2 7.1 8.4 8.4 11.0 1.309 
eth 2.7 7.0 1.7 3.8 4.2 4.0 6.4 5.9 7.6 4.8 4.8 1.000 
agr 6.2 22.8 16.3 14.0 16.4 11.3 20.8 22.9 9.1 15.5 14.7 .948 
                                                                                                                                             
is then succeeded by an increase, although the beneficiaries will have changed in this new cycle. 
Later again, the process of incorporation may begin anew, and so on" (Katz and Mair 1993a, 12-
13). The consequence of this method of measurement is that when a party is incorporated into the 
status of a governing party once, it remains 'included' even if the party never enters a government 
again. 
80 In Finland the communists joined the Paasio-cabinet in 1966 and in Germany the SDP joined its 
first postwar coalition in 1966. Shortly before, in 1963, the Norwegian Hoyre, Senterpartiet, KrF 
and Venstre had formed the first postwar (and shortlived) non-labour coalition in Norway. Three 
left-wing parties in the Netherlands (DS70, D66 and PPR) gained government control in the early 
1970's and in Belgium the ethnic parties (Rassemblement Walloon, Volksunie, FDF and PRLW) 
were included in broad coalitions in the late 1970s. During the late 1970s the Swedish liberals and 
conservatives established the first bourgeois coalition. In addition, the British Liberal Party 
provided the parliamentary majority for a minority Labour government in the mid-1970's, although 
the Liberals were not formally part of a Lib-Lab coalition. By the end of the 1980s, also the 
Austrian FPÖ, the Danish Centre Democrats and Christian People's Party, as well as the Finnish 
Rural Party (SMP) gained office for the first time. Finally, the PD joined a governmental coalition 
with Fianna Fail in Ireland in 1989 (data from Woldendorp et al, 1993). 




X 17.9 19.9 17.4 16.9 16.8 15.3 14.3 14.6 14.2 16.2 - - 
S 25.5 27.8 28.0 28.0 28.3 24.6 25.8 22.9 24.2 25.9 - - 
CV 1.42 1.40 1.61 1.66 1.68 1.61 1.80 1.57 1.70 1.60 - - 
 
Higher scores indicate larger proportions of ministries held by members of one party family in that 
particular period. Socialist, environmental, fascist and protest parties were not included in coalitions as 
these parties never obtained ministerial control. The column and row indicated by an X provide the 
average score of the period and the mean score of the party family. The row and column marked by 'S' 
provide the standard deviation for the party families and nine periods respectively. The columns indicated 
by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or 
could not be calculated. 
 
Conservative, Christian democratic and particularly social democratic parties have 
been most successful in securing ministerial control. On average, every third minister 
in Western Europe was of social democratic origin. In the first years after World War 
II the social democrats even held over forty-three per cent of all ministerial portfolios. 
Still, the heydays of social democracy were the 1970s and early 1980s. In the course of 
the 1980s, however, social democratic parties lost electoral and governmental ground 
again (see also Kitschelt 1994). Overall, Christian democratic ministers controlled 
over one quarter of all ministerial portfolios. Particularly during the 1950s Christian 
democrats held a large share of ministries in Western Europe. Christian democratic 
parties are often considered 'pivotal' in term of coalition formation (Keman 1994; 
1997) This high level of Christian democratic government control is primarily the 
result of the dominance of the Italian, Dutch, Belgian and Austrian Christian 
democratic parties (Kersbergen 1995). In Italy and the Netherlands the Catholic 
parties were pivotal in every single post-war coalition and usually provided the prime-
minister. Belgian Christian democratic parties participated in most post-war 
governments and more often than not the prime minister was recruited from their 
ranks. In the French Fourth Republic the MRP participated in most coalitions, yet the 
constitutional changes of 1958 resulted in a marginal position of Christian democracy 
within the UDF party-framework. In Scandinavia, Christian democracy is in a much 
weaker position (see Fogarty 1957; Irving 1979; Hanley 1994). Government control 
by communist parties immediately after the Second World War resulted from the 
important role communists had played in the resistance against Nazism. Communists 
entered governments in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Italy. However, 
developments in Eastern Europe and pressure from the United States resulted in the 
exclusion of communist parties from most European cabinets. Only the Finnish 
SKDL maintained government control as a result of Soviet pressure and in the 1980s 
the PCF gained government responsibility again in France. Conservative parties in 
Europe lost some executive command in the 1970s, though regained government 
control in the course of the 1980s. Especially in Denmark, Norway and Britain 
conservative parties increasingly gained ministerial control. Additionally, French 
conservatives assembled by Chirac and the Finnish KOK have given conservative 
parties more governmental power. Needless to say, the long-lasting dominance of 
Fianna Fail in Irish politics contributes significantly to the average level of 
conservative ministerial control. Liberal parties have been less successful in the 
coalition game. Nevertheless, the German FDP has participated in most post-war 
coalitions and also the Belgian, Italian and Dutch liberals were frequently invited to 
join coalitions. In Scandinavia, however, organised liberalism is weak. Ethnic parties 
have succeeded in controlling some ministerial portfolios in Finland, where the SFP 




coalesced with the social democrats as well as with conservative parties and thus 
established a pivotal position. The Belgian Volksunie also entered governmental 
coalitions in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s. Over time agrarian parties 
increased their control of ministerial portfolios; the agrarian parties of Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, which adopted the name of 'Centerparties', have entered 
coalitions. Moreover, Kesk usually plays a pivotal role in Finnish coalition formation. 
Socialist, fascist, protest and environmental parties possess the least coalition potential 
of the West European party families. That this may well change in the future is 
witnessed by the entry of the successor of the MSI in a right-wing coalition in Italy in 
the 1990s. Furthermore, environmental parties have in some countries been able to 
enter in coalitions at the local level of government, which may well stage a 
development towards future participation in government at the national level. In 
France and Germany this already materialised when the first 'green' ministers were 
invited to join the governments led by Jospin and Schröder. 
 The fairly complicated pattern of executive control of the different party families 
can simply be summarised by the regression coefficients between control of 
ministerial portfolios and the year of observation as the independent variable. 
 
Table 5.14 Trends in ministerial control over time of West European party families 
1945-1990 
 cd com con sd lib eth agr 
beta (β) -.26* -.17 .22* -.03 -.05 .23 .05 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the ministerial control and the year of observation. An asterisk 
(*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
The regression analysis clearly shows that the executive power is slowly slipping 
through the hands of Christian democratic parties in Western Europe, which have 
lost a considerable share of ministerial control over time. Some erosion of 
government control is also discernible for social democratic and liberal parties. 
Conservative, agrarian and ethnic parties, in contrast, have strengthened their grip on 
the wheels of state and show a positive trend in control over public affairs through 
ministerial authority. 
 Over time the average proportion of ministerial control declined for the initially 
dominant Christian democratic and social democratic parties. Significant differences 
between party families in government control decreased since the 1970s, as Christian 
democrats and social democrats more often shared executive power or alternate in 
government with other party families. However, despite the erosion of social 
democratic and Christian democratic dominance, the traditional political party families 
persist in dominating the executive branch of government. Christian democratic and 
social democratic ministers have usually been replaced by conservative, ethnic and 
agrarian colleagues. The next section analyses whether this continuing oligarchisation 
of political power is the result of a growing inclination of political elites to maximise 
their control of the executive branch by adopting less rigid portfolio preferences. 
5.3.2 Traditional ministerial control 
Transformation towards the catch-all model manifests itself in the propensity of 




political elites to exchange qualitative government participation (policy-seeking 
motives) for quantitative government control; catch-all parties are primarily office-
seeking and will maximise their control over ministries regardless of the policy field it 
covers. They will also augment their control over the period in which office is held, 
no matter the composition of the coalition and without regard for the allocation of 
ministerial portfolios. This digresses from the traditional model, where parties 
formerly combined policy and office-seeking motives. Government participation and 
the corresponding control of ministerial portfolios entrusted parties with influence 
over specific policy-fields which were of crucial importance to a particular party-
family (Budge and Keman 1990a; Laver and Shepsle 1994; 1995). 
 In this traditional model parties have, resulting from their historical origin, 
traditional support and ideology, clear policy preferences and a rank-order in the 
policy goals. Related to this rank-order in policy goals, parties also have a rank-order 
in preferred cabinet portfolios.81 Based on the study by Budge and Keman (1990a; 
1990b) I have classified the ministerial preferences for each party family. Party 
families traditionally prefer certain clusters of portfolios: conservative parties, for 
example, typically have a first preference for ministries the area of law and order 
(Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence) and secondly in the cluster of economic 
management departments (Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry 
and Public Works). Social democratic, socialist and communist parties, in contrast, 
prefer most of all control over the social welfare portfolios (Education, Health, 
Housing, Social Affairs and Environment). Christian-democratic parties also have a 
first preference for control over social welfare ministries. As Christian-democratic 
parties usually aim to defend the existing order and values, their second preference is 
with the law and order cluster. Social-democratic parties prefer (some of the) 
economic management portfolios over law and order departments. Conservative 
parties are more interested in the economic management portfolios than in social 
welfare departments. The social welfare portfolios are also most a-typical for liberal 
parties. On the basis of the preferences reported by Budge and Keman (1990a), table 
5.15 rank-orders the ten most preferred traditional ministerial portfolios by party 
families. As it is difficult to establish the precise rank-order in ministerial portfolios I 
have opted to consider the ten most preferred portfolios as the 'traditional' ministries 
of the main party families and the actual control of ministerial portfolios will be 
checked against these preferences. 
                                                        
81 "(...) possession of vital ministries will be sine qua non of joining government, even if not all 
relevant ones can be obtained possibly because of overlapping interests on the part of policy-pur-
suing partners" (Budge and Keman 1990a, 90). 















liberals agrarians and 
centre 
ethnic environmental 
Social Welfare Religious Affairs Interior Economics Agriculture Education Environment 
Labour Education Foreign Affairs Finance Interior Interior Agriculture 
Public Works Agriculture Defence Justice Foreign Affairs Housing Industry 
Economics Social Welfare Justice Interior Economics Social Affairs Economics 
Education Health Agriculture Industry Finance Justice Interior 
Industry Labour Economics Foreign Affairs Defence Health Public Works 
Health Economics Finance Defence Industry Environment Labour 
Housing Finance Industry Public Works Justice Foreign Affairs Finance 
Finance Industry Public Works Labour Public Works Defence Justice 
Environment Environment Labour Agriculture Labour  Foreign Affairs 
 
Adapted from Budge and Keman (1990a, 97, table 4.2) who summarise the ranking of standard ministries 
for the different party families. The portfolios which belong to the same cluster (see above) have been 
added to the top ten of preferred portfolios. 
 
Following from this, we can therefore hypothesise that ideological catch-allism will be, 
thirdly, indicated by a declining level of control of traditionally preferred ministerial 
portfolios.82 The rank-ordered portfolios are not weighted, as there is no reliable and 
comparative information available on the relative weight party elites assign to the 
different ministerial portfolios. Table 5.16 provides the results of two analysis: the 
first three columns show the average control of the major party families over the 
three basic clusters of ministries explained above (social welfare, economic 
management and law and order) as well as over the traditionally preferred portfolios 
(the top ten enumerated in table 5.15). Note that in the first three clusters the specific 
ministries in the clusters are equal for all party families, while the portfolio 
composition of the 'traditional ministerial control-cluster' differs between party 
families. The results in the basic cluster most preferred by the various party families 





Table 5.16 Mean control of basic and traditional portfolio clusters of West European 
party families 1945-1990 
                                                        
82 In these calculations the total number of ministers, not the number of ministries, are counted. 
This is justified by the rationale that, in case of disagreement within the cabinet where a vote is 
necessary, the number of votes will determine the party's policy control. Budge and Keman (1990a, 
128) also opt for this strategy and argue that it is better to evaluate the ".... parties' shares of 
ministers in the Cabinet as opposed to their share of ministries (since what is at stake is a vote in 
Cabinet and one man casts only one vote, so the proportion of ministers might be more significant 
than the proportion of ministries) ...." The extent to which a party is capable to obtain ministerial 
portfolios during the coalition negotiations is called 'party-control' (Keman 1988, 193). 
Government control can only be determined of parties which have actually participated in 
government. Also, when a party opts for a single party government and thus obtains all ministerial 
portfolios, it is impossible to determine their preferred portfolios. 


































cd 26.4 30.5 18.3 37.2 26.9 17.1 34.3 23.8 15.4 31.8 28.7 17.7 
con 17.0 25.0 30.5 16.1 28.1 35.2 16.9 29.3 32.7 18.8 31.9 36.3 
sd 37.8 33.5 35.1 35.0 31.3 31.3 33.6 33.7 29.6 36.4 32.4 33.2 
lib 6.2 5.7 6.7 8.0 9.5 9.9 10.4 8.2 11.1 9.2 8.9 10.5 
eth 2.4 0.9 5.3 2.1 4.3 2.9 5.6 3.7 12.3 4.0 2.3 8.8 
agr 16.4 7.8 19.1 19.2 16.2 16.4 10.7 12.8 20.7 15.0 14.5 18.6 
 
Data from Woldendorp et. al. (1993). Entries are percentages of clusters of ministerial portfolios 
controlled by the respective party families during three post-war periods. The basic clusters are: social 
welfare = social welfare portfolios (Education, Health, Housing, Social Affairs and Environment). 
Economic management = economic management ministries (Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, 
Agriculture, Industry and Public Works). Law & order = law and order portfolios (Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, Justice and Defence). The final columns (traditional portfolios) provide the traditionally preferred 
ministries as enumerated in table 5.15. Socialist, fascist, environmental and protest parties have not 
participated in government during the period studied here and are therefore not included. 
 
Christian democratic parties have lost considerable ministerial control, namely, over 
social welfare ministries which they traditionally value highly. By and large, most other 
party families have maintained control over portfolios which are traditionally 
important to them. Social democratic parties in Western Europe, for example, control 
the largest proportion of ministries in the social welfare cluster in every period. 
Conservative parties even increased control over those ministries which they prefer: 
portfolios which are concerned with national and international law and order. When 
invited into government, liberal parties also progressively expanded their control over 
those ministries which traditionally have been their preference, namely, portfolios in 
the cluster of economic management. With regard to control over the traditionally 
most preferred ministries it emerges very conclusively that Christian democratic 
parties have not been able to claim these crucial portfolios. Social democratic parties 
have maintained relative stable level of control over the traditionally preferred 
portfolios, while all the other party families have increased control over the ten most 
preferred ministries. The exceptional position of Christian democratic parties with 
respect to traditional portfolio control can be summarised a regression analysis of 
portfolio control within the three clusters and traditional ministries (see table 5.15) 
with the year of observation. 




Table 5.17 Trends in ministerial control over time of West European party families 
1945-1990 
 cd com con sd lib eth agr 
Economic Management -.25* .06 .24* -.04 .04 .06 -.09 
Social Welfare -.09 -.12 .18 -.04 .01 .28 .05 
Law and Order -.25* -.21* .20 -.05 .03 .27 .19 
Traditional portfolios -.19* -.09 .21 -.04 .04 .29 .06 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between ministerial control and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) 
indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Traditional portfolios for 
each party family are given in table 5.15. Social welfare departments are the ministries of Education, 
Health, Housing, Social Affairs and Environment. Economic Management are the ministries of Finance, 
Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry and Public Works. Law and order portfolios are Interior, 
Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence. 
 
These regression analyses show unequivocally that Christian democratic parties have 
lost control over ministerial portfolios which are ideologically and historically 
important to them. Despite this overall loss of ministerial control, Christian 
democratic parties were selective in which portfolios they tried to hold on to, as is 
shown by the lower loss of social welfare ministries. Social democratic parties lost 
control over a small proportion of ministerial portfolios, without any clear difference 
between the clusters. With the exception of the communists, the other party families, 
in particular conservative, agrarian and ethnic parties, are all increasingly successful in 
claiming ministries which have their preference. These differences in control of 
government are, however, not the simple function of preferences. Overall 
government control is closely related to electoral strength (r² = .74). Traditional 
portfolio preferences, however, only seem to play a minor role in the decision for 
parties to enter government. The correlation between electoral strength and control of 
traditional ministries (r² = .71) is only marginally stronger than correlation-coefficients 
between popular support and control over the social welfare ministries (r² = .70), 
portfolios of economic management (r² = .69) and ministries in the cluster of law and 
order (r² = .69).83 
 To evaluate these trends in portfolio control further and assess the extent to which 
parties have remained loyal their traditional portfolio preferences this section relates 
the control of traditional ministries to the total overall control of portfolios. 
According to the theory outlined in this study, catch-all parties will have an increasing 
propensity to accept government responsibility even when they are unable to control 
'traditionally' preferred ministerial portfolios. In order to determine whether parties 
have become increasingly 'office-seeking', I will relate the percentage of traditional 
portfolio control to the overall portfolio control. The assumption is that a catch-all 





  total proportion of ministerial portfolios controlled 
                     =  % opportunist ministerial control 
         proportion of traditional portfolios 
                                                        
83 All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 






When parties control more traditional portfolios the denominator of this equation 
increases, resulting in a lower score. Less control over traditional portfolios makes for 
a lower denominator of the equation, resulting in a higher score. Therefore this ratio 
is labelled 'opportunist government control', indicating that higher scores on this 
measure denote that the behaviour of parties is being guided by what seems possible, 
or by circumstances, rather than by ideology or principle. This indicator should be 
interpreted with caution as, for example, one of its shortcomings is that it is highly 
susceptible to the dominant type of government building; the number of parties 
which actually enter into government influences the equation. Single party 
governments, for example, where one party secures control over all ministerial 
portfolios, inevitably raises the level of control over traditional ministerial portfolios 
(the denominator) to the same level as the total control, resulting in a score of 1.00. In 
contrast, coalitions amalgamated out of parties with overlapping preferences will 
suppress the level of traditional portfolio control which results in a higher ratio. I 
have chosen to exclude single-party governments as in these cases it is impossible to 
determine what portfolios parties prefer to control. Table 5.18 shows the ratios of 
'opportunist' ministerial control of portfolios within the different countries of this 
study. 
 




















X S CV 
Aut .57 1.04 1.04 1.07 # # # .73 .82 .85 .36 .423 
Bel .68 .67 1.04 1.14 .87 .95 1.07 .86 .72 .87 .19 .218 
Den 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.18 1.19 1.00 .74 .51 2.01 1.13 .98 .867 
Fin .61 .76 1.02 .96 .93 1.02 .94 .80 .91 .89 .51 .573 
Fra 1.65 1.64 1.68 .75 1.00 .94 1.00 1.07 1.43 1.25 .72 .576 
Ger 1.50 1.43 1.68 .91 .73 .76 .75 .79 .74 1.00 .51 .510 
Ire 1.25 # .94 # # 1.02 # 1.02 1.11 1.05 .27 .257 
Ita 1.03 1.13 .90 .78 1.00 1.40 1.04 1.71 1.43 1.18 .78 .661 
Net .61 .72 1.09 1.03 .83 .85 .80 .84 .88 .85 .30 .353 
Nor # # # 1.13 .76 1.04 # 1.40 1.05 1.08 .38 .351 
Swe .89 .91 .85 .96 # # 1.03 1.06 # .97 .14 .144 
X .97 1.02 1.15 .97 .92 1.01 .92 .98 1.14 1.01 .59 .584 
S .60 .53 .56 .30 .67 .45 .38 .58 .97 .59 - - 
 
Data from Woldendorp et. al. (1993). Entries are ratios of the proportion of total ministerial control 
divided by the proportion of traditional portfolio control. An '# ' means that no score was calculated in 
order to exclude single party governments. A higher score of opportunistic government control indicates 
that parties have enlarged their non-traditional government responsibility. The column and row indicated 
by an X provide the average score by period and country means. The row and column marked by 'S' 
provides the standard deviation for the nine periods and countries. The column indicated by 'CV ' provide 
the coefficient of variance (S/ X). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be 
calculated. 
 
Contrary to the assumptions of Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, the data show that 




there is a relatively stable level of opportunistic government control throughout the 
post-war period (β = .01). Across Western Europe there is no trend towards an 
increasing propensity of party elites to share government responsibility when they can 
not control the ministerial portfolios of their highest preference. There are, however, 
significant variations between West European countries. Times of fierce party 
competition, such as in the French Fourth Republic and Italy, force parties to be 
more pragmatic in their claims for ministerial portfolios. Thus, parties in France, Italy 
and Denmark are among the most opportunistic in Western Europe, while Irish and 
German parties are also relatively Machiavellian in their control over ministerial 
portfolios. Highest levels of traditional, and consequently lower levels of 
opportunistic ministerial control are found in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and 
Finland. 
 A cross-time analysis of the post-war period with respect to opportunistic 
ministerial control does not confirm Kirchheimer's thesis. The period spanning the 
1950s and 1960s, correctly deemed by Kirchheimer to be characterised by increasing 
catch-all behaviour on the part of political elites, indeed manifests high levels of 
opportunistic portfolio control. Still, the late 1960s and 1970s mark a return to more 
orthodox ministerial control. Nevertheless, the late 1980, are the heydays of 
'Realpolitik' as opportunism in ministerial control increases to the highest post-war 
level. That this development is confined to only a few countries is shown by the 
overall cross-time trends, summarised in table 5.19 with the results of linear 
regression analyses of opportunistic ministerial control with the year of observation as 
the independent variable. 
 
Table 5.19 Trends in opportunistic ministerial control over time of Western Europe  
1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe 
beta (β) -.10 -.04 .09 -.02 -.41* -.26 -.01 .10 .05 .20 .53 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between opportunistic ministerial control and the year of observation. 
An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Countries differ substantially with respect to opportunistic ministerial control; parties 
in some of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) as well as 
Italy and the Netherlands demonstrate an increasing opportunistic attitude towards 
ministerial control. In other countries, particularly in France and Germany, parties 
became more uncompromising in their portfolio claims over time. In these countries, 
however, parties were very pragmatic in portfolio control throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. In Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Finland have parties revitalised their interest 
in traditional instead of showing an eagerness to control non-traditional portfolios. It 
can be concluded, however, that despite the relatively high level of opportunism in 
ministerial control in France, Italy and Ireland, no overall and continuous trend 
towards more opportunistic government participation is discernible. Table 5.20 
summarises the findings when this measure of proportional opportunistic ministerial 
control is applied to the different party families. 
 
Table 5.20 Ratios of opportunistic portfolio control of West European party families 
1945-1990 






















X S CV 
cd 1.07 .86 1.09 1.01 .87 1.07 .90 1.00 .87 .98 .40 .425 
com .56 - - .73 .67 .92 1.10 .96 - .74 .40 .540 
con - .88 .79 .88 .85 .80 .77 .90 1.01 .87 .25 .287 
sd 1.12 1.05 1.07 1.07 1.46 1.04 1.17 1.05 1.31 1.13 .55 .486 
lib 1.06 1.27 1.52 .78 .67 1.03 .79 .86 1.39 1.03 .83 .805 
eth - .67 1.09 1.42 .00 .93 1.07 .59 .59 .67 .50 .746 
agr .79 .96 1.06 1.27 .97 1.06 .92 1.36 1.07 1.08 .33 .306 
 
Data from Woldendorp et. al. (1993). Socialist, fascist, environmental and protest parties have not 
participated in government during the period studied here and are therefore excluded. Entries are ratios 
of the proportion of total ministerial control divided by the proportion of traditional portfolio control. A 
higher score indicates that parties have gained in non-traditional government responsibility. The column 
indicated by an X provide the average score of the party family. The column marked by 'S' provide the 
standard deviation for the party families. The column indicated by 'CV ' provides the coefficient of 
variance (S/ X). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated. 
 
Table 5.20 reveals that the most opportunistic actors in the West European coalition 
game are social democratic parties, which accept (perhaps forced to do so after 
electoral losses) more unconventional ministerial portfolios when in government. 
Liberal and Christian democratic parties are also relatively pragmatic in their portfolio 
claims. However, while Christian democratic parties became more traditional in their 
control over ministerial portfolios over the last decades, liberal parties have become 
very opportunistic in ministerial control. Conservative and agrarian parties have in 
recent years also been more inclined to accept government responsibility without 
obtaining control over their traditionally preferred portfolios. These cross-time trends 
are summarised in the next table by a linear regression analysis of the level of 
opportunistic ministerial control and the year of observation as the independent 
variable. 
 
Table 5.21 Trends in opportunistic ministerial control over time of West European 
party families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd lib eth agr 
beta (β) -.16* -.04 .26* .01 .02 .15 .27 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between the opportunistic ministerial control and the year of 
observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < 
.05). 
 
Clearly, Christian democratic and communist parties stand out again as the only party 
family which has become less opportunistic in ministerial portfolio control over time. 
Social democratic, liberal ethnic and communist parties have maintained a relatively 
stable level of opportunism during their participation in government. The only party 
family which can be said to have become more anxious to enter government, even 
when the traditionally preferred portfolios could not be obtained is the conservative 
party family. 
 In conclusion, parties in Western Europe have shown a consistent willingness to 
accept non-traditional, less preferred ministerial portfolios over being excluded from 
executive power. However, there is no increasing propensity to more promiscuous 




office-seeking behaviour on behalf of the parties which would support Kirchheimer's 
catch-all thesis. Rather, pragmatic office-seeking behaviour is a perpetual feature of 
West European politics. Having said that, this analysis also shows that parties 
maintain solid portfolio preferences and actual control over traditional portfolios. The 
differences across countries and over time indicate that political parties are very 
willing to adapt their portfolio claims to the parameters of political competition and 
electoral outcomes. Although there is a considerable effect of electoral strength on 
bargaining position in the coalition game, even after losing an election parties still 
seem to prefer participation in government over forming the parliamentary 
opposition, sometimes with little regard of the portfolio allocation. Yet, the analysis 
above has shown that, given the opportunity, parties restore control over traditionally 
preferred ministries and related policy areas. It was also shown that the traditional 
governmental parties adopt flexible policy stances and became less rigid in their 
portfolio preferences. This litheness enables them to participate in governments, even 
when coalition partners disallow them their preferred ministerial portfolios. 
Accordingly, traditional political parties can be considered more competitive than ever 
and able to adapt more easily to changes in their political, economic and social 
environment. This increasing flexibility, and consequent loss of ideological rigidity is a 
feature of Kirchheimer's assumptions of catch-allism, visible in increasing control 
over the executive power in terms of the total accumulated time in executive office, 
that is addressed in the next section. 
5.3.3 Continuity in government control 
In the last section it was established that the 'traditional coalition parties' by and large 
dominate the executive branch of government and have a stable office-seeking 
inclination. This section seeks to evaluate to which extent parties have held on to their 
governmental power or have alternated in government. Accumulated time of 
government control indicates consensus or dissensus between parties. If Kirchheimer 
was correct in his assertion that there is a general waning of opposition in Western 
Europe, then this should lead to more agreement over policy and to smoother co-
operation between parties, so dissolution of governments should occur less often.84 
This section moves beyond the size of ministerial control and measures the duration of 
government control by the percentage of the total time individual parties participate in 
government in each period (see Lijphart 1968, 24). This measure is not similar to 
government durability and rate of survival.85 Parties can remain in power, while 
governments dissolve. The most frequently cited case is the now defunct Italian 
Democrazia Cristiana. This party participated in more than fifty post-war 
governments and was never out of executive office until 1994. Cabinets in Italy and 
elsewhere frequently resign, only to return with the same party composition and 
sometimes even to a large extent with the same individuals in ministerial 
responsibility. 
                                                        
84 Overall, the duration of governments have not significantly increased over time in Western 
Europe. Woldendorp at al. (1993, 107-108) found that in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and to a lesser extent in Ireland and Italy, the average duration of 
governments even went down. Only in Austria, Germany, Finland and France has the time that 
parties were able to remain in office increased. 
85 see Sanders and Herman 1977; Lijphart 1974; 1984b. 




 Differences in duration of incumbency of the different party families are given in 
table 5.22. Entries are proportions of the total time parties held at least one ministerial 
portfolio. A score of 100 means that all parties which belong to this party family have 
been in government the entire period of five years. A score of 0 means that none of 
the parties belonging to one party family gained executive power.  
 




















X S CV 
cd 74.6 81.1 66.2 65.3 66.5 42.1 31.8 43.0 57.3 58.7 44.3 .754 
com 21.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.4 6.3 9.9 0.0 5.1 16.6 3.254 
con 0.0 31.3 33.9 48.2 45.8 43.4 31.0 45.2 50.0 37.2 38.7 1.040 
sd 76.8 52.0 56.6 41.9 50.1 60.5 58.7 53.9 51.2 55.7 38.9 .698 
lib 32.0 36.7 30.9 37.3 30.4 39.2 33.3 35.2 44.2 35.6 36.7 1.031 
eth 71.5 45.4 17.1 19.9 31.8 39.8 54.3 50.0 64.8 42.2 38.4 .909 
agr 23.8 58.5 45.5 33.8 61.5 44.4 48.3 61.7 27.1 45.0 41.1 .913 
X 44.1 41.6 36.5 35.7 36.9 35.3 30.8 32.4 34.3 39.5 36.4 .921 
S 42.6 42.5 42.8 43.9 39.7 38.2 38.5 36.7 41.5 40.7 - - 
CV .965 1.022 1.173 1.230 1.076 1.082 1.250 1.133 1.210 1.030 - - 
 
Data based on Woldendorp et al. 1993. A score of 100 means that all parties of the party family 
participated in government for the entire period. The column and row indicated by an X provide the 
average score by period and the mean party family score. The row and column marked by 'S' provide the 
standard deviation for the party families and nine periods respectively. The row and column indicated by 
'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or 
could not be calculated. 
 
Initially, Christian and social democratic parties dominated the executive branch of 
government in Western Europe in terms of tenure. More than half of the post-war 
period these party families managed the public affairs of West European democracies. 
During the late 1950s and 1960s, however, the ability of social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties to prolong their incumbency weakened. Social 
democratic party elites regained a firm hold on ministerial office during the 1970s, 
whereas the 1980s marked a decade of decline in social democratic tenure of office. 
The relatively low coefficient of variance for the social democrats shows that among 
members of this party family the differences in tenure are modest. Comparable cross-
national consistency in tenure in office is also found among Christian democrats. 
Nevertheless, until the early 1980s the Christian democratic parties in Western 
Europe saw their time in office decline continuously. Between the late 1950s and the 
early 1980s the average tenure in office of Christian democratic parties declined from 
around eighty per cent to less than one third of the period 1976 until 1980. This trend 
of declining incumbency by Christian democratic parties was reversed again in the late 
1980s when Christian democratic ministers remained in office for longer stretches of 
time. Conservative parties, in contrast, increased their tenure in office over the last 
few decades. During the 1950s conservative parties held government responsibility 
for one third of the time, whereas in the years spanning 1986 to 1990 conservative 
parties have been in executive power half of this period. However, the relatively high 




coefficient of variance shows there are substantial differences in tenure of office 
among the parties belonging to the conservative family. On average, liberals have a 
very stable average level of incumbency with an average hovering around thirty per 
cent of the time in each period, despite relatively large variation among liberal parties 
in the different countries. Agrarian parties, although they have a relatively high tenure 
in office on average, have a very whimsical record of incumbency, with peaks in the 
late 1960s and early 1980s when agrarian ministers participated in government for 
over 60 per cent of the period. During the 1970s the variation in incumbency between 
parties declined gradually, indicating less dominance by only a few (Christian 
democratic and social democratic) parties as more, and sometimes new parties entered 
West European governments. However, the heterogeneity among the different parties 
in tenure in office increased again in the 1980s indicating predominance by a smaller 
number of parties. 
 These trends in tenure in office of the party families are summarised in the next 
table by way of regression analysis between time in government and the year of 
observation as the independent variable. 
 
Table 5.23 Trends in tenure in office of West European party families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd lib eth env agr 
beta (β) -.27* -.09 .24* -.08 .06 .18 - .04 
 
Entries are regression coefficients between time in office and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) 
indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
As can be seen in table 5.23, the regression analysis confirms the general picture of 
substantial decline in government control over time for Christian democratic parties 
and moderate decline in tenure for social democratic parties. All other parties, with 
the exception of the communists, have increased their duration of government 
control over time. In particular conservative parties participated more often and 
longer in West European cabinets. These variations among party families show that 
control of government has become more competitive; a larger number of parties 
compete for office and the post of minister in national governments has become less 
secure, particularly for those who represent social democratic and Christian 
democratic parties. Still, Christian democratic and social democratic parties have not 
lost their dominance of government control to new competitors, but to the traditional 
liberal and conservative contenders. 
 This indicator of duration of incumbency shows that social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties have lost some of their predominance over the executive 
in Western Europe. In particular conservative and liberal parties now compete more 
fiercefully with the Christian democrats and social democrats for office. Moreover, an 
increasing number of other parties are clamouring at the door of the executive powers 
of West European democracies as well. It looks as though those who are already 
seated at the government table have a less secure position then they used to have. 
However, the traditional governmental parties of Christian democratic, conservative, 
social democratic and liberal origin have been very reluctant to let the new contenders 
in. This makes Kirchheimer's assertions problematic. On the one hand, he was correct 
in asserting that many parties adopt flexible policy positions in or near the centre of 
the political spectrum. Furthermore, parties are willing to accept government 




responsibility even if their preferred portfolios are not open to them. On the other 
hand, there is no 'cosy consensus' in which all opposition is stifled. The major parties 
in Western Europe maintain clear policy positions and still aim to control traditionally 
preferred portfolios. In addition, traditional parties still compete for control over the 
executive branch of government and their tenure in office has rather shortened on 
aggregate than increased. In sum, Kirchheimer correctly asserted that opposition of 
principle has dwindled, yet not all party competition evaporated along with it; 
competition for control over office is still 'the name of the game' in West European 
politics. 
5.4 Conclusion: ideological catch-allism of West European parties 
At the ideological level no linear trend towards catch-allism is discernible. Although a 
substantial number of parties occupy the centre space of Western European party 
systems, this study found no uniform centripetal trend as Kirchheimer asserted. 
Evidence presented actually indicates an opposite, namely centrifugal tendency over 
time; particularly conservative, liberal and social democratic parties moved away from 
the centre since the 1970s. Parties did move towards the centre during most of the 
1950s and 1960s, yet distanced themselves more from the centre of political 
competition in the early 1970s an 1980s. Nevertheless, Kirchheimer correctly claimed 
that Christian democratic and some social democratic parties possess a relatively high 
propensity to move closer to the centre of their party system. However, over the 
entire post-war period Christian democratic, agrarian, communist and socialist parties 
show a moderate centripetal tendency, while conservative, social democratic and 
liberal parties reveal a modest centrifugal trend over time. Overall, the direction of 
competition shows a clear development towards the left in the 1960s and 1970s, while 
a trend towards the right is visible in the 1980s. Most notably, social democratic 
parties moved into the centre of their national party system during this rightward 
drift. Christian democratic parties generally preserved a position in the centre space of 
West European party systems, indicating that while the width and position of the 
centre may be in flux, Christian democratic parties often move with the dominant 
current to maintain a centrist position. In terms of policy position a pattern is 
observable, where parties of all genetic origin move towards and away from the centre 
of the political spectrum dependent on the strategic behaviour of the major 
competitors in the party system. 
 A second outcome of this study which contradicts to Kirchheimer's assumption of 
convergence of political parties, is the finding that there is no secular trend towards a 
contracting range of party competition. Instead, in most countries the range of 
competition and the centre space expanded during the last decades, indicating a larger 
'room to manoeuvre' for political parties. The width of the centre space of party 
competition declined only in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and Sweden. This 
means that there is little evidence of an overall reduction in inter-party distances, 
although there is not sufficient evidence of polarisation per se either. Kirchheimer 
was correct in his observation of decreasing polarisation during the 1960s; however, 
party systems in Western Europe underwent increasing polarisation during much of 
the 1970s and 1980s. In some countries the 1970s are marked by an interesting 
incongruity, as austere rhetoric polarisation coincided with a convergence in policy 
positions. Parties, given half the opportunity, will take full advantage of the room to 




manoeuvre towards or away from the centre of the party system in order to locate 
themselves in the optimal position for electoral competition and governmental 
participation. Clear policy differences between a fixed set of traditional parties persist 
in most West European party systems and new competitors face a hard time breaking 
down this bulwark of traditional political power. 
 Kirchheimer’s assertion that over the post-war period political parties in Western 
Europe will become more flexible in their political stances could only partly be 
corroborated by this analysis. During the late 1950s and early 1960s there was indeed 
a period of generally increasing ideological flexibility on behalf of the parties. 
Nevertheless, no secular trend towards more flexibility in policy stances can be 
detected over time as is clearly shown by increasing ideological rigidity between the 
mid-1960s and early 1980s. Concerning this ideological flexibility of parties, it was 
found that liberal and conservative parties, which usually position themselves on the 
right wing of the left-right conflict dimension, adopt more flexible positions than 
Christian democratic, agrarian and social democratic parties of the centre-left. There 
are strong indications that when parties adopt a more extreme position they also 
possess more willingness to move back again to a position closer to the centre space 
or their competitors. 
 With regard to the second indicator of ideological catch-allism, it was found that 
parties throughout Western Europe indeed de-emphasised traditional political issues, 
particularly up until the early 1970s. However, in contrast with the catch-all thesis, 
parties in several countries devoted a larger part of their manifestos to traditional 
issues again since the late 1970s, while in other countries the saliency of traditional 
issues remained stable. Here also there is little evidence of a linear trend towards 
electoral catch-allism. 
 More in line with the catch-all thesis, political parties show an inclination to accept 
ministerial portfolios outside their traditional preferences and parties have strong 
office-seeking orientations, although this is rather a consistent tendency than a 
modern trend. Still, particularly in the 1960s and 1980s parties became more 
pragmatic in their portfolio control, while it was also found that, when the 
opportunity arises, parties seek to re-establish control over their traditionally preferred 
ministerial portfolios. Both these findings contradict the assumptions of the catch-all 
thesis with regard to participation in government. Moreover, in most countries, with 
the partial exception of Italian and Scandinavian parties, political elites have been 
reluctant to enter governments when they were unable to claim a substantial 
proportion of their traditionally preferred ministerial portfolios. Additionally, it was 
established that, although control over the executive was broadened somewhat during 
the 1970s, the traditional governmental parties of conservative, Christian democratic 
and social democratic origin have by and large maintained firm control over the 
executive branch of government. Particularly parties with a central position in West 
European politics have a strong record of incumbency (see also Keman 1997; van 
Deemen 1990; Roozendaal 1990).86 In the course of time these ‘traditional’ parties 
have adopted more flexible policy positions and portfolio preferences when they 
thought it was necessary to increase their coalition potential, yet they have not 
                                                        
86 The correlation between control of government and centre occupation is (r² = .10), yet the 
correlation between a centrist position and time of in office is r² = .17, significant at the 0.001 
level. 




eradicated their traditional inclinations for specific policies. This flexibility in policy 
stance has made control of executive office less secure and it intensified competition 
between parties, resulting in decreasing tenure of office particularly for Christian 
democratic and, to a lesser extent, for social democratic parties. Christian democratic 
parties, which Kirchheimer anticipated to be very prone to catch-all behaviour, have 
instead become less flexible and opportunistic with regard to their policies which 
clearly undermined their ability to control governmental power. Although the posture 
of most West European political parties has become less uncompromising and more 
flexible, their behaviour with respect to governmental power is not totally identical 
with Kirchheimer's catch-all model. 
 The next table shows that electorally dominant parties, particularly those with a 
policy position close to the centre of the left-right dimension or highly flexible policy 
positions, controlled the bulk of post-war ministerial positions. 




Table 5.24 Correlation matrix of ideological indicators with party age, electoral size 
and organisational discontinuity 
 PARTY AGE ELECTORAL SIZE ORGANIZATIONAL 
DISCONTINUITY 
CENTRE .11* .02 -.05 
LRMANIF -.15* .00 .09 
TRADEMPH -.14* .05 -.07 
OPTCONT .18** .30** .06 
TRADCONT .28** .71** -.03 
GOVTCONT .25** .74** -.03 
TIMEGOVT .28** .49** .04 
 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. The asterisk indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 
level (*) or at the 0.001 level (**). Definitions and measurement of the variables is explained in Appendix 
2. 
 
As can be seen from table 5.24 there is a strong correlation between the electoral 
strength and the percentage of ministerial portfolios held. In addition, there is a clear 
association between the electoral strength of parties in Western Europe and their 
ability to claim their traditionally preferred ministerial portfolios as well as with their 
competence to maintain government control. Table 5.24 also reveals that the older 
parties have been most successful in obtaining government responsibility over a 
longer period of time and in claiming traditionally preferred portfolios. In sum, the 
electorally stronger and more senior parties, which occupy a centrist position, are 
'pivotal' in control over the executive within their party system. The logic assumption 
that electorally weaker parties would adopt a more opportunistic approach to 
government participation is not corroborated, instead what was found is that 
Kirchheimer correctly assumed that electorally larger parties are also more pragmatic 
in their portfolio claims. Finally, it is interesting to note that none of the ideological 
variables can be significantly associated with the number of splits and mergers of 
party organisations. 
 
The finding in this chapter of only limited ideological catch-allism in Western Europe 
is confirmed by an analysis of the standard scores of the individual indicators. Again, 
all scores have been standardised into z-scores in such a manner that a high standard 
score indicates more catch-allism and a low standard score means less ideological 
catch-allism.87 
                                                        
87 The variable opportunistic control (OPTCONT) is not included in this table as this variable was 
constructed out of a ratio of two original variables in this study (GOVTCONT and 
TRADCONT). 

























centrdis .24 .00 .01 .10 .19 -.19 .14 -.25 -.14 474 
trademph -.36 -.11 -.35 .04 .42 .17 .13 .08 -.06 454 
tradcont -.04 -.08 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.02 .05 .04 .07 630 
optcont .06 .07 .09 -.02 -.07 -.03 -.14 .01 .05 630 
govtcont .07 .14 .05 .03 .02 -.03 -.08 -.06 -.08 630 
timegovt .20 .13 .01 -.01 .02 -.02 -.13 -.09 -.04 617 
 
The variable names are explained in appendix II. Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation 
from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relatively high 
level of catch-allism, while a low score indicates a relatively low level of catch-allism.  
 
Table 5.25 shows that political parties moved closer to the centre of their political 
system during the 1950s and 1960, inflating the standard catch-all score on this 
variable. Thereafter, particularly in the early 1970s and 1980s, the standard catch-all 
score on this variable decreases as a result of centrifugal tendencies of parties. During 
the 1960s and 1970s parties became less opportunistic, more traditional in their 
portfolio claims and consequently have lower standard catch-all scores in this period. 
In the 1980s parties became more flexible in their portfolio preferences when they 
entered into government, resulting in higher catch-all standard scores on traditional 
and opportunistic portfolio control. In the period spanning  the early 1960s up until 
the early 1980s parties indeed de-emphasised traditional issues and thereby 
downgraded the saliency of their traditional ideological heritage which makes for 
higher standard scores of catch-allism in this period. However, in the mid-1980s 
parties returned to more traditional issue emphasis and have lower standard catch-all 
scores as a result. The other indicators of ideological catch-allism, however, 
demonstrate less transformation towards the catch-all model. The two indicators of 
increasing coalition potential, namely control of ministerial portfolios and time in 
government, both show decreasing standard scores over time, which manifests a 
trend away from ideological catch-allism at the level of office-control. 
 
Similar to the previous chapter, this section seeks to establish, by means of scale 
analysis, to which extent the indicators of ideological catch-allism tap into one single 
phenomenon or measure different theoretical constructs (see appendix 3). The 
conclusion from this test can be no other than that the items at the ideological level 
do not tap one single phenomenon. In order to detect which latent factors underpin 
these ideological variables of catch-allism, factor analysis was performed on these 
items, by which two factors were extracted that basically represent the antithesis 
between office-seeking and policy-seeking motives.  
 The first 'office-seeking' factor correlates almost perfectly positive with all four of 
its items. On the second factor both items, traditional emphasis (TRADEMPH) and 
the distance of parties from the centre (DISTCNTR), load positively. This means that 
traditional emphasis does not render a policy position close to the centre impossible. 
Political parties can do both; they can emphasise traditional issues and concerns in 
their party platform without distancing themselves too far from the centre of party 




competition. Apparently, traditional issue emphasis is not diametrically opposed to 
adopting a strategic position close the centre space of competition. On the other 
hand, there are parties which remain loyal to their traditional ideology and program, 
whatever the consequences for participation in government. The association between 
the two factors is negative, pointing to the fact that the more parties are geared 
towards office control, the less their ideological position matters to them. Evidently, 
there is a clear distinction between 'what parties do', which is seeking control over 
executive power, and 'what parties say', which is evidenced by their policy positions. 
Political parties oscillate between the need to attract voters with clear policy positions 
and their compulsion to command the executive branch of government, yet most 
political parties have a strong and consistent propensity to distance themselves not 
too far from the centre of their party system for one reason and one reason alone, 
namely to obtain governmental power. 
 In order to summarise more precise the extent to which political parties in 
Western Europe have moved towards the catch-all model, the method of simple 
summation of variables with high factor loadings is applied here again. By aggregating 
the standardised z-scores of all items with substantial loadings on one factor, a factor 
based score of relative catch-allism is constructed (see Kim and Mueller 1978b, 70). 
Office-seeking behaviour, then, consists of the average standard scores of the items 
GOVTCONT, TRADCONT, OPTCONT and TIMEGOVT. Policy-seeking 
behaviour contains the average of the z-scores of CENTRE and TRADEMPH.  
 This enables us to determine the relative level of ideological catch-allism in the 
different countries and of the different party families as well as of each individual 
party. All item scores have been recalculated in the same direction so that higher 
scores indicate a higher level of catch-allism. In table 5.26 first the relative catch-all 
scores of the all parties from the different countries are presented. These scores are 
rank-ordered in descending order that a higher position indicates a relatively higher 
level of catch-allism. 




Table 5.26 Cross-time development in ideological catch-allism (in z-scores) in West 
European countries 1945-1990 













Ger  .41 Net  .16 Ita  .38 UK  .93 Ger  1.06 Bel  .85 
Fra  .23 Ger  .15 Fin  .10 Ita  .59 Ita  .76 Aut  .64 
Net  .19 Fin  .08 Net  .06 Ger  .27 UK  .72 Ita  .45 
Aut  .17 Bel  .05 Ger  .05 Net  .26 Bel  .62 Net  .30 
Bel  .13 Fra  .03 Fra  .01 Fra  .24 Aut  .34 Fin  .13 
Fin  .04 Aut  -.01 Bel  .03 Aut  .23 Fra  .35 Ger  .11 
Ire  .02 Nor  -.07 Aut  -.05 Nor  -.03 Net  .14 Fra  -.05 
Den  -.07 Den  -.07 UK  -.07 Den  -.27 Ire  -.17 Swe  -.27 
Swe  -.08 Ire  -.09 Swe  -.09 Bel  -.46 Den  -.32 Ire  -.30 
UK  -.08 UK  -.10 Ire  -.15 Ire  -.96 Swe  -.59 Nor  -.48 
Nor  -.15 Swe  -.16 Den  -.15 Swe  -1.33 Nor  -.72 UK  -.67 
Ita  -.38 Ita  -.48 Nor  -.16   Den  -1.18 
 
Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the 
standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score 
indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. OFFICE SEEKING= the degree 
of office-seeking behaviour and POLICY SEEKING = the degree of policy-seeking behaviour. 
 
Table 5.26 reveals that ideological catch-allism in terms of office-seeking behaviour 
on behalf of political parties is higher in the larger continental democracies (Germany 
and France) as well as in the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland than elsewhere in 
Western Europe. Comparatively low levels of office-seeking behaviour are found in 
the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) as well as in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. This finding is remarkable since these are the countries where 
single party government is most frequent. This rank-order is relatively stable over 
time, with the exception of the Italian case. At the policy-seeking dimension a more 
volatile picture emerges, except for German, Italian and Austrian parties which have a 
high catch-all score on the policy dimension over the entire post-war period 
compared with the other countries. Relatively low levels of ideological catch-allism 
concerning policy-seeking behaviour are found in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Ireland. In comparative perspective, Belgian parties have transformed most rapidly 
towards the catch-all model on the policy dimension. Similar to the findings in 
chapter 4 it emerges that parties in the larger continental West European democracies, 
particularly the German, French and Italian parties, have transformed more into the 
catch-all direction than their counterparts in other countries. Conversely, parties in the 
Scandinavian party systems are primarily found at the lower end of the distribution. In 
this respect, Kirchheimer's assertion that parties in the larger democracies will be 
more 'catch-alllist' in their behaviour is again confirmed here. Whether Kirchheimer 
was also correct in his differentiation between the different party families is examined 
below. Average standard z-scores of the party families on the two ideological 
dimensions are provided in table 5.27. The party families are rank-ordered in 
descending order of relative catch-allism. 





Table 5.27 Cross-time development in ideological catch-allism (in z-scores) of West 
European party families 1945-1990 













cd  .48 cd  .19 sd  .16 lib  .39 agr  .80 agr  1.14 
sd  .20 sd  .15 cd  .08 agr  .25 cd  .55 cd  .55 
agr  .06 agr  .08 agr  .07 cd  .19 lib  .39 lib  .27 
lib  -.01 con  .05 con  03 sd  -.01 sd  .16 sd  -.02 
con  -.13 lib  -.03 lib  -.03 con  -.65 com  -.45 con  -.63 
com  -.23 com  -.28 com  -.24 com  -.1.14 con  -.69 com  -.65 
 
Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the 
standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score 
indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. OFFICE SEEKING = the degree 
of office-seeking behaviour and POLICY SEEKING = the degree of policy-seeking behaviour. 
 
This table shows that Kirchheimer correctly alleged that parties of social democratic 
and Christian democratic origin have relatively higher levels of ideological catch-allism 
in terms of office-seeking than parties of other genetic origin. Notwithstanding, in 
contrast to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis parties from the social democratic family 
have been very reluctant to dispose of their ideological heritage which assigns them to 
the lower end of the catch-all scale in terms of policy. With respect to policy, 
Kirchheimer's conclusions seem to have been too harsh. In relative terms, liberal 
parties have shown the least propensity to adopt the catch-all strategy in terms of 
office-seeking, though have very high average catch-all scores at the policy level. 
Conservative parties moved towards higher levels of ideological catch-allism on both 
factors over time, indicating both an inclination to discard their ideological heritage, 
traditional preferences and an eagerness to adopt flexible policy positions if this 
results in a pay-off in terms of office. 
 As was the case at the organisational level, there is no uniform cross-national and 
cross-time development towards ideological catch-allism. At the ideological level 
substantial variation between party families and between countries remain visible. 
These inter-country differences and variation among parties of different genetic origin 
remain relatively stable over time. In general, ideological catch-allism is found but only 
for specific party families and countries. Ideologically, parties of Christian democratic 
and social democratic descent, as well as the former agrarian parties have 
comparatively adopted more catch-all characteristics than their competitors. 
Concerning office-seeking behaviour, it seems that the doctrinal legacy of these party 
families allowed them to espouse catch-all properties. This investigation showed that 
Christian democratic parties in particular, have showed an almost 'natural' propensity 
for catch-all tactics; their traditional centrism in terms of policy, their attempt to 
bridge class divisions in electoral terms as well as their 'pivotal' position with respect 
to government control has facilitated this process. Conservative and communist 
parties, on the contrary, experienced the constraints of an ideological embarkment 
from a position more distant from the political centre. Members from both party 
families can continuously be found at the bottom end of the catch-all league tables. 




Also, a similarly distinct geographical distribution of ideological catch-allism emerges 
similar to what was found in at the organisational level. In particular parties in the 
larger West European democracies, namely Germany, France and Italy, have articulate 
catch-all features. This pattern is largely duplicated in the league table of all the 
individual parties in three periods below. In addition, parties in the Dutch, Finnish, 
Austrian and Belgian political system have also been prone to catch-all tactics. 
Corresponding to the findings at the organisational dimension, parties from Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark are generally found at the bottom end of the league tables, 
indicating that parties in these party systems have had little incentive to adapt to the 
catch-all model, precisely as Kirchheimer (1966a, 187-188) stated. 





Summary of the main findings: 
 
• Parties in Western Europe show no linear trend towards increasing centripetal 
competition and there is neither evidence of increasing centre space occupation. Rather 
the opposite trend, namely a decline in centre space occupancy, is discernible. 
• There is no general trend towards ideological moderation, instead a general shift 
towards the right of the political spectrum was found. 
• This study found no secular trend towards more flexibility in policy positions of political 
parties. 
• Parties decreased their emphasis on traditional issues during the 1960s, but the 1970s 
and 1980s marked a period of more traditional issue emphasis in party manifestos. 
• The traditional ‘parties of government’ (social democratic, Christian democratic and 
conservative parties) have largely maintained their dominance over the executive 
branch of government. Only members of the Christian democratic party family have lost 
some government control. 
• Christian democratic parties have also lost control over ministerial portfolios they 
traditionally prefer. Other party families have largely  maintained control over portfolios 
they ideologically and historically value most. 
• There is no uniform tendency towards more opportunistic and pragmatic ministerial 
control by political parties in Western Europe. 
• The level of incumbency declined for Christian democratic parties and social democratic 
parties, while over time particularly conservative parties strengthened their hold over 
executive power. 
• Two dominant dimensions of party behaviour can be distinguished at the ideological 
level, office seeking-behaviour and policy seeking behaviour. 
• The geographical pattern in relative levels of ideological catch-allism is that in particular 
parties from the larger continental West European democracies (Germany, France and 
Italy) have transformed more into the catch-all direction on the electoral dimension than 
parties in the Scandinavian party systems, Ireland and (to a lesser extent) the United 
Kingdom. 
• Parties of social democratic and Christian democratic origin have relatively higher levels 
of ideological catch-allism in terms of office-seeking. 
• In terms of policy-seeking behaviour social democratic parties have a relatively low level 
of ideological catch-allism, whereas the Christian democratic and liberal parties rank 
higher at the level of ideological catch-allism with regard to policy position 





Office and policy seeking behaviour 1945-1990 
 
Table 5.28 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of office and policy seeking 
behaviour 1945-1960 
Country Family Party Office Country Family Party Policy 
Ger cd CSU 1.57  Den lib VEN 0.84  
Ger cd CDU 0.70  Ita lib PRI 0.82  
Net cd KVP 0.69  Fra con GAUL 0.79  
Bel cd CVP 0.63  Fra lib UDF 0.79  
Aut sd SPO 0.61  Ita fas MSI 0.71  
Nor sd DNA 0.57  Ita sd PSI 0.58  
Ita cd DC 0.54  UK sd LAB 0.58  
Fra cd MRP 0.53  Ita com PCI 0.49  
Net cd CHU 0.51  Net sd PVDA 0.42  
Fin agr KESK 0.46  Ita sd PDSI 0.38  
Swe sd SAP 0.46  Fra sd PSF 0.35  
Fra lib RAD 0.43  Nor agr SP 0.30  
Aut cd OVP 0.40  Den com DKP 0.26  
Ger lib FDP 0.37  Ita cd DC 0.23  
Fra lib UDF 0.35  Net cd ARP 0.22  
Fra sd PSF 0.33  Aut sd SPO 0.21  
Den sd SD 0.30  UK con CON 0.19  
Fin sd SSP 0.30  Fra lib RAD 0.17  
Fin eth SFP 0.24  Fra com PCF 0.04  
Bel sd BSP 0.20  Net lib VVD 0.01  
Ire con FF 0.16  Nor com NKP -0.05  
Net sd PVDA 0.15  Nor con HOYR -0.06  
Net cd ARP 0.14  Ger cd CDU -0.17  
Ire sd ILP 0.12  Den lib RV -0.18  
Bel lib PVV 0.11  UK lib LIB -0.19  
Ita lib PRI 0.11  Ger sd SPD -0.20  
Ire cd FG 0.09  Swe com VPK -0.22  
Ita sd PDSI 0.09  Den con KF -0.24  
UK sd LAB 0.08  Den sd SD -0.24  
Ita lib PLI 0.07  Nor lib V -0.26  
Den lib VEN 0.02  Aut lib FPO -0.28  
Swe agr C 0.01  Bel sd BSP -0.31  
Ire soc WP -0.00  Bel cd CVP -0.33  
Ita soc DP -0.00  Aut cd OVP -0.34  




Fra con GAUL -0.02  Den soc SF -0.34  
UK con CON -0.02  Ita lib PLI -0.39  
Aut com KPO -0.05  Nor sd DNA -0.50  
Net lib VVD -0.06  Swe con MSP -0.50  
Bel com KPB -0.12  Fra cd MRP -0.55  
Fin com SKDL -0.13  Bel lib PVV -0.69  
Den con KF -0.14  Swe sd SAP -0.74  
Den lib RV -0.16  Ger lib FDP -0.74  
Bel eth VU -0.20  Ire sd ILP -0.75  
Fin lib LKP -0.22  Ire cd FG -0.75  
Fra com PCF -0.23  Net cd KVP -0.86  
Ita com PCI -0.24  Ita prt PR -0.89  
Ita sd PSI -0.27  Nor cd KRFP -0.91  
Fin con KOK -0.29  Swe lib FP -0.95  
Nor cd KRFP -0.30  Net cd CHU -1.07  
Nor agr SP -0.30  Swe agr C -1.08  
Den com DKP -0.30  Ire con FF -1.47  
Swe lib FP -0.30  Ger com DKP -1.58  
Net com CPN -0.30  Ger cd CSU  
Swe com VPK -0.30  Fin agr KESK  
Nor com NKP -0.30  Ire soc WP  
Ita fas MSI -0.30  Fin com SKDL  
Nor lib V -0.30  Fin cd SKL  
Swe con MSP -0.30  Aut com KPO  
Ger sd SPD -0.30  Fin con KOK  
Ire com CPI -0.30  Net com CPN  
Den soc SF -0.30  Fin lib LKP  
Ger com DKP -0.30  Fin eth SFP  
Nor con HOYR -0.30  Ire com CPI  
Fin cd SKL -0.30  Fin sd SSP  
UK lib LIB -0.30  Ita soc DP  
Aut lib FPO -0.30  Bel eth VU  
Ita prt PR -0.89  Bel com KPB  
 





Table 5.29 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of office and policy-seeking 
behaviour 1961-1975 
Country Family Party Office Countr
y 
Family Party Policy 
Fra con GAUL 0.63  Den prt FRP 0.80  
Ita cd DC 0.56  Ger lib FDP 0.76  
Ger cd CSU 0.56  Ger cd CDU 0.75  
Swe sd SAP 0.55  Swe com VPK 0.74  
Bel cd CVP 0.53  Net lib D66 0.69  
Net cd ARP 0.49  Ire sd ILP 0.66  
Ire con FF 0.46  Den com DKP 0.63  
Net cd KVP 0.46  Nor lib V 0.63  
Fin agr KESK 0.45  Bel eth VU 0.62  
Net cd CHU 0.37  Ita lib PRI 0.61  
Den sd SD 0.37  Ire cd FG 0.59  
Bel sd BSP 0.33  Den soc SF 0.54  
Aut sd SPO 0.32  Net sd PVDA 0.53  
Fin eth SFP 0.25  Nor sd DNA 0.47  
Fin sd SSP 0.24  Swe agr C 0.45  
Net lib VVD 0.23  UK con CON 0.44  
Aut cd OVP 0.22  Swe lib FP 0.41  
Fra lib UDF 0.21  Net lib VVD 0.41  
Den lib RV 0.19  Nor agr S 0.37  
Nor sd DNA 0.19  Ita com PCI 0.35  
Ger sd SPD 0.18  Den con KF 0.32  
Ger cd CDU 0.17  Fra com PCF 0.30  
Ita sd PSDI 0.16  Den lib VEN 0.29  
Fin lib LKP 0.16  Fra con GAUL 0.25  
Ger lib FDP 0.13  Nor soc SV 0.25  
Ita lib PRI 0.11  Bel lib PVV 0.23  
Ita sd PSI 0.11  Ita fas MSI 0.22  
Nor agr S 0.10  Fra cd MRP 0.20  
UK sd LAB 0.08  Fra lib UDF 0.17  
Fra cd MRP 0.03  Den lib CD 0.17  
Fra lib RAD 0.02  Fra lib RAD 0.15  
Nor lib V 0.00  Nor cd KRFP 0.11  
Den lib VEN -0.03  Ita sd PSI 0.09  
Bel lib PVV -0.04  Den lib RV 0.09  
Nor cd KRFP -0.05  Fra sd PSF 0.08  
Nor con HOYR -0.05  Aut cd OVP 0.01  
Fin com SKDL -0.06  Swe sd SAP -0.01  




Net lib D66 -0.09  Aut lib FPO -0.02  
UK con CON -0.09  UK sd LAB -0.03  
Den con KF -0.12  Bel cd CVP -0.06  
Net sd PVDA -0.12  Den sd SD -0.07  
Ire cd FG -0.18  Ita lib PLI -0.10  
Ire soc WP -0.20  Bel sd BSP -0.16  
Fin con KOK -0.20  UK lib LIB -0.23  
Ire sd ILP -0.21  Ita cd DC -0.25  
Ita lib PLI -0.22  Aut sd SPO -0.49  
Net com CPN -0.30  Net cd KVP -0.49  
Den prt FRP -0.30  Net cd CHU -0.53  
Swe con MSP -0.30  Net cd ARP -0.58  
Ire com CPI -0.30  Ger sd SPD -0.59  
UK lib LIB -0.30  Nor con HOYR -0.74  
Den com DKP -0.30  Swe con MSP -0.86  
Aut lib FPO -0.30  Ita sd PSDI -0.97  
Nor com NKP -0.30  Ire con FF -1.04  
Ita fas MSI -0.30  Den cd KRF -1.34  
Fra lib MRG -0.30  Nor prt FRP -1.56  
Ita com PCI -0.30      
Fra com PCF -0.30      
Den lib CD -0.30      
Fin cd SKL -0.30      
Den soc SF -0.30      
Den cd KRF -0.30      
Bel com KPB -0.30      
Ger com DKP -0.30      
Nor soc SV -0.30      
Swe lib FP -0.30      
Bel eth VU -0.30      
Aut com KPO -0.30      
Nor prt FRP -0.30      
Swe agr C -0.30      
Swe com VPK -0.30      
Fra sd PSF -0.30      
Swe cd KDS -0.30      
Ita env PR -0.50      




Table 5.30 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of office and policy seeking 
behaviour 1976-1990 
Country Family Party Office Country Family Party Policy 
Aut sd SPO 0.56  Ita env PR 1.60  
Bel cd CVP 0.54  Den lib CD 1.22  
Ita cd DC 0.50  Fra lib UDF 0.91  
Net cd CDA 0.48  Ita soc DP 0.67  
Fin sd SSP 0.48  Nor lib V 0.66  
Fin eth SFP 0.38  UK       sd SDP 0.65  
Fin agr KESK 0.33  Den lib RV 0.61  
Net lib VVD 0.31  Ger cd CDU 0.58  
Ita sd PSDI 0.31  Bel sd BSP 0.56  
Nor sd DNA 0.30  UK con CON 0.55  
Ger cd CSU 0.30  Net lib VVD 0.54  
Fra lib UDF 0.28  Fra sd PSF 0.54  
Ita lib PRI 0.27  Nor sd DNA 0.47  
Ita sd PSI 0.25  Bel eth VU 0.44  
Ire con FF 0.24  Ita lib PRI 0.33  
Ger lib FDP 0.22  Ire lib PD 0.32  
Swe sd SAP 0.22  Aut cd OVP 0.32  
Ita lib PLI 0.20  Fra com PCF 0.30  
Ire cd FG 0.18  UK sd LAB 0.28  
Bel lib PVV 0.17  Nor soc SV 0.25  
Ger sd SPD 0.14  Fin com SKDL 0.21  
Ger cd CDU 0.12  Den soc SF 0.20  
UK con CON 0.11  Ire cd FG 0.19  
Fra sd PSF 0.10  Den com DKP 0.19  
Fra con GAUL 0.10  Swe com VPK 0.19  
Den sd SD 0.08  Ita com PCI 0.18  
Den con KF 0.07  Fin con KOK 0.18  
Den lib VEN 0.06  Aut lib FPO 0.17  
Swe lib FP 0.04  Ire con FF 0.16  
Ire sd ILP 0.04  Bel lib PVV 0.16  
Fin com SKDL 0.03  Fin eth SFP 0.15  
Bel sd BSP 0.03  Nor prt FRP 0.10  
Net cd KVP 0.01  Swe agr C 0.06  
Swe agr C 0.01  Net lib D66 0.04  
Fra lib RAD 0.00  Net sd PVDA 0.04  
Fra cd MRP -0.00  Ita cd DC 0.00  
Net cd CHU -0.00  Fra con GAUL -0.00  
UK sd LAB -0.05  Ire sd ILP -0.04  




Fin lib LKP -0.06  Nor agr S -0.05  
Net sd PVDA -0.08  Ita fas MSI -0.06  
Swe con MSP -0.09  Ita lib PLI -0.06  
Net cd ARP -0.09  Ger lib FDP -0.08  
Bel eth VU -0.10  Den con KF -0.08  
UK lib LIB -0.10  Fin agr KESK -0.09  
Nor cd KRFP -0.11  Den lib VEN -0.12  
Nor agr S -0.11  Ire soc WP -0.13  
Net lib D66 -0.12  Bel cd CVP -0.15  
Nor con HOYR -0.12  Net cd CDA -0.17  
Aut cd OVP -0.13  Den prt FRP -0.18  
Fin con KOK -0.13  Swe con MSP -0.19  
Fra com PCF -0.13  Aut sd SPO -0.20  
Den lib RV -0.19  Ger sd SPD -0.24  
Aut lib FPO -0.19  Ger env GRU -0.26  
Bel env ECO -0.20  Fin sd SSP -0.39  
Net com CPN -0.20  UK lib LIB -0.47  
Ger env GRU -0.20  Ita sd PSDI -0.48  
Den lib CD -0.24  Nor cd KRFP -0.48  
Den cd KRF -0.28  Nor con HOYR -0.49  
Fra lib MRG -0.29  Den sd SD -0.54  
Ita env PR -0.30  Ita sd PSI -0.56  
Nor prt FRP -0.30  Swe sd SAP -0.63  
Swe cd KDS -0.30  Swe lib FP -0.69  
Aut com KPO -0.30  Swe env MP -1.10  
Ire soc WP -0.30  Fin cd SKL -1.10  
Ita com PCI -0.30  Den cd KRF -1.18  
Swe com VPK -0.30  Aut env GA -1.54  
Bel com KPB -0.30  Bel com KPB  
Aut env GA -0.30  Ger com DKP  
Ita fas MSI -0.30  Ire com CPI  
Den prt FRP -0.30  Net cd KVP  
Nor soc SV -0.30  Fra lib MRG  
Den com DKP -0.30  Aut com KPO  
Den soc SF -0.30  Fra cd MRP  
Swe env MP -0.30  Net cd ARP  
Nor com NKP -0.30  Net com CPN  
Fin cd SKL -0.30  Net cd CHU  
Ita soc DP -0.30  Nor com NKP  
Ger com DKP -0.30  Bel env ECO  
UK sd SDP -0.30  Swe cd KDS  




Ire env GRE -0.30  Fra lib RAD  
Nor lib V -0.30  Fin lib LKP  
Ire com CPI -0.30  Ger cd CSU  
Ire lib PD -0.66  Ire env GRE  
 





6 The electoral dimension of catch-allism 
6.1 Electoral support and democracy 
Elections constitute one of the most fundamental democratic process whereby 
citizens elect their political representatives and provide legitimacy to power-holders. 
In West European democracies individual candidates and political parties need this 
electoral support to obtain or consolidate political power and influence. Kirchheimer 
specifically linked the quality of a democratic regime to the level of political 
representation and the inclusion of all social groups. The importance Kirchheimer 
attributed to the electoral dimension of politics is further evidenced by his decision to 
use this aspect  in typifying the catch-all concept. Literally, a catch-all party denotes a 
party able to catch voters from all social groups. Kirchheimer was well aware of the 
fact that distinctive social cleavages such as class, religion and ethnicity historically 
structured European electorates into faithful voter groups, which closely aligned 
themselves with specific political parties representing their particular interests. By 
asserting that catch-all parties attempt to ignore, or at least cross-cut, these social 
divisions, class in particular, Kirchheimer depicted the emergence of catch-all parties 
and subsequent electoral realignment as the dawning of a new political era. 
 To corroborate the extent to which party support spreads across the social 
spectrum, this chapter first analyses cross-time and cross-national variations in the 
social basis of party support. Kirchheimer claimed furthermore, that the catch-all 
party only permits a disjointed connection with the electorate. In order to assess 
whether this process of electoral de-alignment of European electorates is fundamen-
tal, this chapter also reviews the level of passive support for political parties (party 
identification) as well as actual electoral shifts at election time. Changes in (active) 
electoral support for political parties is examined with the measure of electoral volatil-
ity. Finally, to scrutinise Kirchheimer's contention that catch-all parties communicate 
primarily through intermediary interest groups, the recruitment pattern of party elites 
from these organised interests is evaluated. As an indicator of burgeoning interest 
group influence, the social and political background of cabinet ministers is examined 
as well as the inclination of parties to recruit ministers from outside the parliamentary 
party. 
6.1.1 The social structure of electoral support 
Analyses of the social structure of party support are at the heart of the field of 
political sociology. Political sociologists usually depart from the assumption that 
political behaviour, voting in particular, is associated with individual characteristics 
such as occupation, income, ethnicity, religion, and/or social status. In life voters 
develop lasting partisan preferences and affiliations as a result of these social 
characteristics. These partisan attachments and identities, in turn, provide simple and 
meaningful cues which structure individual voting behaviour (Dalton 1988; Andeweg 
1982). 
 In Western Europe the most important social cleavages are the class cleavage and 
the religious cleavage, followed by ethnicity and region (Rose 1974; Lijphart 1981; 




1984). These cleavages largely determined the development and structure of the 
Western European party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; LaPalombara and Weiner 
1966; Dalton et al. 1984; Klingemann et al. 1994). This study limits itself to an analysis 
of the class-structure of electorates; class being the most dominant cleavage.88 
Although this will result in only a partial picture, a full discussion of all possible social 
divisions is clearly beyond the scope of this particular study. Chapter 3 has shown 
that, by definition, catch-all parties extend their appeal to voters from social strata 
which did not belong to the traditional supporters of the party. Therefore, catch-
allism of political parties at the electoral level is indicated, firstly, by a decline in the 
class-distinctiveness of the social basis (or stratification) of electoral support of 
political parties. 
 Studies on the stratification of party support concerning class cleavage often use 
Alford's Index of Class-Voting89. Cross-national surveys on the relation between class 
and voting behaviour in West European countries found, with few exceptions, a 
substantial decline in the class structuring of voting behaviour.90 Studies which used 
other measures than Alford's Index of relative class voting or more elaborate class 
schemes yielded similar results (see Nieuwbeerta 1995). In this study a very 
rudimentary class scheme is used: the electorate is divided into only two classes, 
namely, the manual or blue-collar working class and the non-manual, white-collar 
middle and upper class. White-collar employees are regarded as the equivalent to the 
'middle-classes' and also included in the non-manual category are higher-educated 
upper-classes, which usually figurate in surveys under headings such as 'professionals', 
'business' or 'self employed'. Some surveys use more elaborate class distinctions 
within intermediate categories, such as unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers and 
skilled workers, resulting in more refined forms of class analysis.91 This dichotomous 
class concept - working class versus non-working class - is a simple and straightfor-
                                                        
88 According to Lipset, different parties represent the interests of different classes and he arrived at the 
conclusion "that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes. ... 
More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes, and the most impressive single fact 
about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income 
groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the 
right" (Lipset 1960, 223-224; Lipset 1966, 413-414; Lipset 1981, 230). Some authors voiced objections 
against this 'naive theory' and argued that the size of the working-class is not a powerful predictor of 
support for parties on the left (Kitschelt 1994, 41). In contrast, Rose and Urwin (1969, 12) argued that 
"religious divisions, not class, are the main social bases of parties in the Western World today." 
 
89 Alford's Index of Class-Voting is obtained by calculating the difference between the percentage of the 
working class (manual workers) voting for the left and the percentage of middle class (non-manual 
workers) who vote for the left (Alford 1962; 1963). Higher values on this index indicate a more solid and 
cohesive class voting. Although, this measure is heavily criticised for its serious statistical deficiencies and 
its Anglo-Saxon bias (Goldthorpe 1980; 1990; Heath, Jowell, Curtice et al. 1991) the measure is widely 
used in empirical analysis. 
 
90 Traditionally, the working class by and large supported parties of the left in Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Great Britain, France and West Germany. During the 1960's and in the 1980's class based 
voting declined considerably; only the 1970's marked a period of moderate increases in class-voting in 
some of these countries. See Alford 1962; 1963; Lijphart 1971b; Butler and Stokes 1974; Budge and Farlie 
1977; Crewe 1968; Andeweg 1982; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1983; Franklin 1985; Rose 1986; Inglehart in 
Dalton et al. 1984; Dalton 1988; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Inglehart 1990, 260; Franklin et al. 1992; 
Lane and Ersson 1994; Nieuwbeerta 1995; 1996. 
 
91 This analysis relies on the scarce cross-national comparative data-bases on the electoral profiles of 
parties, as well as on individual country studies. As a consequence, this study has to be lenient towards the 
different categorisations in order to make them fit this simple dichotomous scheme. Surveys, even within 
one country, differ substantially on the wording of the questions, in sample-size and class categories. 




ward method which suffices for the overall research aim: to determine significant 
shifts in electoral behaviour and composition of the electorate of parties across class 
lines. By subtracting the proportion of white-collar middle/upper-class vote from the 
percentage of manual working-class vote, an index similar to the Alford-Index of class 
voting is constructed. All party scores then range between +100, a situation when all 
voters for the party are manual working-class, and -100, when all voters have a non-
manual middle or upper-class background. Since for this study it is most important to 
note to which extent the electorates of political parties in Western Europe remain 
class-distinctive, the positive and negative signs are ignored and the entries are thus 
rated to range between 0 (indicating a complete absence of class distinctiveness) and 
100 (indicating totally distinctive homogeneous class support). Catch-allism, visible in 
less marked and cohesive class voting, will be indicated by lower values on this index. 
So, the first electoral indicator of progressing catch-allism can be seen in less class-
distinctiveness of the electorate of parties. Table 6.1 summarises this level of class 
distinctiveness of the electorates of parties in West European countries. 
 










X S CV beta (β) 
Aut 28.5  49.5  37.9  24.4  35.1   9.7 .276 -.31 
Bel - 40.7  25.9  28.1  31.6   6.5 .206 -.32 
Den 58.2  48.6  35.2  39.9  45.5   8.8 .193 -.37* 
Fin 63.3  52.7  32.3  49.8  49.5  11.1 .224 -.25 
Fra 34.3  31.0  32.4  35.3  33.3   1.7 .051  .01 
Ger 30.7  33.7  37.3  43.8  36.4   4.9 .135  .20 
Ire - 40.0  36.1  33.3  36.5   2.7 .074 -.22 
Ita 24.8  24.1  21.1  37.9  27.0   6.5 .241 -.02 
Net 41.0  57.9  32.2  48.2  44.8   9.4 .210  .01 
Nor 55.2  47.9  47.6  38.0  47.2   6.1 .129 -.20 
Swe 56.0  45.9  47.7  38.0  46.9   6.4 .136 -.01 
UK 36.2  34.7  21.6  34.4  31.7   5.9 .168 -.14 
X 42.8  42.2  33.9  37.6  38.8   6.6 .170 -.08 
S 13.3  9.5  8.2  7.1  7.2   2.7 - - 
 
Entries are index-scores of support from working class minus non working-class voters. For sources of 
data see appendix 4. Scores range between 0, which indicates a complete absence of class distinctiveness 
and 100, indicating totally homogeneous class support. The level of class voting is taken from the sources 
enumerated in Appendix IV. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period 
and country means. The column and row marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the periods 
and the countries. The column indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X). The row 'b' 
provides the regression coefficient between the level of class-distinctiveness and the year of the 
observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < 
.05). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated. 
 
As can be seen from table 6.1, over time the class distinctiveness of political parties 
declined in most countries. In Scandinavian party systems the class cleavage is the 
most important political divide, resulting in the highest mean levels of class 




distinctiveness of party support. Finland, in particular, was unequalled in Western 
Europe with regard to class distinctiveness of voting behaviour. Oversimplified; the 
Finnish party system reflects the left-right dimension by its division in two major left-
wing parties (SKDL and SDP) as the typical working class representatives and the 
right-wing non-socialist block of parties. The centre-right flank of the political 
spectrum is inhabited by the Agrarian Union (Kesk, later Senterpartiet) representing 
farmers, while the conservative party (KOK) and the liberal party (LKP) represent the 
interests of the middle and upper classes. This highly class-structured voting pattern 
decreased considerably since the late 1960s. Similarly, in Sweden high proportions of 
the working class loyally supported the two left parties (VpK and SAP), while non-
manual middle and upper class voters mainly supported the three bourgeois parties 
(SP, MUP and Fp). Since the 1960s the Swedish party system also showed a decline in 
class distinctive voting. Although traditionally the social basis of Norwegian and 
Danish parties has been durable and distinct, there was, nevertheless, a substantial 
decline in the class distinctiveness in these Scandinavian countries as well, particularly 
since the 1970s. 
 In the German, Belgium, Austrian and Dutch party systems the class cleavage is 
cross-cut by a religious cleavage, resulting in a dominant role for the Christian demo-
cratic parties in these countries. In the post-war period these Christian democratic 
parties attracted a substantial proportion of working class voters. Therefore, the 
decline in class-distinctiveness is very moderate in these countries and almost absent 
in Germany and the Netherlands. Despite the fact that German parties lost some of 
their class distinctiveness, there is still a moderate trend towards increasing class 
distinctiveness of the major political parties. The Dutch electorate was almost 
completely structured by the class (as well as the religious) cleavage (Irwin 1980, 180; 
Lijphart 1974, 243). This clear structuration dwindled, particularly since the early 
1980s. Nevertheless, over time there is a relatively high level of class distinctive voting 
again in the Netherlands during the 1980s. Although the Belgian party system cannot 
be understood without reference to the linguistic division between Walloon and 
Flemish groups, the major political parties in Belgium also reflect the class and 
religious cleavage. Overall, Belgian parties have increasingly adopted a cross-class 
electoral appeal and the class distinctiveness of the electorate of the political parties 
declined rapidly. Notwithstanding similarities between the Austrian, German, Belgian 
and Dutch party systems, parties in Austria have lost much more of their class 
distinctiveness compared to the other consociational democracies, indicating a rapid 
decline in the relevance of class for structuring the popular vote and a substantial 
movement towards the catch-all model. 
 In France and Italy party competition is characterised by the presence of an 
electorally strong and distinctly working-class communist party. Particularly in France 
a relatively stable pattern of class distinctiveness of political parties is witnessed. 
Although the French party system is characterised by four major 'tendencies' rather 
than cohesive parties, the left in France is dominated by two large and relatively 
durable working-class party organisations: the socialist SFIO (later PSF) and the 
communist PCF. In contrast, the right end of the political spectrum, which comprises 
a Gaullist tendency and a liberal tendency, is characterised by more transient party 
organisations. Nevertheless, all the different political constellations which took root at 
the centre-right in France have attracted most of the middle and upper-class vote. 
Similar sharp class divisions in Italian society and politics warranted this country the 




label of 'extreme pluralism' (Sartori 1966; 1976). The main antagonisms in Italian 
politics are the left-right and religious cleavage, together with a North-South divide; 
more recently politicised by the Lega Nord and Lega Lombarda. The result of this 
cleavage structure is political fragmentation at the organisational level; yet the most 
prominent ideological division is found between the catholic Christian democratic DC 
and the anti-clerical communist PCI. Nevertheless, class-distinctiveness of voting 
behaviour remained at a moderate and even declining level; a process which was partly 
reversed during the 1980s. Surveys have shown that at the individual level, voting 
behaviour is rather stable and the declining effects of religion and class are primarily 
due to generational replacement (Franklin et al. 1992, 242; Farneti 1985, 95-96; Von 
Beyme 1985, 291). 
 The two 'outliers' in Western Europe are Ireland and the United Kingdom; Ireland 
for its almost total absence of class-based voting and the United Kingdom for the 
complete dominance the class cleavage. Political conflict within the Irish party system 
is still related to the nationalist cleavage (Marsh 1985). The homogeneous catholic 
population and rural character of the country has led some to typify Irish politics as 
one without social basis and Irish parties as having no distinct social profile. Whatever 
class distinction there was has almost disappeared and the major parties are becoming 
more and more catch-all as the electorates are less class distinct than previously. For a 
long time the class cleavage within the British 'two-party' system was, without a doubt, 
regarded as the most important basis of conflict between two principal social groups 
and two major parties (Rose 1974; Cyr 1980; Crewe 1985; Franklin 1985). The 
traditional pattern of class voting, being that the working class voted for the Labour 
Party and the middle and upper classes supported the Conservative Party, has been in 
decline up until the 1980s. Over most of the post-war period, the Labour party 
appealed increasingly successful to the middle-classes and the Conservative party suc-
ceeded in attracting voters from the working-class. 
 In order to summarise the trends within countries, a regression analysis was 
performed with the year of observation as the independent variable. The last column 
of table 6.1 reports a negative beta-coefficient as a summary measure when there is an 
overall decrease in class distinctiveness of party electorates. The regression statistics 
show that the only exceptions from a general decline in class-distinctiveness of 
electorates in Western Europe are France, Germany and the Netherlands. In 
Germany a moderate positive trend in class distinctive voting is discernible, whereas 
in France and the Netherlands class-voting is relatively stable. These generalised 
findings largely coincide with the findings in other studies, with the exception of the 
German case (see Lane and Ersson 1994, 132; Nieuwbeerta 1996, 356). In sum, with 
this partial exceptions of France, Germany and the Netherlands, the class 
distinctiveness of parties declined throughout Western Europe, in particular since the 
mid-1960s. This development, in line with Kirchheimer's assertions, has been particu-
larly striking in Austria, Belgium and most Scandinavian party systems (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) as well as in Ireland and Britain. However, taking into 
account the restructuring of the labour force, it seems more accurate to conclude that 
in most West European countries the social basis of parties became increasingly 
dominated by middle-class voters during the 1970s and 1980s, resulting from a social 
upward migration which melded the working-class into the white-collar service sector. 
In none of the West European countries has class distinctive voting declined more 
rapidly than the structural regression of the manual working class (see Flora 1987; 




Kitschelt 1994, 42-44; Lane et.al 1991). In fact, the rate of restructuring of the labour 
force is, on average, six times higher than the decline in class distinctive voting. Most 
(left-wing) parties, whose traditional core electorate was formed by the working-class, 
attempted to compensate the loss of working-class support by making inroads on 
middle-class voters. In the 1980s the working-class constituted less than thirty-two 
per cent of the European electorates and parties, particularly those whose traditional 
electorates were dwindling, responded in turn by appealing to middle-class voters. As 
is shown above, in some countries this strategy has been more successful than in 
others. Still, the declining standard deviation over time is ample evidence that the 
differences between parties have decreased, a finding in support of Kirchheimer’s 
convergence hypothesis. 
 The impact of social transformation on parties of different social origin is 
summarised in table 6.2, which provides average levels in class distinctiveness of 
electorates of West European party families as well as regression coefficients 
calculated between the level of class distinctiveness (working class support minus 
middle/upper class party support) and the year of observation as the dependent 
variable. 























X CV beta    
(β) 
cd - 23.5 24.3 39.5 35.2 21.6 31.5 38.9 46.8 32.9 .544  .29* 
com - 65.0 44.5 26.6 47.7 26.4 22.1 22.5 34.9 34.8 .627 -.33 
con 43.9 34.8 61.2 62.8 49.4 66.0 42.5 55.4 55.7 55.3 .358 -.00 
sd 56.9 40.0 38.2 25.8 30.6 19.6 23.9 18.9 13.9 26.2 .782 -.39* 
lib 47.2 25.0 40.6 46.9 48.2 36.3 43.5 50.9 46.5 43.7 .535  .12 
agr - - 54.5 67.4 55.5 77.8 53.9 - 37.0 65.1 .257 -.44 
X 58.4 33.9 41.2 41.6 41.5 35.3 34.4 40.1 36.8 38.7 .612 -.08 
S 30.3 24.0 23.0 22.0 22.4 27.1 20.5 21.4 22.0 23.7 - - 
CV .519 .708 .563 .529 .539 .768 .596 .534 .560 .612 - - 
 
For data sources see Appendix IV. Entries are levels of class-distinctiveness. The column and row 
indicated by an X provide the party family means and the average of each period respectively. The 
column and row indicated by 'CV ' provides the coefficient of variance (S/ X) for party families and time 
periods. The column 'b' provides the regression coefficient between the level of class-distinctiveness and 
the year of the observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent 
level (t = < .05). 
 
Table 6.2 demonstrates a moderate trend towards declining class distinctiveness of 
European electorates over the post-war period. There are, however, significant 
differences between party families. The corrosion in working class support of 
communist and social democratic parties has resulted in a clear weakening of their 
electoral class distinctiveness. Communist and social democratic parties rapidly lost 
their traditional working class support (β -.33 and β -.39 respectively) and solicited 
increasing support from middle class voters (for both parties the parameters of 
middle class support are β = .42*). Barring only the Finnish and Irish social demo-
crats, most West European social democratic parties gradually transformed from 
basically working class parties into parties with relatively more non-working class 
support. Particularly the German SPD, historically the classic and prototypical 
example of a working class party (see Michels 1911), has transformed into a middle-
class party.92 Kirchheimer was clearly influenced by this transformation of the SPD, a 
party he knew well as a former active member; and it is primarily the metamorphosis 
of this party that drove him to construct the catch-all thesis. Moreover, it is indeed 
during the 1960s, as Kirchheimer observed, that the transformation of social 
democratic parties gained momentum. In Britain the development towards electoral 
catch-allism occurred somewhat later (the 1970s) when working class support for 
Labour dropped significantly (Minkin and Seyd 1977, 133-135). In another example 
Kirchheimer highlighted, the Austrian SPÖ also succeeded in its strategy of a trans-
class appeal (Müller and Steiniger 1994; Luther 1988, 229-231; Jacobs 1989, 493). 
Agrarian parties also seem to be affected by a re-alignment of European electorates as 
their support has rapidly declined in class distinctiveness. 
 In contrast, the electoral support of Christian democratic and liberal parties has 
become more class-distinctive, evidenced by positive beta-coefficients in the last 
column of table 6.2. Over time, Christian democratic parties have lost substantial 
                                                        
92 Feist et al. 1978, 172; Mintzel 1982, 140-145; Franklin et al. 1992, 179-202; Missiroli 1992, 127; Merkl 
1980, 625-626; Kirchner and Broughton 1988, 75; Linz 1967; Dalton 1988, 155. 




working class support (β = -.26) and gained electoral backing from particularly middle 
class voters (β = .31*). The deliberate strategy of Christian democratic parties to avert 
religious working-class voters from supporting communist, socialist or social 
democratic parties (see Kersbergen 1995) resulted in a considerable working class 
support and a relatively indistinctive following concerning social class, at least until 
the 1960s. The electorate of the Belgian Christian-democratic PSC and CVP, for 
example, was very heterogeneous with a relative high level of working class support.93 
Gradually during the 1960s, the working-class support of Christian democratic parties 
becomes replaced by middle and upper-class voters. Despite some reversal to working 
class support in the 1970s, the decline of working-class support for Christian 
democratic parties accelerated during the 1980s. Liberal parties seem to attract a 
relatively high proportion of non-working class voters already during the early 1960s. 
Thereafter, the level of middle and upper-class support is comparatively stable until 
the late 1980s. Over time, nevertheless, the composition of the liberal electorate 
slowly increased in class distinctiveness. 
 Conservative parties in Western Europe consistently attracted a predominantly 
middle and upper-class constituency. Being better equipped to woo middle and 
upper-class voters, conservative parties consistently appealed with success to a high 
number of middle and upper class voters during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The 
regression coefficient of electoral class distinctiveness against time shows no trend in 
either direction for parties of conservative origin and the low coefficient of variance 
indicates a more homogeneous and stable stratification in support than most of the 
other party families. 
 In conclusion, West European electorates have become less class distinctive as a 
result of an increasing number of non-working class voters. Nevertheless, this 
development has not affected all parties to the same extent and in the same direction. 
Despite the fact that the relationship between social class and voting behaviour has 
declined significantly over the post-war period in West European party systems and 
the electorate of most parties has become more diffuse, significant differences in class 
distinctiveness between party families remain. Communist parties and, to a lesser 
extent, social democratic parties still have a substantial working-class segment in their 
constituency. Moreover, conservative, Christian democratic and liberal parties have 
not significantly broadened their appeal to voters outside their traditional supporters. 
Instead, conservative parties still basically attract middle and upper class support, 
while Christian democratic and liberal parties have even become more class distinctive 
over the years. Nevertheless, Kirchheimer's hypothesis of declining class-distinctive-
ness of the electorates of West European parties is largely confirmed for communist, 
social democratic and agrarian parties, notwithstanding significant variation between 
countries. To further substantiate Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, this de-alignment of 
European electorates, should also be discernible in higher levels of electoral change 
(volatility) as well as a decline in strong identification of voters with one single party. 
Both indicators of electoral catch-allism are discussed in the next section. 
6.2 De-alignment of West European electorates 
This study is certainly not the first to observe a substantial decline in explanatory 
                                                        
93 Mughan 1982, 168; Lorwin 1966, 162; Frognier 1975; De Winter 1990, 40; Jacobs 1989, 16; Rose and 
Urwin 1969, 53. 




power of the social structure for electoral behaviour in Western Europe and a de-
alignment of West European electorates.94 As a result of social transformations, the 
values and ideologies of European electorates profoundly changed and this has 
weakened the traditional ties between parties and their adherents. Consistent with the 
argumentation in chapter 3, electoral catch-allism is characterised by this moderation 
in strength of the party's connection with the electorate. Next to the demise in the 
social stratification of party support, the second indicator of electoral catch-allism 
measures the extent to which adherents of political parties have disentangled 
themselves from their traditional socio-political milieu and lost durable connection 
with party organisations. This development is measured by both examining the level 
of electoral turnover (volatility) and the level of party identification. 
 First, without tapping actual voting behaviour, the strength of passive support for 
political parties is evaluated with the concept of party identification. Party identification 
estimates the enduring psychological link voters have with political parties resulting 
from political socialisation and party organisational activities. Theoretically, a voter's 
alignment with the party will decline when the social function of the party 
organisation is abandoned in a manner Kirchheimer described. No longer part of the 
integrative organisational structure of the party, the voter becomes progressively 
estranged from the party and identifies less with its aims and leaders. When traditional 
methods of linkage to the electorate are abandoned by the catch-all party, other 
methods have to take its place; elections have to be won. The catch-all party will 
increase its effort in electoral campaigning and adopt alternative styles and methods to 
replace the lost link with a 'natural' constituency. Decreasing party identification will 
eventually result in a complete break with the party and thus to individual electoral 
volatility. Electoral volatility, the second measure used to quantify the second indicator 
of electoral catch-allism, estimates the (dis)connection between parties and voters by 
tapping actual voting behaviour. But, before turning to the variation in electoral 
volatility in Western Europe, the level of party identification is first assessed. 
6.2.1 Party identification 
The concept of party identification, which is used to measure the long-term predispo-
sition to vote for a particular party, was developed in the American political context 
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1954; 1960; Converse 
1976; Budge et al. 1976; LeDuc 1981). This psychological identification with a 
particular party is not always considered applicable to all party systems (Butler and 
Stokes 1974; Thomassen 1976; Gallagher et al., 1995, 230-231). The difficulties in 
comparability and interpretation of the concept are less relevant to this study. Here 
the concept of party identification is only used as an overall measure of relative 
strength of the party's connection with the electorate. Although party identification 
does not tap real voting behaviour, the concept can be used as an indicator of 
developments in affective party attachment or party loyalty (Dalton 1988). When 
measured consistently in a similar manner, the concept of party identification is a valid 
measure for establishing (de-)alignment of European electorates (Van Deth and 
Janssen 1994, 89). If there is a process of de-ideologization and electoral re-alignment, 
then the relative number of voters with a strong party identification should decrease. 
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 As catch-all parties discontinue persistent links with voters, catch-allism is 
indicated by a decline in the proportion of the electorate with a strong enduring 
partisan preference. Evidence from several cross-national studies of party-
identification lead to the conclusion that there is a general weakening of traditional 
ties between the parties and their voters (Dalton et al. 1985; Crewe and Denver 1985; 
Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990).95 Although the data on party identification are scarce 
and very incomplete, it clearly emerges, nevertheless, that party identification 
weakened substantially in most European countries since the late 1960s96. A rough 
estimate of this de-alignment of West European electorates over time can be obtained 
by computing the level of strong party identification with the period in which the 
observation was made. The overall regression coefficient is in the expected direction, 
yet not very high (β = -.14*) and, as we shall see below, primarily the result of a steep 
decline in party identification with social democratic parties. First, table 6.3 shows that 
in most European countries the level of strong party identification did decline over 
the course of time; however, some parties in Denmark and Finland seem to be 
excluded from this general trend in de-alignment. 
 
Table 6.3 Trends in strong party identification over time in Western Europe 1960-1990 
 Aut Den Fin Ger Ire Ita Net Nor UK mean 
beta   
(β) 
-.31 .02 .09 -.27 -.45* -.07 -.09 -.04 -.29 -.14* 
 
The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between the level of party identification and the 
year of the observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent 
level (t = < .05). Data for Belgium, France and Sweden were too scarce to perform a regression analysis. 
 
The decline in strong partisan attachment is most profound in Austria, Germany, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. In Austria there is a general decline in strong party 
identification, as the proportion of the Austrian electorate which claimed to identify 
strongly with a particular party (strong or otherwise) dropped from seventy-three to 
forty-nine percent between 1954 and 1990 (Müller 1992, 39). The share of strong 
party identifiers fell from over thirty percent in the 1960s and 1970s to nineteen 
percent in 1990 (Plasser and Ulram, 1995, 344; Haerpfer 1985, 282). In the German 
1969-election, held after the dissolution of the SPD-CDU (Grand) coalition, marked a 
turning point when the level of strong party identifiers dropped significantly (Klinge-
mann 1985; Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992; Kaase 1976; Dalton 1984, 126; 
Kolinsky 1984). The total level of strong party identification in Ireland is relatively low 
and declined further between 1978 and 1985 from around thirty-eight to twenty-six 
percent (Mair 1987; see also Marsh 1985, 194). As a result of two dominant parties in 
the United Kingdom, the self-placement of voters on the left-right divide is a surro-
gate for party identification (Butler and Stokes 1974, 331). In general, the attachment 
between British parties and their electorate declined significantly. In the 1960s over 
forty percent of the British voters had strong party identification; since the 1970s, 
                                                        
95 In contrast, analysis on the basis of the Eurobarometer-data resulted in the opposite conclusion, namely 
that "there is no evidence of a general process of de-alignment in all countries and all party families 
between 1975 and 1989" (Van Deth and Janssen 1994, 96). 
 
96 The data to which is referred in this section are primarily from Katz and Mair, tables A.4 and Crewe 
and Denver 1985. Data before 1960 are lacking, while for Belgium and France very few data are available. 




however, there was a substantial decline in strong party identification.97 Major parties 
in Denmark, Finland, Norway and France also show declining levels of strong party 
identification.98 In other countries this development has been less sweeping but still 
significant. Initially, the Italian electorate displayed very high levels of strong partisan 
identification. From 1968 through 1981 the level of strong partisan identifiers in Italy 
hovered been between eighty and sixty percent (Barnes 1984). Since the early 1980s, 
however, most Italian parties have experienced a decline in strong party identification 
(Farneti 1985). The Swedish electorate was solidly aligned along the class-cleavage 
with corresponding high levels of strong partisan identification up until the 1950s, yet 
in the 1960s a massive shift towards de-alignment set in. In the Netherlands the 
percentage of voters which strongly identify with a particular party seems to oscillate 
with the electoral fortunes of parties (van der Eijk and Niemoller 1985; Thomassen 
1976). Nevertheless, all parties in the Dutch party system faced a loss of strong party 
identifiers, particularly in the 1980s (Irwin and Dittrich 1984). In Belgium the level of 
strong party identification is very low in a comparative perspective, however, no 
longitudinal data are available (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 249). 
 Despite this linear trend of declining party identification in most countries, there 
are considerable differences in strong partisan affiliation between party families as is 
shown in table 6.4. 
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98 Borre 1985; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 249; Grunberg 1985, 224; Lewis Beck 1984, 432. 




Table 6.4 The proportion of voters with strong party identification by party families 
1960-1990 












X S CV 
 beta  
(β) 
cd - 26.9 17.1 21.7 22.7 19.9 20.8 13.0 .625  .06 
com - - 15.9 15.9 13.0 12.5 13.5  3.5 .259 -.12 
con 24.8 23.2 14.1 23.0 25.4 26.3 22.7 12.7 .559  .14 
sd 40.3 39.9 37.9 26.2 21.9 18.7 26.9 13.8 .513 -.56* 
lib  9.1  5.2  6.3  7.3  7.1  7.4  7.0  6.9 .986  .03 
agr (7.3) (8.2) 11.5 10.4  9.8  9.9  9.9  4.6 .465  .11 
X 17.9 21.1 15.6 15.2 13.7 13.0 14.9  9.1 .611 -.14* 
S 16.8 18.0 15.7 13.2 12.6 11.5 13.7 - - - 
CV .938 .853 1.01 .868 .919 .885 .919 - - - 
 
The column and row indicated by an 'X' provide the party family means and the average score of the 
period respectively. The column and row marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the periods 
and the party family. The column and row indicated by 'CV ' provides the coefficient of variance (S/ X). 
The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the level of party identification and the year of 
observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < 
.05). 
 
In line with Kirchheimer's assertions, the evidence shows that social democratic 
parties in Western Europe are losing strong party identifiers at a very fast pace (β = 
-.56*). Whereas in the 1960s over forty percent of social democratic voters identified 
strongly with their party; during the 1980s this level declined steeply and incessantly to 
less than twenty per cent. As can be seen from the table, a more persistent level of 
party identification can be found among the communist adherents and, although the 
average level of party identification is not very high, the variation between communist 
parties over time is low. Apparently excluded from an almost universal declining trend 
in party identification are the three Scandinavian conservative parties (KF in 
Denmark, KOK in Finland and Hoyre in Denmark) which seem to have strengthened 
their connection with their voters, resulting in an increasing overall level of party 
identification for conservative parties. Christian democratic parties in Western Europe 
experienced a decline in partisan identification of the electorate during the 1970s. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the proportion of Christian democratic voters 
which strongly identified with their party stabilised, while the late 1980s showed a 
significant drop in strong Christian democratic party identification. However, some 
political parties, such as the CDU in Germany, not only largely retained their strong 
identifiers, but even attracted new strong party identifiers. Liberal parties, on average, 
maintain a rather stable level of voters who strongly identify with them. 
 Overall, this study shows that a substantial number of political parties experienced 
a decline in strong party identification and are thus simultaneously loosing the long 
term affective party attachment and loyalty from their electorate. In almost all party 
systems the major and more aged parties are most profoundly affected by this decline 
in party identification. Still, overall the disconnection with the electorate seems to 
have it’s largest impact on the left of the political spectrum and not a universal 
phenomenon. Particularly the social democratic and communist parties are subject to 
a serious disengagement from their supporters. Kirchheimer correctly pointed to this 




development of declining party loyalty of voters but he incorrectly assumed this 
development to be widespread and continuous. This analysis shows that the catch-all 
thesis can not be completely confirmed as, overall, Christian democratic, conservative, 
liberal and agrarian parties have been less affected by a loos of strong party identifiers. 
6.2.2 Electoral volatility 
Lower levels of party affiliation would, according to the catch-all thesis, increase the 
number of floating voters considerably. For the time being these voters may stay loyal 
to parties within the same party block (see Bartolini and Mair 1990, 82), yet declining 
levels of party identification can eventually lead to unprecedented levels of electoral 
volatility. To assess the extent to which this process has already occurred, this section 
examines the cross-national and cross-time variation in electoral volatility in Western 
Europe. If catch-all parties indeed loose their direct and durable connection with their 
adherents, in organisational, ideological and psychological terms, then the result will 
be higher levels of 'floating voters' and increasing electoral turnover. Kirchheimer's 
thesis is somewhat contradictory on this point. Logically it can be expected that 
increasing competitiveness of catch-all parties results in higher levels of electoral 
change; yet, Kirchheimer also pointed to the exclusion of extremist parties and 
progressive dominance of the larger parties. This is important since the number of 
parties operating within party systems significantly influences the degree of electoral 
turnover (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 135-145). 
 The most simple measure to analyse electoral change is electoral volatility, which is 
used here to measure the third indicator of electoral catch-allism. Electoral volatility is 
a very straightforward measure which has been applied by several authors to measure 
catch-allism (see section 3.4 of this book). Aside from the attractive simplicity of the 
measure and the convention to use it for cross-national comparative analyses of 
electoral change, electoral volatility is also a valuable measure for which data are 
available over a long period of time. Furthermore, electoral volatility is useful in this 
study as it can measure electoral change at the individual party level, as well as the 
aggregate level of countries and party families. Finally, electoral volatility gauges actual 
voting behaviour, not attitudes or psychological pre-dispositions. 
 The measure of electoral volatility was developed by Mogens N. Pedersen (1979, 
3), who defined electoral volatility as "the net change within the electoral party system 
resulting from individual vote transfers, divided by two" (Pedersen 1979, 3).99 There 
remains, nevertheless, substantial controversy as to what is indicated by aggregated 
electoral volatility. From his definition it emerges that Pedersen himself thought that 
volatility indicates changes in individual voting behaviour. Secondly, aggregated 
electoral volatility can also result from the growth and decline of the electorate. While 
all voters remain loyal to their partisan choice there can be aggregate volatility due to 
the extension of the electorate (resulting from different electoral preferences of the 
                                                        
99 Electoral volatility can thus be regarded as the net electoral change within a party system between two 
elections. Net electoral change indicates that the differences in turnout and growth of the electorate and 
their effects are not accounted for in this measure. The measure of volatility is not as straightforward as it 
seems to be at first glance. Bartolini and Mair (1990) distinguish different types of volatility. Individual 
volatility which indicates the individual vote-change from election to election. This can only be done by 
so-called exit-polls or surveys. Party volatility which denotes the loss or gains of an individual party from 
election to election. Thirdly, total aggregate electoral volatility which is measured by adding the volatility 
of all individual parties (by country or group of parties), divided by two. The total volatility of all parties 
has to be divided by two as the loss of one party is the gain of another party. 




newly enfranchised) or differences in electoral turnout. The assumption that volatility 
indicates the variation in political preferences of different generations of voters was 
advanced most convincingly by Prezworski (1975). Prezworski suggested that older 
generations have more stable voting behaviour than younger generations. In an 
extreme situation this could mean that there is no individual voting shift; that all 
individuals have stable preferences and that increasing volatility solely results from 
different political preferences of different age cohorts. Thirdly, electoral volatility can 
also indicate the changing character of political parties. In this perspective electoral 
volatility results from strategic and organisational transformation of party 
organisations by the political elites. As a result from socio-economic developments or 
other aspects of modernisation, voters can loose their strong party identification and 
become 'floating' voters. Party elites will have to adapt their organisation to these 
developments. Theoretically, the party of democratic integration such as described by 
Neumann (1956) will experience less electoral volatility than the more competitive and 
less socially embedded 'catch-all' party that Kirchheimer described. In a fourth 
approach, electoral volatility is regarded the consequence of issue effects in 
elections.100 Fifthly, some argue that electoral volatility indicates the stability or weak-
ness of traditional cleavages and 'party alignments' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rose 
and Urwin 1970; Bartolini and Mair 1990).101 In this view traditional cleavages become 
less salient to partisan choice and others gain in importance. This cyclical vision is the 
guiding principle in the studies by Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984) and Inglehart 
(1984; 1990; 1991). Its rationale is as follows; first, a cleavage is politicised and 
political competition polarises, then, the cleavage becomes institutionalised in political 
organisations and is consequently pacified by the political elite. This perspective 
argues that in multi-party systems where parties have to coalesce, they will converge in 
policy positions and seek consensus resulting in lower saliency of the cleavage. Under 
the influence of social, economic and cultural developments new cleavages can then 
emerge. Additionally, new political parties enter the party system and thereby increase 
electoral volatility again. 
 As it is impossible to settle the matter here, it suffices to accept that this measure 
indicates the electoral vulnerability of political parties and the strength of traditional 
partisan alignments. So whether or not electoral volatility is caused by changing 
orientations of the electorate towards political parties or the transformation of the 
basic structure of West European politics, electoral volatility is a valuable indicator for 
the transformation towards catch-allism. Here, total volatility is the sum of all 
individual party volatilities (the change in the percentage of the vote between two 
elections) of parties included in this analysis, divided by two. Table 6.5 summarises 
the trends in total electoral volatility in the different countries. Note that the entries in 
the table are based only on the electoral losses and gains of parties included in this 
study, so total scores of party systems are somewhat lower than country scores 
reported in other studies (see Bartolini and Mair 1990, appendix 2). 
 
                                                        
100  Budge and Farlie 1983; 287; Robertson 1976; 72, Budge and Farlie 1977; 272-273. 
 
101 Crewe and Denver (1985, 6-7), on the contrary, state that "electoral volatility does not necessarily 
signify a profound change of party system. It might be short-lived, and even if not, would not entail a 
fundamental enduring change of party systems; fluctuations around a party's average level of support 
could increase while the average remained stable. Electoral volatility does not entail partisan de-alignment; 
and partisan de-alignment does not entail a change of party system." 























X S CV 
Aut 11.9   3.6   2.5   1.5   3.0   0.9   1.3   3.9   8.0   4.1   3.1 .756 
Bel  5.7   6.9   4.9   9.3   4.1   2.0   2.6   5.0   2.3   4.8   2.4 .500 
Den  2.6   1.3   5.3   1.8   5.7  10.7   9.3   8.5   4.4   5.5   2.3 .418 
Fin  4.9   1.8   4.3   2.7   5.2    2.0   3.7   4.9   4.7   3.8   1.7 .447 
Fra  4.8  19.6   8.0  15.9   5.5   7.9   3.6  10.1   4.4   8.9   5.4 .606 
Ger - 10.3   6.0   3.0   4.3   3.6   2.2   8.4   3.9   5.2   3.6 .692 
Ire  3.9   4.3   9.4   5.0   1.8   2.9   5.9   2.7   4.6   4.5   3.2 .711 
Ita 18.1 10.4   2.9   6.2   5.2   1.8   2.8   7.4   6.2   6.8   3.0 .441 
Net  4.4   4.2   2.9   3.1   8.6   5.1   7.3   3.1   5.5   4.9   2.3 .469 
Nor  6.8  4.2   2.2   4.7   5.4  18.2  17.0   4.2 14.6  8.6   3.7 .430 
Swe  9.5  3.8   2.3   2.5   3.4   8.5   4.1   4.2   6.4   5.0   2.5 .500 
UK  2.9   3.3   3.1   5.8   1.9  13.1   7.5  11.3   3.5   5.8   5.1 .879 
X  6.9  6.1  4.5  5.1  4.5  6.4  5.6  6.1  5.7  5.6  3.2 .571 
S  4.1  4.3  2.4  3.1  2.3  3.8  2.9  3.1  2.7 - - - 
CV .594 .705 .533 .608 .511 .594 .517 .508 .473 - - -  
 
Data from Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mackie and Rose 1974; 1989; Keesings Contemporary Archives and 
reports on more recent elections in the European Journal of Political Research. Note that not all parties 
within the party systems are included, only those included in this study are analysed here. Columns and 
rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period and the country means. The row and column 
marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries respectively. The column 
and row indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X) of the periods and of the party 
system as a whole. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated. 
 
Immediately following World War II most countries experienced considerable party 
realignment and consequently high levels of electoral volatility. Still, the period span-
ning from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, party systems in Western Europe demon-
strated extraordinary electoral stabilisation.102 In retrospect, particularly the period 
Kirchheimer marked as the advent of the catch-all era is a period of stabilisation 
rather than of de-alignment of European electorates. During the late 1950s and 1960s 
the electoral volatility is lower than any other post-war decade. Although since the 
early 1970s this pronounced stability receded somewhat, there is no evidence of a 
linear trend of increasing electoral volatility over time. To analyse the relative variance 
around the mean over time and the consistency of electoral volatility, by way of 
calculating the standard deviation of each period, it emerges that, with the exception 
of the 1970s, there is no proof of increasing dispersion from the mean either. Both 
findings contradict Kirchheimer's assertion of increasing electoral instability. When 
                                                        
102 Bartolini and Mair (1990, 100) calculated that, in the Lipset en Rokkan 'freeze-period' from 1918 until 
1940, the total volatility was 9,9 percent per election on average, while the electoral volatility decreased in 
the period of 1945 until 1985 to an average of 8,7 percent per election. If the last period is broken down 
into two periods (1945-1965 and 1966-1985) the total volatility declined even more; from 9,0 percent in 
the first to 8,5 percent in the latter period. Under the assumption that volatility is not cumulative, 
Bartolini and Mair conclude from this that there is 91 percent electoral stability in Western Europe. Their 
overall conclusion is that there was growing stability in the larger European countries and growing 
instability in the smaller democracies of Europe, a point also observed by Pedersen. This finding clearly 
contradicts Kirchheimer's assertion that electoral competition would be more restricted in the smaller 
democracies. 




both the average level of electoral volatility as well as the standard deviation of the 
countries are taken into account, it materialises that the majority of countries cluster 
together with means ranging between four and six percent electoral volatility and 
standard deviations between two and four. The deviant cases are France, Norway, the 
United Kingdom and Italy with high electoral instability and, on the other hand, 
Finland and Austria with relatively stable electoral alignments. 
 The French and Norwegian electorates have proven to be the most volatile in 
post-war Western Europe. Both party systems are characterised by high mean levels 
of volatility and high standard deviations. France, in particular, experienced electoral 
instability during and immediately after the transition of the Fourth French Republic 
into the Fifth Republic in 1958. In Norway electoral volatility increased since 1973 as 
a result of controversy over the country's entry into the European Community. The 
electoral success of new parties and internal schisms in the Norwegian Labour Party 
resulted in a previously unknown electoral shift. Towards the election of 1985 the 
electorate seemed to return to the earlier stable electoral pattern, yet the 1989-
elections showed large losses for DNA and Hoyre, while the SV and FRP gained 
significantly. More than average volatility is also discernible in Italy. After initial high 
levels of electoral volatility in the 1950s the Italian electorate stabilised. During the 
1060s and 1970s the Italian party system was characterised by a very stable pattern of 
electoral alignment. This stability lasted until the late 1980s when electoral volatility 
increased significantly. The elections of 1992 and 1994 (outside the period of analysis 
of this study) even 'exploded' the old Italian party system. 
 Electoral instability of the British party system is evidenced by the combination of 
a relatively high level of volatility and a high standard deviation. Particularly the 
British elections during the 1970s and the 1980s contributed to this pattern. The 
1974-election, for example, showed high levels of electoral change as a result of 
electoral gains by nationalist parties and the liberals. The cross-time pattern of 
electoral change in the United Kingdom is relatively similar to developments in Den-
mark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, with relatively stable partisan alignments 
until the 1970s. That the high average volatility in Denmark is the result of only a few 
a-typical elections is shown by the relatively low standard deviation. The Danish 
population showed strong party alignment and little electoral turnover for most of the 
post-war era. In sharp contrast, the election of 1973 was unparalleled in electoral 
volatility, when five new parties entered the Folketing which together mustered more 
than thirty-four per cent of the popular vote. Similarly, voting behaviour in the 
Netherlands was strikingly stable and predictable until the mid-1960s. Party-choice 
depended on church affiliation, church attendance, and social class. From the 1960s 
onwards the confessional parties started to lose their electoral appeal in a process 
which became known as 'de-pillarization' (Lijphart 1968). In 1967, for the first time in 
Dutch political history, the Christian democratic parties together did not poll fifty 
percent of the votes and, more important in coalitional terms, the Catholic People's 
Party was no longer the largest party. Forced by this weakened electoral and coalitio-
nal position, the confessional parties merged into one interconfessional party, much 
like the CDU in Germany. However, since the formation of the CDA in 1980, the 
Christian Democrats have not been as dominant in electoral terms as were the three 
individual confessional parties. In the 1980s the Dutch party system became 
structured around four parties (PvdA, CDA, VVD and D66). Sweden also 
experienced a lengthy period of electoral stability which lasted until the late 1960s. In 




particular, the Senterpartiet and the MUP gained electoral support during elections in 
the 1970s, at the expense of the social democrats. Nevertheless, electoral volatility has 
remained at moderate levels compared to other countries. 
 Levels of electoral volatility below the European average are found in Germany, 
Belgium and Ireland. As already mentioned in chapter 2, the German Weimar 
Republic was characterised by high levels of electoral volatility. The elections held in 
1920 and 1924 rank among the most volatile in West European electoral history. No 
wonder that, when the German party system after the Second World War unveiled 
very stable partisan alignments and only minor electoral changes, Kirchheimer saw 
this as evidence of a catch-all development. This electoral stability was particularly 
striking during the 1960s, when the dominance of the two major parties (CDU and 
SPD) reinforced this stasis. Only the ascent of the Grünen resulted in increasing 
levels of electoral change in the elections of 1983. Stability in electoral terms in 
Belgium was only breached by the 1963 elections, in which the social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties suffered significant electoral losses. Despite the emerg-
ence of new parties in the 1980s (Vlaams Blok, Ecolo and Agalev), which increased 
electoral volatility, overall, the Belgian party system is characterised by relatively stable 
electoral alignments. In the Irish party system the dominance of Fianna Fail largely 
stabilised electoral alignments. Over the entire post-war period the electorates of 
Finland and Austria proved to possess the lowest degree of electoral volatility. Most 
notably, Austria is characterised by very stable electoral relations between the major 
political actors of the post-war party system (SPÖ and ÖVP). During the 1970s, when 
other European countries experienced high levels of electoral volatility, the Austrian 
voters remained loyal to their partisan alignments. Only the more recent elections in 
1986 and 1990 demonstrated increasing levels of electoral change. The most stable 
partisan alignments can be found in Finland, witnessed by the lowest average volatility 
as well as a very low standard deviation. Particularly the consistent support for Kesk, 
the SDP and the SFP over several decades contributed to this stability. Nevertheless, 
despite the overall moderate level of electoral change Finland experienced increasing 
electoral volatility. The elections of 1983 and 1987 showed significant electoral losses 
for the SKDL and LKP, while new parties (such as the environmental VIHR) and 
traditional parties (KOK and SFP) gained votes. These trends can be summarised by 
means of regression coefficients between electoral volatility and the year of 
observation. 
 
Table 6.6 Trends in party electoral volatilities in Western Europe 1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
beta 
(β) 
-.01 -.03 -.02 -.08 .05 -.20 -.05 -.06 .10 -.01 -.01 -.02 
 
The row beta ('β') provides the regression coefficient between electoral volatility and the year of the 
observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the 
five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
Regression analysis summarised in table 6.6 shows that, with the exception of France 
and the Netherlands, there is a declining trend in electoral volatility in the period 
under observation. During the last five decades the initially very volatile electorates of 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy stabilised, resulting in a general 
average decline in the level of electoral volatility (β = -.02). 




 It seems, however, premature to conclude that the larger West European democ-
racies have increasingly stable electoral results, while the smaller European countries 
are experiencing increasing instability (Mair 1993, 125). More recent French elections 
in 1993 and 1997 as well as the 1994-election in Italy showed exceptionally high levels 
of electoral volatility. The British elections of 1997 also gave the 'New' Labour Party 
of Tony Blair an unprecedented parliamentary majority. Blair won a land-slide victory 
over the Conservative Party and swept the Tories from power after they had been in 
office for more than eighteen years. Several of the smaller European countries, 
particularly Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, have experienced increasing 
volatile elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the 1994-elections in the 
Netherlands electoral volatility even increased to an unparalleled level of twenty-two 
per cent. 
 In sum, the period Kirchheimer marked as the dawn of catch-allism is rather 
characterised by low levels of electoral volatility than by partisan de-alignment. 
Elections during the late 1950s up until the early 1970s were less instead of more 
volatile in electoral terms. In this period most European countries political parties 
were able to build 'cosy cartels' of power and share the spoils of office. It seems more 
accurate to typify the period which followed, 1971 until 1985, as an epoch of 
profound electoral flux. Nevertheless, the traditional parties of Western Europe have 
shown, in particular during the 1950s that, in the face of momentous social change 
and electoral challenges from new competitors, they are able to stabilize partisan 
alignments and dominate the electoral market. To pursue this line of reasoning with 
regard to the predominance of the traditional parties in electoral terms, table 6.7 
provides the mean level of electoral volatility of parties of different origin. Average 
electoral volatility of party families is measured by summing all individual volatilities 
of parties belonging to one party family, and dividing this total volatility by the 
number of parties. This generates a measure of average volatility for each of the 
respective party families in the nine periods. To summarise cross-time trends of 
electoral volatility the last column gives the regression coefficient of electoral volatility 
with the year of observation as the independent variable. 
 



















X S β 
cd  3.2  6.2  2.0  2.2  1.3  1.3  1.2  2.2  2.2  2.4  3.7 -.11 
com  3.7  1.6  1.6  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5  1.1  1.3  1.6  2.2  .11 
con  3.1  3.9  1.4  3.3  1.6  4.3  5.0  2.0  2.4  3.0  4.4 -.11 
sd  2.7  1.7  1.5  2.0  2.6  2.9  2.4  4.0  2.2  2.4  3.4  .00 
soc  0.2 -  5.8  2.0  1.9  3.1  2.2  1.1  1.7  2.5  3.1 -.14 
lib  2.7  1.3  1.9  2.2  1.9  2.5  1.5  1.2  1.9  1.9  2.9 -.02 
eth  1.2  1.2  0.2  2.2  1.9  0.3  1.0  0.4  0.5  1.0  1.3 -.23 
agr  1.4  1.0  0.7  0.1  2.3  2.0  2.1  1.7  0.6  1.3  2.0 -.13 
 
Entries are the means of all volatility scores of parties belonging to one party families. Data from Bartolini 
and Mair 1990; Mackie and Rose 1974; 1989. The column and row indicated by an 'X' provide the party 
family means and the average score of the period respectively. The column and row marked by 'S' 
provides the standard deviation for the periods and the party family. The column and row indicated by 
'CV ' provides the coefficient of variance (S/ X). The column 'b' provides the regression coefficient 




between the electoral volatility and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) 
indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
After the first highly volatile post-war elections, most parties of the larger party 
families were able to decrease electoral volatility and stabilise mutual relations in the 
electoral arena. Nevertheless, Christian democratic parties experienced an electorally 
volatile period during the 1950s. Over time, however, their average level of electoral 
volatility declined. Electoral volatility of social democratic parties in Europe increased 
during the 1960s and the early 1980s, yet remained stable over time. Conservative 
parties in Western Europe underwent the highest levels of electoral volatility, particu-
larly during the 1970s. The negative regression coefficient of the conservative parties 
shows that over time these parties have become less vulnerable to electoral change. In 
contrast to the general trend, socialist and agrarian parties experienced their highest 
level of volatility in the early 1960s, however, both party families have negative 
regression coefficients. Generally, the liberal parties experience very moderate changes 
in electoral support and seem to have a very stable level of electoral support. Ethnic 
parties have become electorally less vulnerable over time as well. 
 In all, there is little evidence of increasing electoral volatility over time when 
parties are grouped by genetic origin. Only the communist parties have experienced 
significantly more electoral vulnerability over time. All other party families 
experienced a declining or relatively stable level of electoral volatility between 1945 
and 1990. These average levels and trends of electoral volatility are partly a function 
of the total level of support; the electorally largest parties can relatively lose more 
votes. To more closely examine the association between the level of popular support 
and electoral volatility the mean level of electoral support for the most important 
party families are summarised in table 6.8. 
 




















X S CV 
cd 31.4 31.3 27.9 26.3 23.3 20.2 24.8 23.9 23.2 25.4 27.2 1.071 
com 13.1 10.8 9.1 9.5 9.1 8.5 8.8 7.3 6.0 9.1 9.5 1.043 
con 20.8 25.3 25.3 27.7 28.5 26.0 25.9 29.1 29.1 26.4 13.2 .500 
sd 30.4 30.2 30.0 30.0 30.1 29.2 29.3 27.8 27.4 29.4 13.8 .469 
soc - - 6.1 4.6 6.5 5.4 4.0 6.4 7.9 5.8 3.0 .517 
lib 11.0 10.1 9.5 9.8 10.0 8.5 8.4 8.5 9.4 9.4 6.0 .638 
env - - - - - - 1.0 2.3 3.7 2.7 1.9 .704 
eth 5.0 4.7 4.4 5.3 7.2 8.0 6.4 7.0 6.7 6.1 2.5 .409 
agr 14.6 14.4 14.8 15.3 15.3 16.9 16.1 13.2 12.0 14.7 5.7 .387 
prt - - - - - 10.1 7.7 5.6 7.0 7.6 4.3 .566 
S 14.0 14.7 15.4 15.1 15.0 14.2 14.8 14.4 13.8 17.6 14.6 .829 
 
Entries are average levels of electoral support calculated as the mean of the percentage of the vote 
obtained in elections of all parties of one party family, divided by the number of parties. Data from 
Mackie and Rose 1974; 1989. Reports on more recent elections are taken from the European Journal of 
Political Research and Keesings Contemporary Archives. Note that not all parties within the party systems 
are included, only those included in this study are analysed here. The column indicated by an X provides 




the party family means. The row and column marked by 'S' provides the standard deviation for the 
periods and the party families respectively. The column indicated by 'CV ' provides the coefficient of 
variance (S/ X) of the different party families. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could 
not be calculated. 
 
Table 6.8 shows the decline in electoral support for the Christian democratic and 
social democratic parties in Western Europe; a process which clearly contradicts 
Kirchheimer's assertions that these parties would increase popular support with their 
catch-all strategy. If Christian democratic parties have opted for a catch-all strategy, 
then this tactic clearly backfired and has certainly not made confessional parties 
electorally more appealing. Confessional parties have lost a considerable share of their 
popular support since the 1950s when they polled around thirty per cent of the vote. 
Since the 1960s this level declined and Christian democratic electoral support in 
Western Europe hovers between twenty and twenty-five per cent. Parties of social-
democratic origin also lost electoral support, from a steadfast average of over thirty 
percent between the 1950s and the 1970s to less than twenty-eight percent in the 
1980s. This social democratic demise is part of a wider process of electoral corrosion 
of traditional left-wing parties, most ardently indicated by the electoral decline or even 
disappearance of the communist parties in Western Europe. While their electoral 
fortunes were already declining in the late 1950s, the communist option now seems to 
have disappeared from the ballot paper in most West European countries. In some 
party systems (in Norway and the Netherlands) the communists have merged with 
other parties in broader left-wing parties. In Italy, where the communist party has 
traditionally been strong, the party changed its name and moderated its ideological 
identity into a social democratic direction. In most elections after 1989, when the 
communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe were overthrown by popular 
uprisings, electoral decline of traditional left-wing parties could be witnessed, with the 
exception of electoral gains by some new-left socialist parties. More recent elections 
have resulted in victories for social democratic parties and have swept them into 
power in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. 
 In contrast, conservative parties have almost continuously increased their electoral 
support, from an average twenty per cent in the 1950s to over twenty-nine per cent 
on average in the 1980s. The popular support for liberal parties has lingered around 
the ten per cent level. Only during the 1970s and early 1980s did this level decline 
marginally; merely to increase again in the late 1980s. The agrarian parties first 
enlarged their mean level of electoral support from fourteen per cent in the 1950s to 
over sixteen per cent in the 1970s; yet the 1980s showed erosion of the electoral base 
of agrarian or centre parties. The ethnic parties attracted a stable level of popular 
support of around five per cent on average until the 1960s, when their level of 
electoral support increased to around seven per cent. These general trends are 
summarised by way of the regression coefficients between the level of electoral 
support and the year of observation as the independent variable. 
 
Table 6.9 Trends in electoral support over time of West European party families       
1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib eth agr 
beta (β) -.17 -.19 .15 -.07 .21 -.10 .36 -.08 
 




The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between the level of electoral support and the 
year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is 
below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
With the exception of the conservative parties, all major party families have a negative 
trend in popular support over time, making Kirchheimer's assertions on widespread 
electoral catch-all behaviour most unlikely. Additionally, parties which were explicitly 
excluded from the catch-all development by Kirchheimer, namely ethnic parties and 
more ideologically motivated parties on the left of the political spectrum, have gained 
in popular support. 
 In conclusion, there is no evidence of a secular trend towards increasing electoral 
volatility, yet neither is their confirmation of a constant decline in electoral turnover. 
The electorally larger party families have not strengthened their electoral position over 
time, instead most members of the major party families have lost some popular 
support. Despite the obvious conclusion that politics in Western Europe was 
characterised by long-term stability in electoral support, substantial electoral change 
can be observed particularly during the late 1980s and, although outside the scope of 
this study, increasingly so in the 1990s. In addition, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 89) 
found significant association between total volatility and class-cleavage volatility 
(volatility between blocks of parties with a common historical origin). Although very 
few West European elections are actually class-competitive, class cleavage volatility is 
highest in the larger democracies, in particular Germany, France and the United King-
dom. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 both confirm that communist and social democratic parties 
declined electorally to the benefit of conservative and, in some countries, liberal 
parties. In addition, there is also significant electoral movement across other 
cleavages, such as the religious divide, which is indicated by the electoral weakening of 
Christian democratic and agrarian parties. Since the mid-1960s a moderate trend 
towards class de-alignment is discernible, a trend which accelerates in the mid-1980s. 
Overall, however, electoral change across 'ideological frontiers' constituted only a 
modest proportion of the total volatility until the mid-1980s; which justifies the 
conclusion that up until that point in time voters remained loyal to parties belonging 
to the same ideological tendency. Notwithstanding the aforementioned trends of 
traditional parties in Western Europe, some parties, in particular those of social 
democratic origin, had to cope with significant losses of partisan identification and 
electoral support in addition to losses of traditional working-class backing. Therefore, 
it can be asserted that social class declined as a dimension of competition in West 
European party systems (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, 105). Furthermore, the process of 
secularisation has eroded the electoral base of Christian democratic parties. Still, all 
this has resulted in very diverse and sometimes contradictory patterns of electoral 
change with regard to the predictions of Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis. How have 
parties coped with these less secure electoral alignments? One possible strategy 
Kirchheimer himself suggested was that catch-all parties compensate their loss of 
direct association with the electorate by affiliating themselves to different organised 
interests in order to secure pools of voters. 
6.3 Interest group representation 
Throughout this book it was asserted that catch-all parties no longer represent one 
single social or religious group; instead they seek to represent a wider range of social 




interests. This chapter has shown that most major parties have disconnected 
themselves from traditional supporters and appealed to a wider electorate. 
Kirchheimer argued that catch-all parties cope with this loss of traditional support and 
disjointed electoral relations by establishing solid links with interest groups (labour 
unions, religious or business organisations). These interest groups become the 
intermediaries between the electorate and the political elites.103 These links between 
parties and organised interests may take numerous forms, whose study has culminated 
in an entire field of political science research on 'corporatist structures'. Interest 
groups can be important as pools for membership recruitment or, in the case of 
indirect membership, serve as an integral part of the membership party. Organised 
interests can also be meaningful in financial terms; as is the case when funds are 
generated through these organisations. Furthermore, organised interests can perform 
a role in the election campaigns of political parties. Already in 1954 Kirchheimer 
(1954b) stressed these financial and propagandistic functions of interest groups for 
political parties at election time. The network of interest organisations can also act as 
a means for policy-formulation and -implementation. The strength of the ties between 
political parties and organised interests, ranging from clear ancillary party 
organisations to independent political actors, is evaluated here on the basis of 
recruitment of cabinet ministers from these associations. 
 The rationale behind the decision to limit the analysis to cabinet ministers is that, 
when parties endow the most important and powerful office to delegates of organised 
interests they clearly present themselves as the representatives of these interests. In 
defence of the choice to analyse cabinet ministers and not parliamentary representa-
tives, it can be argued that a minister is the most important representative of a 
political party (see Blondel 1991). In this study I only explore the extent to which 
European political parties have espoused interest groups by way of examining the 
nomination of representatives of these organised interests for public office by parties. 
First, this fourth indicator of catch-allism at the electoral level, the increasing influence of 
interest groups, is not only related to the electoral level. Nomination of interest-group 
representatives into powerful intra-party positions influences the policy-making 
process within political parties.104 Furthermore, recruitment for political office and the 
selection of these candidates is also related to the organisational dimension (see 
chapter 4). An increasing number of professionals educated and trained outside the 
party organisation also indicates increasing professionalization of political parties. Still, 
the focus in this section is on the representative aspect, that is the professional and 
political background of party elites throughout Western Europe. Kirchheimer argued 
that catch-all parties will recruit more ministers on the basis of their technical and 
managerial expertise than on the basis of ideological criteria or political experience. 
 Unfortunately, there are no cross-national and longitudinal comparative data 
available on the social and professional origin of parliamentary representatives so that 
I could have analysed all post-war parliamentary representatives. There is, 
nevertheless, one data set on the social background and profession of government 
                                                        
103 Finer 1970, 152; Schmitter 1983; Von Beyme 1985, 11-13, 191-196; Kitschelt 1994, 94-104. 
104 The incorporation of a variety of interests in the party-platform and the influence of interest groups 
representatives on the policy making process of the party, has also been studied by Laver and Hunt 
(1992). Laver and Hunt asked country experts to which extent they think political actors outside the 
official party organization can be used to apply pressure on the policy making process within the party. 
Their main findings are that particularly Scandinavian parties have strong links with external groups, while 
also Christian democratic and social democratic parties can rely on outside pressure groups for support. 




ministers in European cabinets. This data set, collected by Blondel and Thiebault 
(1991), provides information on the educational and occupational background of 
cabinet ministers and on the political careers of these ministers (see also Blondel 
1985). For those parties that have entered into government, this database allows to 
assess changes in the social descent of cabinet ministers and their political experience. 
In this study the data collected by Blondel and Thiebault are combined with the data-
set of cabinet ministers of Woldendorp et al. (1993) in order to establish trends in 
external recruitment of cabinet ministers over time. Thus, it is possible to assess the 
level of external (non-parliamentary) recruitment of members of governmental elites 
of Western European parties, which indicates the extent to which parties represent 
organised interests and are willing to incorporate non-political experts to represent 
them in the highest executive office. 
6.3.1 Origin and social background of cabinet ministers 
Firstly, the general pattern of ministerial recruitment is presented here as these data 
provide insight in the different types of expertise parties find useful to levy into their 
party organisation and their ministerial team. The patterns of recruitment vary 
considerably between parties as is shown in table 6.11. The entries are mean 
percentages of the total number of ministers which held governmental responsibility 
in Western European from 1945 until 1985. The last occupation ministers performed 
before being recruited is used in the analysis. 
 
Table 6.10 Parliamentary origin and social background of ministers in Western 

































































































Aut 67.7  0.0 20.2  8.4  9.5  4.8 16.7  2.4  1.2  0.0 20.2 16.7 
Bel 86.9  0.0 13.0 10.1 21.6 26.1  6.7  1.4  5.1  1.4  8.7  5.8 
Den 78.8  7.9  8.6  6.6  6.6 15.8 15.2  2.0 13.2  2.0  5.3 15.8 
Fin 62.4  7.5 11.7 18.2  5.3 13.9 23.5  1.3  8.6  0.5  4.8  2.1 
Fra 68.9  2.0 13.4 11.0 23.2 11.4 25.2  1.6  6.3  0.4  2.0  2.0 
Ger 73.6  5.8  6.6  6.7 25.8  6.6  5.8  0.0  3.3 15.0  5.0 20.0 
Ire 95.9  2.1 22.7  7.2 20.6 17.6  4.2  7.2  1.0  1.0  9.3  4.1 
Ita 94.3  0.9 10.9  5.2 39.6 19.6  3.5  0.4  9.1  2.2  3.9  3.5 
Net 52.9  0.7 17.6  5.1 18.2 15.6 24.9  2.7  4.7  0.0  3.4  2.7 
Nor 57.1  1.9 12.3  7.5  5.1 11.0 15.6  0.0  6.5  5.2  9.7 24.7 
Swe 61.3  7.7  3.8  7.6  7.7 23.1 11.5  0.0 15.4  3.8  3.8 15.4 
UK 95.1  2.1 19.5  3.8 17.0 11.3  9.5  4.4 10.7  0.0 14.4  7.5 
X 75.5  2.9 13.3  8.4 18.4 14.4 14.4  1.9  7.1  2.3  6.8  8.5 





Entries are percentages of ministers from a certain professional background. Data from Blondel 1985. 
parliament = percentage of ministers with parliamentary background. The other rows represent the 
occupation ministers held before being recruited as ministers: farmers = farmers, industry = people from 
business and industry, cadre = cadre/professional background, jurists = people from the legal 
professions, teachers = teachers, civil servants = civil servants, military = military, journalists = 
journalists, white collar = white collar employees, blue collar = blue collar and/or union background, 
politician = full time politician. The row indicated with an 'X' gives the overall European mean of 
ministers recruited from this professional background. 
 
The occupational background of ministers are categorised in eleven types, 
summarised in columns 2 to 12. The first column provides the proportion of 
ministers with parliamentary experience. The first important observation is that the 
largest proportion of the ministers in Western Europe are recruited from the legal 
professions. Almost one out of every five ministers started their career as a judge, 
lawyer or law professor. Particularly in Italy the proportion of ministers with a legal 
background was very high, almost forty percent of recruited ministers studied law. 
Legal expertise was also very prominent among ministers in Germany and France, 
where a quarter of all ministers concluded a legal education. In Belgium, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Britain the proportion of legal experts was around the 20 percent. 
Another professional group which is highly represented in European cabinets are 
teachers; one in six ministers taught at schools, in higher education or at university 
(law professors have been included in the category of the legal professionals). The 
highest proportion of teachers can be found in Belgian cabinets; one in four Belgian 
ministers were teachers before accepting a ministerial position. Also in Sweden the 
proportion of former teachers is high, 23 per cent, while in Italy, Ireland, the Nether-
lands and Finland the percentage of teachers is also substantial. The third best 
represented profession in European cabinets are civil servants. Here again Belgium 
has the highest proportion of civil servants occupying ministerial posts. Like Belgium, 
also in Sweden one fifth of ministers have worked in state employment. In Italy, 
Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands a considerable proportion of ministers have 
worked as civil servants before being appointed minister. Another important 
observation which has to be made is that the interests of industry, business and 
banking are much better represented at the governmental level than workers and their 
unions; twice as many ministers are recruited from among the employers compared to 
representatives of wage dependent strata. Particularly in Ireland, Austria, Britain and 
the Netherlands industrialists, business men and women and bankers have been very 
successful in obtaining ministerial positions. Only in Austria and Britain can it be said 
that workers or their representatives achieve almost equal representation. In all other 
countries the employers are better represented in cabinet than their employees. 
Farmers are best represented in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland) and Germany at the ministerial level. Not surprisingly this is where 
(remnants) of agrarian parties are best represented in parliament. The military 
profession is not very successful in gaining direct ministerial control, with the 
exception of Ireland. Journalists are best represented in Danish, Swedish and British 
governments. 
 Important with respect to Kirchheimer's thesis of de-politicisation is the propor-
tion of ministers parties recruit from within their party organisation. Within catch-all 
parties the number of internally trained politicians will decline and devoted party 
officials will become an endangered species since they are far too ideologically and 




policy motivated, instead of electorally oriented and office-seeking. In the last column 
of table 6.10 the proportion of ministers which are full time professional party-
politicians is given. This table shows that in Norway, Germany, Austria, Denmark and 
Sweden a significant share of ministerial positions is filled with full-time party 
officials. In Norway one quarter, in Germany one in five and in Austria, Denmark and 
Sweden one in six ministerial posts are occupied by people who have no career 
outside the party. The lowest levels of internal recruitment are found in Finland, 
France, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
 As argued above, with regard to the catch-all thesis, it is also important to examine 
the proportion of ministers recruited from the national parliamentary party. 
Theoretically, a high level of catch-allism correlates with a low level of parliamentary 
recruitment. The mean levels of parliamentary recruitment of ministers in European 
countries are given in the first column of table 6.10. Overall, three quarters of 
European ministers held a seat in parliament before joining a government. In all 
countries the majority of ministers are recruited from the parliamentary party, yet 
substantial differences between countries exist. In Ireland, Britain and Italy more than 
ninety per cent of the ministers have been in the national parliament. The high scores 
for Ireland and Britain are not surprising as it is stipulated by law that ministers have 
to be members of parliament. For Belgium this percentage is also near the ninety 
percent level. In Germany and Denmark between seventy and eighty percent and in 
Austria, Finland, France and Sweden between sixty and seventy percent of the 
ministers have parliamentary experience before entering a cabinet. The lowest levels 
of experience at the national political level among ministers is found in the 
Netherlands and Norway. More than half of the ministers in Western Europe have 
been parliamentary representatives (see also De Winter 1991). This very static analysis 
is extended in the next section, where the external recruitment over time is 
summarised. 
6.3.2 External recruitment of ministers 
External recruitment in this section refers to recruitment of ministers who have not 
held seats in the national parliament. By combining the data from Blondel and 
Thiebault (1991) with the information from Woldendorp et al. (1993) it is possible to 
quantify the level of external recruitment of ministers over time. Kirchheimer 
regarded ministerial appointments on the basis of their expertise and skills, rather 
than on political grounds as an integral part of the catch-all development. Increasing 
proportions indicate a transformation in recruitment pattern towards the catch-all 
model. Table 6.11 summarises the average level of external recruitment of ministers, 
ministers without parliamentary experience, in the different countries. 
























X S CV 
Aut 51.1 16.7 22.5 20.6 18.3 19.3 29.7 58.8 51.3 34.2 31.2 .912 
Bel 16.4  5.6  5.0  5.8 10.5  0.7  4.7  4.5  7.0  7.0  9.0 1.286 
Den 18.7 28.5 23.8 37.9 45.8 37.4 27.9 29.6 30.8 31.8 16.6 .522 
Fin 53.8 34.7 32.4 37.2 30.5 37.6 22.7 20.8 25.0 32.9 24.3 .739 
Fra 28.8  0.0  7.1  5.2 27.0  6.5 18.9 22.1 51.5 17.3 22.7 1.312 
Ger 63.4 75.0 69.9 30.8 27.3 17.8  8.7 13.3 19.3 34.6 26.7 .772 
Ire  0.0  0.0  2.7  6.9  6.7  2.4  0.0  3.7  9.2  3.3  6.6 2.000 
Ita  1.2  0.6  0.7  1.0  0.3  0.7  1.2  1.1  2.6  1.1  2.3 2.090 
Net 44.4 45.4 58.8 44.1 47.7 45.7 25.5 28.3 28.5 41.5 25.5 .614 
Nor 50.0 69.2 57.0 35.7 36.3 25.6 51.2 31.3 31.3 36.1 21.3 .590 
Swe 48.2 16.5 19.6 35.7 35.1 38.9 13.7 20.9 25.7 23.2 18.7 .806 
UK 20.0 27.6 18.5 11.3  8.7  0.0  2.3  4.5  4.5 10.7 10.7 1.000 
X 33.0 26.7 26.5 22.7 24.5 19.4 17.2 19.9 23.9 23.4 - - 
S 31.8 28.5 25.9 24.9 27.4 21.7 14.7 19.5 23.0 24.4 - - 
 
Data from Blondel (1985) and from Woldendorp et al. (1993). Entries are the percentage of ministers 
which have no political experience in national parliament prior to their appointment as minister. Note that 
the mean score of external recruitment in this table and the overall average percentage of ministers with 
parliamentary expertise in column 1 of table 6.10 do not add up to one hundred per cent due to different 
a period of analysis by Blondel. Columns and rows indicated by an X provide the average score by period 
and the country means. The row and column marked by 'S' provide the standard deviation for the periods 
and the countries respectively. The column indicated by 'CV ' provide the coefficient of variance (S/ X) of 
the parties within one party system. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be 
calculated. 
 
In contrast to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, the level of external (non-parliamentary) 
recruitment of ministers declined from an average of more than thirty per cent in the 
1950s to less than twenty-four per cent in the late 1980s. In the mid-1960s, the point 
at which Kirchheimer regarded the catch-all development to mature, there is indeed 
an increasing propensity in external recruitment of ministers. Denmark, France, 
Ireland and Austria (and arguably Italy) are the cases which show a trend towards 
increasing external recruitment. Overall the opposite trend is dominant; increasing 
proportions of ministers are recruited on the basis of their political expertise which 
they acquired in the national parliamentary parties. During the post-war period the 
differences in levels of external recruitment have declined as is indicated by a 
decreasing standard deviation over time. 
 This cross-time variation can result from essentially two possible types of trans-
formation; either parties change their source of recruitment over time or different 
parties with different modes of recruitment enter into governments. In examining the 
cases, it emerges that both types exist. The French Fourth Republic constituted a 
period of extensive parliamentary recruitment of ministers. During the Fifth Republic 
an increasing number of ministers is recruited from outside politics. The steep rise in 
external ministerial recruitment in the 1980s is largely the effect of socialist govern-
mental control at play since 1981. In Austria the SPÖ shifted in the late 1970s from 




total parliamentary recruitment to more external ministerial recruitment. 
 The highest levels of external ministerial recruitment are found in Norway, the 
Netherlands and Germany. The high level of external recruitment in Norway is 
closely related to the high level of social democratic governmental control. Two 
modes of ministerial recruitment seem to emerge in Norway: DNA and Venstre 
recruit only half or less of their ministers from the parliamentary group, while Hoyre, 
KrF and Senterpartiet enlisted around three quarters of their ministers from their 
parliamentary party. Dutch ministers are also often recruited from outside parlia-
mentary politics on the basis of expertise and experience in certain policy fields 
(Andeweg 1988). During the period of 'pillarization' (until 1967) many ministers were 
recruited on a non-political basis (usually expertise) as broad coalitions necessitated 
politically non-controversial and widely acceptable ministers. As a result, many cabi-
nets of the immediate post-war period had a high non-political character in ministerial 
recruitment. In the first four post-war cabinets some ministers were not even 
affiliated to one particular party (Bakema and Secker 1988). Nevertheless, since the 
early 1970s an increasing number of ministers is recruited on political grounds (see 
also Daalder 1987, 213). The differences in parliamentary recruitment between parties 
were substantial in the Netherlands; the Christian democrats recruited only fifty per 
cent of their ministers from their parliamentary group, while the secular parties 
adopted a more political mode of ministerial recruitment. The Dutch social democrats 
recruited more than seventy percent of its ministers from politically experienced 
candidates. In Germany the average high level of external recruitment is primarily a 
function of the highly 'technocratic' post-war CDU-cabinets in the 1950s. In the 
1960s ministerial recruitment politicised rapidly in Germany. Again this can easily be 
explained with the differences between parties; the CDU, which controlled the 
executive until 1966, was also the party with the lowest proportion of ministers with a 
parliamentary background. Since the SPD recruited more than eighty percent of their 
ministers from the socialist parliamentary group, their entry in the 'Grand Coalition' 
decreased the number of external ministers considerably. Political recruitment has 
since dominated in German politics, also within the CDU/CSU. In Sweden, Austria 
and Finland a substantial proportion, around thirty per cent of all ministers, was also 
offered an executive ministerial position without any prior parliamentary experience. 
Here the level of external recruitment also results from the dominance of the social 
democratic parties, which recruited a significant number of ministers from external 
interests groups. In Sweden more than half of the social democratic ministers came 
from outside the parliamentary party. The Swedish conservatives and Senterpartiet 
recruited a large majority, over eighty per cent, of ministers from their parliamentary 
party, while half of the Fp-ministers also had parliamentary experience. The high 
number of non-parliamentary ministers in Finland is again largely the result of the 
external recruitment of the SDP; just over sixty percent of the SDP ministers have 
been MP's. KESK and KOK drew almost ninety percent of their ministers from the 
parliamentary party, whereas the Swedish People's Party had the lowest parliamentary 
recruitment with less than sixty percent of its ministers from their parliamentary party. 
 The lowest level of external recruitment and consequently very 'political' 
appointments of ministers, was found in Belgium and Italy, where almost all ministers 
are recruited from the parliamentary parties. Parliamentary recruitment of ministers is 
characteristic for the Italian political culture, the 'partitocracia' (see Sartori 1971). The 
PSI and DC are the only parties which recruit ministers from extra-parliamentary 




groups. Belgian politics is also characterised by very 'political' ministerial recruitment. 
External expertise is seldom incorporated in cabinet coalitions; the Christian 
democrats are the only party with a fair amount of ministers recruited from external 
organisations. Logically, high levels of parliamentary recruitment of ministers were 
found in Ireland and United Kingdom. This results from the Westminster model of 
government, where the party with a parliamentary majority elects its Prime Minister 
from its parliamentary party who, in turn, selects ministers from the members of 
parliament. In Ireland the constitution also stipulates that ministers are to be recruited 
from parliament. These national trends are summarised by means of regression 
coefficients between external ministerial recruitment and the year of observation as 
the independent variable in table 6.12. 
 
Table 6.12 Trends in external ministerial recruitment over time in Western Europe    
1945-1990 
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK 
beta    (
β) 
.18 -.29 .12 -.31* .24 -.80* .32 .14 -.30* -.29 -.17 -.79* 
 
The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between extra-parliamentary ministerial 
recruitment  and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the 
significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 
 
This table conclusively shows that, contrary to the catch-all thesis, in most countries 
the level of recruitment of non-political experts and professionals declined over time. 
The overall regression coefficient between the level of extra-parliamentary ministerial 
recruitment and the year of observation as the independent variable is a statistically 
significant -.13 (β). This trend was chiefly discernible in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Finland and Belgium. The only countries where the trend is in the direction 
as predicted by the catch-all thesis are Austria, Denmark, France and Italy. If 
anything, what is occurring in Western Europe is rather politicisation of the executive 
power rather than the direct inclusion of organised interests in the executive branch 
of government. An increasing number of ministers in Western Europe is recruited 
from the national parliaments and have clear party-political contours. This does not 
mean that organised interests have not gained more access to power. It may well be 
that the representatives of these interests are first allocated parliamentary seats so that 
they can acquire the necessary political expertise. Nevertheless, direct extra-
parliamentary recruitment of non-political experts and professionals from interest 
groups, as Kirchheimer suggested, has not come to characterise West European 
politics. 
 As described above, differences in the proportion of externally recruited ministers 
between parties of different genetic origin may result from historical and ideological 
modes of elite recruitment. The next section examines these differences between 
party families more closely in summarising their pattern of ministerial recruitment. 
 
Table 6.13 Parliamentary origin and social background of ministers of West European 
party families 1945-1985 














































































































com 80.0  4.0  0.0  8.0 12.0  8.0 16.0  0.0 24.0  0.0 12.0 16.0 
sd 76.7  1.4  5.7  9.1 11.9 16.4 14.7  0.7  9.4  2.3 15.0 12.2 
cd 80.3  1.2 16.1  6.0 27.0 16.0 12.3  0.5  4.8  3.6  5.0  7.5 
agr 86.7 23.0  9.5 23.0  0.0  6.8 12.2  1.4  8.1  4.1  2.7  5.4 
lib 82.5  3.6 16.3  6.3 29.4 21.7  7.7  1.4  7.2  2.3  0.0  4.5 
con 89.7  2.8 25.5  7.5 18.8  7.6 13.1  5.5  6.2  1.0  1.7  9.0 
X 82.7  6.0 12.2 10.0 16.5 12.8 12.7  1.6 10.0  2.2  6.1  9.1 
 
Data from Blondel (1985). parliament = percentage of ministers with parliamentary background. The 
other rows represent the occupation ministers held before being recruited as ministers: farmers = farmers, 
industry = people from business and industry, cadre = cadre/professional background, jurists = people 
from the legal professions, teachers = teachers, civil servants = civil servants, military = military, 
journalists = journalists, white collar = white collar employees, blue collar = blue collar and/or union 
background, politician = full time politician. The row indicated with an 'X' gives the overall European 
mean of ministers recruited from this professional background. 
 
With regard to social background of ministers, it emerges that 'traditional' groups are 
best represented at the ministerial level of 'their' party family. Agrarian parties, for 
example, had the highest level of farmers as ministers; the social democrats recruited 
the highest proportion of blue-collar workers and union representatives as ministers 
and the conservatives and liberals had the highest percentage of industrialists and 
bankers as cabinet ministers. Social democratic and communist parties also have the 
highest level of full-time politicians as ministers, which is in line with the tradition of 
extensive political education within these party organisations and the remnants of the 
ideology of democratic centralism. Christian democratic parties have a very diverse 
pattern of ministerial recruitment indicating their ability to cross-cut class lines and 
occupational stratification in general. The best represented occupational group among 
Christian democratic cabinet ministers are those trained in the legal profession, yet 
teachers, industrialists, bankers and civil servants are also likely to be found among 
Christian democratic ministers. 
 On average, there are only minimal differences between party families with respect 
to the proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience. Thus, ministerial 
recruitment seems more influenced by national political cultures and practices than by 
the origin or ideology of parties. Within the marginal differences, social democratic 
and communist parties recruit less ministers from their parliamentary party and more 
from their own party organisation in comparison to the other party families. To 
evaluate the proportion of external recruitment over time, table 6.14 summarises the 
mean proportions of ministers without parliamentary experience in the different party 
families. 
 
























X S CV 
cd 34.4 35.4 36.7 34.0 30.3 28.0 15.2 13.5 18.8 28.6 27.2 .951 
con -  7.5 12.9 16.2 15.6 14.0  5.6 15.7 11.6 14.2 18.4 1.296 
sd 21.9 21.0 23.1 16.1 19.0 19.0 18.4 23.7 27.2 21.1 21.3 1.009 
lib 25.1 28.2 24.0 34.6 41.4 22.7 16.0 23.8 25.8 26.3 27.3 1.038 
agr - 21.0 12.5 24.4 37.3 31.3 21.2 17.1 16.7 23.6 20.1 .851 
 
Data from Blondel (1985) and Woldendorp et al. (1993). Entries are the percentage of ministers which 
have no political experience in national parliament prior to their appointment as minister. The column 
indicated by an X provides the party family means. The row and column marked by 'S' provides the 
standard deviation for the periods and the party families respectively. The column indicated by 'CV ' 
provides the coefficient of variance (S/ X) of the different party families. A minus sign (-) means that data 
were not available or could not be calculated. 
 
Of the largest party families the Christian democratic and agrarian parties recruited 
more external representatives and experts from organised interests. The Christian 
democratic parties in Western Europe showed a very stable level of thirty per cent of 
external, 'non-political' recruitment of ministers until the 1970s. Thereafter, Christian 
democratic parties have opted for more 'political', parliamentary recruitment of their 
ministers. The agrarian parties recruited an increasing number of external 
representatives during the 1970s, although the number of ministers from outside the 
parliamentary party declined in the 1980s. After an initial period of increasing external 
recruitment, the 1970s marked a turning point for liberal parties, it was then that they 
began admitting more people with parliamentary experience to represent them in 
government. Social democratic ministerial recruitment was characterised by a decline 
in non-political experts until the 1980s, thereafter, an increasing number of social 
democratic ministers have had no parliamentary political experience. The conservative 
parties had, over the post-war period, a relatively moderate level of external 
recruitment. Cross-time trends in external ministerial recruitment of party families are 
summarised by way of a regression analysis between the level of recruitment of 






Table 6.15 Trends in extra-parliamentary ministerial recruitment of West European 
party families 1945-1990 
 cd com con sd soc lib eth agr 
beta (β) -.27* -.72* -.17 .04 - -.07 .20 -.16 
 
The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between extra-parliamentary ministerial 
recruitment and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the 
significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). 





Over time, members of almost all party families have, contrary to the catch-all thesis, 
recruited less individuals which had no prior political expertise before their 
appointment as cabinet minister. Stated differently, most party families adopted more 
‘political’ patterns of ministerial recruitment and selected an increasing number of 
ministers from their parliamentary party. Only the social democratic and ethnic parties 
have recruited an increasing proportion of non-political external experts as cabinet 
ministers. 
 In sum, there is little evidence to suggest that ministerial recruitment has become 
based more on technical and managerial skills and less on political grounds as 
Kirchheimer suggested. In fact, there is more testimony that the opposite trend has 
been dominant and ministerial recruitment became increasingly 'political' in Western 
Europe as the number of ministers with parliamentary experience increased. This 
finding clearly contradicts Kirchheimer's assertion that parties in Western Europe 
would seek to represent various social interests through recruitment of experts and 
professionals from non-parliamentary domains. 
6.4 Conclusion: electoral catch-allism of West European parties 
At the electoral level the catch-all thesis could only be corroborated to a limited 
extent. Indeed, Kirchheimer had correctly asserted that political parties in Western 
Europe would appeal to voter groups outside their traditional pools of support. 
Across Western Europe, an overall and substantial decline in class-voting is 
discernible at the electoral level during the post-war period, although there are 
significant differences between countries and party families. In France, Germany and 
the Netherlands, for example, the class-distinctiveness of political parties did not 
decline significantly. Nevertheless, in all other countries class-voting did decline, 
despite the fact that this process was less expeditious than the structural decline of the 
manual working-class in the total labour force. In general, Western European 
electorates became progressively middle-class dominated as the manual working-class 
'disappeared' upwards into the non-manual white collar social strata. This upward 
social mobility of the manual working class into the middle classes resulted in 
increasingly middle-class dominated constituencies of social democratic, Christian 
democratic and liberal parties, particularly since the late 1970s. Since the working class 
traditionally voted for social democratic and Christian democratic parties, their 
constituencies have undergone the most profound restructuring. Particularly the 
deliberate strategy of Christian democratic parties to employ a cross-class electoral 
appeal has faltered in the most recent decades. Despite the fact that the working-class 
electorate declined, the de-alignment of European electorates should not be 
exaggerated; within the electorate of social democratic and communist parties there is 
still an overrepresentation of the working class constituency. Nevertheless, the 
explanatory power of social class for voting behaviour weakened decisively in the 
West European context. 
 In addition, the passive support for political parties, when measured by the level of 
party identification, decreased considerably in most European countries since the late 
1960s. This justifies the conclusion that a general weakening of the traditional link 
between parties and their voters has taken place, as Kirchheimer stated. This decline 
in partisan attachment resulted in increasingly volatile elections, particularly in Den-




mark, the Netherlands and Norway, while the initially very volatile electorates of 
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland stabilised somewhat. Higher 
levels of electoral turnover were largely caused by the decline in electoral support of 
communist, social-democratic and Christian democratic parties. Still, the period which 
Kirchheimer marked as the ascent of the Western European catch-all party, is 
characterised by low levels of electoral turnover and limited party competition. In 
contrast, the 1970s and early 1980s were characterised by increasing electoral 
volatility. As a result of the post-war economic restructuring process and consequent 
social transformation parties have inevitably become more electorally vulnerable. The 
traditional parties of social democratic, Christian democratic, agrarian, liberal and 
conservative origin, have however, largely maintained control over the electoral 
market. Relatively few new political competitors have made serious electoral inroads 
in West European party systems. 
 To compensate for the loss of clear representation of social strata and strong 
party-voter links, Kirchheimer argued that catch-all parties seek association with the 
electorate through organised interest groups. This study found that parties in Western 
Europe have not established stronger links with the electorate via interest groups. 
Indeed, there is proof of a steady decline in external (non-parliamentary) recruitment 
of ministers; only in the mid-1970s and the late 1980s were a larger number of 
ministers appointed on the basis of their expertise and skills, rather than on the basis 
of political experience in parliament. Thus, there was little evidence to suggest that 
ministerial recruitment has become increasingly based on technical and managerial 
skills and less on political grounds as Kirchheimer suggested. On the contrary, 
ministerial recruitment became progressively more 'political' in Western Europe as a 
larger number of ministers were recruited from the parliamentary parties. Only the 
social democratic parties strengthened the representational links with external groups 
through the recruitment of ministers without any parliamentary background. 
 
To examine Kirchheimer's claim that in particular the major traditional parties are 
prone to adopt catch-all characteristics, table 6.16 reports the correlations between the 
four indices of electoral catch-allism and indicators of ancientry (the age of party), 
electoral strength and organisational continuity of political parties (the number of 
splits and mergers). 




Table 6.16 Correlation matrix of electoral indicators with party age, electoral size and 
organisational discontinuity 
 PARTY AGE ELECTORAL SIZE ORGANIZATIONAL 
DISCONTINUITY 
class distinctiveness -.03 -.13 -.15 
party identification    .38**    .94**   .01 
electoral volatility -.08 -.02 -.04 
external recruitment  .02  .01 -.03 
 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. The asterisk indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 
level (*) or at the 0.001 level (**). Definitions and measurement of the variables is explained in Appendix 
2. 
 
As can be seen from table 6.16, most indices of electoral catch-allism are unrelated to 
the indicators of seniority, significance and stamina of parties. Only the level of party 
identification is strongly associated with the life-span of parties and even more with 
its level of popular support at elections. 
 
As in the earlier chapters, to analyse the development of catch-allism over time, all the 
indicators on the electoral dimension are standardised into z-scores and recalculated 
so that a high score indicates more electoral catch-allism than a low score in order to 
establish the relative level of catch-allism across time. Cross-time trends in class-
distinctiveness of party electorates, external ministerial recruitment, party identifica-
tion and electoral volatility are summarised in standardised z-scores in table 6.17. 
 




















class-distinctiveness -.85 .20 -.11 -.13 -.12 .15 .19 -.06 .08 
party-identification - - - -.22 -.44 -.04 -.02 .09 .15 
volatility .02 .04 .07 -.04 -.06 .02 .02 .01 -.07 
external recruitment .33 .03 .10 .06 .16 -.07 -.36 -.16 -.02 
 
The variable names are explained in appendix II. A z-score is obtained by finding the deviation of the 
score from the mean of the distribution and dividing the result by the standard deviation (z = (x - avg)/s). 
The higher the standard score, the more West European parties have moved towards catch-allism on this 
indicator. 
 
Clearly, this table shows that there is no evidence of a incessant development towards 
electoral catch-allism on all indicators. If anything, a trend contrary to the 
assumptions of the catch-all thesis is discernible on two indicators of the electoral 
dimension, namely with regard to volatility and external recruitment of ministers. 
Only with respect to party identification there is strong evidence that Kirchheimer 
correctly asserted that the party-voter link is weakening in West European party 
systems. Table 6.17 shows the continuous decline in the average level of party 
identification, indicating the disjointment of European electorates with their political 
representatives. Apparently, the average level of electoral volatility remains relatively 
stable over the entire post-war period and even declined in the late 1980s, resulting in 
a lower standard score of electoral catch-allism in the last period. External recruitment 




declined almost constantly over the post-war period, only the mid-1970s and 1980s 
show a more non-political pattern of ministerial recruitment. This partially makes for 
a development contrary to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis on this indicator as well. 
Instead of incorporating more interest-group representatives, ministerial recruitment 
became more political over time. With regard to the class-distinctiveness of the 
parties' electorate, Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis is also only confirmed to a certain 
extent. Kirchheimer correctly observed that particularly during the 1950s and 1960 
class-distinctiveness of the electorate of individual parties declined constantly. 
However, the late 1970 and the 1980s mark a period in which this process was 
reversed and the support of parties in Western Europe became more distinctive with 
regard to social complexion. 
 
Similar to previous chapters, the assumption of a uni-dimensional electoral catch-all 
concept is examined with a reliability test and was rejected (see appendix 3). There is 
no single underlying dimension of electoral catch-allism. Instead, two latent factors 
underpin the electoral behaviour of political parties of which the first factor is the 
width of electoral appeal. The factor analysis shows that the class basis of party 
support and the intensity of party identification are correlated with this first 
underlying factor. The level of party identification is negatively associated with this 
latent factor, while class-distinctiveness of party support is correlated positively with 
this ‘electoral appeal’ factor. This suggests that the more parties are class-distinctive, 
fewer people can identify with this party, namely only those who regard themselves 
part of the core constituency. Apparently, some parties still have a distinct 
representative image in the eyes of the electorate. People's parties with a broad social 
appeal, on the other hand, allow a larger proportion of the electorate to identify with 
the party. Both items are considered to constitute the poles of what shall be 
paraphrased as 'the electoral appeal-factor' of political party behaviour. 
 The second latent factor will be coined the 'level of social inclusion' of political 
parties. On this factor electoral volatility is positively associated with the level of 
external (extra-parliamentary) recruitment of ministers. Apparently, parties which 
opened up their organisation to non-partisan elites from external interest groups are 
also more vulnerable to electoral fluctuation. Both these items point towards a party's 
sensitivity towards penetration by non-traditional, external influences both at the elite 
level as well as in terms of voters. Recruitment of ministers with no political expertise 
makes the party less recognisable for their traditional voters, yet these 'new and fresh 
faces' in the elite can also proof to have electoral advantages in attracting new voters. 
From the other side, non-affiliated individuals with political ambitions will rather seek 
contact with a party elite which does not require their members to perform all sorts of 
intra-party obligations and traditional 'routes' to ministerial power. Additionally, elites 
which are pragmatic and primarily electorally motivated, as opposed to ideologically 
motivated politicians, will sooner invite talented, yet unaffiliated, professionals into 
the party leadership in order to raise the party's governing potential. 
 
Since the items 'party identification' and 'class-distinctiveness of the electoral profile' 
load substantially on one factor, the standard z-scores on both items are summated 
into one single score indicating the relative catch-allness or width of a party's electoral 
appeal. Individual party scores on the items 'electoral volatility' and 'external 
ministerial recruitment' are similarly mediated into one standard score indicating the 




level of social inclusion. All scores have been recalculated so that higher scores mean 
relatively higher levels of catch-allism. In table 6.17 the countries included in this 
study have been rank-ordered according to their level of catch-allism in descending 
order. 
 
Table 6.18 Cross-time development of electoral catch-allism (in z-scores) in West 
European countries 1945-1990 
















Ita  .60 Ita  .73 Ita  .58 Ger  .85 Net  .30 Aut  .24 
Aut  .44 Fra  .24 Bel  .42 Net  .38 Nor  .30 Fra  .21 
Ger  .34 Bel  .20 Nor  .38 Fin  .38 Den  .29 Net  .10 
Fra    .19 Nor  .11 Den  .28 Aut  .20 Ger  .16 Nor  .05 
UK  .11 Ire  -.05 Fra  .24 Den  .08 Fin  .11 Den  .02 
Net  -.10 Den  -.09 Aut  .06 UK  .04 Aut  -.08 Swe  -.06 
Nor  -.75 Ger  -.21 Fin  -.11 Nor  .04 Swe  .05 Fin  -.09 
Swe  -.75 Net  -.27 UK  -.06 Swe  .01 UK  .01 Ger  -.12 
Den  -.84 Fin  -.40 Ger  -.26 Fra  -.11 Ire  -.11 UK  -.19 
Fin  -1.06 Swe  -.42 Ire  .27 Bel  -.13 Fra  -.17 Bel  -.21 
 UK  -.42 Net  -.40 Ita  -.23 Bel  -.23 Ita  -.25 
 Aut  -.63 Swe  -.47 Ire  -.37 Ita  -.33 Ire  -.32 
 
Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the 
standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score 
indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. The first column provides the 
standard score of the width of the electoral appeal, INCLUSION = the level of social inclusion 
(openness) at both the elite level as well as the level of voters. 
 
The relative standing of party systems differs substantially on these factors; highest 
levels of catch-allism in terms of the electoral appeal of political parties are found in 
Italy and France, with Belgium and Norway also ranking in the upper bracket of the 
distribution. Concerning the level of social inclusion, however, France, and 
particularly Italy score relatively low on the catch-all scale. Lowest levels of 
transformation in electoral appeal towards the catch-all model are discernible in 
Sweden and Finland, yet at the elite level these party systems are also very inaccessible. 
Regarding this social inclusion at the elite level, the Netherlands consistently ranks at 
the upper echelons of the distribution, while Norway, Austria and Finland can also be 
found among the highest ranking countries. At the bottom of the distribution in 
terms of social inclusion are, next to Italy, also Belgium and Ireland. In very few party 
systems parties have both adopted a very inclusive strategy at the level of the voters as 
well as at the elite level. In most countries the relative level of catch-allism increased in 
terms of the width of the electoral appeal of parties, with the exception of Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. With respect to the social 
inclusion of parties, parties in most countries have not transformed in a manner 
Kirchheimer predicted. Levels of electoral volatility have not increased significantly 




over time and recruitment of cabinet ministers in not progressively on the basis of 
expertise outside parliamentary politics. 
 In terms of transformation at the electoral dimension, Kirchheimer rightly asserted 
that parties of different origin are not equally successful in adopting the catch-all 
strategy. This proved to be a valid hypothesis as table 6.19 shows. Party families are 
rank-ordered in descending order according to the extent to which they have 
developed towards the catch-all model on the electoral factors. 
 
Table 6.19 Cross-time development in electoral catch-allism (in z-scores) of West 
European party families 1945-1990 
WIDTH OF  















cd  .63 sd  .20 com  .44 cd  .31 agr  .36 sd  .05 
lib  .06 cd  .19 sd  .22 lib  .20 lib  .17 con  .03 
sd  -.06 com  .11 agr  .22 con  .14 com  .14 lib  -.01 
com  -.29 lib  -.13 lib  .15 agr  -.01 cd  .05 cd  -.22 
con  -.67 agr  -.65 cd  -.22 sd  -.03 sd  -.20 agr  -.27 
agr -1.55 con  -.78 con  -.62 com  -.37 con  -.23 com  -.36 
 
Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the 
standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score 
indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. APPEAL = the width of the 
electoral appeal, INCLUSION = the level of social inclusion (openness) at both the elite level as well as 
the level of voters. 
 
In terms of electoral appeal, the social democratic parties have moved most 
substantially into the catch-all direction and consistently rank at the top in the 
distribution. The liberal parties also have a relatively high level of catch-all 
characteristics at the electoral level as well. Over the last five decades, the Christian 
democrats however, transformed from parties which succeeded in their historical 
attempt to cross-cut social class divisions and attract voters from all social strata, into 
a party family with a more distinct and limited class appeal. Conservative and agrarian 
parties have proportionally the lowest level of electoral catch-allism with respect to 
electoral appeal, since they are characterised with the clearest class-distinctive 
constituencies. In the 1970s and 1980s the agrarian parties, or centre-parties, moved 
progressively towards a popular appeal in line with the catch-all model. 
 Exactly as Kirchheimer asserted, in terms of social inclusion the social democratic 
parties adopted a relatively high catch-all character. Social democratic parties initially 
had a very low level of catch-allism until the late 1960s, yet they transformed rapidly 
in the late 1970s to more electoral openness and more inclusive, non-political 
ministerial recruitment. In contrast, the Christian democratic, liberal and conservative 
parties already possessed these electoral catch-all characteristics. Still, while the 
Christian democratic, liberal, agrarian and communist parties regressed to lower levels 
of social inclusion and less penetration by non-affiliated voters and members of the 
party elite, the social democratic and conservative parties increased their electoral 
catch-allism during the 1980s and opened their doors to external social influences and 




support. These relative standings in the distribution of parties of different genetic 
origin are also found when individual parties are rank-ordered as in the league tables 
below. Clearly, many individual Christian democratic parties could be found at the top 
of the table in terms of their cross-class appeal, yet in the last period, spanning 1976 
to 1990, there are hardly any representatives of the confessional party family. Many of 
the social democratic parties can be found in the higher brackets of the distribution of 
both the catch-all aspects of electoral appeal as well as their openness to new voters 
and elites. Conservative parties, on the other hand, are primarily found at the bottom 
of the league table with respect to their 'catch-allness' in electoral appeal. 
 Time and again this study showed that Kirchheimer depicted certain trends within 
West European party systems with an astounding precision, yet he exaggerated the 
scope and swiftness of these changes. Perceptively, Kirchheimer sketched us a picture 
in which parties in the larger continental democracies would transform most rapidly 
towards the catch-all model, while parties in the smaller democracies (particularly in 
Scandinavia) and in the British and Irish party system would not experience similar 
incentives to modernise their strategies. The evidence presented above does not 
completely duplicate Kirchheimer's geographical distribution, yet the relative 
standings of the countries come relatively close to Kirchheimer's predictions. 
Similarly, Kirchheimer correctly asserted that certain parties are more prone to catch-
all tactics than others. Kirchheimer proved right in that social democratic parties in 
Western Europe have shown strong inclinations to adopt catch-all characteristics. 
 Nevertheless, Kirchheimer was mistaken in that he assumed that this process 
would continue incessantly. In fact, this study showed that developments in West 
European party systems are rarely perpetual and uni-directional. A multitude of 
parties attempt a wide range of alternative strategies in order to raise their 
competitiveness at the electoral as well as the governmental level. Additionally, certain 
institutional constraints and specific national features of West European party systems 
have clearly prohibited a full-scale adoption of the catch-all model. The ramifications 
of this process of 'partial catch-allism' is extensively discussed in the final chapter of 
this book. 
 





Summary of the main findings: 
 
• West European parties have substantially broadened their electoral appeal and have 
become less class-distinctive over the last five decades, although this trend is not 
universal. 
• Strong party identification among voters has declined from an average level of around 
20 percent to 13 percent of the electorate in the 1980s. Particularly the social 
democratic parties have lost a substantial number of strong identifiers. 
• There is no evidence of a secular trend towards increasing levels of electoral volatility, 
yet there is no proof of a constant decline in electoral turnover either. 
• In contrast to the catch-all thesis, the level of external parliamentary recruitment of 
ministers declined from an average of more than thirty per cent in the 1950s to less than 
twenty-four per cent in the late 1980s. Ministerial recruitment has become increasingly 
‘political’ in Western Europe. 
• At the electoral level two dimensions of party behaviour can be distinguished, namely 
the width of the electoral appeal of political parties and, secondly, their level of social 
inclusion (or openness to new groups) at both the elite level as well as in terms of 
voters. 
• The geographical dispersion of electoral catch-allism on these two dimensions is very 
erratic. Highest levels of catch-allism with respect to the width of electoral appeal can be 
found in Italy, Belgium, France and to a lesser extent in Norway. Swedish and Finnish 
parties have the lowest level of catch-allism concerning their electoral appeal. On the 
dimension of social inclusion, Italy and Belgium have relatively low levels of catch-
allism. Dutch as well as Austrian and Norwegian parties have transformed most towards 
the catch-all model at the level of social inclusion. 
• Social democratic as well as liberal parties have transformed most extensively in the 
catch-all direction at the electoral level. Christian democratic parties have moved away 
from the electoral catch-all model in general. Lowest levels of electoral catch-allism is 
found among conservative parties. 
 





Electoral appeal and social inclusion 1945-1960 
Table 6.20 Parties rank-ordered according to width of electoral appeal and level of 
social inclusion 1945-1960 
Country Family Party social 
inclusion 
Country Family Party electoral 
appeal 
Ger cd CDU 2.16  Fra sd PSF 1.49  
Den soc SF 1.88  Swe sd SAP 1.49  
Ire soc WP 1.66  UK lib LIB 1.34  
Net cd CHU 1.59  Net cd KVP 1.29  
Fra con GAUL 1.36  Ita cd DC 1.13  
Fin lib LKP 1.29  Aut sd SPO 1.06  
Nor sd DNA 1.09  Net cd ARP 1.04  
Ger lib FDP 1.03  Ita lib PLI 0.95  
Aut lib FPO 0.94  Ita lib PRI 0.91  
Swe lib FP 0.93  Ita fas MSI 0.76  
Fin sd SSP 0.65  Fra com PCF 0.70  
UK con CON 0.59  Fra cd MRP 0.63  
Net cd KVP 0.58  Ger cd CDU 0.62  
Net cd ARP 0.51  Ita sd PSDI 0.59  
Ita fas MSI 0.47  Ita sd PSI 0.48  
Aut com KPO 0.40  Ger sd SPD 0.33  
Bel eth VU 0.40  UK con CON -0.02  
Ger sd SPD 0.38  Den lib RV -0.14  
Fra lib UDF 0.37  Fra con GAUL -0.19  
Fin agr KESK 0.36  Aut cd OVP -0.19  
Swe sd SAP 0.33  Ger lib FDP -0.19  
Net sd PVDA 0.32  Nor con HOYR -0.31  
Fin com SKDL 0.32  Net cd CHU -0.60  
Nor cd KRFP 0.21  Ita com PCI -0.64  
Nor con HOYR 0.17  Fin sd SSP -0.67  
Den lib VEN 0.15  Den sd SD -0.68  
Nor agr S 0.10  Net sd PVDA -0.70  
Den lib RV 0.04  Nor sd DNA -0.83  
Ita soc DP 0.04  Fra lib RAD -0.92  
Fin cd SKL 0.04  Nor lib V -0.92  
UK lib LIB -0.02  Fin com SKDL -0.95  
Net lib VVD -0.02  Fin con KOK -0.99  
Ita cd DC -0.05  UK sd LAB -1.00  
Den com DKP -0.05  Fra lib UDF -1.09  





Aut cd OVP -0.08  Den lib VEN -1.18  
Fra lib RAD -0.08  Swe agr C -1.22  
Swe con MSP -0.10  Net lib VVD -1.51  
Fin eth SFP -0.10  Den con KF -1.52  
Den sd SD -0.11  Swe con MSP -2.04  
Fin con KOK -0.11  Fin agr KESK -2.21  
Bel cd CVP -0.11      
Bel lib PVV -0.23      
Ita sd PSI -0.26      
Den con KF -0.26      
Ita sd PSDI -0.26      
Bel sd BSP -0.27      
Bel com KPB -0.43      
UK sd LAB -0.44      
Nor lib V -0.45      
Aut sd SPO -0.46      
Ita com PCI -0.47      
Ire cd FG -0.49      
Fra com PCF -0.50      
Swe agr C -0.50      
Ita lib PRI -0.50      
Ire sd ILP -0.57      
Swe com VPK -0.64      
Ita lib PLI -0.66      
Fra sd PSF -0.68      
Net com CPN -0.68      
Ire con FF -0.72      
Nor com NKP -0.91      
Ger com DKP -0.92      
Fra cd MRP -1.15      





Table 6.21 Parties rank-ordered according to width of electoral appeal and level of 
social inclusion 1961-1975 
Country Family Party social 
inclusion 
Country Family Party electoral 
appeal 
Den prt FRP 2.10  Swe sd SAP 1.44  
UK lib LIB 1.56  Fin cd SKL 1.36  
Nor prt FRP 1.54  Ita fas MSI 1.29  
Net cd CHU 1.14  Ita sd PSDI 1.16  
Ger sd SPD 0.98  Fra sd PSF 1.12  
Swe agr C 0.86  Nor prt FRP 1.04  
Nor soc SV 0.84  Nor soc SV 0.99  
Den lib RV 0.82  Ita cd DC 0.95  
Fin lib LKP 0.70  Ita com PCI 0.88  
Net lib D66 0.65  Fra com PCF 0.86  
Bel eth VU 0.58  Ita sd PSI 0.83  
Net lib VVD 0.58  Bel sd BSP 0.70  
Den cd KRF 0.53  Nor lib V 0.69  
Nor com NKP 0.53  Nor cd KRFP 0.66  
Nor lib V 0.51  Ita lib PRI 0.64  
Ita com PCI 0.43  Net cd KVP 0.62  
Fin agr KESK 0.37  Den lib CD 0.50  
Den lib VEN 0.34  Den cd KRF 0.49  
Den lib CD 0.32  Net sd PVDA 0.47  
Aut cd OVP 0.30  Swe cd KDS 0.46  
Fra com PCF 0.30  Den lib RV 0.46  
Nor cd KRFP 0.30  UK lib LIB 0.42  
Fin con KOK 0.27  Bel cd CVP 0.40  
Net cd ARP 0.26  Den soc SF 0.29  
Fin cd SKL 0.22  Ire con FF 0.26  
Swe cd KDS 0.16  Ire sd ILP 0.12  
Net com CPN 0.15  Fra cd MRP 0.07  
Ire sd ILP 0.14  Aut lib FPO 0.05  
Swe sd SAP 0.09  Den com DKP 0.05  
Den com DKP 0.09  Den prt FRP 0.03  
Fra con GAUL 0.08  Fin sd SSP -0.07  
Swe com VPK 0.08  Ger sd SPD -0.08  
Ger com DKP 0.07  Bel lib PVV -0.14  
Fra lib RAD 0.07  Ger lib FDP -0.14  
Ire cd FG 0.05  Bel eth VU -0.14  
Nor sd DNA 0.05  Net cd ARP -0.16  
Fin sd SSP 0.05  Den con KF -0.27  





Den soc SF 0.05  Fin com SKDL -0.27  
Net cd KVP 0.02  Net cd CHU -0.29  
Bel com KPB -0.03  Nor agr S -0.35  
Ita lib PLI -0.04  Net lib D66 -0.37  
Ita fas MSI -0.07  Nor con HOYR -0.38  
Den sd SD -0.08  Ger cd CDU -0.42  
Fin com SKDL -0.09  Fin eth SFP -0.47  
Swe con MSP -0.10  Ita lib PLI -0.49  
Fra sd PSF -0.10  Nor sd DNA -0.56  
Aut com KPO -0.15  Swe lib FP -0.57  
Nor agr S -0.16  Den sd SD -0.60  
Aut lib FPO -0.18  Fin lib LKP -0.65  
Den con KF -0.20  Swe com VPK -0.74  
Ger lib FDP -0.20  UK con CON -0.77  
Ire soc WP -0.28  Swe agr C -0.77  
Ger cd CDU -0.28  UK sd LAB -0.89  
Aut sd SPO -0.30  Aut cd OVP -0.89  
Bel lib PVV -0.32  Fin agr KESK -0.89  
Nor con HOYR -0.39  Aut sd SPO -0.90  
Ire con FF -0.40  Fin con KOK -0.90  
Ita lib PRI -0.41  Den lib VEN -0.97  
Net sd PVDA -0.55  Ire cd FG -1.00  
Ita cd DC -0.64  Fra con GAUL -1.00  
Fin eth SFP -0.69  Net lib VVD -1.89  
UK sd LAB -0.69  Nor com NKP -1.99  
Bel cd CVP -0.70  Swe con MSP -2.08  
Bel sd BSP -0.71  Ger    
Ita sd PSDI -0.73  Fra    
Fra lib UDF -0.73  Fra    
Ita sd PSI -0.76  Ire    
Swe lib FP -0.81  Fra    
UK con CON -0.84  Ire    
Fra cd MRP -0.99  Net    





Table 6.22 Parties rank-ordered according to width of electoral appeal and level of 
social inclusion 1976-1990   
Country Family Party social 
inclusion 
Country Family Party electoral 
appeal 
Fra sd PSF 1.60  Swe sd SAP 1.55  
UK sd SDP 1.35  Net cd KVP 1.54  
Aut lib FPO 1.21  Fra com PCF 1.21  
Swe env MP 0.72  Ire env GRE 1.07  
Nor prt FRP 0.71  Nor prt FRP 1.01  
Fin lib LKP 0.68  Ire soc WP 0.97  
Aut env GA 0.58  Ita soc DP 0.96  
Den con KF 0.57  Ita env PR 0.95  
Nor sd DNA 0.53  Swe com VPK 0.95  
Ger env GRU 0.47  Nor soc SV 0.94  
Net lib VVD 0.46  Ita sd PSDI 0.90  
Nor con HOYR 0.43  Ire lib PD 0.84  
Net cd KVP 0.40  Nor lib V 0.79  
Den sd SD 0.38  Ita fas MSI 0.79  
Fra lib UDF 0.35  Fra sd PSF 0.77  
Fin sd SSP 0.28  Ita lib PLI 0.77  
Den lib CD 0.27  Ger env GRU 0.76  
Swe sd SAP 0.25  Nor agr S 0.75  
Net cd CDA 0.22  Ita lib PRI 0.74  
Ita env PR 0.21  UK sd SDP 0.69  
Den soc SF 0.21  Bel sd BSP 0.69  
Net lib D66 0.19  Ire sd ILP 0.68  
Ire soc WP 0.18  Nor cd KRFP 0.65  
Ita soc DP 0.15  Den cd KRF 0.64  
Bel env ECO 0.11  Den lib CD 0.62  
Net sd PVDA 0.09  Den lib RV 0.59  
Fin eth SFP 0.07  Bel lib PVV 0.50  
Swe cd KDS 0.02  Aut lib FPO 0.47  
Nor lib V -0.02  Ita sd PSI 0.43  
Fra con GAUL -0.02  Den soc SF 0.43  
Ger com DKP -0.04  Fin eth SFP 0.42  
Ita fas MSI -0.05  UK lib LIB 0.36  
Ger cd CDU -0.05  Den sd SD 0.27  
UK con CON -0.06  Den prt FRP 0.21  
Swe com VPK -0.06  Den com DKP 0.16  
Ire lib PD -0.06  Aut sd SPO 0.11  
Fin con KOK -0.07  Fin com SKDL 0.09  





Fin agr KESK -0.08  Fra lib UDF 0.08  
Aut com KPO -0.08  Bel eth VU 0.07  
Fin cd SKL -0.10  Ita com PCI 0.03  
Nor cd KRFP -0.14  Den con KF 0.01  
Ita sd PSI -0.15  Fin agr KESK -0.01  
Bel com KPB -0.17  Net sd PVDA -0.04  
Den cd KRF -0.18  UK sd LAB -0.07  
Den lib RV -0.18  Fra lib RAD -0.08  
Bel lib PVV -0.19  Aut env GA -0.14  
Nor agr S -0.19  Ger sd SPD -0.16  
Den com DKP -0.19  Bel cd CVP -0.19  
Aut sd SPO -0.20  Aut cd OVP -0.27  
Aut cd OVP -0.20  Nor con HOYR -0.28  
Bel eth VU -0.22  Fin con KOK -0.31  
Nor soc SV -0.23  Net lib D66 -0.32  
Fra lib RAD -0.25  Ita cd DC -0.37  
Ita com PCI -0.25  Den lib VEN -0.37  
Ger lib FDP -0.27  Ire cd FG -0.52  
Swe con MSP -0.27  Fin sd SSP -0.57  
Den lib VEN -0.27  Fra con GAUL -0.60  
Net cd ARP -0.28  Ger lib FDP -0.62  
Swe lib FP -0.28  Swe agr C -0.65  
Bel sd BSP -0.29  Fin cd SKL -0.66  
Ire con FF -0.38  Ger cd CDU -0.70  
Net com CPN -0.44  Ire con FF -0.76  
Ire sd ILP -0.44  Net cd CDA -0.89  
Den prt FRP -0.45  UK con CON -0.98  
Ita lib PLI -0.45  Net lib VVD -0.99  
Ita lib PRI -0.45  Fra cd MRP -1.00  
Bel cd CVP -0.48  Swe lib FP -1.02  
Swe agr C -0.53  Nor sd DNA -1.20  
Ita sd PSDI -0.57  Swe con MSP -1.56  
UK lib LIB -0.60      
Ita cd DC -0.65      
Ger sd SPD -0.71      
Nor com NKP -0.73      
Ire cd FG -0.73      
Fra com PCF -0.75      
Fin com SKDL -0.88      
UK sd LAB -0.94      
 





7 Catch-allism in Western Europe: an arrested 
development 
7.1 Catch-all parties or partial catch-allism? 
In the 19th century, people's representatives, assembled in national parliaments, 
founded the first extra-parliamentary organisations which became known as 'political 
parties'. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century Western Europe has 
witnessed the genesis of hundreds of political organisations attempting to rally voters 
behind their platform in order to gain access to parliamentary and governmental 
power. An analysis of the diversity in organisational format of these parties, the 
differences in their ideological dispositions and policy preferences, their varying 
methods of elite recruitment as well as the significant disparity in the social basis of 
the electoral appeal of these political parties would be impossible without some 
theoretical framing. This study tested one of the seminal theories in the study of 
transformation of West European political parties, Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all 
thesis, as a means of analysing party change at the organisational, ideological and 
electoral level. 
 Departing from the conviction that the social structure of society should be 
reflected at the political level, Kirchheimer asserted that politicians in post-war 
Europe no longer compete against each other but instead form a co-optive oligarchy 
as their political parties progressively converge on ideology and policy. This would 
culminate in the waning or even total vanishing of principled political opposition 
against the dominant political and economic system. Since it is much easier to reach 
agreement over incremental policy adjustments than on a major framework for 
society, political leaders of catch-all parties would no longer offer distinct political 
alternatives to the public, resulting in immutable and unchallenged ruling political 
elites. According to Kirchheimer, the sovereignty of the people is clearly undermined 
by this ‘oligarchisation’ of power. Kirchheimer perceived a shift from the painstaking 
business of building effective and democratic institutions and an accountable civil 
service by the traditional mass parties towards the ‘personification’ of political power 
in catch-all parties, in which political leaders seem increasingly oriented towards their 
own political careers, instead of concerned with the responsiveness and accountability 
of the party system as a whole.  
 Empirical analyses in the previous chapters have revealed that, despite the 
portrayal of the mass party as an ideal model in political rethorics, in reality the mass-
party mould is indeed no longer applicable to most political parties in Western 
Europe. Mass parties, characterised by their strong embeddedness in civil society 
through mass membership and their representation of clearly defined social or 
religious groups, if they ever existed in the first place, have by now been replaced by 
new types of political organisation. Yet, the dominant party type which constitute 
West European party systems is not the catch-all party Kirchheimer predicted would 
emerge. This does not mean, however, that certain developments Kirchheimer 
depicted have not occurred in West European party systems. In fact, it will be argued 
in this final chapter that although catch-all parties as such do not generally exist, a 




partial transformation towards catch-allism can nevertheless be observed. Certain 
developments Kirchheimer described did occur, while other features of catch-allism 
did not fully materialise in Western Europe. Moreover, the transformation towards 
catch-allism has not been a linear process, but was at times interrupted or even 
reversed. 
 
In the following section I will briefly summarise the main empirical findings of the 
previous chapters, before going on to section 7.3 to review which dimensions of party 
transformation, if not catch-allism, can then be differentiated and to what extent 
political parties in Western Europe have remodelled themselves. 
7.2 Catch-allism in Western Europe 
One of the major findings in this study is first and foremost that no uniform and 
continuous trend of party transformation towards the catch-all model is discernible in 
Western Europe. In journalistic as well as scientific accounts of politics certain 
developments Kirchheimer identified are often accentuated, sometimes leading to the 
conclusion that catch-all parties thrive in West European party systems. Certainly, at 
the time Kirchheimer unfolded his thesis some of the developments he sketched were 
clearly manifesting themselves within certain parties. In the period spanning 1954 to 
1966, during which the catch-all thesis was developed, the aim of building democratic 
extra-parliamentary membership organisations was precipitously abandoned. Political 
elites began to professionalise their organisations and started to allocate state finance 
to their own political parties. Kirchheimer also correctly perceived that political 
parties in post-war political systems were downgrading their old ideological rigidity 
and put less emphasis on their traditional issues. The centripetal movement of 
German parties, the SPD in particular, was not missed by many political observers 
either. Still, Kirchheimer misinterpreted certain other developments or simply 
misconstrued them. Party members have not been progressively excluded from all 
internal decision-making processes, although their influence has remained scanty. 
Neither is there evidence of an unvarying trend of parties moving towards the centre 
(space) in their party system, nor of a constant tendency towards political consensus. 
Kirchheimer was also mistaken in believing that a smaller number of parties would 
come to increasingly dominate the political systems in West European countries. 
Shortly after Kirchheimer had sketched his gloomy picture of cartel-forming powers, 
vanishing opposition and political apathy on behalf of the population, the opposite 
occurred. Since the mid-1960s a process of social protest set in, expressing popular 
demands for new forms of political participation and representation. Furthermore, the 
emergence of radical political parties and social movements, rhetorical polarisation 
and parliamentary fragmentation seemed to be part of the grit of increasing electoral 
change as well as governmental instability. This all leads to the conclusion that West 
European political parties did not totally transform along the lines of the catch-all 
theory. 
 
In essence, Kirchheimer was correct in his claim that the importance of membership 
declined as a substructure for the human and financial resources for most parties in 
Western Europe. In most West European countries party membership declined over 
the post-war period. Despite the rapid professionalization of political parties since the 




1950s, however, party members have not been totally marginalised and still remain 
important to the elites of political parties. At party conferences and other public 
meetings party members legitimise the party leadership by vesting them with authority 
and by publicly ratifying their decisions. Furthermore, membership remains important 
as it provides a pool from which the future party leadership can be selected. In 
addition, many party members find executive power at the lower echelons of public 
government. Indeed, major political parties often pride themselves in that their 
policies can be carried out so effectively and efficiently because of their network of 
loyal and influential local politicians. Although membership is still valued for these 
reasons, overzealous membership participation is not encouraged by modern party 
leaders as it seriously reduces the flexibility in policy stances of their parties and 
radical party activism can also hamper a party's ability to enter into government. 
 Despite the fact that the room for manoeuvre for the party leadership in general 
has increased and party members have lost some influence over the selection of 
parliamentary candidates, members have been given more leverage in the selection of 
the party leader. My data do not confirm Kirchheimer's assertion that members are 
progressively excluded from all inner-party decision making structures. What was 
found instead is that party elites empower individual, unorganised party members 
rather than marginalising them in the internal decision-making process. Party activists, 
who have been progressively restricted in the opportunity to speak their mind on the 
policies of the party, are the real victims of the ambitions of party elites. That said, 
there are three reasons why the minor democratisation of leadership selection should 
hardly be heralded as a great victory of democracy. 
 First, despite the fact that the level of intra-party democracy varies substantially 
across party systems and among party families, internal decision-making procedures 
overall have usually been very centralised to begin with and could hardly be further 
centralised without parties losing all of their democratic substance. 
 Secondly, the unorganised member is given more power over that part of the 
political process which has become increasingly irrelevant to party politics. True, the 
number of congresses held by parties has not been reduced and neither have 
procedures to put motions to the national congress been centralised in the majority of 
West European countries. However, national party conferences can hardly be 
considered to constitute important policy making bodies in that they have become 
primarily geared towards public expressions of unity and governability of parties. 
Open leadership contests and disputes over policy alternatives are a rare sight at party 
conferences. As media attention increasingly focused on these party congresses, party 
elites have preferred to maintain tight central control over the agenda and format of 
these national conference meetings. 
 Kirchheimer did correctly predict an accumulation of power and resources at the 
level of the party leadership. This study found that particularly the parliamentary party 
organisation has become the dominant part of political parties, primarily as a result of 
the electoral orientation of parties. With the disappearance of the mass-party format, 
the extra-parliamentary party loses much of its function. Considering the modern 
means of communication available to the parliamentary leadership, it has less need for 
the membership party organisation in its interaction with voters. Parliamentary 
representatives have used their legislative prerogative to accumulate their own 
resources for political competition. As a result, in financial terms and regarding 
professional staff, parliamentary party organisations are increasing their resources at 




an unprecedented rate. Kirchheimer justly asserted that these growing resources 
would not be generated from membership fees, yet his claim that parties would come 
to rely primarily on state subsidy is not corroborated. What was found, instead, is that 
parties did not progressively extract their resources from the state after the 1970s but 
directly from private and corporate donations or other (economic) activities. Rather 
than spending their vast resources on expansion of the membership organisation, 
party elites vigorously professionalised their election campaigns and the parliamentary 
party organisation, bringing this already most powerful part of the party under even 
stricter central control of the leadership itself. These increasingly professional party 
organisations aim primarily at short-term electoral success instead of the long-term 
integration of citizens into the body politic. 
 The third reason why the minor internal democratisation of the leadership 
selection should be not be overstated is that the electoral orientation of parties has 
resulted in further domination of the parliamentary party over the party organisation, 
evidenced in that the parliamentary party is more than ever the pool from which 
ministers are recruited. Decisions on participation in government as well as the route 
to power remain firmly in the hands of the national elites of the traditional parties of 
government. This solid central control in the decision-making structures is not a 
modern trend, as Kirchheimer seems to argue, but rather a consistent characteristic of 
West European politics. Half a century before Kirchheimer, Roberto Michels (1911) 
had already pointed this out to us, although he argued it was a feature of all 
organisations without regard to its ideological or sociological character. The growing 
influence of the parliamentary party over the party organisation is in one sense 
beneficial to the democratic process as representative and accountable politicians 
come to dominate political decision-making, instead of extra-parliamentary party 
officials. On the negative side, however, as the selection of political leaders remains 
relatively centralised and parliamentary representatives are accountable only to the 
electorate at large from whom concerted action is less likely to occur, popular 
influence on political decisions will be minimal at best. 
 
Traditional democratic theory assumes that parties present distinct policy programs 
from which voters choose that closest to their own preferences. As against this, this 
study shows that, at times, some major parties do converge to more centrist positions 
within their party system. Nevertheless, Kirchheimer was mistaken in his assertion 
that this centripetal movement of parties was universal and inexorable. The evidence 
presented in this book reveals that particularly Christian democratic parties tend to 
occupy the centre space of party competition. Frequently, social democratic, liberal 
and agrarian parties can also be found in or close to the centre position, yet no linear 
centripetal trend is discernible (see also Keman 1992; 1997). Instead, what was found 
was that over time fewer parties adopt centrist positions and that the range and 
direction of party competition differ considerably across Western Europe and across 
time. Parties move in and out of the centre of political competition in accordance 
with their expectations of electoral rewards or for reasons of governmental control. 
Moreover, the shift to the left of most political parties during the 1970s and the 
rightward trend of party competition in the 1980s suggests that the Downsian model 
of centripetal movement, which Kirchheimer duplicated and enriched with 
sociological notions, is not validated by the empirical evidence. Parties can actually 
extricate significant electoral gains from adopting more extreme policy positions on 




either the left or right of the political spectrum. 
 Being well aware of this, political parties adopt dissimilar policy positions and have 
become more willing to revise their policy stance when this is beneficial to their 
electoral appeal or chances of government participation. This research shows that, in 
line with the catch-all thesis, parties have become less rigid concerning their 
traditional issue-emphasis. This increasing flexibility of political parties at the 
ideological level was first depicted with a manifest decreased emphasis on traditional 
issues, notwithstanding substantial cross-national variation. In all, parties are more 
willing to emphasise issues which are unrelated to their historical origin. Still, this 
investigation also found that political parties, given the chance, reveal clear and 
distinct policy preferences and return to more traditional policy profiles when this is 
possible. Not completely in line with the findings in this study, Kirchheimer assumed 
that parties would become increasingly power-hungry and office-seeking motives 
would guide their behaviour, rather than the execution of a specific political program. 
Evidence presented in this study shows that political parties indeed have a steady 
inclination to accept governmental office even when traditionally preferred policy 
fields cannot be controlled through ministerial responsibility. However, it also 
emerged that when parties have the power to (re)claim traditionally preferred 
portfolios they will seize this opportunity with both hands. Office-seeking and policy-
seeking motives are apparently very closely intertwined and political elites carefully 
counterbalance their aspirations and ambitions for public office with their ideological 
convictions and policy objectives. Consistent with this outcome, it was found that 
political parties in Western Europe have a very stable level of 'opportunism' in 
ministerial control. Contrary to the catch-all thesis, control over ministerial portfolios 
of some party families became more conventional at times, as the allocation of 
ministerial positions develops increasingly in accord with traditional policy 
preferences of these political parties. Christian democratic and social democratic 
parties, as Kirchheimer inferred, have been less interested in (or capable of) 
controlling portfolios which are traditionally important to them. Nevertheless, the 
growing aptitude and willingness to adopt flexible policy positions as well as an 
enduring inclination to accept control over non-traditional ministerial portfolios both 
indicate a substantial level of office-seeking behaviour on behalf of West European 
political parties. 
 If it is true that Christian democratic parties are "catch-all parties avant-la-lettre" 
(Kersbergen 1994) then catch-allism is not a strategy to be recommended for parties 
which want to increase their effectiveness in control over the executive. Christian 
democratic governmental power has declined significantly, both in scope and 
duration. Social democratic parties, which fulfilled Kirchheimer's criteria of catch-
allism more than the other party families, have experienced some erosion of their 
power base as well. In contrast, conservative, agrarian and, to a lesser extent liberal 
parties, have gained more control over traditionally preferred portfolios as well as 
over the number of ministerial posts in general. Furthermore, the conservative, 
agrarian and liberal parties, which comply relatively little with the catch-all model, 
have increased their tenure in office over the last five decades. 
 As a consequence, political competition in Western Europe has altered towards 
more competitive interaction between parties, be it only amid members of the 
traditional party families. What can be seen is that the major traditional parties 
continue to dominate the executive branch of government and by and large divide the 




spoils of office among themselves by admitting few new contenders through the 
portal of executive power. Thus, political competition increased but only among a 
fixed number of parties who are very disinclined to allow new competitors into the 
governmental arena. Although it proved relatively easy to enter the parliamentary 
arena by appealing to new groups of voters or disillusioned supporters from the 
traditional parties, gaining access to governmental power is infinitely more complex. 
Acquiring admittance to governmental responsibility not only necessitates a certain 
level of electoral support, but also the approval of the traditional party elites. So far, 
traditional parties have not fully succumbed to the forces that are slowly undermining 
their power bastion. 
 
Central to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis is his assertion that political parties adopt an 
electoral appeal beyond their traditional social bases of support which will make their 
electoral profile less class-distinctive. This study showed that, in general, parties have 
indeed been very successful in their cross-class appeal and that class voting in Western 
Europe declined substantially. During the post-war period, electorates of political 
parties have become increasingly characterised by middle class voters. Social 
democratic parties in particular transformed from primarily the representatives of the 
working class into parties which attract a majority of middle class voters. Christian 
democratic parties became transfigured from parties with a very heterogeneous social 
representation to parties with a predominately middle class support. 
Overrepresentation of the middle class in the electorate of conservative parties has 
remained stable over time, whereas for liberal parties the level of support from non-
working class voters increased. By comparing these developments to changes in the 
social stratification of West European societies it was found that this process of de-
alignment is much in line with the structural transformation of the total electorate, 
which makes the claim of a deliberate strategy of cross-class electoral appeal 
problematic. In addition, parties which are traditionally associated with working class 
representation, communist and social democratic parties, still attract the bulk of the 
residue of the working class vote in most countries. Instead of the conclusion drawn 
in many other studies, namely that the explanatory power of social class for voting 
behaviour has declined, it seems more accurately to conclude that the sharp 
differences in class-distinctiveness between parties was reduced by the structural 
transformation of West European societies, yet that the remaining social stratification 
is still visible in terms of party support. 
 De-alignment of West European electorates was also assessed by the level of party 
identification and electoral volatility. Paradoxically, the electoral orientation of political 
parties has not strengthened their long-term link with the electorate and modern 
political parties increasingly aim for short-term electoral support at the next general or 
local election, rather than constant political participation. Long term affiliation with 
one particular party can still be found only among a rapidly declining number of 
European voters. Kirchheimer had anticipated this disconnection of political parties 
from their supporters at a very early stage and he was very concerned about its 
consequences for the quality of the democratic process. This loss of identification 
with one single political party has particularly affected the traditional representatives 
of the working class, namely social democratic and communist parties. This is not 
surprising in light of the finding that their traditional social basis of support withered 
away with the upward social mobility of the working class across West European 




countries. In addition, this process also affected Christian democratic parties which 
previously had attracted a substantial segment of the working class at elections in 
some countries. 
 Contrary to the catch-all thesis, however, this loss in stable affiliation between 
parties and voters did not result in a continuing rising trend in electoral volatility. In 
fact, what was found instead was a declining trend in electoral turnover in most 
countries between 1945 and 1990. Increasing levels of electoral flux, which 
Kirchheimer predicted would result from the adoption of catch-all features, could 
only be witnessed between the early 1970s until the mid-1980s. Still, almost all 
traditional major party families, with the exception of the conservatives, have seen 
some erosion of their electoral base and their electoral performances have become 
less secure. 
 This study found little evidence to support the catch-all assumption that parties 
aim to communicate primarily with the electorate through organised interest groups. 
At the elite level parties have not been progressively penetrated by individuals from 
non-traditional social groups supporting the party. In contrast to Kirchheimer's 
predictions there is little evidence of a linear trend towards external recruitment of 
ministers from organised interests. Ministerial recruitment has not become 
characterised by the assimilation of an increasing number of experts and professionals 
into the party elite. Instead, a progressively more ‘political’ pattern of ministerial 
recruitment is dominant because national party leaders of most West European 
parties recruited more of their colleagues from among the parliamentary 
representatives. Rather than vesting experts and professionals with direct executive 
power and ministerial responsibility, political elites have opted to maintain direct 
executive control themselves. This is not to say that politics in Western Europe has 
not professionalised; indeed as was also shown above, politicians hire an increasing 
number of experts and professionals. Still, these experts only advise them on the 
decisions that are taken; politicians themselves have maintained firm control over the 
executive. The increasing resources party elites allocate to themselves, while 
preserving power over who has access to this select group of powerholders, are all 
indicators of concentration and centralisation of power at the elite level. On the other 
hand, organised interests have found it less practical to enlarge their influence by 
seeking ministerial representation and think it far more advantageous to make 
financial contributions to political parties or establish influential lobby organisations 
in West European capitals where the national governments reside. 
 
The major conclusion from all this is that not one of the eighty-three parties in this 
study completely fulfil all the criteria of the catch-all party model. This outcome is 
partly an artefact of the multi-dimensional test of the catch-all thesis, of course, which 
renders it almost impossible to satisfy all the requirements of catch-allism on all the 
indicators. Nevertheless, some parties and party systems come relatively close to the 
catch-all model. In line with Kirchheimer's hypotheses on the geographical pattern of 
catch-allism, it was found that, in particular, parties in the larger West European 
continental democracies (France, Germany and Italy) have advanced towards the 
catch-all model at the organisational level, while parties from the Scandinavian 
countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) as well as Irish and British parties have not 
progressed at the same speed in this direction. A similar pattern was found at the 
ideological dimension; relatively higher levels of catch-allism were found in Germany, 




Italy and France and relatively low levels of ideological transformation towards catch-
allism can be seen in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom. A 
less transparent picture was found at the electoral dimension, but here too higher 
levels of catch-allism were discernible in Italy and France, while Danish, Swedish and 
Finnish parties were less marked by catch-all characteristics at the electoral level. 
 With regard to the genetic origin of parties this study found considerable 
substantiation of Kirchheimer’s assertion that social democratic and Christian 
democratic parties would transform more into the catch-all direction than parties 
from another lineage. On the organisational dimension, social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties indeed acquired a higher level of catch-allism compared 
to their liberal, agrarian and conservative competitors. Kirchheimer also correctly 
claimed that the social democratic and Christian democratic parties moved relatively 
closer to the catch-all model with regard to ideological catch-all characteristics: social 
democratic and Christian democratic parties are more catch-all in their ideology than 
members of the other party families, yet liberal and conservative parties also 
transformed towards the catch-all design at the ideological level. It was seen that at 
the electoral level the social democratic parties could be found in the upper brackets 
of the distribution of relative catch-allism again, while conservative and liberal parties 
also adopted electoral catch-all practices. Christian democratic parties scored relatively 
low on the electoral catch-all dimension. Furthermore, there is some confirmation of 
Kirchheimer’s hypothesis that most communist parties are largely excluded from the 
catch-all development, particularly as far as the ideological and electoral dimension are 
concerned. 
 In sum, despite the fact that there is no evidence of a universal and linear development 
towards catch-allism, this study clearly substantiated several of the trends and patterns 
Kirchheimer pointed out, justifying the conclusion that a partial development towards 
catch-allism has come to characterise West European party systems. 
 
In an earlier study on Christian-democratic parties in European countries Schmidt 
(1985, 392; 1989, 174) arrived at a similar conclusion (see also Sundberg 1985, 315). 
According to Schmidt, Christian democratic parties were on their way to becoming 
catch-all, yet their transformation came to a grinding halt halfway, because of the 
continuing importance of traditional cleavages. Schmidt asserts that ideological 
distances between socialist and non-socialist parties diminished on issues such as 
religion, social welfare, economic intervention and defence. He argues that, although 
parties clearly try to maximise popular support, significant differences in socio-
political profiles of the larger parties remain visible. By confining the catch-all thesis 
to its ideological dimension and only including Christian democratic parties, Schmidt’s 
analysis is, of course, quite limited. As Keman notes, Schmidt’s "contention makes 
sense for most countries where de-confessionalisation emerged during the sixties. The 
Christian democratic parties were organisationally and ideologically well suited to 
appeal to different (sub-)classes of the electorate and are often already near the centre 
of the party system. ...Only those in the German speaking countries show a tendency 
towards catch-all parties. ...Perhaps the FRG should be considered as the only party-
system with genuine catch-all parties" (Keman 1988, 174-178). This latter assertion is 
not corroborated by the present study, however. Despite the fact that German parties 
rank relatively high in terms of catch-allism on all three dimensions, there are other 
countries where this process is at least as far advanced. 




 My findings also contradict Wolinetz's (1991) assertion that the emergence of 
catch-all parties in the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands), Scandinavia and 
Switzerland is constrained by highly structured electorates as well as by strong and 
persistent patterns of party identification in the electorate. By failing to include the 
organisational and ideological dimension of catch-allism, Wolinetz could not detect 
the relative high level of organisational and ideological catch-allism in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, at the electoral level, parties in Scandinavian countries, in 
particular Norway and Denmark, have been transformed relatively closely towards the 
catch-all model. Wolinetz (1979) had claimed earlier that where catch-all parties did 
develop, namely in Germany and France, this is caused by disruptions in political 
development and in the specific operation of these party systems. Kirchheimer 
(1966a, 185) also assumed significant differences between the larger European 
countries: "Germany and Great Britain would appear at opposite ends of the 
spectrum rather than showing a similar speed of transformation." This geographical 
dispersion of catch-allism is by and large confirmed by my analysis, though I am 
unable to determine whether disruptions in the political development caused this 
pattern. 
 Kirchheimer himself suggested that: "As a rule only major parties can become 
successful catch-all parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187). Apart from any disagreement 
over which parties could be considered to be ‘major’ parties, this assertion is not 
corroborated when we look at the ranking of individual parties. Taking electoral 
strength to indicate whether or not we are dealing with a ‘major’ party, it becomes 
evident that the larger as well as smaller parties can be found in the upper brackets of 
the distribution, while some of the ‘major’ parties in electoral terms can also be found 
at the bottom of the (league) tables. 
 Evidently, the analysis provided above rebuts most, if not all, assertions of these 
authors. The catch-all development is neither limited to one particular family, nor to 
one particular country. Different patterns of geographical distribution and among 
party families were found on the various indicators of party transformation. Overall, 
this study found significant cross-national variation in catch-allism as well as 
divergences among parties of different genetic origin. Several indicators of catch-
allism hardly differentiate between parties, one example being the power distribution 
between members and the party leadership, while other indicators, such as the 
position on a left-right scale, signify substantial and important differences between 
political parties, across time and within different party systems. An although these 
geographical patterns of catch-allism as well as the variation among party families 
were sketched reasonably accurately by Otto Kirchheimer, he was perhaps inaccurate 
in assuming this process to be linear. In this sense, Kirchheimer was too 
deterministic. 
 
Of course, it might be argued that this general assessment of catch-allism is in some 
sense inadequate. A number of potential criticisms might be advanced here. First of 
all, it could be asserted that the operationalisation of catch-allism in this study is 
invalid. Still, the conscientious method of concept reconstruction on the basis of 
Kirchheimer's complete oeuvre, including the investigation of his personal archive at 
German Refugees Archives of the State University of New York at Albany as well as a 
thorough review of secondary literature on catch-allism does seem to offer sufficient 
guarantees for a valid measurement. Second, the finding that the items do not tap one 




single phenomenon could result from an inaccurate conceptualisation with regard to 
the measurement of catch-allism. However, the selection of indicators of catch-allism 
is largely based on Kirchheimer's own references and propositions. Furthermore, the 
large number of indicators on three dimensions makes for a wide range of analysis of 
party transformation, rendering it unlikely that the inclusion of more or other 
indicators would increase the validity of the conceptualisation. Third, the multi-
dimensionality of the outcomes could result from incomplete or unreliable data which 
were collected to measure the extent of party transformation. To be sure, the most 
comprehensive data that are available at present were used and where possible 
supplemented with data from additional sources. Nevertheless, it proved impossible 
to collect a complete data-set for all cases; some figures are simply not available. 
Moreover, the need to integrate so many data-sets from such a variety of different 
sources will always cause problems with deficiency, consistency and comparability. 
 Nonetheless, and despite these evident limits, I believe that this analysis does 
reflect the most comprehensive inquiry into catch-allism that is possible at present, 
and provides a valid and reliable evaluation of the level of catch-allism in Western 
Europe, which illuminates several cogent and useful measures of party behaviour. 
Furthermore, this analysis allows for four different approaches to the evaluation of 
party transformation, namely cross-time analysis over the post-war period, cross-party 
analysis based on historical genetic origin, cross-national investigations over twelve 
party systems, as well as examinations at the level of individual parties. This made it 
possible to see if change occurred, when change occurred and where change occurred.  
7.3 Dimensions of party transformation 
One of the key conclusions of this study is that party transformation is far from uni-
dimensional. Rather than one single model of the mutation of political parties, what 
we see instead is a multiplicity of features, some of which, indeed, appear to work in 
opposite directions to one another. Parties are complex multi-faceted creatures, and 
their patterns of  transformation are neither uni-directional nor linear. Moreover, even 
with the broad electoral, organisational and ideological categories which have been 
explored in the previous chapters, change, when it occurs, tends both to flow and to 
retreat, and sometimes, even concurrently, it appears to run in contradictory 
directions. It is this conclusion more than any other that belies the otherwise 
appealing simplicity of the original catch-all thesis. 
 
In an effort to boil down the multi-dimensional complexity which characterises the 
transformation of parties in modern European democracies, and to try and make 
sense of what is a multi-faceted phenomenon, this final section will draw on the 
various factor analyses which were conducted within each of the three categories of 
change to suggest that there are seven key dimensions through which the behaviour 
of parties may best be understood (see appendix 3). Three of these may be associated 
with the organisational character of parties, two may be associated with their electoral 
behaviour, and two with their ideological character. These seven dimensions certainly 
do not over-simplify the study of party behaviour or party style, and in this sense they 
cannot be seen as an alternative to the catch-all model. But they do offer a more 
readily grasped summary of the complexity that was revealed in the previous chapters, 
and in this sense they merit some further elaboration. 




 Below, I will first enumerate the seven extracted factors on which parties in 
Western Europe deviate. Second, I will discuss their mutual relationships. Third, the 
seven factors will be employed to make some general observations on party 
transformation across party systems, party families and over time. Finally, on the basis 
of the factor plots provided in appendix 3, I will attempt to interpret this complex 
pattern of party transformation and its consequences for democracy in western 
Europe. 
 




1. The first extracted factor is interpreted as the professionalization of leadership 
organisation, because the number of professionals at the parliamentary party 
organisation is positively related to this factor. Thus, a higher score on this factor 
means that parties employ more professional staff in relation to the strength of 
the parliamentary party. However, income from membership is also positively 
correlated with this factor, while the level of state finance is negatively correlated. 
On this ‘professionalisation of the central office-factor’, all scores have been 
recoded so that high scores in tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate a high level of 
professionalisation of the parliamentary party, even if the financial resources for 
this professionalization comes from members, instead of state subsidies. 
2. The second factor is best interpreted as the professionalization (or 'de-
massification') of the extra-parliamentary party organisation (the central 
party office). High correlations to this latent factor is established of both the level 
of membership (which is negatively associated with this underlying factor) as well 
as the level of professionalization of the central office (which is positively 
associated to this underlying factor). Scores on the professionalization of the 
membership party in tables 7.2 and 7.3 below have been recoded in the same 
direction so that higher scores indicate lower membership levels and higher 
numbers of staff employed at the party central office. Low scores thus suggest 
highly unprofessional parties that have remained relatively close to the mass party 
model in terms of the membership organisation. High scores denote professional 
parties that have only a small membership pool. 
3. The third factor is the level of centralisation of intra-party decision-making. 
To this underlying factor both the openness of the party leadership selection and 
the selection of parliamentary candidates are positively related, as well as the 
number of congresses held by the parties (see appendix 3). Scores on this 
centralisation-factor have been recoded so that higher standard scores in tables 
7.2 and 7.3 below mean less influence of members on the selection of party 
leaders and parliamentary candidates and also fewer opportunities to speak their 
mind at national party congresses. 
Low scores on all three organisational factors indicates that parties have a relatively 
democratic structure and members have some influence in the party internal decision-
making structures, while at the same time the extent of professionalization is low 
within the party organisations. A relatively high score on all three organisational 
factors means that parties tend to have highly centralised decision-making procedures 
and professional party organisations 'on the ground' as well as in parliament. 
4. The fourth factor is very straightforward: all items indicate the degree of office-
seeking behaviour. To this factor both the number of controlled ministries, 
traditional and non-traditional, as well as the accumulated time in government are 
positively correlated. Higher scores on this factor denote more control in office 
and prolonged time in government. Little desire or less ability for taking on 
governmental responsibility is indicated by low scores on this office-seeking 
factor. 
5. The fifth factor is the degree of policy-seeking behaviour. Positive correlations 




of both traditional emphasis as well as the policy distance from the centre 
position makes for the interpretation that this factor indicates the strategic 
equilibrium parties attempt in their pursuit of a particular policy. On the policy-
seeking dimension all scores have been recoded so that higher scores indicate a 
higher propensity to seek this optimum between traditional issue emphasis and a 
strategic centrist position, that is the propensity to downgrade ideology 
(traditional issues) and a tendency of centripetal movement of the party. Parties 
which have low scores on the policy factor put more emphasis on their traditional 
policy preferences and adopt positions outside the centre of party competition. 
On the two ideological factors higher scores indicate parties that have a high 
propensity for office-seeking and policy seeking behaviour. 
6. The sixth factor represents the popular appeal or vote-seeking behaviour of 
parties. The extent to which parties attract voters from different social groups is 
positively associated with this underlying factor, while the level of identification is 
negatively correlated with this latent factor. This means that the more parties 
cross-cut social cleavages, the more people are able to identify with the party. All 
scores have been recoded so that a higher score on this factor in tables 7.2 and 
7.3 below means a broader and more indistinct electorate in terms of social class 
and a larger number of voters which can identify with the party. Low scores on 
this factor indicate that parties have a very distinct appeal to a core electorate 
which strongly identifies with one party. 
7. The seventh and final extracted factor will be coined the level of social 
inclusion, to denote more openness at both the level of voters and the elite. 
Positively associated with this factor are the level of external, non-parliamentary 
recruitment of the party elite as well as the level of electoral volatility of the party. 
This means that higher scores on this factor indicate that parties are more 
vulnerable to electoral shifts and more accessible for elites which have no prior 
political experience in the parliamentary party. Low scores of social inclusion 
denote a very distinct and stable electorate and less penetration of the party by 
external influences.  
Higher scores on the two electoral factors means that parties make a broad electoral 
appeal and have opened their party to external influences at the elite level as well. 
 
These seven extracted factors can, to some extent, be related to the five original 
aspects of catch-allism Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) emphasised. The "drastic reduction 
of the party's ideological baggage" can be seen as the trade-off between policy and 
office motives in favour of the latter. "Further strengthening of top leadership 
groups" coincides with the extracted factor concerning the professionalization of the 
party organisation, while "downgrading of the role of the individual party member" is 
similar to the centralisation of the internal decision-making processes. "De-emphasis 
of the class-gardée in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large" is 
interchangeable with the electoral appeal-factor and "securing access to a variety of 
interest groups" is relatively identical to the social inclusion-factor. It is, however, my 
assertion that all these factors do not indicate one underlying phenomenon but that 
these factors tap seven different aspects of party transformation. To substantiate this 




assertion, table 7.1 summarises the relationships between these seven dimensions by 
way of correlation coefficients and reveals that in most cases they are generally only 
weakly associated with one another. 
 

































1.00       
CENTRALISATION OF 
DECISION-MAKING 
 .00 1.00      
PROFESSIONA LISATION OF 
CENTRAL OFFICE 
 .00  .00 1.00     
OFFICE-SEEKING 
 
 .15 (99) -.24* (98)  .39** (98) 1.00    
POLICY-SEEKING 
 
 .04 (99)  .04  (98) -.01   (98)  .00 1.00   
WIDTH OF POPULAR 
APPEAL 
 
-.31 (37)  .40* (37) -.19   (37) -.51** (76)  .09 (76) 1.00  
SOCIAL INCLUSION  .01 (37)  .06  (37) -.21   (37) -.09   (76)  .01 (76)  .00 1.00 
 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between factor scores. One asterisk (*) indicates 
statistical significance at the 0.01 level, (**) indicates significance at the 0.001 level. The number of cases 
(N) is given in between brackets. 
 
As can be seen from table 7.1, in particular the level of professionalization of the 
parliamentary leadership organisation, the extent of policy-seeking behaviour and the 
level of social inclusion of parties are virtually uncorrelated to any of the other factors. 
Office-seeking behaviour, on the other hand, is significantly correlated to three other 
factors. First, the fact that office-seeking behaviour is negatively correlated with the 
level of centralisation in internal decision-making contradicts the idea that solid elite 
control over the organisation makes the party better equipped to enter into 
government. Apparently, influence by members over the selection of the party elite as 
well as over the policy of the party does not interfere with the ability of the party elite 
to gain and maintain control over the executive branch of government. Secondly, it 
emerges that office-seeking behaviour is positively associated with the 
professionalisation of the central office, which indicates that professional party 
organisations are more inclined to office-seeking behaviour that to policy-seeking. 
Finally, the level of office-seeking behaviour is negatively correlated with the width of 
the  electoral appeal of the party. In contrast to what was expected by Kirchheimer, it 
seems that parties which are better able to attract voters from outside their traditional 
social basis of support also face more difficulties getting into office. Apparently, 
winning elections does not automatically result in control of office (with the exception 
of majoritarian systems like the United Kingdom). It seems that representation of 
clearly definable social groups with strong partisan affiliations still constitutes a 
valuable asset for political parties to obtain governmental power, suggesting that 




ridding political parties completely of their social embeddedness and their 
membership organisation would seriously undermine the party's ability to control the 
administration. Additionally it is established that the width of electoral appeal is 
positively associated with the level of centralisation of the internal decision-making 
procedures and negatively with the professionalization of the leadership organisation. 
This provides corroboration for my previous conclusion, namely that party leaders 
have been very willing to open up their parties to new voters, but only when they can 
increase their grip on the decision-making processes by way of centralisation. In this 
way they ensure that the newly recruited voters cannot successfully rebel against the 
ruling 'classe politique'. More generally, however, the infrequency of strong 
associations between these different dimensions suggests again that catch-allism itself 
is far from being a uni-variate phenomenon. 
7.3.1 Party systems compared 
These seven extracted factors can also be utilised to determine which type of political 
parties characterises party systems in West European countries. Again I use standard 
scores  (z-scores) to compare countries as well as party families. Table 7.2 provides 
the mean standard-scores of the parties within each country aggregated up to the level 
of the national party system itself. Again the method of simple summation of 
variables with high factor loadings is applied. All scores have been recoded so that a 
higher score means a higher relative level of catch-allism (see above). In presenting 
these summary data in table 7.2 I have ranked the countries in descending order 
according to their relative level of catch-allism over the post-war period. 




Table 7.2 Mean standard scores on seven dimensions of party behaviour in West 
























Ger  1.57 Ita    2.16 Ita   1.11 Fra  .64 Ita  .59 Den  .58 Ger  .37 
Ita   1.52 Fra    Net   .28 Fin  .31 Ger   .45 Ita   .53 Net   .35 
Swe  .69 Aut   .81 Ger  .07 Ita  .26 UK   .41 Nor  .02 Fra  .15 
Nor  .51 Bel   .58 Den  .00 Net  .18 Bel  .41 Fin   -.27 Nor  .10 
Den  .19 Net     .47 Fin  -.15 Bel  .14 Aut  .40 Ire   -.34 Fin  .09 
Fin  .16 Ger   -.05 Nor  -.21 Ger  .05 Fra  .23 Swe  -.55 Den  .08 
Ire      -.58 UK          -.43 Aut  -.21 Den  -.12 Net  .22 Aut  -.56 Aut  .01 
Net      -.89 Den  -.65 UK   -.29 Aut  -.17 Fin   .13 UK  -.83 Swe  -.14 
Aut    -1.16 Fin  -.66 Ire  -.32 Ire  -.18 Nor  -.42 Net  -.89 Bel   -.47 
UK  -.1.35 Ire  -.96 Swe   Nor  -.25 Ire  -.50 Ger   -.92 Ita   -.50 
 Nor  -1.49  UK  -.41 Den -  .61  Ire   -.51 
 Swe  -1.81  Swe  -.49 Swe  -.73  UK  -.66 
 
Entries are average standard-scores (z-scores). 
 
The first point that can be noted from table 7.2 is that the national party systems in 
the various European countries tend to have very distinct characteristics. The 
Austrian party system, for example, is characterised by relatively undemocratic, 
centralised mass parties which have a mediocre level of professionalization. Austrian 
parties rank high in terms of policy-seeking. Additionally, Austrian parties are 
characterised by a relatively traditional electoral appeal and a traditional and closed 
mode of elite recruitment, reminiscent of the consociational grip Austrian political 
parties have on civil society. In contrast, Danish parties are comparatively professional 
organisations with relatively democratic internal decision-making procedures. Parties 
in Denmark by and large balance their office-orientation with their policy-seeking 
ambitions and adopt wide electoral appeals, while they also apply relatively open 
patterns of elite recruitment. Finnish parties are characterised by low levels of 
professionalization and fairly democratic internal procedures (as is stipulated by 
national law). Nevertheless, Finnish parties are more oriented towards control of 
office than to the execution of a particular policy. Like in Denmark, parties in Finland 
appeal to a relatively wide electorate and have a relatively open structure for people 
with political ambitions. Party organisations in Germany are highly professional with 
undemocratic internal decision-making procedures and low membership participation. 
German parties are policy-oriented and grant relatively low weight to office-seeking 
behaviour. The electoral appeal of German parties is very traditional, yet their pattern 
of elite recruitment is very open. Parties in Ireland are, in European perspective, 
relatively traditional, unprofessional political organisations with relatively democratic 
internal procedures. In general, Irish parties rank at the bottom of the distribution on 
most factors as they have remained close to the mass-party model. Irish parties 
balance the propensity to put forward a political program with the need to obtain 
governmental power. Furthermore, Irish parties have a relatively traditional electoral 




appeal and the route to power for elites is very conventional as well. Bearing in mind 
that some of the Italian parties included in this analysis no longer exist, it can be 
concluded that party organisations within the Italian party system were very distinctive 
creatures. In the period under analysis, Italian parties had relatively professional 
structures and were by far the most centralised and thus undemocratic parties found 
in Western Europe. In all, Italian parties consistently rank at the top of the table on 
six of the seven factors. On only one factor can Italy be found at the bottom of the 
distribution: the Italian political elite have not opened their mode of elite recruitment. 
Most of the political activity is geared to fulfil the office-seeking ambitions of a 
‘closed’ political class, a characterisation that neatly fits the numerous descriptions of 
the clientelist Italian partitocracia. To enhance their chances at gaining governmental 
power, Italian parties did appeal to a relatively wide audience. 
 Central party organisations in the Netherlands tend to be very professional parties, 
without having rid themselves of all internal democracy. Parties in the Dutch 
parliament have been extensively staffed with experts and professionals, and rank 
among the most professional in Western Europe. This can be explained by the fact 
that the Netherlands is the only country without direct state finance to central party 
organisations, while the parliamentary party is allocated sufficient resources for 
extensive professionalization. The typical Dutch tendency to seek political 
representation in the state structures instead of aiming for civic organisation is also 
witnessed by a relatively strong office-seeking orientation of political parties in the 
Netherlands and their open pattern of elite recruitment. Compared to parties in other 
European countries, the appeal of Dutch parties is fairly restricted, no doubt a 
heritage of the formerly pillarised social structure of the Netherlands. 
 Norwegian and Swedish parties have relatively professional parliamentary party 
organisations while they maintained a substantial mass membership at the ‘party on 
the ground’. Members are granted a comparatively high level of influence on internal 
decision-making procedures. In both countries parties put relatively much emphasis 
on traditional issues compared to parties in most other party systems. This is where 
the similarities end between Norway and Sweden. Parties in Norway have a relatively 
wide electoral appeal and open method of elite recruitment, whereas Swedish parties 
have a far more restricted and traditional electoral appeal and mode of elite 
recruitment. Swedish parties are also characterised by a large discrepancy between the 
high level of professionalisation of the leadership party and the very low level of 
professionalisation of the membership party. Finally, parties in the British polity are 
relatively unprofessional organisations which offer little democratic participation by 
the membership. British parties rank very high on the policy-seeking dimension, in 
contrast to the Downsian assumption of office-seeking behaviour of parties operating 
in majoritarian (two-party) systems. Moreover, British parties also rank among the 
most traditional parties with regard to the breadth of their electoral appeal and type of 
elite recruitment. 
7.3.2 Party families compared 
Chapter 2 and 3 showed that Kirchheimer suggested that political parties will not all 
transform at a similar speed, nor will all parties find themselves in the same stage of 
development. Moreover, since parties differ in genetic origin they do not begin their 
metamorphosis from the same point of departure. Thus, even with similar social and 




institutional forces at work upon the party organisation, the responses may differ. 
Next to substantial cross-national differences discussed above, table 7.3 reviews the 
relative scores on the seven dimensions of the different party families as derived from 
an aggregation of their family members in the different countries. Here also the party 
families are rank-ordered in descending order. 
 
Table 7.3 Mean standard-scores on seven dimensions of party behaviour of West 






















com  1.13 com  1.61 com  .63 sd  .65 agr  .72 lib  .41 lib   .09 
lib  .73 cd  .64 lib  .16 cd  .46 cd  .42 com  .11 con  -.00 
agr  .51 sd  .05 con  -.01 agr  .37 lib  .35 agr   -.43 cd  -.10 
con   .12 lib  -.49 cd  -.34 lib  .17 sd  .04 cd   -.53 sd  -.13 
sd  -.31 con   -.73 sd  -.69 con  -.06 con  -.66 sd  -.75 agr   -.17 
cd   -.63 agr  -1.23 agr  -.79 com  -.85 com  -.77 con  -.89 com  -.40 
 
Entries are mean standard-scores (z-scores).  
 
As is clear from table 7.3, Christian democratic and social democratic parties are 
political organisations with a fairly similar format that distinguishes them from parties 
with other genetic origins. The heritage of an extensive extra-parliamentary mass party 
organisation has in fact impeded the professionalisation of Christian democratic and 
social democratic parties, as well as that of agrarian parties. Their relatively high level 
of membership constitutes one of the persisting characteristics of their former mass-
party format. At the same time Christian and social democratic parties are also 
characterised by relatively low levels of internal democracy. In addition, both social 
democratic and Christian democratic parties are the most office-seeking parties in 
Western Europe, although they have not abandoned their traditional policy objectives. 
Neither have these parties distanced themselves from their traditional voters, resulting 
in a relatively narrow electoral appeal compared to other party families. Furthermore, 
social democratic parties and Christian democratic parties have maintained their 
historic modes of elite recruitment and their party organisations have remained 
relatively closed to external influences. Agrarian parties, which have transformed 
themselves into Centre-parties, have also preserved some features of their former 
mass-party characteristics: a comparatively low level of professionalism particularly at 
the central party office, large party memberships which are granted relatively little 
democratic participation in the internal decision-making processes. Agrarian parties, 
however, give proportionately more weight to policy-seeking motives than to office-
seeking motives. 
 Conservative parties differ from this mass-party model in that their organisations 
are more professional and their internal decision-making procedures are more 
democratic than in Christian or social democratic parties. This may have resulted 
from a different organisational ideology and practice characterised by decentralisation 
and more autonomous branches. Parties belonging to the conservative party family 
rank relatively low with respect to policy flexibility, indicating their ideological rigidity 




and strong inclination for policy-seeking behaviour. Control of government by 
conservative parties is still guided by a clear political program. With respect to their 
electoral appeal, conservative parties also deserve their name; they have a very 
traditional and narrow electoral appeal to middle and upper class voters. In contrast, 
at the level of elite recruitment conservative parties are relatively open to external 
influences compared to other party families. 
 Liberal party organisations in Western Europe differ from both models described 
above in that they have a wider electoral appeal and are also more 'liberal' in their 
openness and accessibility at the elite level. Additionally, liberal parties are very distant 
from the mass-party model in that they have relatively democratic decision-making 
structures. These open and democratic liberal party organisations have shown a lower 
ability to control governmental office.  
 Consistently ranked at the most extreme position on six of the seven factors, 
communist parties make for a very unique type of party in Western Europe. Their 
ideology of democratic centralism resulted in the most undemocratic internal 
structures of all party families included in this study. This practice of co-optation and 
ideological fundamentalism has also resulted in very closed recruitment patterns for 
party elites. The rapid dissolution of traditional working class support has forced 
communist parties to open their electoral appeal to middle-class voters, yet they have 
largely remained excluded from governmental responsibility. 




7.3.3 Trends of party transformation over time 
By way of regression analyses it is possible to sketch some of the broad trends of the 
manner in which parties have transformed over time in Western Europe. Table 7.4 
provides the regression coefficients of the seven factors with the year of observation 
as the independent variable. 
 

























Aut  .37  .18 -.08 -.14 .23  .55*  .18 
Bel -  .27* - -.10  .49* - -.02 
Den - -.10  .49*  .05 -.32* -.16  .03 
Fin -.59* -.27*  .18 -.01  .64  .03 -.15 
Fra -  .62* - -.40* -.09  .09 - 
Ger  .07 -.35 -.28 -.30* -.23 .17 -.54* 
Ire  .63* -.37*  .47 -.09  .19  .42 -.11 
Ita -.58*  .03  .33  .09 -.11 -.51 -.06 
Net  .79* -.19 -.00  .04  .09 -.07 -.10 
Nor .35*  .19  .31  .15 -.24  .06 -.41* 
Swe  .14 -.22  .25  .05  .30* - -.11 
UK -.68 -.54*  .82* -.01 -.67*  .14 -.15 
total  .07 -.05  .23* -.05 -.04  .06 -.08 
 
Entries are regression coefficients of the factors scores with the year of observation as the independent 
variable. An asterisk (*) indicates a significance level above the .05 level. 
 
Overall, as these figures make clear, parties in most West European countries have 
moved away from the mass-party model and professionalised their party organisations 
over time. Particularly in the Netherlands and Ireland this process is most noticeable, 
precisely the countries where financial support from the state is relatively limited, 
which suggests that state funding is not a prerequisite for professionalisation. In 
general, the originally very centralised power structure of internal decision-making 
procedures has become more inclusive and democratic in most countries, although 
this process is only marginal with regard to the remaining central control over elite 
recruitment and policy-formulation. In contrast to the general trend, parties in France 
and Belgium have progressively centralised their internal decision-making procedures. 
Another significant finding is that while control of office is still the most important 
objective of political parties, policy-seeking behaviour remains pivotal as well. Across 
Western Europe there is little evidence of a progressive trend towards pragmatic 
office-seeking behaviour regardless of the political program which is to be 
implemented. Still, parties in Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium have 
increased their orientation towards the realisation of a specific political platforms. 
Apparently, policy still clearly matters to a large number of political parties in Western 




Europe. Throughout Western Europe parties are gradually appealing to voters outside 
their traditional bases of party support, most rapidly in Austria. The only countries 
where this process of wider electoral appeal is not found are Italy, the Netherlands 
and Denmark. At the elite level, however, most West European parties are very 
reluctant to open up their organisations to ambitious politicians without any prior 
party political experience. In general, table 7.4 shows substantial differences between 
party systems, which suggests that the specific operations of the national party system 
seems to deeply influence the type of party transformation. The types of 
transformations have been in very divergent directions and little evidence can be 
found of convergence over time of West European party systems. 
 This pattern of very different directions in transformation of political parties over 
time can also be found among the various party families. The results of a cross-time 
analysis of transformation of party families are summarised in table 7.5. 
 

























cd .55* -.12  .13 -.24*  .18 -.21 -.17 
com .64 -.24  .36 -.07  .18 -.79 -.59 
con -.52* -.11 -.05  .25*  .07 -.19 -.28 
sd -.38*  .15  .18 -.01 -.03  .57* -.01 
lib .24  .01   .32*  .03 -.08 -.29  .13 
agr -.31 -.11  .32  .23  .31  .58 -.31 
 
Entries are regression coefficients of the seven factors with the year of observation as the independent 
variable. An asterisk (*) indicates a significance level above the .05 level. 
 
As can be seen from table 7.5, parties of different genetic origin have followed 
dissimilar trajectories of transformation. Apparently, the genesis of parties exerts 
influence on the type and speed of transformation. Liberal, Christian democratic as 
well as communist parties have professionalised their parliamentary party most rapidly 
over the post-war period. This analysis shows that parties of conservative, social 
democratic and agrarian origin, in contrast, have not modified their parliamentary 
party in this direction. Professionalization of the central party office, however, seems 
to constitute an almost universal trend among parties, regardless of their descent. 
From another general trend, namely that of moderate democratisation of West 
European party organisations, some social democratic and liberal parties are partly 
excluded. The access to power at the governmental level has remained relatively 
closed and few new parties have been allowed to enter into governmental 
responsibility. Only Christian democratic parties have lost considerable control of 
government. Furthermore, it emerged that office-seeking behaviour is a dominant 
motivation for political action. Conservative party leaders, in particular, have given 
more weight to office-seeking motives. Nevertheless, policy motives remain 
important as well for the endeavours of West European party elites. Overall, policy 
has remained important for all party families; none of the party families have 




collectively shed all ideological heritage and traditional policy preferences. 
 Since democracy necessitates popular legitimisation for political activity of political 
representatives, the investigation of the vote-seeking behaviour shows that many 
parties appealed to a wider audience over time, although the structural transformation 
of West European societies left party leaders with little alternative. Party leaders 
progressively mould the party image to the perceived needs of the electoral market 
and preferences of the unaffiliated electorate. With regard to this electoral appeal of 
parties, the social democratic and agrarian parties diverge from the general trend 
among parties of other historic origin in that they have most ardently solicited a wider 
social spectrum, while the other party families have been less ‘vote-seeking’. 
 The modes of elite recruitment have remained largely traditional within most West 
European party systems; the liberal party family is the only group which has 
collectively opened up their recruitment pattern to non-traditional external influences. 
In this respect, liberal parties have an edge over the other party families, in particular 
over conservative, agrarian and communist parties, which have all regressed to more 
traditional modes of elite recruitment and conventional representation of social 
interests. In conclusion, there is little evidence for the convergence of political parties 
from different genetic origin on these dimensions of party transformation. 
7.4 Directions of party transformation in Western Europe 
As will be recalled from the analysis presented above, three organisational factors 
were extracted along which West European party organisations diverge. From the 
factor matrices and factor plots provided in appendix 3, it can be seen that these three 
latent factors describe a two dimensional space in which, on one axis, capital intensive 
and professional party organisations face non-professional membership organisations 
on the opposite pole. The second dimension is constituted by two polar positions, 
one indicating a very centralised parties versus parties with internally democratic 
power structures. For sake of illustration these two axes can be transformed into a 
four-fold categorisation as is visualised in figure 7.1. 





































open and democratic 
internal decision-making 
 
This exploratory two-dimensional model thus generates four possible ideal types of 
political parties, which, however, will not be used as a new typology of political parties 
in Western Europe. Political parties do not uniquely fit into one cell. What I want to 
demonstrate here is that the seven extracted dimensions can be used to typify 
different directions of party transformation by analysing the movement of parties 
over time between these cells. 
 On these two organisational dimensions four ideal types of party organisation can 
be categorised as follows: 
 
• First, traditional mass parties , which are characterised by a considerable 
membership organisation and derive a substantial proportion of their income 
from membership fees. These mass parties grant their members only marginal 
and indirect influence in internal decision-making procedures, while in general 
power is centralised at the leadership level within these parties. 
• Second, democratic mass parties characterised by mass-membership and a 
democratic internal structure as well. This party type is not prevalent in the West 
European political culture, but it approximates the old ideal type of mass parties. 
• On the opposite pole we find parties which have only a moderate membership 
organisation, making them essentially dependent on state finance or alternative 
sources of income. These parties are unable to use the 'party on the ground' for 
the daily organisational activities, instead the leadership of these parties has to 
employ a substantial number of professional staff and experts to administer the 




party organisation. These 'cadre' parties exist in two varieties: on the one hand 
some of these parties adopt relatively democratic structures and allow members 
significant influence in the decision-making processes. These parties could best be 
characterised as democratic cadre parties. 
• On the other hand some of these 'cadre' parties exclude the relatively few 
members of the party from any significant influence in the internal decision-
making, culminating in a fourth type, traditional, non-democratic cadre parties.  
 
What can be seen in Western Europe is a reluctant shift from traditional mass and 
cadre parties towards a more dominant presence of democratic cadre parties. 
 
At the ideological level two basic dimensions of party transformation were found (see 
appendix 3), which are consistent with the concepts of policy-seeking behaviour and 
office seeking-behaviour. If the items are plotted in a two-dimensional space of 
ideological behaviour, it emerges that all items indicating government control cluster 
at one pole of the office-seeking dimension. In all, it materialises that the raison d'être 
for political parties is to control national executive power, which shows that one 
strategy, namely office-seeking, dominates at the ideological level. The factor-plot 
reveals nothing to indicate the existence of non office-seeking party behaviour, 
epitomised by the fact that the other pole of this dimension is void of any substance. 
This is not surprising, since by definition parties which would not be office-seeking 
would best be labelled ‘social movements’, rather than political parties. 
 On the second dimension which was extracted from the ideological items it was 
found that the tactics of strategic policy-flexibility or of traditional ideological 
fundamentalism constitute both poles. Traditional issue emphasis as well as distance 
from the political centre both constitute one pole. Apparently, emphasis on traditional 
issues does not exclude the possibility of adopting a position close to the centre of the 
political spectrum. This type of behaviour, best labelled as ‘strategic policy flexibility’, 
indicates that parties are willing to move into (centrist) policy positions that are of 
beneficial to them in electoral and governmental terms, without losing their traditional 
policy preferences. Few parties manoeuvre themselves in a policy position which 
would automatically condemn them to the opposition benches in parliament. 
Nevertheless, there are parties which remain loyal to their traditional ideology and 
program, whatever the consequences for participation in government. Considerable 
variation among parties was found concerning the distinctiveness of their policy 
position, indicating the continuing importance of the left-right policy dimension in 
political competition. This is evidenced by the position of the item 'policy position on 
the left-right scale (LRMANIF)' on the opposite pole in the plot, although the item 
does not correlate highly with the policy factor. Apparently, this opposite strategy of 
traditional ideological fundamentalism is less appealing to political parties. All this 
culminates in the conclusion that two dimensions predominate, namely one 
dimension at which office-seeking behaviour constitutes the one and only extremity, 
without any viable antagonist strategy available to political parties and a second 
dimension, policy-seeking behaviour, where traditional issue emphasis and party 
distance from the centre both constitute one pole facing traditional ideological 
fundamentalism as a weak antagonist strategy which few parties find an attractive 











































The two extracted ideological dimensions can be used to distinguish four stereotypical 
types of party behaviour as is visualised in figure 7.2. 
 
• Although at times parties do adopt distinct and traditional policy positions, they 
also need to avoid distancing themselves too far from the centre space of party 
competition (see also Keman 1997). As a dominant strategy, political parties in 
Western Europe seek to carefully balance both office-seeking and policy-seeking 
ambitions, a type of behaviour which comes close to catch-all behaviour. In real 
life, political parties oscillate between the need to attract voters and the need to 
appear able to govern in the eyes of their political opponents. 
• Kirchheimer, as well as Downs for that matter, were incorrect in their assertion 
that a vague policy position near the centre of the political spectrum is a necessary 
prerequisite for gaining governmental responsibility. Parties have not massively 
converged on the centre space of party competition. Strategically, parties are 
clearly capable of using a strategy whereby they emphasise traditional issues and 
policies (and appeal to a core electorate) to strengthen their position in the 
governmental arena. Perhaps the conclusion that Kirchheimer was partially 
correct is more fair; parties are very strategic creatures, yet they have not 
undergone a process of de-ideologisation (see also Budge, Hearl and Robertson 





• A strategy whereby parties adopt a fundamentalist traditional ideological position 
without any regard for the consequences in terms of office control is not 
prevalent in Western Europe, indicated by the fact that the cell in the left hand 
corner is practically empty. This shows that few parties in Western Europe can be 
categorised as opposition of principle. 
• Some parties do adopt strategic policy positions close to the political centre 
without too much emphasis on their traditional ideology. Yet, for some reason or 
another these parties are unable to gain governmental responsibility, condemning 
them to a strategy of (permanent) democratic opposition.  
 
In Western Europe party leaders must steer their party between the Scylla of 
maintaining a recognisable and typical ideological profile towards the electorate and 
the Charybdis of flexibility in policy stance to seek the optimal strategic position for 
obtaining governmental power. What seems to be occurring is that political parties 
move back and forth between traditional policy emphasis and catch-all behaviour. 
 
A two-dimensional pattern of factor scores could also be extracted at the electoral 
level (see appendix 3). 




Figure 7.3 Electoral dimensions of party behaviour in Western Europe 
 
 


































In electoral terms, parties are first characterised by their differences in class-
distinctiveness and strength in their connection with the electorate. The negative 
relationship between the social heterogeneity of party support and party-electorate 
link demarcate the difference between parties with a broad electoral appeal and a weak 
connection with their core constituency, while other parties have a more narrow social 
base of party supporters which strongly identify with 'their' political party. Strategic 
vote-seeking behaviour indicates that parties seek voters outside their traditional voter 
groups, while at the same time attempt not to alienate their traditional electorate. This 
external solicitation for popular support is duplicated at the elite level as well. The 
second dimension at the electoral level shows that political parties either recruit both 
voters and members of the elite from outside the traditional social basis of support or 
they remain closed to external influences at both levels. Once parties open their doors 
to new groups of voters, then newcomers from more diverse social background at the 
elite-level are also increasingly numerous. Still, this process of social inclusion does 
not fully dominate in West European parliamentary democracies, where traditional 
patterns of elite recruitment continue to dominate, while the openness at the level of 
the electorate is more advanced. 
 These two dimensions of electoral behaviour of party elites results in four ideal 
types of parties: 
• parties can both have a strong link to their core constituency and an elite 
recruitment from a very narrow social base, a party type which resembles political 
parties during the times of pillarised consociational democracies and are best 
typified as a closed shop parties; 




• parties can also have a broader electoral appeal towards voters with a weak link to 
the party, yet recruit their elite from a very well-defined social group, which 
parallels the behaviour of traditional peoples parties; 
• parties with a narrow electoral appeal, but which are open to external recruitment 
of new members of the party elite can be characterised as democratic devotee 
parties; 
• the fourth type of party behaviour comes closest to the catch-all model, whereby 
parties are open to external influences at both the elite level as well as in their 
popular appeal. These parties become strategic electoral machines which are 
primarily geared to winning elections. 
 
In West European party systems ‘closed shop’ parties are rapidly disappearing, yet 
parties approaching the three other stereotypes can still be found in significant 
numbers. 
7.5 Conclusion: the arrested development of catch-allism 
The last four chapters provide ample proof that parties adapt effectively to the 
national context in which they operate, enabling them to perpetuate their prominent 
position in the democratic process of West European countries. It seems that it is not 
so much the innate qualities of political parties that determine their survival and 
success, but rather their capacity to adapt themselves to a changing environment. 
Formal responses by parties to external challenges are visible in their organisational 
choices, mode of elite recruitment and strategic behaviour in terms of office, policy 
and vote. The present study sought to determine the type and extent of party 
transformation in Western Europe and the extracted factors enabled an evaluation of 
the relative importance of the different motives underpinning the behaviour of party 
leaders in Western Europe. 
 Taking into account the obvious limitations, this study found no linear trend 
towards catch-allism in Western Europe over time, although there was a clear trend 
towards catch-allism on several of its indicators until the early 1960s. The problem 
with Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis is his assumption of a continuing trend. For this 
assumption of a linear development towards catch-allism I found no evidence. On the 
contrary, during the late 1960s up until the 1980s there was a decline in the overall 
level of catch-allism. West European party systems have witnessed an arrested 
development of catch-allism in the post war period. However, it is almost impossible 
to generalise this finding to all parties and countries included in this study. Across 
Western Europe I also found large variation in the extent, timing and direction of 
party transformation. Therefore, Kirchheimer's hypothesis of convergence of parties 
to one single model of transformation could not be corroborated either. European 
parties do not converge to one single type of political party, with similar 
organisational, electoral and ideological strategies. There are still substantial 
differences between parties in one country and across Western Europe regarding their 
organisational format, their office and policy-seeking behaviour as well as their 
electoral appeal. Moreover, all over Western Europe political parties transform their 
organisation, reorient their policy positions and revise their electoral strategies in 




different directions. Party transformation, therefore, is not a single story. None of the 
individual indicators showed a similar trend in all countries and across all party 
families. Basically, this study found no uniformity in development. There are vast 
differences across countries and party families regarding the timing, the level and the 
direction of party change. All in all, it is almost impossible to generalise about all 
individual parties. This detailed study over a time span of forty-five years did not find 
one unilateral  and uni-dimensional development. At the different dimensions and 
indicators contradictory developments could be recorded, allowing for the main 
conclusion that over the post war period a partial transformation towards catch-
allism has occurred in West European party systems, a development which was 
discontinued in the late 1970s, early 1980s. 
 Notwithstanding these divergent trends, the analysis above proved that the items 
used to measure catch-allism constitute an internally valid measurement tool to 
quantify the transformation of political parties in Western Europe in the post war 
period. Also, this study developed an analytical instrument which can test not only 
Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, but which by means of a multi-dimensional approach 
and a wide range of indicators, can also be used to address wider questions of party 
transformation and party system change. Finally, this study has tried to show that 
Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis remains relevant to the debate on the 
transformation of West European party systems, not necessarily because of its 
currency and validity, but because of its rich argumentation. In this sense 
Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis has proved to be a valuable working hypothesis that can 
be employed to delineate the transformation of political parties over the second half 
of the twentieth century. 
 
Evidently, the type of party which Kirchheimer himself joined in the interbellum no 
longer exists, yet neither did post war parties develop into full-blown catch-all parties. 
And although it is uncertain which type of parties will characterise the West European 
party systems of the 21st century, it is clear that the last decade of the 20th century 
already reveals a sense of unravelling in some of the party systems. The Italian case 
has shown that even rapid and total system breakdown is not impossible, while in 
France, Germany and Austria extreme right-wing parties seem capable to alter the 
hitherto structured patterns of interaction between parties. No doubt that the end of 
Cold War and subsequent disappearance of a bi-polar world system will have other 
effects on the ideological complexion, the electoral appeal and the internal 
organisation of parties. This study can perhaps serve to describe and understand the 
character and consequences of such profound changes that have taken place in recent 
times and serve as a tool to analyse future developments. 










Appendix 1.  The West European parties under 
analysis 
 
No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
01 Austria Kommunistische Partei Österreichs 
Founded  in Vienna on 3 November 1918. 
KPÖ COM 
02 Austria Die Grüne Alternative 
Founded in 1987 out of the merger of the Alternative Liste 
Österreichs (ALÖ), the Vereinigte Grüne Österreichs (VGÖ 
founded in 1982) and a number of citizens’ initiative groups. 
GA ENV 
03 Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
Originates from the Deutscher Nationalverband (1910) and the 
parties of the nationalist Lager: the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei 
and the Landbund. The FPÖ is the result of a merger in 1955 of 
the Verband der Unabhangigen (VdU founded in 1949) and the 
Freiheitspartei (founded in 1955). 
FPÖ LIB 
04 Austria Österreichische Volkspartei 
Originates from the Christlich Soziale Partei (1889). The ÖVP 
itself was founded in 1945, after attempts of uniting Christian 
democracy as early as 1870. 
ÖVP CD 
05 Austria Sozialistische Partei Österreich 
Originates from Sozial Demokratische Partei, founded on 30 
December 1888-1 January 1889. The SPÖ is founded in 1945. 
SPÖ SD 
06 Belgium Parti Réformateur Libéral/Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang 
Originates from the Brussels Alliance Libérale and the Parti 
Libéral (founded in 1846).  
Parti Réformateur Libéral (PRL) was founded in November 1976 
out of the Parti Liberal and Rassemblement Wallone (RW). Other 
RW-members merge with the Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès 
(PLP founded in 196) into the Parti des Réformes et de la Liberté 
Wallone (PRLW). In 1971 the liberals split into the linguistic 
parties: the Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (PVV) and Parti 
Réformateur Libéral (PRL). 
PRL/PVV LIB 
07 Belgium Parti Social Chrétien/Christelijke Volkspartij 
Originates from Catholic organizations Unions Conservatrices et 
Constitutionelles (1864), the Cercles Catholique (1855) and the 
Federations des Sociétés Ouvrières Catholique. The three 
groups merge into the Parti Catholique in 1888. In 1936 the party 
is renamed Bloc  
Catholique. In 1945 the unitary party Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti 
Social Chrétien is founded. In 1968 the party splits into its 
Walloon and Flemish wings. 
PSC/CVP CD 
08 Belgium Parti Communiste de Belgique/Kommunistische Partij van 
België 
The party was founded in 1921 out of the Parti Communiste de 
Belgique and the Ancien Parti. 
PCB/KPB COM 
09 Belgium Parti Socialiste Belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij 
Originates from the Parti Ouvrier Belge, founded in 1885. The 
PSB is founded in 1945. The party splits in October 1978 into the 
Socialistische Partij (SP) and the Parti Socialiste (PS). 
PSB/BSP SD 
10 Belgium Volksunie 
The Volksunie originates from the Flemish Frontpartij and the 
Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV). The VU was founded in 1954 
out of the Vlaamse Concentratie, a split from the CVP. In 1978 a 
right wing group broke away into the Vlaams Blok. 
VU ETH 
11 Belgium Écologistes confederés pour l'organisation de luttes 
originales 
Originates, like AGALEV, from the Green movement. The 






No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
12 Denmark Venstre 
Venstre was founded in June 1870. In 1895 the party transforms 
into the Venstre Reform Party. In 1905 the reformist members 
brake away into the Radikale Venstre. In 1910 the Venstre 
Reform Party and the Moderate Venstre Party merge into 
Venstre. 
VEN LIB 
13 Denmark Radikale Venstre 
Founded in 1905 by the reformist wing of Venstre. 
RV LIB 
14 Denmark Socialdemokratiet 
Originates from the Danish section of the First International, 
which was established in 1871. The first congres was held in 
1976. In 1878 the party changes its name to Det 
Socialdemokratiske Forbund, which is usualy regarded as the 
predecessor of the Socialdemokratiet, the party's name since 
1965. 
SD SD 
15 Denmark Socialistisk Folkeparti 
The Socialistisk Folkeparti was founded in 1959 as a result of a 
split from the Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti. 
SF SOC 
16 Denmark Centrum-Demokraterne 
Founded on 7 November 1973 by a breakaway from the 
Socialdemokratiet. 
CD LIB 
17 Denmark Fremkridspartiet 
Founded in 1972. 
PP/FRP PRT 
18 Denmark Det Konservative Folkeparti 
Founded in 1915 by members from Hoyre. 
KF CON 
19 Denmark Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti 
The Danish Communist Party was founded in 1919 from a 
merger of several left-wing groups. Initially its name was the 
Danish Left Socilaist Party. In 1922 the party adopted its current 
name. 
DKP COM 
20 Denmark Kristeligt Folkeparti 
The Kristeligt Folkeparti was founded in April 1970. 
KrF CD 
21 Finland Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto/Demokraattinen 
Vaihtoe 
The Finnish People's Democratic League was founded on 
October 29, 1944 by communists and left-wing socialists. The 
Finnish Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue), 
founded in 1918 in Moscow, remains the core element of the 
SKDL. In 1985 some communists left the SKDL to form the 
Democratic Alternative (Demokraattinen Vaihtoe) together with 
the SKP-Y (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue- Yhdenälsyys, the 
Communist Party of Finland-Unity). 
SKDL/DEVA COM 
22 Finland Liberaalinen Kansanpuolue 
The party originates from the Finnish Party and the Kansallinen 
Edistyspuolue (National Progressive Party) of which the latter 
was founded in 1894. In 1951 the liberal party split into the 
Finnish People's Party (Suomen Kansanpuolue) and the Liberal 
League (Vapamielisten Liitto). In 1965 the two parties merged 
again into the present Liberal People's Party. 
LKP LIB 
23 Finland Kansallinen Kokoomus 
KOK was founded on December 9, 1918 by members of the Old 
Finnish Party. In 1933 the party joined shortly in an elecoral 
alliance with the Isänmaallinen Kansanliike, the Patriotic People's 
Movement. 
KOK CON 
24 Finland Suomen Kristillinen Liitto 
The Finnish Christian Union was founded in 1958. 
SKL CD 
25 Finland Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue 
The first socialist party in Finland, the Finnish Workers Party was 
founded in 1899. In 1903 the Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen 
Puolue adopted its present name. 
In 1959 a group, the Social Democratic League of Workers and 
Smallholders (SKOG), breaks away from the party. In 1973 most 
members of the SKOG-group join the SSP again. 
SSP SD 




No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
26 Finland Keskustapuolue 
The Agrarian Union was founded in 1906. In 1965 the Union 
changed its name into Center Party. 
KESK AGR 
27 Finland Svenska Folkpartiet 
Originates from the Swedish Party which was founded in 1906. In 
1973 some members of the party joined the Constitutional Party 
of the Right (POP). 
SFP ETH 
28 France Parti Socialiste (SFIO/PSF + PSU) 
The Parti Socialiste is the successor of the Section Francaise de 
l'Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO), founded in 1905. From 1969 
until 1971 the movement was known under the name Nouveau 
Parti Socialiste. From 1972 to 1977 the party constituted a part of 
the Union de la Gauche togeher with the PCF and MRG. In 1960 
a radical-left group forms the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU). 
PSF SD 
29 France Gaullistes 
The parties in the Gaullist tradition are the Rassemblement pour 
la France (RPF) which existed from 1947 until 1953. In 1958 the 
Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) was formed from 
several party organisations among which the Union pour la 
Renouveau Francaise and the Union Civique were the most 
important. This amalgamation dissolved into the Union de 
Démocrates pour la République (UDR) in 1967. In 1976 the UDR 
transformed into the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). 
In the 1981 election the UDR joined the Union pour la Majorité 
Nouvelle. In 1988 the UDR joined the UDF in the Union Républi-
que et du Centre (UDC). 
GAUL CON 
30 France Union pour la Democratie Française (+ CDS + Parti 
Républicain)  
This current, originating from the Parti Republicain (1901) 
reconstructed the first post-war liberal party in 1945 from 
elements of the Independent Republicans and the Independent 
Paysans. In 1948 the CNIP was formed and co-existed along with 
the Parti Republicain Radicale and the Radical Socialists within 
this liberal tradition.. The Centre National des Independants et 
Paysans (CNIP) existed from 1951 until 1966. In 1962 the CNIP 
split into the Centre National des Independants (CNI) and the RI. 
The Parti Républicain originates from the Républicain 
Independant (RI) which was founded in 1966. From 1974 until 
1978 the party was named FNRI. In 1978 the UDF was founded. 
The main components of the UDF are the Parti Républicain 
(founded in 1977), the Parti Radical, the Centre des Democrats 
Sociaux (CDS) and the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD). 
The christian democratic current of the UDF , the CDS, is the 
successor of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP). The 
CDS was formed in 1976 as a result of a fusion of the Centre 
Démocratique et Progrés and the Centre Democrate. One other 
wing of this movement, the PSD, was founded in 1973 as the 
Mouvement Démocrate Socialiste de France (MSDF), later 
renamed Mouvement Démocrate Socialiste (MDS). In 1982 the 




France Mouvement Republicain Populaire 
The Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) is founded in 
1944. The origin of French christian democracy can be found in 
the Parti Démocrate Populaire (PDP) of the interbellum and the 
Catholic labour unions (Confédération Francaise des Travailleurs 
Chrétiens) and other catholic organizations. 
MRP  CD 
32 France Parti Communiste Française 
The French Communist Party was founded after a split from the 
SFIO in 1920 at the Congres in Tours. The party joined the Union 
de la Gauche together with the PSF and MRG in 1972, which it 
left again a few years later. 
PCF COM 
33 France Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche 
The MRG is a split from the Parti Radical in June 1972 and was 






No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
34 France Parti Républicain Radical et Radical Socialiste (PRR/RS) + 
Radical Socialist Party (RSP) 
The origin of the radical movement in France can be traced back 
to the activities of Louis Blanc from 1839 until 1848. The radical 
tendency is represented by the Parti Radical, founded in 1901. 
Before that time the radical tendency was never well organised. 
In 1972 the MRG broke away from the party. The UDSR is also 
considered to belong to the radical tendency. 
RAD LIB 
35 Germany Christlich Demokratische Union 
The CDU was founded in 1945 (officially at the Goslar 
conference in 1950) by prominent members of the former 
Weimar catholic Zentrum party and other local community 
leaders. 
CDU CD 
36 Germany Christlich Soziale Union 
The CSU, founded in 1945, is a local party which competes in 
elections only in Bavaria. At the national level the CSU forms a 
united parliamentary party together with the CDU. 
CSU CD 
37 Germany Die Grünen 
The Grünen originate from local environmental groups such as 
the Grüne Liste Umweltschutz (GLU), Aktionsgemeinschaft 
Unabhangiger Deutscher (AUD) and Grüne Aktion Zukunft 
(GAZ). These and other groups merge for the 1979 European 
elections into Die Grünen. The first national conference was held 
in Karlsruhe in 1980. In 1981 some conservative members broke 
away into the Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei (ÖDP). Under 
the name Alternative Liste and Grüne Alternative Liste the 
Grünen compete in local elections between 1980 and 1983. 
GRU ENV 
38 Germany Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
The SPD originates from the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterspartei 
(DSAP) and the Allgemeiner Detscher Arbeitersverein (founded 
in 1863), which joined forces in 1875 and was renamed 
Sozialistische Arbeiterspartei Deutschlands (SAPD). In 1891 the 
party adopted its present name. German participation in World 
War I led to a split into the nationalist MSPD and the independent 
USPD. In 1918 part of the socialist movement broke away into 
the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). In 1945 the 
party was re-established. 
SPD SD 
39 Germany Deutsche Kommunistische Partei 
The Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP) was founded in 
1918. In 1945 the party was reconstituted. In 1956 the party was 
banned as unconstitutional as it rejected the German Basic Law. 
In 1968 the party was refounded. 
DKP COM 
40 Germany Freie Demokratische Partei 
The FDP originates from two liberal parties of the Weimar 
Republik, the Deutsche Staatspartei (DSP) and the Deutsche 
Volkspartei (DVP). The DVP was founded as the Volkspartei in 
1866 in Württemberg. In 1945 the DVP was re-founded. In other 
regions liberal parties emerged: the Deutsche Partei, the 
Demokratische Volkspartei, the Partei Freier Demokraten, the 
Bremer Demokratische Volkspartei, the Liberale-Demokatische 
Partei and others. The first attempt to unite these regional parties 
into the Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (DPD). In December 
1948 the regional liberal parties merged into the FDP at the 
Heppenheim-conference. In 1956 several FDP ministers broke 
away into the Freie Volkspartei (FVP). In 1983 some prominent 
members found the Liberale Demokraten. 
FDP LIB 
41 Ireland Worker's Party 
The Pairtí na nOibrí, or Workers' Party (WP), originates from a 
split within Sinn Féin in 1969. In 1977 the party was renamed 
Sinn Féin-The Workers' Party, an addition which was dropped 
again in 1982. 
WP SOC 
42 Ireland Fine Gael 
Fine Gael (FG) originates from the pro-Treaty party Cumann na 
nGaedhael, which was founded in 1922. The defeat of Cumann 
na nGaedhael in the 1932 election resulted a merger with the 
National Centre Party and the National Guard of Blueshirts into 
Fine Gael in September 1933. In 1986 some members join the 
Progressive Democrats (PD). 
FG CD 




No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
43 Ireland The Communist Party of Ireland 
The Irish version of a communist party was founded in 1921. 
Soon thereafter the party changed its name into the Irish 
Worker's League (IWL) and later Revolutionary Worker's Groups. 
In 1933 the party was renamed Communist Party. In 1948 the 
party revived as the Irish Worker's League. In 1962 the party 
reorganized under the name of Irish Worker's Party (IWP). In 
1970 the IWP merged with the Communist Party (of the North) 
into the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI). 
CPI COM 
44 Ireland Fianna Fáil 
Fianna Fáil ("soldiers of destiny") originates from members of 
Sinn Féin which refused to accept the Treaty with Britain after the 
Civil War ended in 1921. On May 16, 1926 the party was 
founded. In 1973 the "Arms Crisis" resulted in a split of the 
Aontacht Éireann (Irish Unity Party). In 1985 some members 
found the Progressive Democrats (PD). 
FF CON 
45 Ireland Irisch Labour Party 
The foundation of the Irish Labour Party (ILP) was in 1912. A 
national organization was completed in 1922. In 1944 some 
members, together with labour unionists, split into the National 
Labour Party (NLP). In 1950 the two groups merge again. In 1986 
some members join the Progressive Democrats (PD). 
ILP SD 
46 Ireland Progressive Democrats 
The Progressive Democrats (PD) is founded on December 21, 
1985. The origins of the party lie in an internal conflict within 
Fianna Fáil over the leadership of Charles Haughey. 
PD LIB 
47 Ireland The Green Alliance 
The Green Alliance was founded as the Ecology Party of Ireland 
in 1981 by members of environmental and anti-nuclear protest 
groups, and with support of the Ecology Party in the United 
Kingdom. 
GRE ENV 
48 Italy Democrazia Proletaria 
The Democrazia Proletaria (DP) was founded in 1978 out of 
several left-wing parties of which Vanguardia Operaia is the most 
important. First named the Partito di Unita Proletaria (PDUP) and 
later Sinistra Democrazia Proletaria (SDP) the alliance broke up. 
A new party was formed, the PDUP per il Communismo, which 
soon joined the Communist Party. A minority of PDUP members 
and the majority of the Vanguardia Operaia found the DP. 
DP SOC 
49 Italy Partito Radicale 
The Radical Party, more a movement than a party, is founded in 
December 1955 as the result of a split from the Liberal Party. In 
the 1958 elections the Radical Party presented a joint list 
together with the Republican Party. In 1962 the party collapsed 
only to revive in 1969. In January 1988 the party congres decided 
to no longer compete in national elections and rename the party 
as the internationalist Partito Federalista Europeo. 
PR ENV 
50 Italy Partito Socialista Italiano/Partito Socialista Unificato 
The Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) originates from early socialist 
movements like the Italian Revolutionary Socialist Party (1882), 
the Workers Party (1885) and the Milanese Socialist League 
(1889). At the 1892 conference in Genova, these groups merge 
into the Party of Italian Workers. In 1895 the party changes its 
name into Partito Socialista Italiano. In 1907 the first major 
schisms occured and the revolutionary syndicalists were forced to 
leave the party. In November 1914 Mussolini is expelled from the 
party on the grounds of being in favour of Italian participation in 
World War I. In 1921 another group splits away into the PCI. In 
1922 there is another internal dispute and a group of reformists is 
expelled, which results in the creation of the Partito Socialista 
Unitario (PSU). In 1924, after the murder of the PSU leader 
Matteotti, the two socialist parties join forces again. Some 
dissatisfied members join the Communist Party. In 1934 the PSI 
and the PCI enter into a "pact of unity of action" against the 
fascists. This pact is renewed in 1943 when the Italian Socialist 
Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) joins the pact. In 1947 a large 
reformist wing of the PSI breaks away into the PSLI/PSDI. In 
1964 a left-wing group of the PSI splits from the party in order to 
revive the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). In 1966 
the PSI and PSDI start the proces of a merger, but this is never 






No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
51 Italy Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano 
The origins of the PSDI are found in January 1947 when a group 
of PSI deputies and members split away from the party over the 
issue of cooperation with the communists. The newly founded 
party was first named Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani 
(PSLI). In 1951 the PSLI and the Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU) 
merge into one party which is officially named Partito Socialista 
Democratico Italiano (PSDI) in 1952. From October 1966 until 
1969 the PSI and PSDI enter into the proces of closer 
cooperation in order to unite again. On July 4, 1969 some social 
democrats leave the semi-merged party in order to reestablish 
the PSU. On February 16, 1971 the former name, PSDI, is again 
adopted. 
PSDI SD 
52 Italy Partito Liberale Italiano 
Liberal organization can be traced back to 1848. The origin of 
Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI) can be found in the Unione 
Democrazia Nationale (1946) and the Blocco Nazionale (1948). 
In 1955 a group of left-wing Liberals break away into the Radical 
Party. 
PLI LIB 
53 Italy Partito Repubblicano Italiano 
The Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI) originates from 
republican (workers) associations which were combined into the 
patto di fratellanza in 1871. In April 1895 a first formal Republican 
Party organization is set up. After World War II the party splits 
into the PRI and the Partito d'Azione. In 1946 the Partito d'Azione 
dissolves and some of its former members join the PRI again. In 
the 1958 national elections the PRI presents a common list with 
the Radical Party and for the 1984 European elections with the 
PLI. 
PRI LIB 
54 Italy Movimento Sociale Italiano 
The origins of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) have to be 
traced back to the pre-war fascist movements. The MSI was 
formally founded in 1946. In 1972 the MSI join in an electoral 
alliance and in 1973 into a formal merger with the Italian 
Democratic Party of Monarchical Union (PDIUM) under the label 
of Destra Nazionale. In 1976 the party split into the MSI and 
Democrazia Nazionale. 
MSI FAS 
55 Italy Democrazia Cristiana 
The origin of the christian democratic party lie in the early catholic 
movements such as Opera dei Congressi e dei Comitati Cattolici 
(1874) and its successor Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action, 
founded in 1905). In 1919 the Catholics reorganized under the 
name of Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI). In 1929 the party was 
dissolved by an agreement between Mussolini and the Church. In 
November 1942 prominent members of the Partiti Popolare and 
the Milanese Movimento Guelfo found Democrazia Cristiana 
(DC). 
DC CD 
56 Italy Partito Communista Italiano/Partito Democratico de la 
Sinistra 
The Partito Communista Italiano (PCI) was founded in January 
1921 as a result of a split of the Socialist Party over joining the 
Third International. In 1934 the PCI concluded a pact with the 
Socialist Party, which was renewed in 1943. In 1947 this 
cooperation resulted in the creation of a Popular Front together 
with the socialists. In the late 1950 the socialists distanced 





The Democraten '66 (D66) was founded in 1966 as an attempt to 
'explode' the Dutch party system. The party joined in an electoral 




Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 
originates from the Liberale Unie (1885) and the Radicale Bond 
(1982) which merge into the Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond 
(VDB) in 1902. Part of the VDB, the Bond van Vrije Liberalen 
(1906) and the Economische Bond (1918) merge into the 
Vrijheidsbond, later renamed the Liberale Staatspartij in 1921. In 
1946 some of the liberals joined the PvdA, others founded the 
Party of Freedom (PVV). In 1948 the PVV and the liberal 
breakaway from the PvdA found the VVD. 
VVD LIB 








Christelijk Historische Unie 
The Christian Historical Union (CHU) is the result of a split from 
the ARP into Vrije Anti-Revolutionairen. Together with the 
Christelijk Historische Kiezersbond these Free Anti-
Revolutionaries establish the Christian Historical Party in 1903. In 
1908 the party is joined by a Frysian Christian Historical group 
and the CHU is formally established. In 1945 left-wing members 
joined the PvdA in its 'breakthrough'-attempt, others continue to 





The Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) was established in 1879. In 
1894 the party split into the ARP and the Vrije Anti-
Revolutionairen, the latter joined the CHU in 1903. In 1918 the 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) breaks away and in 
1948 some dissidents jion the Gereformeerde Politiek Verbond 
(GPV). In 1970 some members of the left-wing of the party break 
away to join the Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR). In 1981 some 






The Catholic People's Party (KVP) originates from the Catholic 
organizations in the 1880's. In 1897 the Catholic organizations 
adopt a common electoral program. In 1904 the General League 
of Roman Catholic Associations is formed. In 1926 the Rooms 
Katholieke Staats Partij (RKSP) is established. In 1945 the 
Catholic People's Party is founded. In 1948 a right-wing group 
splits into the Katholieke Nationale Partij (KNP) and another  
group reassembles into the Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland 




Christen Democratisch Appel 
The Christian Democratic Appeal originates from the merger of 
three parties: the Catholic People's Party (KVP), the protestant 
Christian Historical Union and the orthodox protestant Anti 
Revolutionary Party. In 1971 a common programme was 
presented and in 1975 a federation is estabished. In the 1977 
elections the christian democrats present a common list. The 




Communistische Partij Nederland 
The Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) was founded in 
1909 as a result from a split from the Sociaal Democratische 
Arbeiders Partij. Initially the party was named the Sociaal 
Democratische Partij. In 1918 the party was renamed the 
Communist Party. In 1958 prominent members of the party are 
expelled for 'revisionist ideas'. In 1984 a group of orthodox 
marxists form the Verbond van Communisten in Nederland 
(VCN). The CPN cooperates since 1984 with PPR, PSP, the 
EVP and ecologists in Groen Progressief Akkoord, later renamed 




Partij van de Arbeid 
The origin of the Dutch Labour Party can be traced back to the 
Sociaal-Democratische Bond founded in 1882. In 1894 the 
Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP) is established. In 
1909 the radical wing is expelled and they found the Communist 
Party (CPN). The Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) was founded in 
1946 as an attempt to create a broad movement of socialists, 
christians and liberals; a strategy named the 'Breakthrough'. In 
1947 some liberals split away into the VVD. In 1956 part of the 
left-wing leaves the party to join the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) 
in 1957. In 1970 some right-wing socialist break away into Demo-
cratic Socialists 1970 (DS'70). In 1971 and 1972 the PvdA forms 
an electoral alliance with the PPR and D66. 
PVDA SD 
65 Norway Norges Kommunistiske Parti 
The Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) was founded in 1923 by 
left-wing members of DNA. In 1972 the NKP joins forces with the 
SF and the Demokratiske Sosialister-AIK into the Sosialistisk 
Valgforbund (Socialist Electoral Alliance). In 1975 the NKP 






No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
66 Norway Det Norske Arbeidersparti 
The Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) was founded in 1887. In 
1921 the moderate wing of the party splits into the Norges 
Sosialdemokratiske Arbeitersparti (NSA). In 1923 the radical 
wing leaves the party to found the Norges Kommunistiske Parti 
(NKP). In 1927 the DNA and NSA reunite. In 1961 part of the left-
wing left the party to join the Sosialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist 
People's Party). 
DNA SD 
67 Norway Venstre 
Venstre originates from the liberal organizations of the 1870s. In 
1888 conservative members break away into the Moderate 
Venstre. In 1905 a serious schism results in Venstre members 
joining Hoyre, while others established Frisinnede Venstre 
(National Venstre) later renamed as Frisinnede Folkparti (Liberal 
People's Party). In 1972 a further schism split the party into Det 
Nye Folkeparti (New People's Party) and Venstre. In 1980 Det 
Nye Folkepartiet renamed itself Det Liberal Folkepartiet (DLF). 
From 1987 DLF and Venstre cooperated again and the parties 
were reunited in 1988. 
V LIB 
68 Norway Hoyre 
Hoyre originates from conservative groups in the 1870s. In 1884 
Hoyre is founded. At the turn of the century the party is renamed 
Samlingspartiet. In 1910 the party is renamed Hoyre. 
HOYR CON 
69 Norway Kristeligt Folkeparti 
The Christian People's Party is founded in 1933 by members of 
the Venstre party. In 1939 a national organization is completed. 
KRFP CD 
70 Norway Socialistisk Venstreparti 
The origin of the Socialistisk Venstreparti (SV) lies in 1961, when 
part of the left-wing left the DNA join independent socialists in the 
newly founded Sosialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's Party). 
In 1972 the SF joins forces with the NKP and the Demokratiske 
Sosialister-AIK into the Sosialistisk Valgforbund (Socialist 
Electoral Alliance). In March 1975 the party is renamed 
Socialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party). From 1975 the 
NKP no longer participates in the Alliance. 
SV SOC 
71 Norway Senterpartiet 
The Center Party is founded as the Bondepartiet (Agrarian Party) 
in 1920. In 1959 the Bondepartiet changes its name into 
Senterpartiet. 
SP AGR 
72 Norway Fremskrittspartiet 
The origin of the Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) is found in 
April 1973 as (and by) Anders Lange Party for Strong Reduction 
in Taxation and Public Intervention. In 1977 the party changed its 
name into Progress Party. 
FRP PRT 
73 Sweden Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet 
The Christian Democratic Community Party is founded in 1964 
as the Kristen Demokratisk Samling. In 1985 the party enters into 
an electoral alliance with the Senterpartiet. In 1987 the party 
renames itself Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet. 
KDS CD 
74 Sweden Folkpartiet 
The Liberal Party originates from the liberal groupings in the 
1860s. In the 1890s the first Parliamentary organization is set up. 
The 1902 the national party under the name Frisinnade 
Landsföreningen is founded. In 1923 the Liberal Party splits into 
the Frissinade Folkpartiet (Liberal People's Party) and the 
Sveriges Liberale Parti (Swedish Liberal Party). In 1934 the two 
parties reunite within the Folkpartiet. 
Fp LIB 




No Country Name of the political party Abbreviation Party 
family 
75 Sweden Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna 
The Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna originates from the 
establishment of the Vänstersocialister (Left Socialists) in 1917. 
In 1921 the Vänstersocialister splits into the Sveriges 
Kommunistiska Parti (Swedish Communist Party) and Left 
Socialists. The last group joins the Social Democrats again in 
1924. In 1924 the a part of the Communist Party breaks away 
into the Socialistiksa Vänsterparti (Socialist Left Party). In 1929 
there is another schism and the Socialist Party is founded. In 
1967 the 
Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (VPK) is founded as a result of 
another internal conflict. In 1977 a further schism leads to the 
establishment of Sveriges Arbetarepartiet Kommunisterna. 
VpK COM 
76 Sweden Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet 
The Social Democratic Labour Party was founded in 1889. The 
SAP originates from the Labour movement, the Social 
Democratic Club, established in 1883. In 1917 a number of 
members broke away into the Vänstersocialister (Left Socialists), 
some of which return again in 1924. 
SAP SD 
77 Sweden Moderata Samlingspartiet 
The Moderate Unity Party originates from the conservative 
Allmänna Valmansförbundet (National Campaign Union), 
founded in 1904. In 1935 the major conservative groups the 
Nationella Partiet (National Party) and the Lantmanna och 
Borgare Partiet (Farmers and Burghers' Party) merge into the 
Högern (Right Party). In 1969 the party changed its name to 
Moderate Unity Party.  
MSP CON 
78 Sweden Senterpartiet 
In 1910 the Bondeförbundet (Agrarian Party) was founded. In 
1915 another agrarian party, the Jordbrukarnas (Farmer's Union), 
was founded. In 1921 the two parties merge into the 
Bondeförbundet. In 1957  the party changes its name to 
Senterpartiet (Center Party). In the 1985 election the 
Senterpartiet forms an electoral alliance with the Christian 
Democratic Party, which is not renewed in 1988. 
C AGR 
79 Sweden Miljöpartiet de Gröna 
The Green Ecology Party was founded in September 1981, as a 




The Conservative Party 
The origin of the Conservative (or Tory) Party can be traced back 
to 1832 when the party organized in response to the Reform Act. 
In 1846 the Conservative Party split and the Conservative 
Protectionist Party is is founded. The National Union (founded in 
1867) under the leadership of Disreali establishes a new 
Conservative Central Office in 1870. The official name for the 
organization is National Union of Conservative and Unionist 






The origin of the Labour Party can be traced to the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP) founded in 1893 and the Social Democratic 
Federation (SDF) established in 1883. These groups merge in 
1900 into the Labour Representation Committee, together with 
the trade unions and the Fabian Society (1884). In 1901 the first 
schism led to the breakaway of the marxist SDF. In 1906 the 
Committee changed its name into Labour Party. In 1931 Labour 
split over participation in a national government with the Liberals 
and Conservatives. In 1932 the Labour party splits into three: the 
(fascist) New Party, the ILP and Labour. In 1981 some prominent 












The origins of the Liberal Party lie in the foundation of the first 
Liberal Party established in 1859 out of a merger of Whigs, 
Radicals and Peelites. In 1877 a Liberal National Federation is 
founded. In 1886 the the Liberal Unionists break away to merge 
with the Conservatives. In 1916 the Liberal Party split again, only 
to reunite in 1923. The creation of the 1931 national governments 
split the party once more into three groups: the Liberal Nationals, 
Independent Liberals and Liberals. In 1980 the liberal leader 
Steel established the SDP/Liberal Alliance with members of the 




Social Democratic Party 
The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was established on March 
26, 1981 by former members of the Labour Party who declared 
themselves independent from Labour as the Council for Social 
Democracy earlier that year. The SDP had already formed an 
electoral alliance with the Liberals (the SDP/Liberal Alliance). In 
1988 the SDP splits and the majority of the party merges with the 
Liberal Party into the Social and Liberal Democrats (SLD). The 









Appendix 2.  Variable list 
 
variable code abbreviation source 
COUNTRY 
n = 628 
1 = Austria Aut 
2 = Belgium Bel 
3 = Denmark Den 
4 = Finland Fin 
5 = France Fra 
6 = Germany Ger 
7 = Ireland Ire 
8 = Italy Ita 
9 = Netherlands Net 
10 = Norway Nor 
11 = Sweden Swe 
12 = United Kingdom UK 
 
PERIOD 
n = 628 
1 = 1945-1950 
2 = 1951-1955 
3 = 1956-1960 
4 = 1961-1965 
5 = 1966-1970 
6 = 1971-1975 
7 = 1976-1980 
8 = 1981-1985 
9 = 1986-1990 
 
YEAR 
n = 628 
the last year of the period  
FAMILY 
n = 628 
1 = communist com 
2 = socialist soc 
3 = social democrat sd 
4 = Christian democrat cd 
5 = liberal lib 
6 = conservative con 
7 = ethnic eth 
8 = agrarian agr 
9 = protest prt 
10 = environmental env 
11 = fascist fas 
The classification is 
based on Lane, Mac-
kay and Newton 1991; 
Wende 1981; Jacobs 
1989. 
PARTYNR 
n = 628 
1 to 83 See Appendix I for the 
complete name of the 
party and the partynum-
ber. 
PARTY 
n = 628 
abbreviation of the party name  See Appendix I. 
SPLITMER 
n = 628 
the number of splits of the party or the number of mergers with other 
party organisations within the period of five years. 
Based on Mair 1990; 
Jacobs 1989: Wende 
1981 
STAFMEM 
n = 274 
 
the proportion of staff in the central party organisation in relation to the 
number of members. The number of staff in the central office is divi-
ded by the number of members. 




n = 222 
the proportion of parliamentary seats in relation to the parliamentary 
staff. The number of seats in parliament is divided by the number of 
parliamentary staff. 
Data from Katz and 
Mair 1992, tables C1 




n = 235 
the proportion of staff in the central party organisation in relation to the 
total seats in the national parliament. The number of staff in the cen-
tral office is divided by the number of seats in parliament. 
Based on Katz and 
Mair 1992; Mackie and 
Rose 1974; 1991 
 
STAFCOPAR 
n = 215 
the proportion of staff in the central party organisation in relation to the 
parliamentary staff. The number of staff in the central office is divided 
by the number of parliamentary staff. 
Based on Katz and 






variable code abbreviation source 
MOTIONS  
n = 215 
the openness or inclusiveness of the procedure by which motions can 
be put to the national congress. 
 
1 = the party leader decides which motions are discussed at 
the national congress. 
2 = motions are put to the congress by external (interest) 
groups, formally outside the official party organs. 
3 = the parliamentary leader or group decides which motions 
are discussed at the congress. 
4 = a national committee or board decides which motions will 
be put to the national congress. 
5 = party members have to attend (local) meetings or con-
gresses to have their motion accepted by this lower party 
body before the motion is send to the national congress. 
This category also includes a procedure in which only the 
local board or policy committee is allowed to send in moti-
ons for the national congress. 
6 = the most open and democratic procedure: all members 
can put motions to the national congress. 
 
Based on Katz and 
Mair 1992; 1994; Janda 
1980 and numerous 
country studies 
OBLIMEM 
n = 492 
the number of requirements or obligations people have to fulfil in 
order to join the party organisation. 
Based on Katz and 
Mair 1992; Janda 1980 
 
MEMFIN 
n = 284 
MF/TI-ratio = the proportion of membershipfees in relation to the total 
income of the party. 




n = 228 
SF/TI-ratio = the proportion of state finance in relation to the total 
income of the party. 




n = 628 
the age in years of the party at the end of the period. Data from Jacobs 
1989; Wende 1981 
 
CANDSEL 
n = 564 
= the openness or inclusiveness of the procedure by which the parlia-
mentary candidates of the party are selected. 
 
1 = the incumbent party leader selects the parliamentary 
candidates. 
2 = the party central office or executive selects the parliamen-
tary candidates. 
3 = the selection of parliamentary candidates is dominated by 
groups outside the official party organs (interest groups). 
Usually the selection requires ratification by the party cen-
tral body. 
4 = the parliamentary leader or group selects the parliamen-
tary candidates. This procedure can include ratification by 
party members after the selection. 
5 = the official congress representatives or local leaders 
select the parliamentary candidates. Members can only 
ratify the candidate selection afterwards. 
6 = party members (party activists) have to attend (local) 
meetings or congresses to be admitted in the selection 
procedure. This category also includes a procedure in 
which special election committees are established. 
7 = the most open and democratic selection procedure. All 
members of the party formally have the right and oppor-
tunity to participate in the selection procedure in open 
primaries, referenda or polls among all party members. 
 
 
Gallagher and Marsh 
1988, Katz and Mair 
1992; 1994 




variable code abbreviation source 
LEADSEL = the openness or inclusiveness of the procedure by which the party 
leader is selected. 
 
1 = the incumbent party leader selects the new party leader. 
2 = the party central office or executive selects the party lea-
der. 
3 = the selection of party leader is dominated by groups outsi-
de the official party organs (interest groups). Usually the 
selection requires ratification by the party central body. 
4 = the parliamentary leader or group selects the party leader. 
This procedure can include ratification by party members 
after the selection. 
5 = the official congress representatives or local leaders 
select the party leader. Members can only ratify the 
candidate selection afterwards. 
6 = party members (party activists) have to attend (local) 
meetings or congresses to be admitted in the selection 
procedure. This category also includes a procedure in 
which special election committees are established. 
7 = the most open and democratic selection procedure. All 
members of the party formally have the right and oppor-
tunity to participate in the selection procedure in open 
primaries, referenda or polls among all party members. 
 
Gallagher and Marsh 




n = 577 
the source of membership of the party. 
 
1 = entirely indirect membership 
2 = mainly indirect, but some direct 
3 = membership equally divided 
4 = mainly direct, but some indirect 
5 = entirely direct membership 
Janda 1980; Wende 
1981; Jacobs 1989 
NOCONGR 
n = 586 
the number of congresses to be held according to the official statutes. Katz and Mair 1992; 
Janda 1980; Wende 
1981: Jacobs 1989. 
 
MVRATIO 
n = 428 
the member-voter ratio: the number of members in relation to the 
number of voters for the party. 
Mackie and Rose 1971; 
1991; Katz and Mair 
1992: Charlot 1967; 
Borella 1990; 
Chagnollaud 1993; 




n = 441 
the member-electorate ratio: the number of members of the party in 
relation to the total electorate of the country. 
Mackie and Rose 1974; 
1991; Katz and Mair 
1992; Charlot 1967; 
Borella 1990 
Chagnollaud 1993; 




n = 576 
the average percentage of the vote in national elections. Mackie and Rose 1971; 
1991 
SEATSPAR 
n = 572 
the average percentage of the seats in national parliament Mackie and Rose 1974; 
1991 
VOLATIL = electoral volatility: the net change within the electoral party system 
resulting from (individual) vote transfers: The formula for electoral 
volatility is: 
Electoral Volatility (EV) P i,t = Ù P i,t - P i,t-1  
Ù = change 
P i,t = the percentage of the vote for party i in election t 
P i,t-1 = the percentage of the vote for party i in election t-1 
Pedersen 1979; Barto-
lini and Mair 1990 
GOVTCONT 
n = 630 
the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party. Woldendorp et al. 1993 
TIMEGOVT 
N = 617 





variable code abbreviation source 
TRADCONT 
n = 630 
the percentage of traditional portfolio control (for traditional portfolios 
see table ). 
Woldendorp et al. 
1993; Budge and 
Keman 1992 
CONTLAOR 
n = 630 
the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party in 
the cluster of law and order ministries: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice 
and Defence.  
Woldendorp et al. 1993 
CONTECMA 
n = 630 
the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party in 
the cluster of the economic management departments: Finance, 
Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry and Public Works. 
 
Woldendorp et al. 1993 
CONSOWE 
n = 630 
the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party in 
the cluster of social welfare portfolios: Education, Health, Housing, 
Social Affairs and Environment. 
Woldendorp et al. 1993 
OPTCONT 
 
n = 629 
= opportunistic portfolio control. The percentage of control over non-
traditional ministerial portfolios relative to the total ministries 
controlled. 
Budge and Keman 
1992; Woldendorp et 
al. 1993 
LRMANIF 
n = 474 
the left-right position of the party on the basis of the Manifesto Data. 
The position of the party on the left-right scale is constructed by 
subtracting the sum of emphasis of the 'left-wing-issues' (variables 
105, 106, 202, 413, 701 and 503) from the sum of the emphasis on 
the 'right-wing' issues (variables 104, 303, 401, 402, 505, 507, 414 
and 605). The poles of the scale are +100 (when the entire manifesto 
consists of emphasis on left-wing issues) and -100 (when the entire 
manifesto consists of emphasis on right-wing issues). 
Budge, Robertson and 
Hearl 1989: Volkens 
1992 
DISTCNTR 
n = 474 
= the distance from the mean policy position of the party system Budge, Robertson and 




n = 251 
This measure of class-distinctiveness is obtained by subtracting the 
percentage of non-manual workers (SUPPUPP and SUPPMID) from 
the percentage of manual workers (SUPPWORK). The measure is 
based on Alford's Index of Class-Voting. 
Alford 1963; Lane and 
Ersson 1994 and 
various country studies 
(see appendix 4). 
 
SUPPWORK 
n = 311 
= the average percentage of working-class support for the party. various country studies 
(see appendix 4). 
 
SUPPMID 
n = 295 
= the average percentage of middle-class support for the party. various country studies 
(see appendix 4). 
SUPPUPP 
n = 251 
= the average percentage of upper-class support for the party. various country studies 
(see appendix 4). 
SUPPAGR 
n = 202 
= the average percentage of agrarian support for the party. various country stu-
dies(see appendix 4). 
IDENTIFY 
n = 189 
= the level of party identification: the long-term predisposition to vote 
for a particular party. The score is the percentage of the voters that 
strongly identify with a party. 
Katz and Mair 1992; 
Denver and Crewe 
1988 and various coun-




n = 461 
the score on this variable is obtained by correlating the party profile 
with the country's average policy profile. 








variable code abbreviation source 
TRADEMPH 
n = 454 
= the score on this variable is obtained by adding the five issues that 
are most emphasised by parties belonging to the party family in the 
period 1945-1960. These issues are considered as the traditional 
issues: 
1. communist = 701 + 106 + 504 + 503 + 105. 
2. socialist = 504 + 703 + 701 + 503 + 408. 
3. social democrat = 504 + 703 + 701 + 503 + 408. 
4. Christian democrat = 603 + 504 + 503 + 201 + 703. 
5. liberal = 401 + 504 + 703 + 201 + 706. 
6. conservative = 414 + 504 + 401 + 410 + 703. 
7. ethnic = 504 + 305 + 703 + 410 + 101. 
8. agrarian = 703 + 414 + 305 + 411 + 606. 
9. protest = 504 + 706 + 401 + 414 + 404. 
10. environmental = 703 + 502 + 705 + 301 + 303. 
11. fascist = 504 + 305 + 410 + 101 + 703  
Budge, Robertson and 
Hearl 1987: Volkens 
1992 
CAMPAIGN 
n = 218 
= the percentage of the total party income spend on electoral 
campaigning. 
Katz and Mair 1992 
POLEXPRT 
N = 324 




n = 324 









Appendix 3. Methodological Considerations 
 
The Comparative method 
 
This study tests the catch-all thesis by using the comparative method of social science. 
The comparative method can be used develop and test general theories (Prezworski 
1987, 35) as well as to identify and explain similarities and deviations from general 
patterns. This study adopts a variable-oriented strategy (Ragin 1989), analysing a large 
number of cases on a limited number of variables, in order to falsify or validate the 
catch-all thesis. The variable-oriented strategy allows for some generalisation, if only 
for a limited number of variables as a result of considerable simplifications (ceteris 
paribus-assumptions). First, reliable and valid measures of the variables have been 
specified (see chapter 3 and appendix 2). Secondly, these measures guided the 
systematic collection of data, which have been subjected to statistical analysis in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
The variable-orientated strategy permits the use of quantitative methods. Although 
the quality of the research will always increase with the investigator's familiarity of all 
the units under investigation, compared with the case-orientated strategy less 
knowledge about the individual cases is required and possible, due to the large 
number of cases. For discussions of the distinctiveness of the comparative scientific 
method see Prezworski and Teune 1970, 50-51; Lijphart 1971, 684; Lijphart 1975, 
164; Ragin 1987, 6; Ragin 1989, 68-69; Mayer 1989, 56-57; Dalton 1991, 15; Sartori 
1991, 244; Aarebrot and Bakka 1992; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 27-39; Keman 1993, 
37; Lane and Ersson 1994, 6; Ragin 1994, 93; Mair 1995; Marsh and Stoker 1995, 173-
188. 
 
The number of cases and indicators 
 
In this study 83 parties are included in 12 West European countries (see appendix 1). 
For all 83 parties data have been collected on 18 indicators (see appendix 2 for a 
complete variable list) for the period spanning 1945 to 1990. Since data-collection on 
an annual basis proved impossible, this period has been broken down into nine 
periods and scores have been aggregated into 5 year averages. So, for each party there 
are nine scores available over the period 1945-1990. This format increases the 
maximum number of cases to 747 (83 parties times nine post-war periods of five 
years). Since not all parties existed in all nine periods, the actual number of cases is 
628, when non-existing cases are omitted. 
 
Validity and reliability 
 
There are two important criteria for the quality of a conversion of theoretical 
concepts into operational definitions: its validity, i.e. does the concept measure what it 
is intended to measure?, and its reliability, i.e. does it measure the same in different 




contexts? (Müller and Schmidt 1979, 30). 
 
In the operationalisation of catch-allism the validity was maximised by way of an 
elaborate literature study. In this chapter a core definition of Kirchheimer's catch-all 
concept was formulated on the basis of the original catch-all conception (see chapter 
2) and the ensuing scientific debate (see chapter 3). This debate on the definition and 
measurement of the catch-all concept, which still continues, shows a widespread bias 
towards the electoral dimension. The neglect of the organisational and ideological 
dimension acerbated the confusion insofar as the defining elements of catch-allism are 
concerned. Using the core definition as a starting point, a valid operational definition 
of the three dimensions of catch-allism was constructed. For each dimension multiple 
indicators were selected in order to empirically scrutinise the catch-all development in 
West European party systems (chapters 4, 5 and 6). The selection of these empirical 
indicators is based on the notes and references of Kirchheimer himself as well as on 
the secondary literature regarding catch-allism. The claim of this study is that the 
empirical operationalisation of catch-allism presented here reflects more precisely 
Kirchheimer's original conception and allows a more comprehensive examination 
than earlier empirical assessments of the catch-all development.  
 
Uni-variate analysis: 
measures of central tendency and dispersion 
 
The present study sought to chart the degree of catch-allism across West European 
countries and over time. To empirically test the catch-all thesis, first a measurement of 
transformation towards the catch-all model is performed in separate uni-variate 
analyses of all individual variables. For each individual indicator of catch-allism, the 
cross-national variance, cross-time variations as well as the different levels of catch-
allism of party families are summarised in chapters 4 to 6. Explanations for cross-
national, cross-time differences as well as for the diversity among party families 
concerning their relative level of catch-allism were evaluated by assessing the major 
source of variation. 
 
Analyses of these patterns of variation was facilitated by using summary measures of 
central tendency and measures of dispersion. To analyse the level of homogeneity 
within one party family and convergence among all parties over time, standard 
deviations and coefficients of variance were included in most tables. Aware of 
ecological and particularist fallacies, some generalisations were nevertheless made 
about certain clusters of parties and countries. Next to average scores of parties 
within one party system and parties belonging to one party family, the tables also 
provide standard deviations (indicated by an S). Horizontally, the standard deviation 
shows the variation between parties within one party system, while the standard 
deviation for each of the nine periods shows whether parties in Western Europe are 
converging or diverging from one another over time. To compare "groups with 
respect to their relative homogeneity in instances where the groups have very different 
means" I have chosen to report the coefficient of variance (see Blalock 1979, 84). The 
coefficient of variance (CV), obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the mean 
value, indicates the homogeneity or variety of all parties in each period or within one 





within and across West European party systems. 
 
In addition to these measures of central tendency and dispersion, statistical analyses is 
used to cross-time variation. This development over time on each of the indicators 
was summarised by means of regression analysis (Lewis-Beck 1980).105 This type of 
analysis can clarify the direction and extent to which parties in Western Europe are 
transforming towards the catch-all model, as well as provide evidence to whether this 
transformation constitutes a linear trend. Regression coefficients summarise the 
trends over time on the individual indicators, yet these trend parameters no not 
denote linear developments or infer causality. The linear regression parameter 
represents the straight line which mathematically is the 'best fit' to all points in a 
scattergram of all scores. It constitutes only a summary measure of an overall negative 
of positive trend, without regard to fluctuations in this trend over time. For each 
variable in this study the regression coefficient is determined by computing the 
variable scores with the year in which the observation was made as the independent 
variable. On each of the regression coefficients a significance test was performed (see 





In order to test Kirchheimer’s assumption of uni-dimensionality, the variables which 
together constitute one dimension of either organisational, ideological or electoral 
catch-allism are analysed in conjunction with one another utilising multivariate 
reliability and factor analysis. A reliability test is performed in each chapter to establish 
whether all indicators tap the same dimension of catch-allism. The assumption that 
items 'scale' (that is, measure the same empirical phenomena) is usually tested with a 
'reliability procedure', the so-called 'scalability' analysis. The measure for reliability is 
Chronbach's alpha (Swamborn 1982), which evaluates the extent to which the items 
correlate in an equal extent to one another. With this measure the number of items is 
important; the higher the number of items of the scale, the higher the score of 
Chronbach's alpha must be in order to indicate an internally consistent scale. In 
theory all items are different indicators for the same phenomenon, namely catch-allism. 
Items or indicators of the same phenomenon must correlate to an equal extent with 
each another in order to assume one underlying dimension.106 
 
                                                        
105 The lineair regression parameter represents the straight line which mathematically is the 'best fit' 
to all points in a scattergram of all scores. It constitutes only a summary measure of an overall 
negative of positive trend, without regard to fluctuations in this trend over time. For each variable 
in this study the regression coefficient is determined by computing the variable scores with the year 
in which the observation was made as the independent variable. On each of the regression 
coefficients a significance test will be performed (see Gujarati 1988). 
106 The assumption that items 'scale' (that is, measure the same empirical phenomena) is usually 
tested with a 'reliability procedure', the so-called 'scalability' analysis. The measure for reliability is 
Chronbach's alpha (Swamborn 1982), which evaluates the extent to which the items correlate in an 
equal extent to one another. With this measure the number of items is important; the higher the 
number of items of the scale, the higher the score of Chronbach's alpha must be in order to 
indicate an internally consistent scale. 




Two problems had to be addressed for the integration of the various individual 
indicators into one general measure of catch-allism. First, the techniques used here 
require that the level of measurement of all variables is transformed to the interval 
level of measurement. The variables 'rules of putting motions to the national congress 
(MOTIONS), the 'procedure for the selection of parliamentary candidates' 
(CANDSEL) and the 'procedure for the selection of the party leader' (LEADSEL) are 
modified from the ordinal to the interval level for this aim (see section 4.5). 
Furthermore, in order to be able to perform a reliability test all individual party scores 
are expressed in standard deviation scores (z-scores), which indicate the relative 
standing in a distribution without regard to the unit for measurement in the original 
raw scores (Blalock 1979, 97). Finally, all standard scores are recoded so that on all 
indicators a high score signifies a high level of catch-allism and a low score denotes a 
low level of catch-allism. The second difficulty is the weighting of different 
variables. In the enumeration of the original elements, Kirchheimer does not specify 
the relative importance of the different elements. The solution adopted in this study is 
to consider all variables of equal importance.  Below I present the results of these 
reliability tests and scalability analysis. 
 
Reliability tests 
The organisational dimension 
 




 SCALE SCALE CORRECTED 
 MEAN VARIANCE ITEM- SQUARED ALPHA 
 IF ITEM IF ITEM TOTAL MULTIPLE IF ITEM  
 DELETED DELETED CORRELATION CORRELATION DELETED  
 
ZSTATFIN -1.0439  9.8263  .2205 .5203 .1544 
ZMEMFIN1 -1.2333 10.4860  .1179 .6094 .2087   
ZMERATI1 - .7635 11.2153 -.1007 .3909 .3482   
ZSTAFMEM -1.1107  8.8516  .1545 .4408 .1745   
ZCAMPAIG - .6834 11.9377 -.0644 .1680 .2668   
ZSTAFSEA - .9037 12.5911 -.2285 .4680 .3338   
ZMOTION1 - .7656 10.7829  .1165 .2738 .2127   
ZCANDSE1 - .6484  9.2800  .2739 .6053 .1156   
ZLEADSE1 - .4472 10.1116  .2278 .4255 .1608   
ZNOCONG1 - .9170  9.8350  .1087 .3905 .2101   
 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS   10 ITEMS   
ALPHA =   .2438 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA =   .2144 
 
The inescapable conclusion from this reliability test is that there is little homogeneity 
between the items at the organisational level (α= .24) and no single underlying 
dimension of organisational catch-allism was found. The most commonly used 
condition of a sufficiently reliable scale (α > .80) is not fulfilled, therefore it is 
concluded that the items at the organisational level do not tap one single 
phenomenon. All the indicators which Kirchheimer suggested to underpin one 
organisational dimension of catch-allism tap, in reality, multiple phenomena. 
 
The ideological dimension 
 
Reliability test on the ideological dimension 
 
ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS 
 SCALE SCALE CORRECTED 
 MEAN VARIANCE ITEM- SQUARED ALPHA 





 DELETED DELETED CORRELATION CORRELATION DELETED 
 
ZLRMANIF  .0751 4.0781  .0283 .0202 -.4276 
ZTRADEM1  .0753 3.6529  .1486 .0779 -.6314 
ZTRADCO1  .2375 8.1486 -.6573 .9182  .4455 
ZTIMEGOV -.0178 3.8620  .0864 .5554 -.5245 
ZGOVTCON -.0976 4.4981 -.1144 .9194 -.2048 
ZDISTCN1  .0717 3.0789  .3294 .1241 -.9849   
 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS   
ALPHA =  -.2949 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA =  -.1862    
 
Reliability analysis of the indicators of ideological catch-allism found little 
homogeneity between these indicators, evidenced by a low alpha score of these 
coefficients (α = -.29). Since the condition of a sufficiently reliable scale (α > .80) is 
not fulfilled, it stands that the items at the ideological level do not tap one single 
phenomenon. 
 
The electoral dimension 
 
Reliability test on the electoral dimension 
 
 SCALE SCALE CORRECTED 
 MEAN VARIANCE ITEM- SQUARED ALPHA 
 IF ITEM IF ITEM TOTAL MULTIPLE IF ITEM 
 DELETED DELETED CORRELATION CORRELATION DELETED 
 
ALFORD 1.4745 .2977 -.1507 .1333  .2354 
IDENTIFY 1.4570 .2563 -.0214 .1621  .0770 
EXTRECRU 1.6286 .0869  .2099 .0540 -.7637 
VOLATIL 1.6684 .2965  .0706 .0152 -.0013 
 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS 
ALPHA = .0325 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA =  -.0524 
 
The four items of the electoral dimension are not reliable in the statistical sense of 
measuring one single phenomenon (α = .44) Indeed, when factor analysis is 
performed to detect which common underlying factors can be found beneath these 
variables, two latent factors are extracted which fulfil the criteria of Eigenvalue > 1, 




The outcome of the reliability tests shows that the items which measure catch-allism 
at all three dimensions do not indicate a uni-dimensional phenomenon. Therefore 
factor analysis (Principle Component Analysis) is used to explore how many and 
which other latent factors lie beneath the different variables (Kim and Mueller 1978a; 
1978b). Factor-analysis attempts to test whether or not all the scores of a multidimen-
sional scatter-gram can be described as a one-dimensional space. The main 
assumption of factor analysis is that, beneath the observed variables a system of 
underlying source, variables (factors) exist and observed co-variation is due to these 
underlying common factors (Kim and Mueller 1978a, 8). This study utilised factor 
analysis to exploratively identify these latent factors and consequently determine 
which of the variables load significantly on these underlying factors. The extent to 
which an observed variable is related to an extracted factor is referred to as factor (or 
component) loadings. These factor loadings of the observed variables on the 
extracted factors are crucial for the interpretation of the underlying dimensions (see 
below). This dual method of reliability and factor analysis will shed some light on the 




directions and dynamics of the transformation of political parties in West European 
party systems. 
 
The organisational dimension 
 
An analysis of factors underpinning the organisational variables of catch-allism does 
not deduce a simple pattern of underlying factors. In fact, the Principle-Components 
Analysis of the organisational indicators extracts four latent factors when the widely 
accepted Kaiser or Eigenvalue criterion (whereby only factors with Eigenvalues 
greater or equal to 1 are included) is used (Kim and Mueller 1978a, 49). Taken 
together, these extracted factors explain almost seventy per cent of the variance in the 
dependent (or observed) variables. 
 





Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct  
  *                                              
MERATIO  .75075 * 1 2.69207 24.5 24.5  
STAFSEAT  .65389 * 2 2.24751 20.4 44.9  
MEMFIN         .81856 * 3 1.61617 14.7 59.6  
STATFIN  .77602 * 4 1.09690 10.0 69.6  
CAMPAIGN  .65263 * 
STAFMEM  .57981 * 
CANDSEL  .82014 * 
MOTIONS  .64270 * 
LEADSEL  .66699 * 
MVRATIO  .70204 * 
NOCONGR  .58912 * 
 
One conventional method to simplify the structure of factor loadings is varimax 
rotation (Kim and Mueller 1978b, 35). Close examination of the component loadings 
(excluding factor loadings below .4) after one varimax-rotation leads to the conclusion 
that of the four initial factors, three reasonably clear interpretable factors can be seen 






Varimax Rotation 1,  Extraction 1,  Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 Rotated Factor Matrix: 
 
 FACTOR  1 FACTOR  2 FACTOR  3 FACTOR  4 
 
MEMFIN  .88966 
STATFIN -.87118 
STAFSEAT  .73632 
 
MVRATIO   .82319 
MERATIO    .81050 
STAFMEM  -.67137 
 
CANDSEL    .88008 
LEADSEL     .77510 
NOCONGR    .40760   .54666 
 
CAMPAIGN     -.79609 
MOTIONS      .72939 
 
The items MEMFIN, STATFIN and STAFSEAT constitute the first latent factor. 
Professional staff in relation to the strength of the parliamentary party and income 
from membership are both positively correlated with this factor, while the level of 
state finance is negatively correlated with this underlying factor. The interpretation of 
this factors is not crystal-clear, yet all items seem to point towards aspects of profe-
ssionalization of the organisation surrounding the party leadership, be it that the 
resources for this professionalisation are not derived from  the state but from 
membership fees. The second factor, which consists of the items MERATIO, 
MVRATIO (membership) and STAFMEM (staff in central office) is somewhat easier 
to interpret. The level of membership is negatively associated with this factor, while 
the professionalization of the central office is positively associated to this latent 
factor, allowing for the interpretation that this factor denotes the professionalization 
of the membership organisation. The third factor designates the dimension of internal 
democracy of parties or centralisation of power and consists of the variables CANDS-
EL, LEADSEL and NOCONGR, whic are all positively correlated to this underlying 
factors. The fourth factor, constituted by the items MOTIONS and CAMPAIGN is 
less interpretable and has little explanatory power. It will be excluded from further 
analysis. 
 
When these items are plotted in a two-dimensional space, the following pattern 
emerges. 




Factor plot of organisational items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor  3 
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Open and democratic 
internal decision-making 
 
Symbol Variable Coordinates 
1 MERATIO -.085 -.277 
2 STAFSEAT  .736  .002 
3 MEMFIN  .890 -.162 
4 STATFIN -.871 -.033 
5 CAMPAIGN  .018  .000 
6 STAFMEM -.158 -.218 
7 CANDSEL  -.141  .880 
8 MOTIONS  .100  .314 
9 LEADSEL -.087  .775 
10 MVRATIO -.146 -.049 





Factor plot of organisational items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 2 
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Symbol Variable Coordinates 
1 MERATIO -.138 -.293 
2 STAFSEAT  .742  .050 
3 MEMFIN  .878 -.160 
4 STATFIN -.867  .009 
5 CAMPAIGN  .048 -.272 
6 STAFMEM -.137 -.120 
7 CANDSEL -.122  .871 
8 MOTIONS   .078  .543 
9 LEADSEL -.064  .805 
10 MVRATIO -.197 -.035 
11 NO-CONGR  .452  .454 
 
The ideological dimension 
 
The Principal-Components Analysis on the ideological items extracts two relevant 
latent factors (with Eigenvalues > 1), which explain sixty-five per cent of the variance 
in the dependent variable. 
 
Principal-Components Analysis (PC) Final Statistics:                                                        
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct  
  * 
GOVTCONT .87199 * 1 3.09479 44.2 44.2  
DISTCNTR .60667 * 2 1.27010 18.1 62.4  
OPTCONT .52976 * 
LRMANIF .10407 * 
TIMEGOVT .79766 * 
TRADCONT .84751 * 
TRADEMPH .60723 * 
 




After one varimax-rotation, the component loadings on these factors (again excluding 
factor loadings below .4) authenticate the existence of two meaningful factors as is 
shown below. 
 
Varimax Rotation 1,  Extraction 1,  Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization  
 
Factor Matrix: 







TRADEMPH  .77924 
DISTCNTR  .71711 
LRMANIF 
 
The first factor clearly designates 'office-seeking' (OFFICE), as it consists of the items 
GOVTCONT, TRADCONT, OPTCONT and TIMEGOVT, which are all positively 
associated with this latent factor. A second ideological factor consists of the two items 
'distance from the centre' (DISTCNTR) and 'traditional issue emphasis' 
(TRADEMPH) which are both positively correlated with this underlying factor, and 
this factors will therefore be coined 'policy-flexibility' (POLICY). The item 
LRMANIF is not strongly associated with any of these factors. 
 
When the items are plotted in a two dimensional space, the pattern is as follows: 
 
Factor plot of ideological items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 2 
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Symbol Variable Coordinates 
 
1 GOVTCONT  .930  .080 
2 DISTCNTR -.260  .734 
3 OPTCONT  .717 -.126 
4 LRMANIF  -.064 -.316 
5  TIMEGOVT  .892 -.044 
6 TRADCONT  .916  .090 






The electoral dimension 
 
The Principal-Components Analysis on the electoral items extracts two relevant latent 
factors (with Eigenvalues > 1), which explain sixty-two per cent of the variance in the 
dependent variable. 
 
Final Statistics:                                                        
Variable Communality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct  
    
IDENTIFY .70555 * 1 1.39032 34.8  34.8  
ALFFIN .65856 * 2 1.10396 27.6  62.4  
VOLATIL  .51843 *  
EXTRECRU .61174 *                                              
 
Varimax Rotation 1,  Extraction 1,  Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
After varimax-rotation, the component loadings on these factors (again excluding 
factor loadings below .4) indicate that two meaningful factors can be extracted from 
these electoral items. 
 
Varimax converged in 3 iterations.                                  
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
 
 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 
 
IDENTIFY -.82595 
ALFFIN  .80361 
 
EXTRECRU  .76506 
VOLATIL  .71044 
 
The level of strong party identification is negatively correlated with the first latent 
factor, while the extent to which parties attract voters from different social groups is 
positively associated with this factor. This suggests that this factor could be 
interpreted as a factor which indicates the broadness of popular appeal or level of 
vote-seeking behaviour. On the second factor the items EXTRECRUT (extra-
parliamentary recruitment of ministers) and VOLATIL (electoral volatility) are both 
positively associated with the. This factor can therefore best be characterised as the 
level of social disclosure at the elite level as well as at the level of voters.  
A plot of the electoral items in a two-dimensional space presents the next picture: 




Factor plot of electoral items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 2 
 








































Symbol Variable Coordinates 
1 IDENTIFY -.826 -.153 
2 ALFFIN  .804 -.113 
3 VOLATIL -.117  .710 
4 EXTRECRU  .163  .765 
 
 





Appendix 4.  Sources for the social composition 
of party electorates 
 
Data for Austria from: 
Sully 1977, 232; Merkl 1980, 643; Haerpfer 1985, 279; Jacobs 1989, 489; Müller 1992a, 155. 
 
Data on Belgium from: 
Oppenheim 1956, 161; Hill 1974, 47 ff.; Dalton et al. 1984, 84;  Jacobs 1989, 22; Mughan in Franklin et 
al. 1992, 86-97; De Winter 1992, 185; Lucardie and ten Napel 1994, 57-59. 
 
For Denmark from:  
Rustow 1956, 183; Nilson 1980, 223; Rokkan 1966; Thomas 1977, 241; Faurby and Kristensen 1982, 
84-88; Borre 1985;  Borre 1987;  Thomas 1988, 287-290; Borre 1992, 149, 159-166; Karvonen 1994, 
132.  
 
Data for Finland from: 
Pesonen 1974, 295; Helenius 1977, 278; Arter 1988, 337-340; Karvonen 1994, 124-133. 
 
Data for France from: 
Micaud 1956, 128-141; Lipset 1966, 422; Criddle 1977, 31-32; Lecomte 1982, 242; Lewis-Beck 1984; 
Grunberg 1985; Frears 1988; Grunberg 1992, 80-96; Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1992; Chagnollaud 
1993; Elgie 1994, 156-158. 
 
Data for Germany from: 
Liepelt 1966; Linz 1967; Urwin 1974, 147; Paterson 1977, 192-193; Feist et al. 1978, 172; Merkl 1980, 
625-626; Mintzel 1982, 140-145; Klingemann 1985; Kolinsky 1984; Kirchner and Broughton 1988, 75; 
Dalton 1988, 155; Dalton et al. 1992, 202; Pappi and Mnich 1992, 179-202; Missiroli 1992, 127; 
Broughton 1994. 
 
Data for Ireland from: 
Whyte 1974, 631-633; Orridge 1977, 165; Carey 1980, 271; Merkl 1980, 660; Chubb 1982; McAllister 
and O'Connel 1984; Gallagher 1985, 132-134; Marsh 1985, 186; Mair 1987, 40; Laver et al. 1987; Mair 
1992; Marsh 1992, 235-236; Marsh 1992; Breen and Whelan 1994.  
 
Data for Italy from: 
Lipset 1966, 415; Dogan 1966, 711; Barnes 1974; Hine 1977, 84; Zarneti 1980; Zariski 1980; Caciagli 
1982, 266; Farneti 1985, 91-96; Pridham 1988; Mackie, Manheimer and Sani in Franklin et al. 1992, 
246-251; Donovan 1994, 80. 
 
Data for the Netherlands from: 
Wolinetz 1977, 368; Van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1985; Daalder and Koole 1988; Van Deth et al. 1991; 
van der Eijk and Niemöller in Franklin et al. 1992, 289-290; Koole 1992, 212; Lucardie and Ten Napel 
1994, 59-60. 
 
Data for Norway from: 
Rose and Urwin 1969, 65; Valen and Rokkan 1974; Heidar 1977, 301; Nilson 1980; Kristiansen and 
Svasand 1982, 125-128; Leiphart and Svasand 1988, 317; Valen in Franklin et al. 1992, 323-324; Karv-
onen 1994. 
 
Data for Sweden in: 
Rustow 1956, 181; Särlvik 1969, 101-103; Särlvik 1974, 382-402; Petersson 1977, 16; Scase 1977, 
328; Hancock 1980, 196; Berglund and Lindstrom 1982, 74; Borre 1984; Von Beyme 1985, 291; Holm-
berg and Gilljam 1987, 183-187; Linsström and Wörlund 1988, 261; Inglehart 1990, 260-261; Oskarson 
1992, 350-357; Karvonen 1994, 132; Oskarson 1994, 58. 
 
For the: United Kingdom: on the British Labour Party see Butler and Stokes 1969; 1975; Heath, Jowell 
and Curtice 1985, 29; 1991; 1994; Rose and McAllister 1986. For analyses of the British Conservatives 
see Beer 1959, 49; Butler and Stokes 1974, 79; Cyr 1980, 70; Peele 1982, 39; Crewe 1985, 132; Heath 
et al. 1985, 20; Curtice 1988, 108; Franklin 1992, 119-122. 
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De catch-all partij in West Europa 1945-1990 
Een studie naar een verstomde ontwikkeling 
 
De catch-all these is oorspronkelijk geformuleerd door Otto Kirchheimer (1954a; 
1959a; 1966a). Kirchheimer stelde dat de op klasse of religie gebaseerde massa-
partij zoals Duverger die beschreef, langzaam verandert in wat hij noemt 'catch-all 
people's party'. Kirchheimer’s these over de ontwikkeling van de 'catch-all' partij is 
zeer geschikt voor een analyse van partijverandering, omdat Kirchheimer’s these 
luidt dat partijen op ideologisch, organisatorisch en electoraal vlak een bepaalde 
ontwikkeling doormaken. Kirchheimer acht vijf kenmerken van de ontwikkeling 
van massapartij tot catch-all partij belangrijk: a) een drastische reductie van het 
ideologische karakter van de partij; b) een versterkte positie van politieke leiders 
die eerder worden beoordeeld op hun betekenis voor het totale politieke en sociale 
systeem dan op de mate waarin zij de specifieke doelen van de partij bevorderen; c) 
een minder sterke positie van gewone partijleden; d) minder nadruk op specifieke 
sociale of confessionele kiezersgroepen: catch-all partijen trachten kiezers te 
winnen uit alle bevolkingsgroepen; e) een verminderde loyaliteit van leden en 
kiezers die partijen dwingt samen te werken met een groot aantal 
belangengroeperingen om zich op deze manier van permanente electorale steun te 
verzekeren. Desalniettemin is de precieze betekenis van het catch-all concept niet 
altijd even duidelijk. Pogingen om tot een éénduidige definiëring van het vaak 
geciteerde catch-all concept te komen hebben geleid tot een nog steeds voortgaand 
debat. Ook bestaan er aanzienlijke meningsverschillen over welke partijen als 
catch-all partijen kunnen worden beschouwd. In dit proefschrift is gepoogd een 
operationele definitie van catch-allism te ontwikkelen vanuit de oorspronkelijke 
context waarin deze is ontwikkeld.  
  De onderzoeksvraag luidt: Hoe kan Kirchheimer’s concept van de catch-all partij worden 
geoperationaliseerd en in welke mate is er in de naoorlogse periode sprake van catch-allisme in 
West Europese landen?  
  Op basis van het gehele gepubliceerde oeuvre van Kirchheimer alsmede zijn 
persoonlijke aantekeningen en met behulp van de secundaire literatuur over de 
catch-all these is de originele betekenis van catch-allisme zo zorgvuldig mogelijk 
gereconstrueerd. Om te bepalen in welke mate politieke partijen zich op 
ideologisch, organisatorisch en electorale vlak catch-all karakteristieken hebben 
aangemeten zijn de 83 belangrijkste politieke partijen in twaalf West Europese 
landen vergeleken. Politieke partijen zijn gecategoriseerd naar partijfamilie om ook 
de verschillen tussen partijen van verschillende origine in kaart te brengen (zie 
appendix 1). 
                                                        
 




Kirchheimer's catch-all these 
 
Wanneer men de catch-all these in de context van Kirchheimer’s totale oeuvre 
plaatst wordt duidelijk dat hij de vooroorlogse partijen in West Europa zag als 
representanten van specifieke sociale of religieuze groepen. Na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog verdwijnen volgens Kirchheimer deze scherpe klassentegenstellin-
gen en confessionele scheidslijnen langzamerhand als gevolg van ongekende 
economische groei en de uitbreiding van de welvaartsstaat. De levensstandaard van 
velen wordt zozeer verhoogd, dat partijen in staat zijn te appelleren aan een brede 
groep kiezers wier belangen niet veel uiteenlopen. Dit is mogelijk geworden door 
het ontstaan van een brede middenklasse. Partijen worden gedwongen de 'wet van 
de electorale markt' te aanvaarden en zich te richten op een breder deel van de 
bevolking dan de traditionele achterban. Hierdoor ontstaat een nieuw type partij: 
de catch-all volkspartij. De oude, sterk ideologisch geladen, doelstelling van 
representatie van bepaalde sociale groepen in het politieke bestel wordt gematigd, 
met als oogmerk de gunst van zoveel mogelijk kiezers te winnen. Partijen 
concentreren zich daarom steeds meer op issues die breed worden gedragen in de 
samenleving, in plaats van de onderlinge tegenstellingen te benadrukken. 
Kirchheimer heeft dit fenomeen aangeduid met 'het verdwijnen van de oppositie'. 
Volgens Kirchheimer worden politieke partijen en de staat in toenemende mate 
afhankelijk van elkaar. De staat legitimeert haar acties middels de politieke partijen 
in het parlement, terwijl deze partijen steeds afhankelijker worden van de staat 
voor hun (financiële) middelen. De catch-all partij leidt dan ook tot vervaging van 
de democratische machtenscheiding. De wetgevende, uitvoerende en ook 
rechterlijke macht vormen tezamen een kartel. Politieke partijen trekken zich 
steeds verder terug uit de samenleving en machthebbers misbruiken de wetgeving 
voor de eigen politieke doeleinden. De consequentie van deze ontwikkeling is dat 
burgers een zeer beperkte en passieve rol hebben in de politiek en hun partijkeuze 
steeds meer laten afhangen van het charisma van een lijsttrekker. Deze wordt 
steeds bepalender voor het electorale succes van de partij. Dit hangt samen met de 
veranderende functie van politieke partijen. Catch-all partijen integreren niet langer 
nieuwe groepen in de politieke samenleving en articuleren niet langer de belangen 
van deze groepen. In plaats daarvan is de rekrutering van politieke kandidaten 
verreweg de belangrijkste functie van een moderne catch-all partij geworden. 
Volgens Kirchheimer is dit een zorgwekkende ontwikkeling omdat hij er van 
overtuigd is dat een regime alleen legitiem kan zijn wanneer de sociale structuur in 
de politieke arena wordt gerepresenteerd. 
 
In Kirchheimer’s optiek wordt de organisatorische, ideologische en electorale 
transformatie van politieke partijen beïnvloedt door politieke factoren (de 
structuur van het partijstelsel, de politieke cultuur en de electorale wetgeving), 
structurele factoren (de grootte van het land), sociale en economische factoren (de 
sociale scheidslijnen en professionele stratificatie) De toenemende economische 
welvaart, massaconsumptie en uitbreiding van de welvaartsstaat verminderen de 
sociaal-economische tegenstellingen en doen een brede middengroep ontstaan. Dit 
is nadrukkelijk van invloed op de ontwikkeling van catch-all partijen. Een brede 
middenlaag maakt het partijen mogelijk te appelleren aan kiezers buiten de 
traditionele clientèle. 




  Achter de oude namen gaan geheel veranderde partijen schuil omdat politieke 
partijen zich uit electorale overwegingen aanpassen aan de snel veranderende 
omgeving. Hier ontstaat de connectie van verandering van een individuele partij 
naar de verandering van het gehele partijenstelsel. Volgens Kirchheimer is de 
catch-all ontwikkeling is een 'besmettelijk' fenomeen. Wanneer één partij met 
succes de catch-all strategie aanwendt, moeten andere partijen volgen om 
electoraal te overleven. Dit zal zowel het soort, als het aantal partijen in het 
politieke stelsel beïnvloeden. 
  
De catch-all partij: een definitie en operationalisatie 
 
Om te beoordelen in hoeverre er sprake is van een catch-all ontwikkeling is in 
hoofdstuk 3 het catch-all concept geoperationaliseerd. Hiervoor is gebruik 
gemaakt van Sartori's methode van concept-ontwikkeling en -reconstructie (Sartori 
1984). Voor de reconstructie van het catch-all concept gebruik ik de discussie die 
volgde op Kirchheimer's publikatie. Uit deze discussie kunnen zes elementen 
worden gedestilleerd waarover brede consensus bestaat dat zij de kern van het 
catch-allisme vormen. Deze elementen komen sterk overeen met de vijf 
kenmerken die Kirchheimer zelf opsomt en leiden tot de definiering van een 
catch-all partij als een partij die wordt gekarakteriseerd door een laag ideologisch profiel, een 
breed electoraal appèl, een geringe connectie met haar electoraat, een machtsbalans in het voordeel 
van de partijleiding versus de leden en een professionele en gecentraliseerde organisatie, wiens 
personeel en kapitaal voornamelijk uit externe bronnen afkomstig zijn. 
  Vanuit deze definitie is vervolgens een operationele definitie geconstrueerd. 
Om zo dicht mogelijk bij de originele betekenis van het concept te blijven is 
gezocht naar empirische verwijzingen in Kirchheimer's werk. De hierboven 
genoemde vijf kenmerken van de catch-all ontwikkeling op individueel partij 
niveau kunnen worden ondergebracht in de drie dimensies van aanpassing en 
verandering van politieke partijen: een ideologische dimensie (punt a van 
Kirchheimer’s kenmerken), een organisatorische dimensie (punten b en c) en een 
electorale dimensie (punten d en e). Op basis van Kirchheimer’s teksten en 
verwijzingen zijn tot tien kenmerken van catch-allisme ontwikkeld die gemeten 
kunnen worden met vijftien indicatoren (zie hoofdstuk 3). 
 
De organisatorische dimensie van catch-allisme 
 
Uit hoofdstuk 4 blijkt dat Kirchheimer’s catch-all these genuanceerd dient te 
worden en dat niet alle organisatorische veranderingen binnen West Europese 
politieke partijen conform de catch-all these zijn. Conform de catch-all these is er 
sprake van een substantiële afname van het aantal partijleden in de meeste West 
Europese landen. Uitzondering op deze regel vormen de meeste partijen in 
Duitsland, België en Ierland. Partijleden zijn, zoal Kirchheimer veronderstelde, 
veel minder belangrijk voor partijen geworden in termen van inkomsten. 
Inkomsten uit staatsfinanciering, daarentegen, zijn toegenomen in de naoorlogse 
periode en partijen verkrijgen nu gemiddeld één-derde van hun inkomsten van de 
staat. Kirchheimer stelde dat catch-all partijen professionaliseren en uit dit 
onderzoek blijkt dat West Europese partijen in een snel tempo een proces van 
professionalisering ondergaan, zowel wat betreft de buiten-parlementaire 




organisatie als, in nog sterkere mate, de parlementaire fracties. Deze accumulatie 
van menselijke en financiële middelen bij de parlementaire partij hebben geleid tot 
een dominantie van parlementaire fracties binnen de gehele partijorganisatie. 
Kirchheimer’s these wordt echter niet geheel bevestigd. Alhoewel de absolute 
bedragen die aan verkiezingscampagnes worden uitgegeven aanzienlijk toenemen, 
zijn de totale inkomsten van partijen zo sterk gestegen dat een relatief kleiner 
aandeel van het totale inkomen aan campagnes wordt uitgegeven. 
  Op andere punten is ook een ontwikkeling te zien die niet geheel spoort met 
Kirchheimer’s catch-all these. Politieke partijen in West Europa hebben niet 
stelselmatig de invloed van leden verminderd op de selectie van het 
partijleiderschap. Daarbij dient aangetekend te worden dat de invloed van leden op 
deze keuze al zeer gering was en nauwelijks verder kon worden verminderd. 
Verder is het buiten-parlementaire leiderschap van partijen een steeds marginalere 
rol gaan spelen, waardoor leden iets meer zeggenschap hebben gekregen over een 
minder belangrijk aspect. Conform the catch-all these is de invloed van leden op 
de selectie van kandidaten voor het parlement in de meeste landen iets afgenomen 
over de naoorlogse periode, maar van een continue trend van uitsluiting van leden 
uit het interne besluitvormingsproces is geen sprake. Echter er is evenmin sprake 
van een democratiseringstrend binnen West Europese politieke partijen. De laatste 
vijftig jaar wordt de besluitvorming over machtsposities binnen West Europese 
partijorganisaties en in het parlement gedomineerd door het partijleiderschap, de 
partijleiding heeft op zijn minst een vetorecht over kandidaten. Vastgesteld kan 
worden dat de greep van de partijtop op de interne besluitvorming een reeds lang 
bestaand kenmerk is van West Europese democratieën en niet een moderne 
ontwikkeling. 
  Uit de analyses blijkt verder dat de door Kirchheimer genoemde kenmerken 
niet duiden op een één-dimensionaal fenomeen. Eerder is er sprake van drie 
dimensies van partijverandering op het organisatorische vlak, namelijk van 
centralisatie van de interne besluitvorming, van professionalisering van de buiten-
parlementaire ledenorganisatie en van professionalisering van het parlementaire 
leiderschap. Ontwikkelingen op deze drie dimensies staan relatief los van elkaar. 
Wat betreft de centralisatie in de interne besluitvorming zijn met name de (nu 
veelal verdwenen) communistische partijen het meest in de catch-all richting 
opgeschoven, evenals de christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen. 
Liberale, agrarische en ‘groene’ partijen zijn relatief democratisch. Op het gebied 
van de professionalisering van de buiten-parlementaire partijorganisatie zien we 
een geheel ander patroon. Conservatieve en liberale partijen hebben een veel hoger 
niveau van professionalisering dan andere partijen. De traditionele, uitgebreide 
ledenorganisaties van de christen-democratische, sociaal-democratische en 
agrarische partijen zorgen voor een relatief langzame ontwikkeling in 
professionalisering van de buiten-parlementaire partijorganisatie. Vergelijkbare 
verschillen tussen partijfamilies zijn ook waar ten aanzien van de 
professionalisering van het parlementaire leiderschap. Ook hier blijven met name 
christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen achter bij hun liberale en 
conservatieve concurrenten. 
  Tussen landen bestaan er eveneens aanzienlijke verschillen in ontwikkeling op 
deze drie organisatorische factoren. Met name partijen in de grotere continentale 
West Europese democratieën (Italië, Duitsland en Frankrijk) hebben zich relatief 




verder ontwikkeld in de richting van catch-all partijen. In deze landen zijn partijen 
sterk gecentraliseerde en professionele organisaties waar leden weinig invloed 
hebben in vergelijking met andere landen. Partijen in de Scandinavische landen, 
Ierland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk verschillen aanzienlijk van partijen in deze 
continentale grootmachten. Noorse, Zweedse, Britse en Ierse partijleden hebben 
relatief meer invloed op de interne besluitvorming. Partijen in België, Nederland 
en Oostenrijk laten een veel minder eenduidige trend zien. Concluderend kan 
worden gesteld dat Kirchheimer ten onrechte veronderstelde dat er een universele 
en lineaire trend richting het catch-all model bestaat, maar dat hij wel de 
geografische patronen van deze ontwikkeling juist heeft weergegeven. 
 
De ideologische dimensie van catch-allisme 
 
Op ideologisch niveau is evenmin een lineaire ontwikkeling richting catch-allisme 
waar te nemen. Alhoewel een groot aantal politieke partijen in West Europa een 
beleidspositie in of dichtbij het politieke centrum verkiest boven een meer extreme 
positie laat de analyse in hoofdstuk 5 zien dat er geen uniforme trend richting 
centripetale partijcompetitie is. Ook neemt het aantal partijen in het politieke 
centrum niet significant toe over de naoorlogse periode: er is juist sprake van 
minder centrumpartijen. Met name conservatieve, liberale en sociaal-
democratische partijen hebben tussen 1970 en 1990 het politieke centrum verlaten. 
Kirchheimer stelde wel terecht dat voornamelijk christen-democratische en 
sociaal-democratische partijen het politieke centrum domineren in West Europa. 
In de onderzochte landen is evenmin sprake is van een algemene trend in de 
richting van ideologisch meer gematigde posities. Sinds de jaren ’80 is bij veel 
partijen een verschuiving naar rechts in het politieke spectrum waarneembaar. In 
het bijzonder de sociaal-democratische partijen zijn door deze algemene ruk naar 
rechts vaker in het politieke centrum te vinden. Kirchheimer veronderstelde ten 
onrechte dat er ideologische convergentie zou plaatsvinden in West Europese 
partijstelsels. Dit onderzoek wijst uit dat partijen eerder een grotere 
‘manoeuvreerruimte’ hebben verkregen door een verbreding van het politieke 
spectrum. Wel is het juist dat er minder polarisatie was in de periode vanaf eind 
jaren ’50 tot begin jaren ’70, maar dat de jaren ’70 en ’80 laten duidelijk grotere 
beleidsafstanden kennen tussen politieke partijen in de meeste landen. 
 Uit de analyses blijkt verder dat Kirchheimer maar gedeeltelijk gelijk had met 
zijn veronderstelling dat partijen steeds flexibeler zouden worden in hun 
ideologische opstelling. Hiervoor kon slechts bewijs worden gevonden voor de 
periode tussen de late jaren ’50 en de eerste helft van de jaren ’60, met name bij 
‘rechtse’ partijen van conservatieve en liberale origine. Tussen 1965 en 1985, 
daarentegen, is sprake van meer ideologische rigiditeit. Het lijkt correcter te stellen 
dat politieke partijen in West Europa altijd al flexibel genoeg zijn geweest om 
volledig gebruik te maken van de door de politieke ‘tegenstanders’ geboden 
ideologische ruimte om zichzelf zodoende in een optimale positie te plaatsen voor 
electoraal gewin, vergroting van de kans op regeringsdeelname of maximalisering 
van invloed op het beleid. 
  West Europese politieke partijen hebben, met name in de jaren ’60 en begin 
jaren ’70, minder nadruk gelegd op hun traditionele beleidsvoorkeuren en politieke 
issues. Maar, in tegenstelling tot hetgeen Kirchheimer  veronderstelde, leggen 




partijen sinds eind jaren ’70 weer meer nadruk op hun traditionele gedachtengoed. 
Ook hier is dus geen sprake van een lineaire trend richting catch-allisme. Wel 
worden politieke partijen steeds pragmatischer in hun voorkeuren voor 
ministersposten en accepteren zij steeds vaker niet-traditionele portefeuilles 
wanneer ze aan een regering deelnemen. Echter, uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat 
politieke partijen, wanneer ze daartoe de kans krijgen, snel terugkeren naar hun 
traditionele preferenties. Verder blijkt dat, hoewel in sommige landen nieuwe 
coalitiepartners zijn toegelaten aan de regeringstafel, de traditionele 
regeringspartijen van christen-democratische, sociaal-democratische, liberale en 
conservatieve origine grotendeels de regeringsmacht monopoliseren. Met name 
partijen met een beleidspositie in of dichtbij het politieke centrum hebben een 
hogere frequentie en duur van regeringsdeelname. Een belangrijke uitzondering 
hierop vormen de West Europese christen-democratische partijen die een 
aanzienlijk deel van hun regeringsmacht hebben moeten inleveren sinds de jaren 
’70. In de naoorlogse periode zijn (sommige van) deze traditionele 
regeringspartijen dus flexibeler geworden in hun beleidsposities en hun voorkeur 
voor regeringsportefeuilles, maar dat betekent niet dat zij hun traditionele 
beleidsvoorkeuren geheel overboord hebben gezet. 
  Er blijkt geen één-dimensionaal proces van ideologische partijverandering te 
bestaan. Op het ideologische niveau van partijverandering kunnen twee dimensies 
worden onderscheiden die samenvallen met strategisch gedrag ten aanzien van 
beleid (policy-seeking behaviour) en met de mate waarin regeringsmacht wordt 
veroverd (office-seeking behaviour). Uit het onderzoek blijkt verder dat een zekere 
nadruk op traditionele issues niet strijdig is met het innemen van een strategische 
positie in of dichtbij het politieke centrum. Wel blijkt dat, naarmate politieke 
partijen meer pragmatische ‘office-seekers’ zijn, zij minder rigide zijn in hun 
beleidspreferenties. Politieke partijen laveren tussen de noodzaak om kiezers te 
winnen met een duidelijk en herkenbaar eigen programma en de wil om te regeren 
waardoor een partij zich doorgaans niet te ver van het politieke midden kan 
positioneren. 
  Wanneer we kijken naar de verschillen tussen landen, dan blijkt dat partijen in 
Duitsland, Frankrijk, Nederland, België, Oostenrijk en Finland pragmatischer en 
meer office-seeking zijn dan partijen in Ierland, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Denemarken, 
Noorwegen en Zweden. Ook wat betreft strategisch gedrag ten aanzien van beleid 
zijn de politieke partijen in Frankrijk, Duitsland, België, Nederland en Italië meer 
naar het catch-all model opgeschoven dan partijen in Zweden, Denemarken, 
Noorwegen en Ierland. Wederom blijkt dat Kirchheimer terecht veronderstelde 
dat de ontwikkeling naar catch-allisme verder gevorderd zou zijn in de grotere, 
continentale democratieën en minder in de Scandinavische landen.   
  Kirchheimer moet eveneens in het gelijk worden gesteld wat betreft zijn 
veronderstelling dat met name sociaal-democratische en christen-democratische 
partijen zich op het vlak van strategisch ‘office-seeking’ gedrag meer hebben 
ontwikkeld in de richting van catch-all partij dan liberale, conservatieve en 
communistische partijen. Voor wat betreft ‘policy-seeking’ gedrag zijn liberale, 
agrarische en christen-democratische partijen juist flexibeler en strategischer dan 
hun sociaal-democratische, conservatieve en communistische concurrenten. 
 
De electorale dimensie van catch-allisme 





Op het electorale vlak is er maar een zeer beperkte ontwikkeling richting het catch-
all model. Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat Kirchheimer terecht stelde dat een groot 
aantal politieke partijen in toenemende mate kiezers aantrekt van buiten hun 
traditionele achterban. Door heel West Europa is er een duidelijke neerwaartse 
trend in stemgedrag op basis van sociale klasse, alhoewel er duidelijke verschillen 
zijn waar te nemen tussen de verschillende landen en partijfamilies. In het 
algemeen wordt het electoraat in West Europese landen steeds meer gedomineerd 
door kiezers uit de middenklasse met name omdat de arbeidersklasse een sterke 
opwaartse sociale mobiliteit vertoont. In het bijzonder heeft het electoraat van 
sociaal-democratische partijen een grondige herstructurering ondergaan en 
stemmen in veel landen nu meer kiezers uit de middenklasse op sociaal-
democraten dan kiezers uit de arbeidersklasse. De traditionele inspanning van 
christen-democratische partijen om tot een vergelijk te komen tussen verschillende 
maatschappelijke groeperingen en hun vaak tegenstrijdige belangen, het innemen 
van een politieke middenpositie en het tegelijkertijd streven naar machtsvorming 
maken dat christen-democratische partijen meer dan andere partijen een breed 
spectrum van de bevolking kunnen aanspreken. Meer recentelijk lijkt deze strategie 
te falen: de kiezer van christen-democratische partijen rekent zich steeds vaker tot 
de middenklasse. Alhoewel de verschillen in electoraal profiel tussen de 
partijfamilies afnemen en sociale klasse steeds minder verklarende kracht heeft 
voor stemgedrag, moet het verval van de structuur van het electoraat (‘de-alignment’) 
niet worden overdreven. Nog steeds stemmen kiezers uit de lagere arbeidersklasse 
vaker op communistische en sociaal-democratische partijen dan op kandidaten van 
andere politieke partijen. 
  Uit dit onderzoek is ook duidelijk gebleken dat het aantal kiezers met een sterke 
partij-identificatie aanzienlijk afneemt in de meeste West Europese landen, met 
name sinds de jaren ’60. Dit bevestigt Kirchheimer’s assumptie dat er een 
algemene verzwakking is van de traditionele band tussen kiezers en politieke 
partijen. Deze achteruitgang in partijbinding leidt tot grotere electorale 
verschuivingen in landen als Nederland en Noorwegen, maar niet overal. In 
Frankrijk, Italië, Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Ierland neemt de electorale 
volatiliteit juist af over de naoorlogse periode. Grote electorale verschuivingen 
worden voornamelijk veroorzaakt door het verlies van kiezers door 
communistische, christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen. 
Desalniettemin wordt de periode die Kirchheimer duidde als de periode waarin de 
catch-all partij tot bloei kwam, eerder gekenmerkt door electorale stabiliteit en 
beperkte partijcompetitie dan door grote electorale verschuivingen. In de jaren ’70 
en ’80 is er wel sprake van toenemende electorale volatiliteit. Ondanks het feit dat 
de traditionele politieke partijen van christen-democratische, sociaal-
democratische, liberale, conservatieve en agrarische origine electoraal kwetsbaarder 
zijn geworden, domineren deze partijen nog immer de uitvoerende macht. Relatief 
weinig ‘nieuwe’ partijen hebben een plaats aan de regeringstafel kunnen veroveren. 
  Om het verlies aan partijbinding en representatie van een specifieke sociale 
groep te compenseren, zo stelde Kirchheimer, zouden catch-all partijen sterkere 
banden ontwikkelen met belangengroepen. Aan de hand van buitenparlementaire 
rekrutering van ministers laat dit onderzoek zien dat de banden tussen politieke 
partijen en belangengroepen niet sterker is geworden. Er is geen bewijs dat 




ministers steeds vaker zouden worden gekozen op basis van hun 
managerskwaliteiten of technische expertise. Er is zelfs een duidelijke trend naar 
een steeds ‘politiekere’ rekrutering: een groeiend aantal ministers heeft 
parlementaire ervaring. Beide laatste ontwikkelingen, afnemende electorale 
volatiliteit en toenemende parlementaire rekrutering van ministers weerspreken de 
catch-all these. Conform de veronderstellingen van Kirchheimer blijkt uit dit 
onderzoek dat de link tussen politieke partijen en kiezers langzaam wordt 
verbroken. 
  Uit de analyse (zie appendix 3) blijkt verder dat op het electorale vlak twee 
dimensies onderscheiden kunnen worden, namelijk de breedte van het electoraal 
appél en de openheid van de partij voor niet-traditionele externe invloeden. Wat 
betreft de breedte van het electoraal appél zijn politieke partijen in de meeste 
landen in de richting van het catch-all model opgeschoven, met name in Italië, 
Frankrijk, België en Noorwegen. Deze catch-all strategie om een breder 
kiezerspubliek aan te spreken is relatief minder courant onder partijen in 
Oostenrijk, Duitsland, Nederland en Verenigd Koninkrijk. Partijen in Oostenrijk, 
Duitsland, Nederland en de meeste Scandinavische landen zijn wel meer catch-all 
wat betreft de openheid in rekrutering van elites en electorale kwetsbaarheid. Met 
uitzondering van Noorwegen zijn er echter weinig landen waar partijen zowel op 
het vlak van de kiezers als op het gebied van de rekrutering van elites meer 
openheid laten zien. 
  In termen van transformatie tot catch-allism blijkt dat met name sociaal-
democratische en liberale partijen hoger scoren wat betreft de breedte van hun 
electoraal appèl. Over de laatste 50 jaar zijn christen democratische partijen 
veranderd van partijen met een breed sociaal spectrum in een partijfamilie met een 
beperkter electoraal  naar voornamelijk de middenklassen. Conservatieve en 
agrarische partijen hebben hun karakteristieke electorale klasseprofiel grotendeels 
behouden. Voor wat betreft de rekrutering van partijelite zijn de sociaal-
democratische partijen ook meer in de richting van het catch-all model 
getransformeerd, terwijl christen democratische, liberale en conservatieve partijen 
van oudsher al meer openheid hadden in de toegang tot de partijtop. Bij deze 
laatste drie partijfamilies is er sprake van een ontwikkeling naar een meer 
eenzijdige rekrutering van de partijelite. 
  Kirchheimer had correct voorspeld dat partijen in de grote continentale 
democratieën, en in het bijzonder de sociaal democratische partijen, zouden 
veranderen in de catch-all richting, maar hij veronderstelde ten onrechte dat andere 
partijfamilies ook een dergelijke ontwikkeling zouden doormaken. Verder blijkt er 
op het electorale vlak geen sprake te zijn van een lineair proces richting het catch-
all model. Alhoewel Kirchheimer met redelijke precisie de geografische distributie 
van catch-allisme in West Europa heeft geschetst, heeft hij zich vergist in de duur 
en de continuïteit van dit proces. Dit onderzoek heeft laten zien dat de 
transformatie van West Europese partijen niet een één-dimensionaal en lineair 
proces is geweest, maar dat institutionele kenmerken van nationale stelsels en 
kenmerken van partijfamilies hebben geleid tot uiteenlopende en ongelijktijdige 
transformatie van politieke partijen. 
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In hoofdstuk 7 wordt deze belangrijke conclusie, dat partijverandering in West 
Europa niet één-dimensionaal en lineair is, verder uitgewerkt. Uit de analyse wordt 
duidelijk dat het concept van de massapartij niet langer toepasbaar is op de 
meerderheid van de West Europese politieke partijen. Massa partijen werden 
gekenmerkt door hun sterke inbedding in de civiele samenleving middels een 
uitgebreide extraparlementaire ledenorganisatie en een duidelijke 
vertegenwoordigende functie voor een specifieke sociale of religieuze groep. Dit 
type partij is niet (langer) dominant in West Europese partijstelsels, maar politieke 
partijen zijn evenmin volledig getransformeerd tot catch-all partijen. Er is eerder 
sprake van een partiële transformatie van politieke partijen in West Europa in de 
richting van catch-allisme. Een aantal ontwikkelingen die Kirchheimer voorspelde 
is duidelijk waarneembaar, terwijl andere aspecten van de veronderstelde catch-all 
ontwikkeling niet zijn gematerialiseerd. Ook is er geen sprake van een continu en 
lineair proces richting het catch-all model, maar was partijverandering in sommige 
perioden in West Europa onderhevig aan stilstand en terugval. 
  Uit nadere analyse blijkt dat er zeven factoren van partijverandering kunnen 
worden onderscheiden (zie bijlage 3). De eerste organisatorische factor is de 
professionalisering van de parlementaire fracties van politieke partijen. Een tweede 
factor is de professionalisering (of beter ‘de-massificatie) van de extraparlementaire 
partijorganisatie. De derde factor op het organisatorische niveau is de centralisatie 
in de interne besluitvorming. Wat betreft ideologie kunnen twee factoren worden 
onderscheiden van partijgedrag: gedrag gericht op het maximaliseren van de 
beleidsuitkomsten (‘policy-seeking’) en optimalisering van de regeringsmacht (‘office-
seeking’). De electorale dimensie van partijverandering valt uiteen in twee factoren: 
de breedte van het electorale appèl (‘vote-seeking’) en het niveau van sociale 
openheid van de partij (‘inclusion’). 
  Op basis van deze zeven dimensies is het mogelijk de verschillende 
partijstelsels en partijfamilies met elkaar te vergelijken. Er bestaan aanzienlijke 
verschillen tussen West Europese partijstelsels, tussen partijfamilies en in de 
verschillende perioden wanneer zij op deze zeven factoren worden vergeleken (zie 
paragraaf 7.3.1 tot en met 7.3.3). Op basis van deze dimensies kan eveneens de 
richting van de transformatie van West Europese politieke partijen worden 
geanalyseerd. Op het organisatorische vlak kunnen vier typen partijen worden 
onderscheiden. De traditionele massapartij die wordt gekarakteriseerd door een 
aanzienlijke ledenorganisatie en die haar inkomsten voornamelijk uit 
lidmaatschapsgelden haalt. Binnen deze partijen hebben leden slechts een geringe 
invloed op de besluitvorming en is de macht gecentraliseerd in de partijtop. Een 
tweede type partij, die weinig voorkomt in West Europa, is de democratische 
massapartij met een democratische interne structuur. Aan de andere kant van het 
organisatorische spectrum vinden we twee typen kader partijen. De traditionele, 
niet democratische kader partij waar leden geen of weinig invloed uit kunnen 
oefenen op de interne besluitvorming en de democratische kader partij. Dit laatste 
type partij, dat steeds dominanter aanwezig is in West Europa, wordt 
gekarakteriseerd door een minimale ledenorganisatie en is voor de inkomsten met 
name afhankelijk van bijdragen van de staat, belangengroepen en commerciële 
belangen. Democratische kaderpartijen beschikken niet over een groot potentieel 
van vrijwilligers om de partijorganisatie te laten functioneren, maar voeren hun 
taken uit met behulp van een groot aantal professionals. Wel hebben deze partijen 




een relatief democratische interne besluitvorming waar leden in kunnen 
participeren. 
  De transformatie van politieke partijen op het ideologische vlak kent twee 
belangrijke dimensies. Partijen verschillen aanzienlijk in de mate waarin zij streven 
naar maximalisering van macht (‘office-seeking behaviour’) en de mate waarin zij 
flexibel of star zijn in hun beleidsuitspraken (in verkiezingsprogramma’s). Op basis 
van deze twee dimensies kunnen vier typen van partijgedrag worden 
onderscheiden. Partijen kunnen sterk de nadruk leggen op traditionele issues en 
beleidsvelden met de intentie hiermee een duidelijk regeringsmandaat te verkrijgen. 
Andere partijen zijn eveneens ideologisch rigide en leggen ook sterke nadruk op 
traditionele beleidsissues, ongeacht de consequenties voor regeringsdeelname. Dit 
heb ik, in navolging van Kirchheimer, principiële oppositie genoemd. Partijen die 
veel flexibeler zijn in hun nadruk op issues volgen twee strategieën in West 
Europa. Sommige van deze partijen nemen positie in dicht bij het politieke 
centrum, maar zijn ondanks hun ideologisch gematigde opstelling niet in staat 
regeringsmacht te veroveren. Andere partijen, eveneens flexibel in hun issue-
benadrukking en met een positie in het politieke centrum op pragmatische 
gronden zijn wel in staat het regeringspluche te bezetten. Dit laatste type partij 
heeft meer een catch-all karakter in ideologische zin. In West Europa volgen de 
meeste partijen, en zeker partijen van de belangrijkste partijfamilies, een koers 
tussen enerzijds het behoud van een duidelijk herkenbaar en karakteristiek 
beleidsprofiel en anderzijds een strategische positionering in het links-rechts 
spectrum door een zekere mate van flexibiliteit in de mate waarin (traditionele) 
issues benadrukt worden.  
  In electorale termen zijn ook vier partijstrategieën te onderscheiden. Partijen 
kunnen tegelijkertijd een sterke link hebben met een duidelijk herkenbare sociale 
groep en een zeer traditionele rekrutering van de partijelite. Dit model, dat 
overeenkomt met politieke partijen in een verzuilde samenleving, kan worden 
gekarakteriseerd als ‘closed-shop’. Wanneer partijen een breder electoraal appèl 
hebben naar kiezers met een zwakke band met de partij, maar de elite uit een zeer 
specifieke sociale groep wordt gerekruteerd, dan is er sprake van een traditionele 
volkspartij. Partijen die daarentegen een zeer beperkt electoraal appèl hebben, maar 
wel openstaan voor rekrutering van de elite buiten de traditionele sociale basis 
kunnen worden gekenmerkt als democratische ‘devotee’ partij. Het laatste type partij, 
gekarakteriseerd als een ‘electorale machine’ komt het dichtst bij het catch-all model 
en kent zowel een brede electorale gerichtheid als een zeer open 
rekruteringsstructuur voor wat betreft het partij leiderschap. 
 
Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat het niet zozeer de historische kenmerken 
van een partij zijn die de overlevingskans van politieke partijen beïnvloedt, maar 
eerder hun capaciteit zich aan te passen aan veranderende omstandigheden. 
Alhoewel Kirchheimer terecht heeft gewezen op dit fenomeen veronderstelde hij 
ten onrechte dat er een lineaire ontwikkeling richting het catch-all model gaande is. 
Partijen in West Europa convergeren niet naar één partijtype met dezelfde 
ideologische, organisatorische en electorale kenmerken. Er zijn nog steeds 
substantiële verschillen in de timing, richting en snelheid van partijverandering 
tussen politieke partijen in de onderzochte landen en tussen partijen van 
uiteenlopende genetische origine. Binnen West Europese landen en partijfamilies is 




geen continue, uniforme trend in partijtransformatie gevonden, hetgeen leidt tot 
de centrale conclusie dat in de naoorlogse periode er in West Europese 
partijstelsels sprake is van een partiële transformatie richting catch-allisme en deze 
ontwikkeling in de late jaren ’70, vroege jaren ’80 tot stilstand is gekomen. 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
